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ABSTRACT
Achieving a balance between free trade, protection of public health and
environmental protection is essential to the goal of sustainable development. Trade
policies adopted by the WTO are intended to promote an efficient allocation and use
of resources that increases production and incomes. Economic growth driven by
trade creates income that can be directed inter alia to environmental and health
protection. Environmental and public health regulation, on the other hand, protect the
ecological and labour resources needed to sustain economic growth and the
expansion of trade.
The international trading system has a role to play in ensuring that its primary
objective of trade liberalisation does not come at the expense of environmental and
health concerns.
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the efforts that have been made by the WTO to
integrate environmental/health issues in the international trade system and to propose
ways of achieving greater linkage between these areas by performing both a legal
and economic analysis of the subject.
The various ways in which linkage occurs in the WTO are analysed, in particular,
through the exceptions to the most-favoured-nation standard contained in Article XX
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Agreement and Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, scientific assessments, the
acceptance of eco-labelling initiatives, the interpretation of WTO rules in the light of
rules of public international law, the incorporation of environmental principles and
overarching norms, as well as the coherence between the WTO and multilateral
environmental agreements.
The WTO's legislative arm and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) are both crucial
in providing coherence between environmental/health and free trade goals. It is
argued, however, that linkage through the legislative arm would enable WTO
members to retain more control over the WTO agreements and achieve the highest
degree of coherence between environmental/health protection and free trade goals
despite the fact that due to the high transaction costs of clarifying existing rules or
devising new ones, linkage through the interpretations given by the DSB is a less
burdensome way of filling the gaps of an incomplete contract.
Although coherence between environmental/health and free trade goals can and
should be increased, it is concluded that it would be unrealistic to expect that the
international trading system achieve a degree of linkage that is acceptable to all
WTO Members in all circumstances. In this respect, the question of whether
Members should be able to maintain WTO inconsistent measures, if compensation is
paid or if concessions are suspended or withdrawn is examined.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 2: ENVIRONMENTAL/HEALTH DISPUTES
INVOLVING ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 7
A. INTRODUCTION 7
B. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE GATT/WTO 10
I. Non-discrimination - the Rationale 10
II. Non-discrimination: Most-favoured nation and National
Treatment Standard 11
III. Quantitative Restrictions 12
IV. The Interpretation of the "Like Product" Concept 13
1.) Like Product and Non-Product Related Productions and
Process Standards 13
2.) Like Product and Product Related PPMs 17
C. ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 21
I. Relation between Article XX and other Provisions of the GATT
21
II. The Exceptions under Article XX 23
Order of Findings 23
Article XX(b): "Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or
Plant Life or Health" 24
The policy goal of protecting "human, animal or plant life
or health" 24
The necessity requirement 25
Economic analysis of the necessity requirement 32
Article XX(g): "Relating to the Conservation of
Exhaustible Natural Resources if Such Measures are
Made Effective in Conjunction with Restrictions on
Domestic Production or Consumption" 39
Policy goal of "conserving exhaustible natural resources"
39
Measures requiring Justification under Article XX(g) 42
"Relating to" and "in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption" 44
Economic analysis of the "means and ends" test used
under Article XX(g) 50
Analysis of the Chapeau of Article XX 53
"Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade" 53
b) The balancing test - a variable trade-off device 75
D. CONCLUSION 78
CHAPTER 3: WTO DISPUTES INVOLVING THE SANITARY
AND PHYTOSANITARY AGREEMENT 83
A. INTRODUCTION 83
B. ORIGINS OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 83
C. APPLICABILITY OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 85
I. In General 85
II. Application of the SPS Agreement to Measures Enacted Before
1995 91
III. Relationship between the SPS, TBT Agreement and the GATT
1994 92
D. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SPS AGREEMENT 100
I. Harmonisation 100
1.) Scope of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement 100
2.) Determining the Existence of International Standards
100
3.) Measures Conforming to International Standards 102
4.) Measures Based on International Standards Analysis
Under Article 3.1 103
5.) Analysis of Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement 110
II. Obligations under Article 2.2 111
1.) Measures Based on Scientific Principles and Not
Maintained Without Sufficient Scientific Evidence 112
a) Relationship between Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the
SPS Agreement 112
b) The relationship between risk assessment and risk
management 114
c) The interpretation of a measure "based on" a risk
assessment 120
(1) Establishing the existence of a risk assessment
120
(2) Is there a "minimum procedural requirement" in
Article 5.1? 129
(3) The substantive requirement of Article 5.1 -
rational relationship between the measure and the
risk assessment 132
(4) Does the precautionary principle override Article
5.1? 145
d) Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement as an exception to the
requirement that measures must be based on scientific
principles and sufficient scientific evidence 152
(1) The requirements of Article 5.7 153
(a) "relevant scientific information is insufficient" 153
(b) "on the basis of available pertinent information"
155
(c) "seek to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of
risk" 156
(d) "review the [SPS] measure accordingly within a
reasonable period of time" 157
(2) How effectively does Article 5.7 deal with scientific
uncertainties? 158
2.) Measures Applied Only to the Extent Necessary 163
a) Relationship between Article 2.2 and 5.6 163
b) "Measures not more trade restrictive than required" 167
Obligations under Article 2.3 178
1.) Relationship between Article 2.3 and 5.5 179
2.) Analysis under Article 5.5 181
a) Different levels of protection in different situations 181
(1) Different situations 181
(2) Different levels of protection 184
b) Arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in levels of
protection 186
c) Differences resulting in "discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade" 195
IV. Implications of the Substantive Issues 207
E. PANEL'S SELECTION AND USE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS 211
F. CONCLUSION 215
CHAPTER 4: THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS
TO TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL/HEALTH REGULATIONS
220
A. INTRODUCTION 220
B. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE TBT AGREEMENT 221
I. Technical Product Requirements 221
II. Temporal Application of the TBT Agreement 230
III. Relationship with GATT 1994 231
C. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TBT AGREEMENT 233
I. Non-discrimination 233
II. Necessity Test of the TBT Agreement 235
III. Scientific Justification and Precautionary Action 237
IV. The Use of International Standards 238
1.) "Relevant international standards" 238
2.) "Ineffective" or "inappropriate" International Standards
242
3.) Presumption of Consistency of M easures with the TBT
Agreement 244
D. CONCLUSION 245
CHAPTER 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND
MEAs: THE NEED FOR COHERENCE 250
A. INTRODUCTION 250
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND OTHER SUB¬
SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND RULES
OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 253
I. Trade Measures Taken Pursuant to an MEA 253
1.) Situation Where Both Parties to a Dispute are Both
Members of the WTO, but Only One is Party to the MEA 256
2.) Situation Where Both Parties a re M embers of a n M EA
and the WTO 257
a) Lex posterior, lex specialis 257
b) Inter se modifications 258
3.) Limitations of the Rules Concerning Conflicting Treaty
Provisions 265
II. To What Extent can the DSB Draw on Other Rules of
International Law to Interpret WTO Obligations? 267
1.) The WTO as Part of the Broader Corpus of Public
International Law 267
2.) Non-WTO Rules that are Incorporated in the WTO
Agreements 269
3.) Non-WTO Rules that are Not Incorporated in the WTO
Agreements 273
a) Rules o n t he I nterpretation of Treaties - T he 1 969 V ienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties 273
b) WTO obligations and obligations arising in MEAs 282
c) Using Article 31(3)(c) to interpretWTO provisions 286
III. The Appropriate Forum for the Settlement of Disputes 288
IV. Compulsory versus Non-compulsory Adjudication 303
C. SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE TO WTO MEMBERS IN FURTHER
INTEGRATING MEA RULES IN THE WTO 311
I. Amendment of Article XX of the GATT 1994 311
II. Establishment of a New "Understanding" on MEAs 313
III. Granting of Waivers for MEAs 315
IV. Formal Interpretations by the General Council 317
V. Encouraging Dispute Avoidance 319
VI. DSU Consultation Obligations 320
VII. CTE Involvement 322
VIII. Reference to the ICJ 323
D. CONCLUSION 326




Achieving a balance between free trade, protection of public health and
environmental protection is essential to the goal of sustainable development.' Trade
policies adopted by the WTO are intended to promote an efficient allocation and use
of resources that increases production and income. Economic growth driven by
trade2 creates income that can be directed inter alia to environmental and health
protection.3 Environmental and public health regulation, on the other hand, protect
the ecological and human resources4 needed to sustain economic growth and the
expansion of trade.5
The Brundtland Report defined sustainable development as "development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".
WCED, Our Common Future, (1987), p43. See Agenda 21 of the 1992 UNCED UN Doc.
A/CONF. 151/4 (1992); Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
Johannesburg, 26 August- 4 September (2002), UN Document, A. CONF. 199/20; 1994
Marrakesh A greement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, (in force 1 January 1 995),
Preamble (hereinafterWTO Agreement).
Trade and direct foreign investment are engines of growth as they confer large efficiency
benefits by fostering the international division of labour and by disseminating the gains from
technological progress. See J.Berdell, International Trade and Economic Growth in Open
Economics: The Classical Dynamics ofHume, Smith, Ricardo and Malthus (2002) and K.Choi,
et al, Economic Growth and International Trade (2000).
For example, empirical evidence suggests that pollution increases at the early stages of
development but decreases after a certain income level has been reached. This observation is
known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve. Empirical evidence is nonetheless mixed as the
EKC hypothesis seems to hold for local pollution problems such as urban air pollution, but not
for global pollution such as carbon dioxide emissions. E. Barbier, "Introduction to the
Environmental Kutnets Curve Special Issue", 2 Environment and Development Economics 4
(1997), pp369-381. See H. Nordstrom and S. Vaughan, "Trade and Environment", WTO Special
Studies, www.wto.org. pp47-58.
The demographical consequences of the AIDS epidemic in Africa impacts present economic
growth and could cripple future economic growth.
Agenda 21 adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 151/4 (1992), §2.19.
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The international trading system has a role to play in ensuring that its primary
objective of liberalisation of world trade does not come at the expense of
environmental and health concerns. Promoting co-ordination between these issues is
an important objective ofWTO law and policy.
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) Members have committed themselves to the
goal of sustainable development. The Preamble to the WTO Agreement states that it
aims at an optimal use of resources, while seeking to protect and preserve the
environment in a manner consistent with the respective needs and concerns of
countries at different levels of economic development. The Doha Ministerial
Declaration reaffirms the commitment to the goal of sustainable development.5
However, international trade rules contained in the WTO covered agreements and/or
interpretations of them have often been considered to show a bias in favour of
economic concerns over environmental/health regulation. This point of view has
been substantiated by the fact that in all but one dispute7 involving trade related
environmental/health measures, WTO DSB has found these regulations to be
inconsistent with the obligations contained in the covered agreements of the WTO.
However, the fact that a majority of WTO decisions have ruled against national
environmental/health measures is not sufficient to conclude that economic concerns
override environmental and health protection. Indeed, measures that are found to be
inconsistent with WTO regulations might be attempts on the part of national
governments to disguise protectionist behaviour, or to impose measures that lack
scientific basis, or that are unnecessarily restrictive in achieving a desired
environmental or health protection objective. In addition, although, the WTO has a
role in balancing environmental/health issues, this does not mean that it should open
WTO, Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 14 November 2001, WT/M1N(01)/DEC/1, §6: "We
strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable development, as stated in the
Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement. We are convinced that the aims of upholding and
safeguarding an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the
protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be
mutually supportive.
See European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products,
Appellate Body Report, 12 March 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R discussed in Chapter 2.
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the door for protectionist measures aimed at restricting trade rather than protecting
the environment or health.
However, it is undeniable that the WTO is primarily focused on trade and not on the
environment or health issues. This can be understood when considering the origins of
the GATT, which was established after a long period of international conflict and
economic crisis. The Bretton Woods system, which GATT was part of, was largely
built on the neo-classical economic theory that did not afford much attention to
environmental concerns. The theory assumes that the market maximises social
welfare and generally produces socially desirable levels of consumption of natural
resources.
Free trade is an optimal policy choice when the market is successful.8 Indeed, when
market prices reflect "true" social costs, then Adam Smith's9 invisible hand can be
trusted to guide us to an efficient allocation of resources and free trade is optimal
way to choose trade (and associated domestic production).10 However, if the market
fails,11 then the invisible hand may point in the wrong direction: free trade cannot
then be asserted to be the best policy,12 as in this case free trade immiserises.
Therefore, where externalities are present, government intervention is needed to
correct these distortions.
A market is successful when a set of competitive markets generates an efficient allocation of
resources between and within economies.
Adam Smith invented the case for free trade in The Wealth ofNations. A. Smith, An Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth ofNations. (1776) E. Cannon (ed.), London (1904).
10 J. Bhagwati, "Free Trade: What Now?", Keynote Address delivered at the University of St.
Gallen, Switzerland, International Management Symposium, 25 May 1998.
11 Market forces of supply and demand do not provide an optimal outcome for society as a whole.
Market failures occur due to monopoly power, asymmetry of information, government
distortions, barriers to public participation, barriers to collective organisation, incomplete
markets due to lack of property rights, the free-rider problem with public goods, when producers
and consumers do not have to bear the full cost of their actions. See N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren, B.
White, Environmental Economics - In theory and practice, (1997), pp22-57. R.W. Broadway
and N. Brace, Welfare Economics, (1984), pp 103-129.
12 See N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren, B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theory and Practice,
(1997), pp22-57. R.W. Broadway and N. Brace, Welfare Economics, (1984), ppl03-129.
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Trade related environmental/health measures are considered only as second-best
policies in protecting environmental/health concerns where trade itself is not the
cause of environmental degradation or the health problem, as they can only partially
correct market failures. Therefore, ideally, environmental/health problems should be
corrected by proper environmental/health policies that correct the problem at the
source. If market failures are corrected through suitable policy intervention, then free
trade can again lead to the best gains from trade. If the environmental problem or
health problem is caused or exacerbated by trade, such as is the case with trade in
endangered species, transport of hazardous waste, or the spread of disease through
trade then trade related environmental or health measures are considered as suitable
from an economic perspective.
However, even if trade is not the cause of an environmental or health problem, there
are political obstacles to sound environmental policy and there can be no doubt that
trade related environmental/health measures are persuasive instruments i n exerting
power internationally in order to protect the environment and health where optimal
environmental/health policies are not agreed upon. Game theory teaches that there
are strong incentives for countries to free-ride on efforts to co-operate on
environmental/health issues and that even where agreement is reached, agreement
may not be stable.13 Indeed, when a good is "non-excludable" the free rider problem
and the associated prisoner's dilemma occur as market participants act to maximise
their own interest. These actions usually do not result in a Pareto optimal outcome
for society as a whole.14
In addition, economic efficiency is only an approximate measure of total utility and
total utility is only a very partial description of what people value. This suggests that
even if a policy is economically efficient, it does not necessarily follow that we
should be in favour of it.
Prisoner's Dilemma results in non-cooperative outcome. See H. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of
Property Rights", American Economic Review (1967). See also S. Barrett, "International
Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfman and N.S. Dorfman (eds.), Economics
ofthe Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), pp446-448. See Chapter 2.
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As long as "optimal" policies are not in place, trade related environmental/health
measures will remain a reality. Although, these measures are second-best policies
where the environmental/health problem is not a direct consequence of trade, they
can be welfare improving. Indeed, by imposing a second distortion, these measures
to some extent correct the inefficiencies of the initial distortion that caused the
market to fail.15 In other words, trade related environmental/health measures can lead
to an outcome that is more efficient than if the market failure were not corrected at
all.
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the efforts that have been made by the WTO to
promote co-ordination between free trade and environmental/health issues and to
propose ways to increase co-ordination, over and above what the international
trading system provides for. The treatment of these issues can be critical both to the
economic prosperity and to the environment, health and life of populations of
countries and it is, therefore, imperative that a predictable and balanced approach be
promoted.
The numerous ways in which linkage can occur in the international trade system are
examined. In particular, linkage occurring through the exceptions to the
unconditional MFN standard, a standard that serves to prohibit the linking of trade to
external issues.16 Both a legal analysis and an economic analysis of the rules
contained in the GATT 1994, SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement as well as the
interpretations given to these rules will be performed. Attention will also be given to
linkage through the interpretation of WTO rules in the light of rules of public
international law, the incorporation of environmental principles or norms into the
trade agreement such as the precautionary principle as well as the incorporation of
new overarching norms such as sustainable development, and through increased
14 R.W. Broadway and N. Bruce, Welfare Economics, (1984), pl30. See Chapter 2.
15 On the theory of the "second best", see J.E. Meade, "External Economies and Diseconomies in a
Competitive Situation", Economic Journal (1952), pp54-67, R.W. Broadway and N. Bruce,
Welfare Economics, (1984), pp 103-136. See also R.G. Harris, The General Theory ofthe Second
Best after Twenty-Five Years, (1981).
16 D.W. Leebron, "Linkages", 96 AJ1L 5 (2002), pi 8.
5
coherence between WTO and multilateral environmental agreements. In addition,
linkage through the WTO legislative arm, for example, through the amendment of
rules or authoritative interpretations by WTO Members and through the WTO's




ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT
A. INTRODUCTION
Trade-related environmental/health measures usually decrease the economic benefits
from international trade by causing trade diversion costs. WTO Members imposing
these measures generally aim to maximise their domestic welfare not world welfare.1
Since maximising domestic welfare does not always lead to world welfare
maximisation, measures can be sub-optimal from a world welfare perspective.
Indeed, countries calculating the efficiency of trade-related environmental/health
measures from a domestic perspective do not usually take into account the effect of
such measures on exporting countries.2 Trade-related environmental/health measures
tend to maximise domestic environmental benefits, minimise domestic trade
diversion costs and administrative costs. Using domestic welfare maximisation
criteria, it would theoretically be possible that most or all of the environmental/health
benefits are enjoyed by the country imposing this kind of measure and that most or
all of the trade diversion costs are borne by exporting countries.
It could be argued, however, as Coase suggests, that the incentive to externalise the
costs of trade-related environmental/health measures to exporters does not
necessarily mean that the use of these measures will be sub-optimal in terms ofworld
K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and




welfare maximisation, if the importing country and exporting country or countries
bargain. If the net costs of a trade-related environmental/health measure incurred by
the exporting countries are greater than the net benefits of this measure to the
importing country, then the exporting countries have an incentive to pay the
importing country to remove its measure, an amount that does not exceed the
difference between the net costs to the exporting countries and the net benefit to the
importing country.3
However, this type of bargaining would probably only be successful if the exporting
countries co-operate with each other as the net costs of a trade-related
environmental/health measure to individual exporting countries may be less than the
net benefits of the importing country, especially where net costs are evenly spread
over exporting countries.4 Therefore, the chances of bargaining decrease as the
number of exporting countries incurring net costs increases.5
However, even if only one exporting country would be involved in the bargaining
process, there may also be a problem in reaching a bargain due to asymmetric
information over the net benefits that the importing country enjoys.6 Indeed, if an
exporting countries would agree to pay an amount that does not exceed the net
benefits to importing country in order to have the trade-related environmental/health
measure removed, but erroneously estimates the net benefits and makes an offer on
this basis, then agreement may not be reached with the importing country. Indeed, an
exporting country will have a tendency to underestimate the nets benefits, since to
R. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 Journal of Law and Economics 1 (1960). K. Saito,
"Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and the
Appellate B ody Reports Regarding E nvironment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001), Part 3 ,
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
Ibidem.
See R. Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton, (1992), pp218-24 on
bargaining with finite horizon and asymmetric information. See also K. Saito, "Yardsticks for
"Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body
Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001), Part 3,
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
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overestimate them would imply that their welfare and possibly world welfare would
be reduced even further. However, it is extremely unlikely that the importing country
would accept less than the value of the domestic net benefits of the measure.
Finally, an another obstacle to bargaining is that the exporting countries suffering net
costs as a result of the trade-related environmental/health measure may doubt
whether the measure is in fact consistent with WTO commitments and would,
therefore, prefer to bring a case to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), to
determine the allocation of property rights.7
The fact that bargaining may not be successful implies that there is a need for a fair
trade-off mechanism8 that will determine the appropriateness of trade-related
environmental/health measures.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the GATT as a trade-off device. The
analysis examines the cornerstone principle of non-discrimination that is found in
two forms in the GATT 1 994, the most-favoured-nation standard and the national
treatment standard, and also evaluates Article XX of the GATT 1994, which
constitutes a conditional exception to most other substantive obligations of the
GATT 1994 for the use of trade-related environmental/health measures. In order to
evaluate t hese p revisions as t rade-off d evices, i t i s e ssential t o examine t he W TO
panel and Appellate Body decisions that have interpreted these provisions with
respect to trade-related environmental/health measures. The analysis will determine
how WTO practice has evolved and will consider whether and what changes should
be made to the WTO system to increase linkage between trade and
environmental/health issues.
K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and
the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001), Part
3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.. See also J.P. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute
Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), pp354-355.
See J. P. T rachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 4 0 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999),
pp354-355.
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B. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE GATT
I. Non-discrimination - The Rationale
GATT 1994 aims for the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in order to
liberalise trade. A major tool in liberalising trade is the principle of non¬
discrimination.
The normative economic analysis of trade discrimination is based on welfare
economics and suggests that discriminatory policies produce greater deadweight
losses9 than non-discriminatory policies.10
Indeed, trade discrimination produces "trade diversion" by preventing those nations
that have a comparative advantage11 over less efficient nations from trading their
goods. This also implies that countries do not satisfy their import needs from the
most efficient sources of supply.12
As WTO officials have stated, non-discrimination is the basis of secure and
predictable market access and undistorted competition: it guarantees consumer
choice and it gives producers access to the full range ofmarket opportunities.13
In addition, non-discrimination rules spread security by guarding against
protectionism and market fragmentation caused by unjustifiable distinctions between
products and their source of origin.14 This promotes multilateral co-operation,
A deadweight loss is a reduction in net economic benefits resulting from an inefficient allocation
of resources.
10 See A.O. Sykes, "Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade
Policy", 1 JIEL (1998).
11 See Chapter 1.
12 J. Jackson, W. Davey, A. Sykes, Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations -
Cases, Materials and Text, 3rd ed., (1995), p436.
13 Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Briefing Notes: Trade and the Environment Committee and Doha
preparations, http://www.wto.org/english/thevvto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/briefl l_e.htm
14 OECD, COM/TD/ENV(92)92, Restricted 6 Nov. 1992.
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achieves the sovereign equality of nations and prevents an undue use of economic
power in international economic negotiations thereby reducing international tensions.
As mentioned above, the principle of non-discrimination is found in two forms in the
GATT 1994: the most-favoured-nation standard and the national treatment standard,
both ofwhich will be analysed in the next section.
II. Non-discrimination: Most-favoured-nation and National
Treatment Standard
Article I of the GATT 1994 includes a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause which
provides that whenever a nation extends a trade "advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity" to another nation, in respect of "like products", it is to immediately and
unconditionally extend that advantage to all other trading partners. This MFN
obligation expressly applies to customs duties and charges related to imports and
exports; the method of levying such duties and charges; all rules and formalities
connected with importation and exportation; internal taxes and other charges, internal
laws and regulations affecting the internal sale of imported goods, their offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.15
Article III of the GATT 1994 includes a national treatment clause that requires that
imports from any WTO Member should not be treated less favourably, with respect
to internal taxes and other internal charges, laws, regulations and requirements, than
domestically produced "like products" and that the measures covered by the article
should not be applied either to domestic or imported products so as to "afford
protection to domestic production".16
15 Article 1:1, 111:2,4.
16 Article 111:1.
1 1
The measures covered by Article 111:1 also apply even if they are enforced against
imports at the time or point of importation of the importing country.17
Under Article 111:2 which applies to taxes states that imported products "shall not be
subject, directly or indirectly to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products".
Article 111:4, which applies to regulations, requires that imported products receive
treatment "no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use". The article also prohibits domestic
content requirements and provides that contracting parties may not otherwise apply
internal quantitative regulations so as to protect domestic production.18
III. Quantitative Restrictions
The GATT 1994, apart from including provisions on non-discrimination, also guards
against quantitative restrictions on imported and exported products, reflecting its
underlying objective ofmaintaining the free flow of goods between parties.
Article XI provides that "no prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or
other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or
other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the
importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the
17 Article III, Note Ad: "Any internal tax or other internal charge, or any law, regulation or
requirement of the kind referred to in [Article 111:1] which applies to an imported product and
the like domestic product and is collected or enforced in the case of the imported product at the
time or point of importation, is nevertheless to be regarded as an internal tax or other internal
charge, or a law, regulation or requirement of the kind referred to in [Article 111:1], and is
accordingly subject to the provisions of Article III".
18 Article 111:5.
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exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other
contracting party".19
Unlike Article I and III, Article XI does not relate to "like products" but to all
products. It should be noted, though, that trade-related environmental/health
measures that are consistent with the non-discrimination requirements are not subject
to the otherwise applicable obligation contained in Article XI.
In the next section, consideration will be given to the interpretation of "like product"
as the GATT's non-discrimination rules are inextricably linked to the concept of "like
product".
IV. The Interpretation of the "Like Product" Concept
1.) Like Product and Non-Product Related Production and Process
Standards
Article I and III of the GATT depend on the meaning given to "like product". If
products are deemed to be like, then taxing or regulating them differently is
discrimination implying an inconsistency with Article I and/or III.
"Like product" is not a "technical phrase in economics" and has no independent
meaning in economic theory.20 As Berg notes: "in trade law, its meaning is linked to
the imported product to which its likeliness applies."21
19 Article XI: 1. Under Article XI:2 deviations from this rule are allowed for the relief of critical
shortages and surpluses, the application of classification, grading, or marketing standards to
internationally marketed commodities
20 G.C. Berg, "An Economic Interpretation of "Like Product"", 30 JWT2 (1996), pp 195-196.
21 Ibidem, pi96.
13
"Like product" is a variable concept.22 Indeed, "like product" has been described as
an accordion that "stretches and squeezes in different places as different provisions
of the WTO agreement are applied".23 "Like product" is not defined in either Article
I or III. The drafters of the GATT did not explicitly exclude non-product-related
production and process methods (PPMs), which suggests that these PPMs could
differentiate between products under Article I and III.24 Therefore, discrimination
against imports that are physically similar to domestic products but that have
different production processes, that is how products are produced, constructed,
gathered, grown or caught, could be permitted.25
In a 1970 Working Party Report it was stated that: "the end-uses in a given market;
consumers' tastes and habits, which change from country to country; the product's
properties, nature and quality"26 all can be considered when determining whether two
products are "like" for GATT purposes.27 Criteria such as "consumers' tastes and
habits", and the product's "nature", strongly suggest that the way in which a product
is made can be important in determining whether the good is a "like product". If
consumers have a preference for environmentally caught shrimps then shrimps
caught with TEDs would be an unlike product. However, the factors contained in the
1970 Border Tax Adjustments Report can only "assist in the task of sorting and
examining the relevant evidence. They are neither a treaty-mandated nor a closed list
of criteria..."28
22 S. Charnovitz, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade: Defogging the Debate", 27 Cornell ILJ,
(1994), p477.
23 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, 4 October 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, p20.
24 See R. Howse and D. Regan, "The Product/Process Distinction - An Illusory Basis for
Disciplining "Unilateralism" in Trade Policy", 11 EJIL (2000), p249.
25 D. Esty, Greening the GATT, (1994), p51.
26 The Asbestos Appellate Body found that the Panel erred when it considered that products that
have the same end-use also have equivalent properties. Appellate Body Report, §111.
27 Report of the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, adopted on 2 December 1970, BISD
18S/97, 102.
28 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §101. The Asbestos Appellate Body found that the Panel had
erred when it focused only on the first of the four factors.
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This issue was unfortunately not clarified in the United States - Import Prohibitions
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products20 (hereinafter Shrimps) case, where the US
imposed an import ban upon importation of certain shrimp and shrimpproducts30
aimed at reducing the incidental capture and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp
trawlers. Indeed, the US did not argue that shrimps caught with sea turtles were
unlike shrimps caught with environmentally friendly techniques and the Appellate
Body did not deal with the issue of consistency of the measure with the non¬
discrimination standards as it made a finding under Article XI. The fact that the
Appellate Body did not examine this issue implies that it cannot be excluded that
future WTO panels and the Appellate Body could differentiate between products on
the basis o f their non-product related PPMs.
The question that arises is whether the regulation of non-product related PPMs
should be authorised.
The regulation of non-product related PPMs enables parties to resort to import
restrictions to compensate for any differences existing between their own
environmental/health policies and those of third countries would have a detrimental
impact on trade. Subjecting imports to non-product-related PPM standards or
regulations could undermine the concept of comparative advantage as the way in
which products are made have an influence on production costs. The exporting
country would incur higher costs and would, therefore, be less competitive than
before.31 In addition, environmental damage caused by non-product-related PPMs is
not transmitted by the product itself and, therefore, it is far more likely that the
production externalities are felt in the producing country rather than in the importing
29 United States - Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel Report, 15
May 1998, WT/DS58/R and Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.
30 The import ban was imposed pursuant to Section 609 of the US Public Law 101-162. See
Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.3.
31 Nevertheless, there is at least one case under Article XX where GATT/WTO authorises trade
restrictions for reasons relating to the manner in which goods are produced: the prison labour
exception of Article XX(e).
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country that consumes the product. Therefore, the externality occurs regardless of
whether or not the goods are traded.
On t he o ther h and, i t c an a lso b e a rgued t hat t he WTO e nables a c ountry tog ain
competitive advantage through low non-product-related PPM standards. This
advantage could be treated as an industrial subsidy and subject to trade rules on
countervailing measures. However, this would lead to a proliferation of disputes on
the appropriateness of national environmental regulations that may not be desirable
either for trade or the environment.
In addition, non-product-related PPMs tend to represent the different values and
preferences of countries. Therefore, non-product PPMs are not necessarily politically
feasible because they interfere with a country's sovereign right to develop its own
policies within its jurisdiction. Imposing non-product-related PPM standards extra-
jurisdictionally on trading partners could potentially undermine the balance of rights
and obligations of countries under the WTO agreements.
Non-product-related PPMs also vary greatly from one country to another depending
on differences in assimilative or absorptive capacities and in national endowments.
In other words, what might be a suitable environmental regulation for one country
may not be for another. However, this argument also has its limits. A country may
have an environment that has greater assimilative capacities than another, however,
this may not always be the case in the absence of environmental regulation.
Therefore, relying on greater absorptive capacities may be short-sighted. In addition,
nothing proves that, for example, pollution only affects the country with the greater
assimilative capacities due to the often transboundary effects of pollutive activities.
Therefore, due to the ecological interdependence of the world it is necessary to
regulate non-product-related PPMs as the environmental consequences of non-
product-related PPMs encompass for example transboundary pollution, loss of
migratory species, depletion of the ozone layer and climate change.
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With the increased interest for the concept of sustainable development,
environmentalists have argued that the way in which a product is produced is an
essential part of its characteristics as it is very often the production as opposed to the
finished product that is harmful to the environment. The artificial distinction between
product-related PPMs and non-product-related PPMs does not take into account that
the production of a product could be more environmentally damaging than the
consumption of that product. An example of this is when chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) are used during the production process. Although CFCs are being released
into the atmosphere causing ozone layer depletion, no trace of CFCs can be detected
in the product that is for sale. Equally, shrimps may be caught in such a way that
turtles are killed but dead turtles are not part of the shrimps that are sold on the
market.
In order to increase linkage between trade and environmental/health issues the
position with respect to non-product related PPMs should be reviewed, although the
Shrimps case has developed a limited way of including non-product related PPMs
under Article XX.32 However, if the spectrum of like products under Article 2.1 of
the TBI Agreement mirrors that of Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994, and if the TBT
Agreement regulates non-product related PPMs, these PPMs would have to be
considered as a factor in distinguishing between products as the TBT Agreement
does not contain an exemption from non-discrimination requirements as will be
examined in more detail in Chapter 4.33
2.) Like Product and Product Related PPMs
The WTO DSB has recognised that goods can be differentiated on the basis of
product-related PPMs. This is not surprising as product-related PPMs are part of the
product and are, therefore, likely to cause or threaten to cause environmental damage
32 S. Charnovitz, "The Law of Environmental "PPMs" in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of
Illegality", 27 Yale JIL (2002), p63. See also M. Matsushita, T.J. Schoenbaum and P.C.
Mavroidis, The World Trade Organisation - Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford, (2003).
33 See Chapter 4.
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in the importing country where the product is consumed and disposed of. Therefore,
importing countries could demand that, for example, goods be biodegradable,
packaging be recycled or cars be equipped with catalytic converters.34
In the European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products case (hereinafter Asbestos case)35, which concerned a French
decree36 that prohibited the manufacture, sale, export and import and use of asbestos
fibres, in order to protect the public from health risks associated with asbestos and
asbestos containing products, demonstrated that health factors could be taken into
account in determining whether products are not "like".
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the French decree violated
Article 111:4 since chrysotile asbestos and the other products37 were like products.
The Appellate Body held that health risks were relevant in evaluating whether
products are like products and that the evidence showed that chrysotile asbestos was
more toxic than the substitute products.
The Appellate Body found that the presence of asbestos in a product did imply that
the physical properties of this product were different and that "evidence relating to
the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of
'likeness'".38
The Appellate Body's decision i s a welcome development from an environmental
perspective. Although, the measure could be justified under Article XX, this finding
is particularly significant in the context of the TBT Agreement because as was noted
in section B.1V.2. there is no exception to the non-discrimination requirements.39
34 C. Stevens, "Trade and the Environment: The PPMs Debate", in Sustainable Development and
International Law, (ed.) W. Lang, (1995) at p 15.
35 WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 5 April 2001.
36 No. 96-1133. Entered into force on 1 January 1997.
37 Such as polyvinyl alcohol, cellulose and glass fibres.
38 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, § 113 and 114.
39 See Chapter 4.
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The interpretation ofArticle 111:4 "implies a less frequent recourse to Article XX(b)"
but "does not deprive the exception in Article XX(b) of effet utile."40 Indeed, a
measure t hat a ims top rotect h ealth from risks t hat a re n ot p roduct-related, w ould
possibly not be found consistent with the non-discrimination requirements and
would, therefore, need to be justified under Article XX.
The Asbestos Appellate Body examined the term "like products" by looking at the
term in the context of Article III as a whole41 and noted that the principle expressed
in Article 111:1 that protectionism should be avoided by ensuring the equality of
competitive positions was relevant to both provisions.42 Therefore, the Appellate
Body found that determining whether two products were "like products" under
Article 111:4 is, "fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a
competitive relationship between and among products."43
As Trachtman points out, however, the focus on competitive relationships would
normally suggest that regulation is not desirable "as regulation is necessarily an
intervention into the ordinary competitive relations in the market; that is, the
economic theory of regulation suggests that the reason to have regulation of products
containing asbestos is because the market itself would not ordinarily differentiate
sufficiently between p roducts t hat c ontain a sbestos a nd t hose t hat d o n ot. T hat i s,
regulation is usually needed where consumers do not distinguish between safe and
unsafe products, and therefore safety is not usually a marketplace factor in cases
where there is a need for regulation."44
40 Ibidem, § 115.
41 The Appellate Body considered that the meaning of "like product" is different in Article 111:4
than in Article 111:2 and that the scope of "like products" under Article 111:4 was broader than in
Article 111:2. Appellate Body Report, §96.
42 See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §97, quoting Japan - Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate
Body Reports, 4 October 1996, WT/DS8, 10, 11/AB/R. See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization - European Communities-Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products", http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p3.
43 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §99.
44 See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization -
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products"
http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p3.
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The Asbestos Appellate Body possibly realised that this interpretation would impart
an overly broad scope for Article 111:4 and, therefore, also stated that under Article
111:4:
"A complaining Member must still establish that the measure accords to the
group of'like' imported products 'less favourable treatment' than it accords to
the group of 'like' domestic products. The term 'less favourable treatment'
expresses the general principle, in Article III:J, that internal regulations
'should not be applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic
production. "'45
In other words, like products must be treated differently and foreign like products as
a group must be treated differently from, and less favourably than, domestic like
products in order for there to be a violation of Article 111:4. Therefore, the focus in
determining whether there is a violation in Article 111:4 is whether it is the fact that
products are foreign that leads to different treatment.46 The test would not require
discriminatory intent but only a finding of differential outcomes in order to
determine the inconsistency of a measure with the non-discrimination
requirements.47 From an environmental perspective, however, an examination of the
discriminatory intent would be preferable, as this would increase the chances of
compliance with the non-discrimination requirements.
The next section will focus on the exception to the non-discrimination and
quantitative restrictions contained in Article XX of the GATT 1994.
45 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, § 100.
46 See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization -
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products",
http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p3.
47 In the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case, the Appellate Body stated that "the broad and
fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application of international
tax and regulatory measures" and that "it does not matter that there may not have been any
desire to engage in protectionism in the minds of the legislators or the regulators who imposed
the measure. It is irrelevant that protectionism was not an intended objective if the particular tax
measure in question is nevertheless, to echo Article 111:1, applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production. This is an issue of how the measure
in question is applied." WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, 1 November 1996,
ppl6 and 28.
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C. ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT 1994
I. Relation between Article XX and other Provisions of GATT 199448
Article XX is a limited and conditional exception from most other obligations of the
GATT 199449 including the non-discrimination standards and the prohibition on
quantitative restrictions obligation discussed in the previous sections. As opposed to
the positive obligations of the GATT, Article XX does not establish obligations in
itself.50 Therefore, Article XX is only examined by the panels if it has expressly been
invoked by a party to the dispute.51
Article XX provides that "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures"52 that are
"necessary" for the protection of "human, animal or plant life or health"53 or that
relate "to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption".54
48 For discussion on the relationship between Article XX and the SPS Agreement refer to Chapter
3, section C.III. For discussion on the relationship between Article XX and the TBT Agreement
refer to Chapter 4, section B.III.
49 See for example United States - Import Prohibition ofCertain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, §165.
50 United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, adopted on 7 November 1989, B1SD
36S/345, §5.9 and Tuna-Dolphin I, §5.22.
51 United States - Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, adopted on 13 March 1984, BISD 31S/67,
§4.4 states that: "the United States had not invoked any of the exceptions provided for in the
General Agreement permitting discriminatory quantitative restrictions contrary to Article XIII.
The Panel therefore did not examine whether the reduction in Nicaragua's quota could be
justified under any such provision". See also EEC - Regulation on Imports of Parts and
Components, adopted on 16 may 1990, BISD 37S/132, §5.11.




In the United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline55
Appellate Body Report (hereinafter Gasoline Appellate Body) it was stated that:
"the exceptions listed in ArticleXX ... relate to all of the obligations under the
General Agreement: the national treatment obligation and the most-favoured-
nation obligation, of course, but others as well. Effect is more easily given to
the words "nothing in this Agreement", and Article XX as a whole including
its chcipeau more easily integrated into the remainder of the General
Agreement, if the chapeau is taken to mean that the standards it sets forth are
applicable to all of the situations in which an allegation of a violation of a
substantive obligation has been made and one of the exceptions contained in
Article XXhas in turn been claimed".56
However, in the Asbestos case, both the Panel and Appellate Body found that Article
XXIII: 1(b) which refers to nullification or impairment does not only apply to
measures that do not otherwise fall under the provisions of GATT 1994.57 The
Appellate Body held that a claim under Article XXIII: 1(b) could under exceptional
circumstances succeed despite the fact that a measure does not otherwise conflict
with other GATT obligations.58 Therefore, the value of Article XX is considerably
reduced.59
55 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Appellate Body Report,
adopted 29 April 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R.
56 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p24.
57 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.255 and Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §185.
58 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §187. "Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow
and only exceptionally would expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those
rules." Quoting Japan - Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, Panel
Report, 22 April 1998, WT/DS44/R, §10.36. See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization - European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products", http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p5.
59 See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization -
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products",
http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p6.
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II. The Exceptions under Article XX
1.) Order of Findings
The first WTO panel to address an environmental issue under Article XX of the
GATT 1994, the Gasoline Panel, made findings under the particular exception
contained in Article XX(g) before considering whether the measure was compatible
with the preamble of Article XX. However, in the Shrimps case, the Panel first
examined whether the measures complied with the chapeau ofArticle XX.
The Appellate Body in the Shrimps case60, unlike the Panel, felt that it was essential
to first consider under which particular exception the measure would have to be
justified and if it did comply with the requirements of the particular exception. The
reason was that the Appellate Body believed that the standards set by the chapeau of
Article XX vary with the type of measures under examination. The Appellate Body
stated that the standard applied to protect public morals may be different from the
standard relating to the products of prison labour.61
The interpretation of the Appellate Body is not convincing especially if one
considers that no explanation was given for the fact that a different standard should
apply to different exceptions contained in Article XX.62 Although, different factors
will be taken into account in determining the compatibility of different measures
with the chapeau of Article XX, this does not mean that the standard of, for example,
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination should vary with the type of measure under
consideration. Although, it could be argued that different public policy goals are not
all equally important, the task of the DSB is to base its interpretation on the text of
the agreement, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.63 The fact that the
60 United States - Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body
Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.
61 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §127.
62 Ibidem.
63 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(1). See Chapter 5, section B.II.3.
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Appellate Body second-guesses what the WTO Members consider to be an important
public policy objective does not seem appropriate.
However, the Shrimps Appellate Body correctly recognised that it was appropriate to
first determine whether an exception is available before determining whether the
measure is consistent with the exception. On the basis of this decision, the Article
XX(b) and (g) will be examined first.
2.) Article XX(b): "Necessary to Protect Human, Animal or Plant Life or
Health"
a) The policy goal of protecting "human, animal or plant life or
health"
In order for a measure to meet the requirements contained in paragraph (b), a WTO
Member imposing a trade-related environmental/health measure must demonstrate
that the policy in respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked falls
within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
that the inconsistent measures for which the exception was being invoked were
necessary to fulfil the policy objective; and that the measures were applied in
conformity with the requirements of the chapeciu of Article XX.
In the Gasoline and Asbestos cases, the measures were recognised as falling within
the scope of the policy objectives of Article XX(b). The Gasoline Panel considered
that "the policy to reduce air pollution resulting from the consumption of gasoline
was a policy within the range of those concerning the protection of human, animal
and plant life or health",64 and the Asbestos Panel and Appellate Body found that the
Decree banning asbestos and asbestos containing products, protects human life or
health within the meaning ofArticle XX(b) ofGATT 1994.
64 Gasoline, Panel Report, §6.22.
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Once it has been determined that a measure is included in the language of Article
XX(b), the necessity of the measure must be ascertained. In the next section, the
concept of necessity in international law will be examined as well as the
interpretation of necessity given by the WTO DSB.
b) The necessity requirement
The concept of necessity is a universal concept in law that "provides a very
exceptional excuse to avoid the ensuing of legal consequences normally following
certain acts".65
The concept of necessity is crystallised in the state of necessity that has been
included by the ILC in Article 33 of the Draft Articles as follows:
"1. A state of necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for
precluding the wrongfulness ofan act of that State not in conformity with an
international obligation of the State unless: (a) the act was the only means of
safeguarding an essential interest of the State against a grave and imminent
peril; and (b) the act did not seriously impair an essential interest of the State
towards which the obligation existed.
2. In any case, a state ofnecessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground
for precluding wrongfulness: (a) if the international obligation with which the
act of the State is not in conformity arises out of a peremptory norm of
general international law; or (b) if the international obligation with which the
act of the State is not in conformity is laid down by a treaty which, explicitly
or implicitly, excludes the possibility of invoking the state of necessity w ith
respect to that obligation; or (c) if the State in question has contributed to the
occurrence ofthe state ofnecessity "66
The ILC in its Commentary to Article 33 defined the state of necessity as "the
situation of a State whose sole means of safeguarding an essential interest threatened
by grave and imminent peril is to adopt conduct not in conformity with what is
J. Barboza, "Necessity Revisted in International Law", in Essays in Internationa1 Law in Honour
ofJudge Manfred Lachs (1984), p27. See M. Montini, "The Necessity Principle as an Instrument
of Balance", in F. Francioni (ed.), Environment, Human Rights & International Trade, (2001).
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II, Part 2, (1980), p34.
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required by an international obligation to another State".67 This decision considered
the protection of the environment as 'essential interests of the State' as provided for in
Article 33.
The formulation of the ILC was endorsed in the Gcibcikovo-Ncigymaros Dam case:
"In the present case, the following basic conditions set forth in Draft Article
33 are relevant: it must have been occasioned by an 'essential interest' of the
State which is the author of the act conflicting with one of its international
obligations; that interest must have been threatened by a 'grave and imminent
peril; the act being challenged must have been the 'only means' of
safeguarding that interest; that act must not have 'seriously impair[ed] an
essential interest' of the State towards which the obligation existed; and the
state which is the author of that act must not have 'contributed to the
occurrence of the state of necessity'. Those conditions reflect customary
international law".6S
Therefore, a state of necessity can only be invoked if a measure that does not
conform to an obligation under international law is the only means available to avoid
grave and imminent peril. Presumably, this measure should only be imposed for as
long as necessary to achieve the prevention of grave and imminent peril.
The interpretation of necessity in the WTO context differs as the measure must not
be indispensable and a grave and imminent peril must not be demonstrated. This is
appropriate as the WTO does not deal with sinking oil tankers or use of force.
Article XX(b) of GATT 1994 was examined in the Gasoline case.69 The dispute
involved the "Regulation of Fuels and Fuels Additives: Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline"70 whereby US refiners, blenders and importers of
gasoline could only sell reformulated gasoline in the most polluted parts of the US.
67 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, II, Part 2, (1980), p34, §1.
68 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, ICJ Rep. (1997), p7.
69 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 20 May 1996,
WT/DS2/R.
70 Adopted by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the 15 December 1993,
pursuant to the 1990 Congressional amendment to the Clean Air Act.
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In the rest of the US, only gasoline that was no dirtier than that sold in the base year
of 1990 could be sold. US refiners were to establish an individual refinery baseline
determined by their gasoline's composition in 1990. The 1993 Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulations permitted US refiners to establish their
baseline using actual data or several other methodologies for reconstructing their fuel
consumption. The EPA also established a statutory baseline, intended to reflect the
average US 1990 gasoline quality, which importers of gasoline were to use.
Venezuela and Brazil protested as they felt that the new regulations accorded less
favourable treatment to importers, since importers were subject to the statutory
baseline while domestic refiners were granted an individual baseline, implying that
the measure was inconsistent with Article III of the GATT.
The US argued that the differences in the baselines applying to domestic refiners and
to importers was due to the EPA's anticipation that concerns over the availability of
foreign data and difficulty in legal enforcement prevented importers from using
individual baselines.
The Panel stated that in this case:
"it was not its task to examine generally the desirability or necessity of the
environmental objective of the Clean Air Act or the Gasoline Rule. Its
examination was confined to those aspects of the Gasoline Rule that had been
raised by the complainants under specific provisions of the General
Agreement. Under the General Agreement, WTO Members werefree to set
their own environmental objectives, but they were bound to implement these
objectives through measures consistent with its provisions, notably those on
the relative treatment ofdomestic and importedproducts".71
The Panel highlighted the fact that WTO Members are free to set their own
environmental objectives, but that the objectives had to be achieved in a way that
does not unfairly discriminate against an exporting country. The Panel's
Gasoline, Panel Report, §7.1.
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interpretation, therefore, leaves WTO Members a certain degree of autonomy in
pursuing environmental protection objectives.
The Panel noted "that it was not the necessity of the policy goal that was to be
examined, but whether or not it was necessary that imported gasoline be effectively
prevented from benefiting from favourable sales conditions that were afforded by an
individual baseline tied to the producer of the product. It was the task of the Panel to
address whether these inconsistent measures were necessary to achieve the policy
goal under Article XX(b)".72
The Panel examined whether there were consistent or less inconsistent measures
reasonably available to the US to pursue its policy objectives, whereby imported
gasoline would be afforded as favourable sales conditions as domestic gasoline:
"the Panel did not consider that the manner in which imported gasoline was
effectively preventedfrom benefitingfrom favourable sales conditions as were
afforded to domestic gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of
a product was necessary to achieve the stated goals of the Gasoline Rule. In
the view of the Panel, baseline establishment methods could be applied to
entities dealing in imported gasoline in a way that granted treatment to
imported gasoline that was consistent or less inconsistent with the General
Agreement73
The Panel concluded that the US "had failed to demonstrate the necessity of the
Gasoline Rule's inconsistency with Article 111:4" in this case.
The Gasoline Panel considered whether the precise aspects of the Gasoline Rule that
it found to violate Article III, namely the less favourable baseline establishment
methods that put importers at a disadvantage were "necessary".
However, there is a flaw in the argument of the Panel as it considered that the "less
favourable treatment" of imported gasoline had to be "necessary" rather than the
72 Gasoline, Panel Report, §6.22.
72 Ibidem, §6.25.
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measure i.e. the baseline establishment rules. The Panel was wrong in referring to its
legal conclusion on Article 111:4 instead of the measure at issue. The Panel, obviously
had to find that the measure provided "less favourable treatment" under Article 111:4
before the Panel examined Article XX. The chapeau of Article XX makes it clear
that it is the measures which should be looked at under Article XX(b) and not the
legal finding of "less favourable treatment".
In the Gasoline case, a measure was considered to be necessary if there were no
alternative measures consistent with the GATT or less consistent with it, and which
could reasonably be expected to be used, in order to achieve its health policy
objectives.74 In other words, in order to be considered necessary, a measure would
have to be the least trade restrictive alternative.
However, it is unclear from the Gasoline case whether measures that are to be
considered are those that are equally effective from an environmental perspective, or
whether account would be taken of the circumstances of the country imposing the
measure such as whether the alternative measure is feasible, for example, with
respect to implementation costs of alternative measures.
To the extent that the WTO allows an environmental goal to be reached in full, the
interpretation of the WTO DSB does not seem to be too restrictive. If, for example,
two measures that are reasonably available both achieve the Member's environmental
goal, then it would be rational to require that the measure that has the least negative
impact on trade be chosen. The achievement of environmental goals with a minimum
of interference with the trading system is desirable.75
74 Gasoline Panel Report, §6.25-6.28. See J. Neumann and E. Turk, "Necessity Revisited:
Proportionality in World Trade Organisation Law After Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC-
Sardines37 JWT 1(2003), pp207-209.
75 The SPS Agreement discussed in Chapter 3 contains a more lenient standard with respect to the
necessity of an SPS measure, as only alternatives that are significantly less trade restrictive
should be used. Article 5.6.
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In the Asbestos case, Canada argued that banning asbestos was unnecessary as the
'controlled' use of asbestos could reduce the health risks to acceptable levels.
However, the alternative proposed by Canada was not considered a reasonable
alternative since controlled use would leave a significant residual risk to the workers
and would not, therefore, achieve France's chosen level of health protection - an end
to health risks induced by asbestos. The Appellate Body noted that WTO Members
have the right to determine the level of health protection they deem appropriate. In
addition, although there is no requirement in Article XX to perform a risk
assessment, t he D SB i n t he A sbestos c ase76 r elied o n i ts i nterpretation o f t he S PS
Agreement in determining the consistency of the French measure with GATT 1994.
Indeed, the fact that risk could be evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively77,
that WTO Members could base their health or environmental measures on qualified
and respected scientific opinions held by only a minority of scientists,78 demonstrates
that the DSB is increasingly merging the interpretation of GATT 1994 with the SPS
Agreement examined in the next chapter.79
In addition, the Appellate Body considered that the Decree was "clearly designed and
apt" to achieve that level of protection.80
The A sbestos c ase m arks a d eparture from p revious A rticle X X(b) a nalysis a s t he
Appellate Body81 considered that the determination of whether a measure is
"necessary" i nvolves a p rocess o fw eighing a nd b alancing a s eries offactors. T he
Appellate Body stated:
"We indicated in Korea - Beef that one aspect of the "weighing and balancing
process ...comprehended in the determination of whether a WTO-consistent
alternative measure" is reasonably available is the extent to which the
76 See Chapter 3, section D.II.
77 Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, §167.
78 Ibidem, §167 and 172.
79 Future interpretation ofArticle XX will also take into account the precautionary principle, as
formulated in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. See Chapter 3, section D.IIl.d.
80 Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, §168.
81 Ibidem, §172.
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alternative measure "contributes to the realization of the end pursued". In
addition, we observed, in that case, that "[t]he more vital or important [the]
common interests or values" pursued, the easier it would be to accept as
"necessary" measures designed to achieve those ends. In this case, the
objective pursued by the measure is the preservation ofhuman life and health
through the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening,
health risks posed by asbestos fibers. The value pursued is both vital and
important in the highest degree. The remaining question, then, is whether
there is an alternative measure that would achieve the same end and that is
less restrictive oftrade than a prohibition. "82
It is not clear what weight is given to these considerations in determining whether a
measure is consistent with Article XX(b) and what the exact relationship of the new
balancing test with the least trade restrictive alternative test is.
In addition, it is unclear which other factors may be considered in the balancing test.
Indeed, the factors such as the degree to which the measure contributes to a
Member's regulatory goal, the importance of the goal, the degree of conflict with free
trade are not exhaustive. Presumably, factors such as whether an international
environmental agreement dealing with this problem exists and the measure is
explicitly required by the MEA, may also be a relevant factor in performing a
balancing test.83
The Asbestos Appellate Body considered that the balancing test is part of the
determination of whether a WTO-compatible or less trade restrictive alternative
exists to achieve the objective pursued.84
The examination of the extent to which the alternative contributes to the goal that is
set implies that WTO Members are not entitled to use the least-trade-restrictive
measure that achieves the result that is desired and reflected in the original measure
82 Asbestos, Appellate Body Report, §172. Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef (hereinafter "Korea - Beef'), Appellate Body Report, 10 January 2001,
WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, §162, 166 and 163.
83 See J. Trachtman, "Decisions of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization -
European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products",
http://www.ejil.org/journal/surveys.html, p6.
84 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §172. G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers
to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General
Agree on Tariffs and Trade - A Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic
Regulation of Goods", 36 JWT 5 (2002), p827.
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if an alternative measure is less-trade-restrictive and which after having been
subjected to a balancing test by the DSB is found to achieve to a sufficient extent the
result sought for in the original measure.85 Therefore, national regulatory ends must
not necessarily be met in full. This is, however, is not desirable from an
environmental point of view, as the environmental benefits of a measure will
potentially be reduced.
c) Economic analysis of the necessity requirement
From an economic welfare point of view, the most efficient measure is usually
preferred as it increases the net monetary wealth of society.86 Monetary wealth of
society usually increases human happiness, in other words, societal wealth is a good
estimate of societal utility.87
Pareto efficiency is usually employed as the standard for efficiency in economics and
is achieved when "goods cannot be reallocated to make someone better off without
making someone else worse off."88 However, the standard of Pareto efficiency tends
to be unhelpful because public policies typically have both winners and losers.89
Therefore, in the field of law and economic analysis, the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
criterion is most often used. The Kaldor-Hicks efficiency has the advantage that it
ignores whether a gainer from an action actually compensates a loser from the action.
Under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a more efficient outcome can leave some people
worse off. It is otherwise called the "potential Pareto efficiency" as those that are
85 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJ1L
(1998).
86 A.O. Sykes, "Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade
Policy", 1 JIEL (1998), p58.
87 In some cases efficient policies can be undesirable because on their effects on income
distribution. A.O. Sykes, "Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of
International Trade Policy", 1 JIEL (1998), p57.
88 See R. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", 3 Journal ofLaw and Economics 1 (1960).
89 See A.O. Sykes, "Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade
Policy". 1 JIEL (1998) and R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw, 5th ed. (1998).
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made better off could in theory compensate those that are worse-off, thereby leading
to a Pareto optimal outcome.90
Potential Pareto efficiency is achieved by choosing a measure that maximises the net
benefits of a trade-related environmental/health measure. In other words, a cost-
benefit analysis would determine which measure is most efficient and would
invalidate national environmental/health regulation where the costs exceed the
benefits.91
In other words, in order for a trade-related environmental/health measure to be
considered efficient in terms of potential Pareto efficiency, the environmental/health
benefits of the measure must outweigh the costs associated with a restriction on trade
and the administration of such a measure.
However, as was discussed in the previous section, panels and the Appellate Body
have not resorted to a strict cost-benefit analysis but to a least trade restrictive
alternative (LTRA) test in determining the necessity of trade-related
environmental/health measures under Article XX(b).
The LTRA test does not necessarily maximise world welfare in terms PPE.92 As
Trachtman notes:
"As a tool to maximize net gains of trade and regulation, necessity testing is
overbroad and underinclusive. First, it seems to elevate trade values to a
preeminent status, by insisting that any non-trade measure be designed to
meet its goal using the means that is least trade restrictive, no matter what the
domestic regulatory cost. Least trade restrictive alternative analysis, when
90 See J. R. H icks, "The F oundations o fW elfare Analysis", 49 Econ. J. 6 96 (1939); N . K aldor,
"Welfare Propositions in Economics", 49 Econ. J. 549 (1939).
91 J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998). See also P.S. Mennell and R.B. Stewart, Environmental law and Policy (1994), pp81-
160.
92 J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998), p72. See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the
WTO Panel and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade
Measures", (2001), Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
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subject to the *reasonably available' qualification, seems to address this
problem by placing an indeterminate cap on the domestic regulatory cost.
Second, there may be circumstances where even the least trade restrictive
alternative is not worthwhile - where the non-trade measure is worth far less
than the trade costs it imposes. Necessity testing engages in truncated
maximization, or truncated comparative cost-benefit analysis, by keeping the
regulatory benefit relatively constant and working on the trade detriment side.
It thus evaluates a much more limited range ofoptions, ignoring other groups
ofoptions that may be superior. "93
The LTRA test centres on the magnitude of trade diversion costs not the size of
environmental/health benefits. Indeed, environmental/health benefits are not
considered in deciding between alternative measures and administrative costs are
only considered to the extent of determining whether alternatives are economically
feasible and reasonably available.94 Therefore, the LTRA test neither performs a
comparison or aggregration of the values administrative costs, environmental/health
benefits, and trade diversion costs, which implies that a least trade restrictive
alternative could be one where environmental/health benefits are very small and
trade diversion costs are very large.95
The LTRA test also excludes policy options by taking "appropriate levels of
protection" as given, which implies that there could be measures available that could
increase net benefits more than options that can attain the "appropriate levels of
protection".96
93 J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998), p72. See also J. Dunoff, "Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the
Global Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect?" 49 Wash, and Lee I. Rev. (1992), ppl449-50.
94 See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
95 Ibidem.
96 Ibidem. J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9
EJIL (1998), p72.
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However, the potential Pareto efficiency approach also has limitations such as the
lack of attention to distributional problems among countries, the incommensurability
of values, and problems with interstate comparison of the utility.97
The potential Pareto efficiency approach assumes that there are no transaction costs
in redistributing benefits regardless of whether winners actually compensate losers
and focuses on whether net benefits increase as a result of the invocation of a
measure without regard to re-distributional results of the measure.98 A measure could
benefit developed countries more than the cost to developing countries and if the
redistribution of the benefits and costs are impossible because of high transaction
costs, then the measure is efficient in terms of potential Pareto efficiency but not
necessarily morally desirable.99 The problem is accentuated when countries invoke
trade-related environmental/health measures in order to protect the domestic
environment as only the country imposing the measure may enjoy environmental
benefits.100
The LTRA test achieves a balance between the right of a country to impose measures
to protect the domestic environment and the right of other countries to enjoy the
benefits of free trade.101 The LTRA test enables WTO Members to choose their
appropriate levels of environmental protection, while requiring them to minimise
trade diversion costs.
97 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998).
98 See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
99 See A.O. Sykes, "Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade
Policy", 1 JIEL (1998) and J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL (1998), p53.
100 See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel




Under the LTRA test, distributional problems remain unsolved to some extent as
exporting countries incur trade harms, even though they are minimised.102 However,
as Trachtman points out, compensation for redistribution could be indirect; the
application of the LTRA test for all trade-related environmental/health measures
aimed at preserving the domestic environment implies that all WTO Members would
receive roughly equivalent payoffs.103 All WTO Members are guaranteed the right to
decide their appropriate levels of protection whereas they simultaneously have the
right not to have trade diversion costs minimised.104
Another problem with the potential Pareto efficiency approach is that the
environmental/health benefits that are linked with a trade-related
environmental/health measure need to be quantified in monetary terms so that a
comparison can be made with trade diversion costs and administrative costs.105
However, not all values are easily quantifiable in monetary terms,106 despite the fact
that as Dorfman notes "the ingenuity and effort devoted to establishing monetary
equivalents to the social values of nonmarket benefits and costs are impressive".107 In
102 J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL (1998)
and K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
103 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998).
104 Ibidem, p73.
105 See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
106 S. Kelrnan, "Cost-Benefit Analysis - An Ethical Critique", Regulation, January 1981, p33; M.
Sagoff, "Economic Theory and Environmental Law", 79 Mich. L. Rev. (1981), pl393. See N.
Hanley, J.F. Shogren, B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theory and Practice, (1997),
pp383-424. See also "Methodologies for Environmental Valuation: A Selected Bibliography",
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, WT/CTE/W/72, 26 November 1997.
107 R. Dorfmann, "An Introduction to Benefit-Cost Analysis", in R. Dorfmann and N.S. Dorfmann,
(eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed, (1993), p308. For example, revealed preference
methods and contingent valuation techniques. See also D.S. Brookshire, M. Thayer, R. Schukze
and R. d'Arge, "Valuation of Public Goods", 72 Amer. Econ. Rev. (1982), ppl65-177. See also
N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren. B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theoiy and Practice, (1997),
pp383-424.
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addition, it is even questionable whether quantifying in monetary terms is
desirable.108
Although, some environmental regulations are primarily based on use value that is
created by the current use of environmental resources either directly or indirectly109,
others refer to non-use values that are created by the desire to ensure that an
environmental resource will continue to be provided in the future.110
With regard to the problem of the incommensurability of values, the LTRA test has
the advantage, as noted above, that it does not compare or quantify any values.111
Moreover, the use of a potential Pareto efficiency approach also has disadvantages
with respect to the interpersonal comparison of utilities.112 As Dorfmann explains,
the role of an economy is to produce the combination of goods and services that
maximises the welfare of individual members of a community, otherwise called the
individual's utility.113 If the individual utilities of a community can be determined,
then a social welfare function could be derived to reflect these utilities. However, an
accurate social welfare function is extremely difficult to build.114 In addition, there is
no single way of going about its construction.115 However, the method enables an
approximate comparison of the desirability of alternative operations of the economy,
108 J.L. Dunoff, "Rethinking International Trade", U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. (1998). p366. C.R.
Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law", 92 Mich. L. Rev. (1994), p854.
109 For example, the protection of human health.
110 For example, the protection of endangered species, biodiversity.
111 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998) and K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO
Panel and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures",
(2001), Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
112 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998) and K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO
Panel and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures",
(2001), Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
113 R. Dorfmann, "Some Concepts from Welfare Economics", in R. Dorfmann and N.S. Dorfmann,
(eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed, (1993), p87-90.
114 Ibidem. p90.
115 Ibidem, p90. See also D. Pearce, A. Markandya, E.B. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy,
(1994), pp51-55.
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essentially by comparing the benefits obtained by one person with costs suffered by
another.
In the evaluation of alternative trade-related environmental/health measures in an
international context, by contrast, it is not the individual utilities of citizens of a
country that are examined rather an interstate comparison of utility is performed. In
other words, the social welfare functions of different countries would need to be
compared. However, as was mentioned above, the construction of such welfare
functions is problematic, which naturally also impacts the value of comparing them.
However, the Appellate Body has in performing an LTRA test avoided comparing
utilities among countries as it does not distinguish between trade diverson costs
incurred by the exporting countries and those incurred by the importing country.116
In conclusion, the LTRA test is a good method for avoiding the distributional and
philosophical of the potential Pareto efficiency approach.117 In particular, regarding
distributional problems, which are significant in the context of trade-related
environmental/health measures for protecting the domestic environment, the LTRA
test significantly improves the distributional disadvantages of these domestic
measures, while guaranteeing the sovereign rights of countries to decide their
appropriate levels of health or environmental protection.118
In the Asbestos case, the DSB also applied a means-end test in determining whether
the means chosen are a rational way of achieving a purported end. An economic
116 See K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel
and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001),
Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
117 See J. Dunoff and J Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law", 24 Yale JIL 1
(1999), pp44-45.
118 See J. Dunoff and J Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law", 24 Yale JIL 1
(1999), pp44-45. See also K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic
Analysis of the WTO Panel and the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated
Trade Measures", (2001), Part 3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
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analysis of the means-end test will be performed in section C.III.3.d, as this test has
initially only been used in the determination of consistency with Article XX(g).
In the following section the second environmental exception aimed at measures
relating to conservation will be examined.
3.) Article XX(g): "Relating to the Conservation of Exhaustible Natural
Resources if Such Measures are Made Effective in Conjunction with
Restrictions on Domestic Production or Consumption."
a) Policy goal of "conserving exhaustible natural resources"
In the Gasoline case, the Panel held that clean air was an exhaustible natural resource
since it could be exhausted by pollutants such as those emitted by the consumption of
gasoline. The Panel, therefore, rejected Venezuela's argument that clean air was the
state of the air that was renewable rather than a resource that was exhaustible.
Therefore, the fact that a resource or its quality is renewable did not deter the Panel
from finding that the resource was exhaustible.119
"In the view of the Panel, clean air was a resource (it had value) and it was
natural. It could be depleted. The fact that the depleted resource was defined
with respect to its qualities was not, for the Panel, decisive. Likewise, the fact
that a resource was renewable could not be an objection. A past panel had
accepted that renewable stocks of salmon could constitute an exhaustible
natural resource. Accordingly, the Panel found that a policy to reduce the
depletion of clean air was a policy to conserve a natural resource within the
meaning ofArticle XX(g) ".120
In the Shrimps case, the Appellate Body found that sea turtles were an exhaustible
natural resource121 as they believed that Article XX(g) is not limited to the
conservation of mineral or non-living resources.122 In addition, the Appellate Body
119 Gasoline, Panel Report, §6.37.
1211 Ibidem, §6.37.
121 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §142.
122 Ibidem, §135.
39
stated that exhaustible and renewable natural resources are not mutually exhaustive
as renewable resources in certain circumstances can be depleted, exhausted or
extinguished.123
The interpretation of the panels demonstrates that although the "environment" is not
mentioned in Article XX, the provision covers all natural resources that can be
depleted whether or not they are renewable from a qualitative or quantitative point of
view.
This is a broad interpretation of Article XX that is responsive to environmental
concerns as it demonstrates a cautious approach to the exploitation of resources.
Indeed, it could be argued that if renewable resources are also considered to be
exhaustible then there is no resource that is "inexhaustible",124 suggesting that
"exhaustible" is a superfluous term and that it would be sufficient to refer to "natural
resources" in Article XX(g).
Unfortunately, the historical background of Article XX(g) provides no definite
answer as to whether exhaustible natural resources include renewable resources.
Indeed, unlike Article XX(b), Article XX(g) was not contained in any previous trade
agreement. It emerged as a proposal from the US Suggested Charter for an
International Trade Organization125 but unfortunately there was no official statement
of purpose.126
The preparatory meetings indicate that the exception was discussed in the context of
export rather than import restrictions and that the natural resources to be conserved
123 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §135.
124 S. Charnovitz, "Exploring the Environmental Exception in GATT Article XX", 25 JWT 5
(1991), p45.
125 US Department of State, September 1946, p24.
126 US Department of State Bulletin Vol. XIII, No. 337, Point V 9, 1945, p926.
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were usually described as a "raw materials" or "minerals" such as manganese127 but
not as living resources such as fisheries.
There is evidence, though, that in the drafting of the chapter on Intergovernmental
Commodity Arrangements, which in the end was not included in GATT, renewable
natural resources were considered as exhaustible.128
In the New York Draft of the chapter on Intergovernmental Commodity
Arrangements, a complete exception was added for "international fisheries or
wildlife conservation agreements with the sole objective of conserving and
developing these resources".129 This exception was modified at several occasions in
Geneva, one version applying to agreements relating "solely to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources such as fisheries or wildlife". This version was not
upheld on the understanding that "fisheries and wild life" were covered by the
language "conservation of exhaustible natural resources".130
Although, the historical background of Article XX(g) does not conclusively support
either interpretation, it can be argued that if one considers renewable resources to be
inexhaustible then the distinction between non-renewable, renewable and continuing
resources has been overlooked.
Non-renewable resources are those resources that cannot be regenerated by natural
processes within a human time-scale but only over a period of billions of years such
as oil, gas, coal and minerals. Renewable resources, by contrast, are those resources
that through natural regeneration processes can be reconstituted despite being used
by mankind such as animals, plants, clean air and fresh water. However, the fact that
a resource is renewable does not mean that it cannot be depleted and ultimately be
127 UN Docs. E/PC/T/C.II/QR/PV/5, pp79-80, E/PC/T/A/PV/25, pp30-32 and E/PC/T/A/SR/30, p5.
128 S. Charnovitz, "Exploring the Environmental Exception in GATT Article XX", 25 JWT 5
(1991), p45.
129 UN Doc. E/PC/T/34, pp43-44.
130 UN Doc. E/PC/T/B/SR/27, p 14. See also S. Charnovitz, "Exploring the Environmental
Exceptions in GATT Article XX" 25 JWT 5 (1991), pp45-46
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exhausted by human activity or evolutionary changes in the ecosystem. Renewable
resources are exhaustible when they are unsustainably exploited.
As opposed to non-renewable and renewable resources, continuing resources such as
solar radiation and geothermal energy are inexhaustible. The reason that these
resources are inexhaustible is that they are unaffected by human activity or
evolutionary changes in the ecosystem.131 Therefore, if one distinguishes between
renewable, non-renewable and continuing resources there is a justification for the
fact that the WTO considers renewable resources as exhaustible.
The Shrimps Appellate Body favoured a dynamic interpretation of Article XX(g)132
recognising, as did the ICJ in Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, that a "treaty is not static,
and is open to adapt to emerging norms of international law".133
Once the policy objective is found to fall within the ambit of Article XX(g), the
measure taken by the importing country must be considered. The next sub-section
will consider which aspects of a measure should be taken into account when
examining Article XX(g).
b) Measures requiring Justification under Article XX(q)
In the Gasoline case, the Panel considered whether the precise aspects of the
Gasoline Rule that it found to violate Article III, namely the less favourable baseline
131 See M. Jacobs, The Green Economy - Environment, Sustainable Development and the Politics of
the Future, London, (1991), pp3-5.
132 The Appellate Body quoted Jennings and Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed.,
Vol. 1(1992), pl282.
133 Shrimps Appellate Body, §130. Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, ICJ
Rep., (1997). See also Namibia Advisoiy Opinion, ICJ Rep., (1971), p31. In the Aegan Sea
Continental ShelfCase ICJ Rep. (1978), p4, the ICJ stated:
"It follows that in interpreting and applying reservation (b) with respect to the present dispute
the Court has to take into account the evolution which has occurred in the rules of international
law concerning a coastal State's rights of exploration and exploitation over the continental
shelf".
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establishments methods that put importers at a disadvantage were "primarily aimed
at" the conservation of natural resources.134
However, the Appellate Body, correctly, disagreed and found that:
"one problem ... is that the Panel asked itself whether the "less favourable
treatment" of imported gasoline was "primarily aimed at" the conservation of
natural resources, rather than whether the "measure"; i.e. the baseline
establishment rules, were "primarily aimed at" the conservation ofclean air.
In our view, the Panel here was in error in referring to its legal conclusion on
Article 111:4 instead of the measure in issue. The result of this analysis is to
turn Article XX on its head. Obviously, there had to be a finding that the
measure provided "less favourable treatment" under Article 111:4 before the
Panel examined the "General Exception" contained in Article XX. That,
however, is a conclusion of law. The chapeau ofArticleXXmakes it clear that
it is the "measures" which are to be examined under Article XX(g), and not
the legalfinding of "lessfavourable treatment".'35
The interpretation of the Gasoline Appellate Body was supported in the Shrimps
Appellate Body as it was stated in relation to Article XX(g) that "we must examine
... the general structure and design of the measure".136
Therefore, as more recent panels have shown, in order to determine whether a
measure is aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources it is not the
way in which the measure is applied or the consequence of the measure but the
measure itself, this conclusion was also reached when the term "necessary" was
interpreted. This is a more logical interpretation as otherwise the chapeau of Article
XX would be redundant.
Having clarified this point, it is now necessary to consider whether the measure
relates to the goal of conserving an exhaustible natural resource and whether the
measure is taken in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption as required by Article XX(g).
134 Gasoline, Panel Report, §6.40.
135 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, pi6.
136 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §145.
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c) "Relating to" and "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption"
Under Article XX(g) of GATT 1994, trade-related environmental measures do not
have to be "necessary" or essential for the conservation of exhaustive natural
resources, but have to be "related to" conservation. This implies that the conservation
of exhaustible resources is more important than the protection of human life or
health. This is a rather unusual proposition as there seems to be no reasonable
explanation to consider exhaustible resources more highly than human health.
In the Gasoline case, the Panel equated the term "related to" with "primarily aimed
at" conservation. The Gasoline Panel concluded that the "less favourable baseline
establishments ... were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources",
because there was "no direct connection between less favourable treatment of
imported gasoline that was chemically identical to domestic gasoline, and the US
objective of improving air quality in the United States".137
The Appellate Body considered that Article XX(g) had to be read in the context and
light of the object and purpose of the General Agreement: the context of Article
XX(g) includes in particular Articles I, III, and XI, equally the context of Articles I,
III and XI includes Article XX. Therefore, the phrase "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources" cannot be interpreted in such a way that the object and
purpose of Article 111:4 is subverted. Similarly, Article 111:4 should not have a reach
that renders Article XX(g) redundant.138
Therefore, the relationship has to be examined on a case-by-case basis by
scrutinising the factual and legal context of a dispute as well as the words used by the
WTO Members to express their intent and purpose.139
137 Gasoline, Panel Report, §6.40.
138 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, pi8.
139 Ibidem, pi8.
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The Appellate Body found it difficult to follow the Panel's reasoning leading to the
conclusion "that the less favourable baseline establishment methods at issue in this
case were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources." 140
The Appellate Body, as opposed to the Panel, found that the baseline establishment
rules were related to the conservation of natural resources as the baseline
establishment rules could not be divorced from other parts of the Gasoline Rule but
should be considered in the global context of the Gasoline Rule to which they were
related.141
The Appellate Body stated that "in the present appeal, the baseline establishment
rules affect both domestic gasoline and imported gasoline, providing for individual
baselines for domestic refiners and blenders and statutory baselines for importers",142
it also agreed that the measures were "made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption."143 The Appellate Body thereby found the
measures to fall within the ambit of Article XX(g).
In interpreting the phrase "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on
domestic production or consumption", the Appellate Body considered that the phrase
is a requirement that measures restrict both imported and domestic gasoline, a
requirement of "even-handedness" in the imposition of restrictions.144
However, the Appellate Body did not believe that the restrictions applying to
domestic and foreign products had to be identical. This makes sense as if the
restrictions were identical the measure would have been consistent with Article 111:4
in the first place.
140 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p21.
141 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p 19.
142 Ibidem, p21.
143 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p20.
144 Ibidem, p20.
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Nevertheless, the Appellate Body stated that if there were no domestic restrictions
and all the limitations were placed on the exporting country then the measure could
not be "related to" conservation.
The Appellate Body also stated that the phrase "made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption" was not intended to establish an
empirical "effects test" for the availability of the Article XX(g) exception".145 The
rationale being that establishing causation is difficult and the effects of a measure
may only be observable after a substantial period of time.
Of course, the Appellate Body recognised that if from the outset it was clear that a
measure would not have any positive effect on the conservation of natural resources,
it would not be a measure that was related to the conservation of natural resources.146
Therefore, the Appellate Body examined whether "the means are, in principle,
reasonably related to the ends" and found that the "phrase primarily aimed at is not
itself treaty language and was not designed as a simple litmus test for inclusion or
exclusion from Article XX"147. In addition, although a measure must at least have the
potential to be successful in achieving the desired environmental goal and be
transparent and predictable for the importing country, it is not necessary that the
measure should have an identical impact on the importing and exporting country.
In the Shrimps Appellate Body case, the relationship between the measure and policy
goal of conserving sea turtles was also considered. The measure was an import ban
on certain shrimp and shrimp products148 where certification had not been given to
exporters, allegedly to reduce the incidental killing of sea turtles by shrimp trawlers.
145 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p21.
146 Ibidem, pp20-22.
147 Ibidem, pp21-22. See G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agree on
Tariffs and Trade - A Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of
Goods", 36 JWT 5 (2002), p828.
148 The import ban was imposed pursuant to Section 609 of the US Public Law 101-162. See
Shrimps, Pane! Report, §7.3.
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In 1987, regulations were issued under the US Endangered Species Act of 1973
(ESA), which considers all sea turtles that occur in US waters as endangered or
threatened species, requiring fishermen to use turtle excluder devices (TEDs) in areas
where there was significant mortality of sea turtles in shrimp trawls.149
In 1989, the US enacted Section 609 which calls upon the US Secretary of State to
initiate negotiations for bilateral and multilateral agreements for the protection and
conservation of turtles. In addition, it provides that shrimp harvested with technology
that may adversely affect sea turtles may not be imported into the US unless the
President certifies on an annual basis to Congress that the exporter has a regulatory
programme for the harvesting of sea turtles that is similar to the US, that the average
rate of incidental killings in the course of harvesting by the exporter is comparable to
the one of the US or that the fishing environment of the exporter does not threaten
sea turtles.150
Initially, Section 609 only applied to countries of the Caribbean/Western Atlantic.151
Elowever, in December 1995, the US Court of International Trade (CIT) directed the
Department of State to prohibit the importation of shrimp and shrimp products
regardless of its origin harvested with commercial fishing technology which may
adversely affect sea turtles.152 In April 1996, revised guidelines were published that
complied with the CIT order.153
In addition, all shipments of shrimp and shrimp products into the US had to be
accompanied by a declaration attesting that the goods had been harvested "either
under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles ... or in waters subject to the
jurisdiction of a nation currently certified pursuant to Section 609".154
149 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.2.
150 Ibidem, §7.3.
151 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.4.
152 Ibidem, §7.4.
153 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.5.
154 Ibidem, §7.5.
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Shrimp or shrimp products harvested in conditions that do not involve the incidental
killing of sea turtles are those where shrimps are harvested in an aquaculture facility
or by a commercial shrimp trawl vessel using TEDs comparable in effectiveness to
those required in the US or by means that do not require the retrieval of fishing nets
by mechanical devices or where no sea turtles occur.155
Certification under Section 609 would not be granted to countries where sea turtles
do not occur or that exclusively use means that do not pose a threat to sea turtles as
this would be unnecessary.156
Certification would be granted only where a government would show evidence of the
adoption of a regulatory programme that is comparable to that of the US including
the use of TEDs and if the average rate of incidental killings in the course of
harvesting by the harvesting country is comparable to the one of the US.157
All those countries that had to be certified but were not granted certification would
not be able to export shrimp and shrimp products to the US.158
The Appellate Body concluded that the measure was "related to" the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources because the measure with respect to the implementing
guidelines was "not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the
policy objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle species. The means are,
in principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends relationship between
Section 609 and the legitimate policy of conserving as exhaustible ... is observably a
close and real one.. ,"159
Unfortunately, the Appellate Body in applying the means-ends test did not give an
indication o fw hat i t m eant b y t he t erms "d ^proportionately w ide" o r "reasonably
155 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.5.
156 Ibidem, §7.5.
157 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.5.
158 Ibidem, §7.6.
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related". It is not really clear from the statement of the Appellate Body, whether a
measure is reasonably related to the policy goal only when the relationship is a "close
and real one". However, considering the restrictive interpretation panels have given
to the term "related to", it would not be surprising if this were the case.
Unlike the Appellate Body in the Gasoline case, which found that in order for a
measure to be "related to", that the measures should also restrict domestic
production, the Shrimps Appellate Body separated the fact that a measure was related
to the policy objective from the fact that the measures were "made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption". In other
words, adherence to the requirement of the measures being "made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" was not a
determining factor in deciding whether the measure was related to the policy
objective.
The Appellate Body did, however, rely on the test provided for in the Gasoline
Appellate Body report for determining compliance with the requirement that the
measures should be "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption". Indeed, the Appellate Body in the Shrimps case
considered whether the measure was an even-handed one.160
In conclusion, the term "related to" conservation was initially interpreted restrictively
as the measure had to be "primarily aimed at" addressing a conservation goal or be
closely and genuinely related to the policy goal. The Appellate Body in the Gasoline
and Shrimps case focused on whether the measure was reasonably related to the
ends.
In determining whether a measure is "made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production or consumption" it is not necessary to find that the
restrictions apply to importers and exporters in an identical way, however, domestic
159 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §149.
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restrictions would have to be present. Unfortunately, this analysis, although in
appearance sound, overlooks the case where there is no domestic production to
restrict. This would occur, for example, when a country regulates imports of gasoline
although it does not domestically produce gasoline.
d) Economic analysis of the "means and ends" test used under
Article XX(q)
In examining the consistency of trade-related environmental measures under Article
XX(g), the panels and the Appellate Body have applied a means-end test. The
Appellate Body in the Asbestos case also applied a means-end test in addition to the
LTRA test in determining the consistency of the health measures under Article
XX(b). The means-end test focuses on whether the measure is a rational means to a
purported end.161 As Trachtman notes, this form of testing is included in most tests
such as the LTRA test, proportionality test, balancing test and cost-benefit
analysis.162
However, means-end test bears most resemblance to a proportionality test that
examines whether the means are proportionate to the ends in the sense that the costs
are not excessive to the ends, in this case environmental or health benefits.163
In other words, the environmental/health benefits and trade diversion costs are
compared. However, the determination of what is disproportionate is a value-laden
judgement similarly to the determination of what is reasonably available under the
LTRA test. In other words, the DSB is left with considerable discretion in
determining the consistency of a measure.
160 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §152.
161 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998).
162 Ibidem.
163 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL
(1998).
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The means-end test does not necessarily lead to the maximisation ofworld welfare in
the potential Pareto efficiency sense.'64 Indeed, although environmental/health
benefits and trade diversion costs are compared, there is no requirement that the
measure that maximises net benefits be chosen. In other words, the means-end test is
a more flexible form of cost-benefit analysis. The availability of alternative measures
is irrelevant, which means that it ignores whether an alternative measure could
improve world welfare more than the measure under consideration.165
However, the "means and ends" test avoids some shortfalls of the potential Pareto
efficiency approach as it overcomes most distributional and moral problems relating
to trade-related environmental measures aimed at protecting the global
environment.166
Distributional concerns over trade-related environmental measures that are aimed at
protecting the global environment are not as significant as those aimed at protecting
the domestic environment, since all countries obtain benefits from the measure,167
and are, therefore, not necessarily worse off. This suggests that the importance of
minimising trade diversion costs of other countries is lesser.
In the context of global environmental protection, the LTRA test does not have the
philosophical, moral, or ethical weight it has in the context of domestic environment
protection.168 As Dunoff explains, applying the LTRA test to measures aimed at
protecting the global environment may imply that trade values are elevated to a pre¬
eminent status in comparison with environmental values: trade diversion costs have
164 See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJ1L
(1998).
165 K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and
the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001), Part
3, www.jeanmomietprogram.org. See J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJIL (1998).
166 Ibidem.
167 Ibidem.
168 K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and
the Appellate Body Reports Regarding Environment-Orientated Trade Measures", (2001), Part
3, www.jeanmonnetprogram.org.
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to be minimised, however, environmental harms do not have to be minimised.169
Therefore, means-end tests are arguably, more appropriate in the context of global
environmental protection,170 than an LTRA test.
In addition, although, by comparing trade diversion costs and environmental benefits,
the "means and ends" test shares problems of incommensurability of values and
interstate comparison of utilities with the potential Pareto efficiency approach, the
problems associated with the "means and ends" test are not as severe.171 Indeed, the
"means-end test" is a balancing test that does not require the same level of accuracy
in quantification as the potential Pareto efficiency approach. Therefore, the balancing
test enables non-monetary and non-commensurable values to be included.172
In order to complete the analysis of Article XX it is essential to examine how the
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the chapeciu of Article XX.
The next sections will examine the requirement that a measure should not be applied
in a way that would result in "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade".
169 See J.L. Dunoff, "Reconciling International Trade with Preservation of the Global Commons:
Can We Prosper and Protect?", 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. (1992), ppl449-50.
170 K. Saito, "Yardsticks for "Trade and Environment": Economic Analysis of the WTO Panel and




4.) Analysis of the Chapeau ofArticle XX
a) "Arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade"
The requirements in the chapeau of Article XX do not overlap with the national
treatment or most-favoured-nation requirement as it allows for discrimination
provided that it is not "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable".
The Gasoline Appellate Body stated that it was "clear that concealed or unannounced
restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning of
"disguised restriction".173
The Gasoline Appellate Body did not define arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or disguised restriction but considered them in the light of their "purpose and object
of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of exception to substantive rules available in
Article XX".174
The Appellate Body was of the view that ""arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable
discrimination" and "disguised restriction" ... may ... "be read side-by-side; they
impart meaning to one another" therefore, "[w]e consider that "disguised restriction",
... may be properly read as embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken under the guise of a measure
formally within the terms of an exception listed in Article XX".175
Therefore, the Appellate Body was of the opinion that the pertinent considerations in
assessing whether a measure is applied in such a way that it amounts to "arbitrary or
172 J.P. Trachtman, "Trade and ... Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Subsidiarity", 9 EJ1L
(1998), p80.
173 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p25.
174 Ibidem.
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unjustifiable discrimination" can also be used to determine whether the measure is a
"disguised restriction" on international trade.176
This interpretation implies that the term "disguised restriction" is somewhat
redundant as a measure that is applied in a manner that constitutes arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination will also be considered a disguised restriction on
international trade. Therefore, there is no need to examine whether the measure is a
disguised restriction on international trade. However, in the chcipeait it is stated that
the measure should not be "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" or a "disguised
restriction on international trade" suggesting that different factors are to be taken into
account in determining whether the conditions are satisfied.
Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the phrases "arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination" and "disguised restriction on international trade" are equivalent and
that the reason they are both included in the chapeau ofArticle XX is to ensure that a
measure which does not apply "between countries where the same conditions
prevail" and, therefore, theoretically which cannot be regarded as an "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination" can nevertheless be found to be a "disguised restriction
on international trade". However, in this case it would be preferable for the phrases
"where the same conditions prevail" and "disguised restriction on international trade"
to be removed from Article XX.
The Appellate Body in the Gasoline case found that the less favourable treatment of
foreign producers was unjustifiable discrimination.177 The Appellate Body noted that
the US could have avoided this finding had they imposed statutory baselines for both
domestic and foreign producers, or by allowing both domestic and foreign producers
to establish individual baselines. The US argued that the reason for the different
175 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p25.
176 Ibidem.
177 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p29.
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baselines was due to administrative difficulties and problems of verification and
enforcement.178
However, the Appellate Body did not accept these arguments as the US had omitted
to "explore adequately means, including in particular co-operation with the
governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administrative problems
relied on as a justification by the US for rejecting individual baselines for foreign
refiners; and to count the costs for foreign refiners that would result from the
imposition of statutory baselines".179
An i nteresting p oint m ade b y t he A ppellate Body was t hat t hese omissions "w ent
well beyond what was necessary for the Panel to determine that a violation of Article
111:4 had occurred in the first place and that "discrimination must have been
foreseen" by the US and was "not merely inadvertent or unavoidable".180 This
suggests that unjustifiable discrimination is discrimination that must have been
intentional. However, the problem with this interpretation is that even if
discrimination is inadvertent, it does not necessarily mean that it is not
unjustifiable.181
The fact that the Appellate Body stated that the omissions "went well beyond what
was necessary" to determine inconsistency with Article 111:4 reasserts the fact that
the discrimination referred to in the non-discrimination rules is different from that of
the chcipeau of Article XX. This point was also made when the Appellate Body
stated "the enterprise of applying Article XX would clearly be unprofitable one if it
involved no more than applying the standard used in finding that the baseline
establishment were inconsistent with Article 111:4".182
178 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p25.
179 Ibidem, p29.
180 Ibidem.
181 See also Chapter 3, section III.2.C.
182 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p23.
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The Appellate Body did not conclude that the measure was applied in an "arbitrary"
way, which could mean that since it found the measure to be unjustifiable there was
no need to consider whether it was arbitrary. However, in the light of the
interpretation of the Appellate Body that "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" impart
meaning to each other it is more likely that the Appellate Body equated those two
terms. In other words, the Appellate Body has also rendered the term "arbitrary"
redundant.
The fact that the Appellate Body probably considered the two terms to be equivalent
does not necessarily comply with the fact that the International Convention for the
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, which provided the
basis for Article XX, only covered "arbitrary discrimination"183 and not "unjustifiable
discrimination" suggesting that GATT drafters by adding the term "unjustifiable"
may have intended it to have another meaning than "arbitrary".
The Shrimps Panel also dealt with the chapeau of Article XX but took a different
approach.
After, the Shrimps P anel h ad found that the U S i mport b an w as i nconsistent with
Article XI because the US banned imports even if a country used TEDs to catch
shrimps but had not been certified,184 the Panel examined India, Pakistan and
Thailand's claim that the US embargo was implemented in a manner that constituted
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail" as they where given less notice to comply with TED requirements
than some other countries.
183 97 L.N.T.S. 403,405.
184 In other words, the US banned imports of shrimp and shrimp products from any country that did
not meet their policy conditions even though one or more of those countries may have used
environmentally friendly techniques that conformed to US standards.
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In addition, the exporting countries argued that there was not only discrimination
between exporting countries but there was also discrimination between the US and
exporting states.185
The US according to the complainants failed to consider that before requiring TEDs
application from them, the US should have demonstrated that the same conditions do
not prevail between India, Pakistan or Thailand and the countries with no TEDs
requirement. They also added that the US in the legislative history of Section 609
included discussions of this section in terms of the competitive position of the shrimp
industry.186
The US, on the other hand, argued that the measures related to the import of shrimps
were carefully and justifiably tied to the particular conditions of each country
exporting shrimp to the U S and that all exporting c ountries with the same shrimp
harvesting conditions are treated equally with no discrimination.
The US argued that the measures were not intended to protect the US fishing
industry as there was a strong and growing international consensus regarding sea
turtle conservation and the mandatory use of TEDs.187 (Indeed, presently, all species
of sea turtles have been included in Appendix I of the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) as species threatened with
extinction).
The international consensus belied any claim that the US measures were some sort of
"disguised restriction" on trade188. In addition, the wider application of Section 609
to other countries than the US and Caribbean/Western Atlantic area did not lead to a
decrease in the quantities imported nor to an increase in prices.189
185 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.31.
186 Ibidem,§ 7.31.
187 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.32.
188 Ibidem.
189 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.32.
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The Panel considered whether the chapeau of Article XX addressed whether Article
XX limits a Member's use ofmeasures conditioning market access on the adoption of
certain conservation policies by the exporting Member and noted that the chapeau of
Article XX prohibits such application of a measure if it constitutes "arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail".
The Panel first considered whether the US measures applied between countries
where the same conditions prevailed.
The Shrimps Panel was the first one to consider in more detail the phrase "countries
where the same conditions prevail". The Panel stated that the US measure applied to
all Members wanting to export wild shrimp retrieved mechanically from waters
where sea turtles and shrimp occur concurrently and that these Members were,
therefore, considered to be countries where the same conditions prevail.190
The Panel in the Shrimps case considered that "countries where the same conditions
prevail" does not recognise the fact that conditions between countries were the same
conditions prevail could not only include conditions between exporting countries but
also conditions between an exporting and an importing nation.
The Internationa] Convention for the Abolition o f Import and Export Prohibitions
and Restrictions that provided the basis for Article XX considered that import and
export restrictions could be used to protect "vital interests" such as the protection of
"public health, the protection of animals or plants against disease, insects and
harmful parasites"191 if the measures were "not applied in such a manner as to
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination between foreign countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade."192
190 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.33.
191 97 L.N.T.S. 405.
192 97 L.N.T.S. 403, 405.
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The fact that the Convention used the term foreign countries implies that in order for
a measure to constitute arbitrary discrimination, there had to be some form of
discrimination between exporting countries.
There seems to be no valid reason to exclude the importing country from being one
of t he c ountries w here t he s ame c onditions p revail. If t he i mporting c ountry w ere
excluded, the phrase may become redundant in a case where there is only one other
country apart from t he i mporting c ountry t hat h arvests w ild s hrimps b y r etrieving
them mechanically from waters where sea turtles and shrimp occur concurrently. If
this were the case, the importing country would not have to justify its measure as
being arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination as there would not be a country where
the same condition prevails.
This opinion was supported implicitly in the Gasoline Appellate Body case as it was
found that the difference in treatment between the exporting country and the
importing country was unjustifiable discrimination.
It could be argued that "countries where the same conditions prevail" could refer to
countries that have the same level of economic development.
However, if this interpretation were correct, this would imply that there would be no
need to justify a measure as not constituting arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination
between an importing country such as the US and exporters from developing
countries which are at a different level of economic development than the US. If the
developing country exporters were treated differently between them by the US and if
the exporting countries would be considered at the same level of economic
development than this would imply that the US would have to justify that the
measure did not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.
On the other hand, i f a developed country exporter would be considered to be at the
same level of economic development as the US then the measure could constitute
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between the US and a developed country
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exporter but not between the developed country exporter and the developing country
exporters.
Although, this interpretation recognises that the importing country is to be taken into
consideration when determining whether a measure is applied to countries where the
same conditions prevail, it is far too broad as it would be very easy for importing
countries imposing measures to by-pass the discrimination requirement contained in
the chapeau where a dispute involves a developed country imposing measures on a
developing country.
The Panel then considered whether the US measure which conditioned market access
on the adoption of certain conservation policies by the exporting country was
"unjustifiable discrimination".
As s tated i n t he G asoline A ppellate Body R eport, "t he t ext o f t he chapeau i s n ot
without ambiguity".193 The Panel noted that the word "unjustifiable" had never been
subject to any precise interpretation.194
The ordinary meaning of unjustifiable does not address explicitly whether Article
XX should be interpreted to contain any limitation on a Member's use of measures
conditioning market access on the adoption of certain conservation policies by the
exporting Member.195
Therefore, the Panel examined the term within its context and in the light of the
object and purpose of the agreement which it is part of, that is Article XX and its
chapeau, the relevant provisions of GATT 1994 together with its preamble and
annexes and the WTO Agreement, including its preamble and its other annexes.
193 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p23.
194 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.34.
195 Ibidem.
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The Panel referred to other panels that had addressed the context and the object and
purpose of Article XX which had concluded that it should be interpreted narrowly as
the preamble was meant to prevent abuse of the exceptions ofArticle XX.
In the Gasoline Appellate Body case, it was noted that although Members have rights
under Article XX there are limits to the scope of Article XX. A Member can invoke
the r ight t o c ertain s pecific s ubstantive p rovisions o f GATT 1 994 b ut in d oing s o
should not frustrate or defeat the purposes and objectives of the General Agreement
and the WTO Agreement or its legal obligations under substantive rules of GATT by
abusing the exception contained in Article XX. This is in line with the Vienna
Convention which states that "[a] State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty."196
The Preamble of the WTO Agreement was also considered by the Panel in order to
determine Article XX's object and purpose. They noted that the first paragraph of the
Preamble acknowledges that the optimal use of the world's resources must be
pursued "in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both
to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means of doing so in a
manner consistent with Member's respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development". On the other hand, the Panel noted that the second
paragraph of the GATT 1994 and the third paragraph of the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement refer to "entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade
and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment" in international trade relations.
Therefore, the Panel considered that the WTO Preamble confirms that environmental
considerations are important for the inteipretation of the WTO Agreement. However,
"the central focus of the agreement remains the promotion of economic development
through trade; and the provisions of GATT are essentially turned toward trade
liberalisation of access to markets on a non-discriminatory basis".197
196 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Article 18.
197 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.42.
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In order to increase the linkage between trade and environmental issues, it could be
argued that the goal of sustainable development should find its way into the WTO
agreement as an obligation rather than merely being part of the context of treaty
provisions.198 The WTO Preamble does not in itself amount to a rule of law but
constitutes the moral and political basis for specific legal provisions.199
However, as Bimie and Boyle note "sustainable development is best viewed as an
objective ... rather than as substantive standard appropriate for judicial review and
determination".200 Indeed, the criteria for measuring this standard remain unclear.201
The Shrimps Panel noted that the WTO Agreement favours a multilateral over a
unilateral approach to trade issues. The Preamble provides that Members are
"resolved ... to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading
system [and] ... determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the
objectives underlying this multilateral trading system".202
Therefore, the chapeau of Article XX only allows Members to derogate from GATT
provisions so long as, in doing so, they do not undermine the WTO multilateral
trading system, so that the exceptions contained in Article XX are not abused.203
Abuse or undermining would occur if a Member jeopardises the operation of the
WTO Agreement in such a way that guaranteed market access and non¬
discriminatory treatment within a multilateral framework would no longer be
possible. In other words, WTO rules not only to protect current trade but also create
predictability to plan future trade.
198 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Article 31.2.
199 South West Africa Cases, ICJ Rep. (1966), p34, §50.
200 P.W. B irnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2"d ed., Oxford, (2002),
p316.
201 Ibidem, p85.
202 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.43.
203 Ibidem, §7.44.
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The Panel found that even if a given measure may not have a great impact on the
multilateral system, it is the accumulation of such measures that affect the security
and predictability of the multilateral trading system. Therefore, according to the
Panel, in considering whether the measure qualifies under Article XX it is important
to determine not whether a single measure undermines the WTO multilateral trading
system, but whether this type of measure if adopted by other Members, would
threaten the multilateral trading system.204
The rationale seems to be that other Members could also impose similar policies but
with differing and conflicting requirements. Therefore, exporting Members would be
unable to comply with multiple conflicting policy requirements.205
The Panel also found that Section 609 is a measure conditioning access to the market
for a given product on the adoption by exporting Members of conservation policies
that the US considers to be comparable to its own in terms of regulatory programmes
and incidental taking. In the light of the context of the term "unjustifiable" and the
object and purpose of the WTO Agreement, the US measure was found to constitute
"unjustifiable discrimination".206
The US argued that many international agreements show that parties may take
actions to protect animals, whether they are located within or outside their
jurisdiction. However, the argument, according to the Panel, is not based on
jurisdictional application:
"We are ofthe v iew t hat t hese t reaties s how t hat e nvironmental p rotection
through- international agreement - as opposed to unilateral measures - have
for a long time been a recognised course of action for environmental
protection. We note that this US argument addresses the issue of a potential
jurisdictional scope ofArticle XX. However, we consider that this argument
bears no direct relation to our finding, which rather addresses the inclusion
204 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.44
205 Ibidem, §7.45.
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of certain unilateral measures within the scope ratione materiae of Article
XX".207
The Panel went on to state that it based its findings on the fact that the measure
affects other countries' policies in a way that threatens the multilateral trading
system, that is by adopting a policy pursuant to which only countries that adopt
measures restricting all of their production to products considered safe by a particular
country may export to the market of the importing country.208
This seems fair on the part of the Panel as individual countries should not dictate
how other countries should produce products that are intended to third markets.
However, the Panel's examination of whether not only the measure under
consideration undermines the multilateral trading system but also whether an
aggregate of such measures undermine the system appears excessive.
The US also argued that the right of the WTO Members to take measures under
Article XX to conserve and protect natural resources is reaffirmed and reinforced by
the Preamble to the WTO Agreement. Although the Panel did not disagree with this
statement, it stated that the Preamble endorses the fact that environmental policies
must be designed taking into account the situation of each Member, both in terms of
its actual needs and in terms of its economic means. In addition, Principle 2 and 11
of the 1992 UNCED Rio Declaration recognise the right of states to design their own
environmental policies on the basis of their particular environmental and
developmental situations and responsibilities. Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration
also stresses the need for international co-operation and for avoiding unilateral
measures. The Preamble also implies that attempts to generalise standards of
environmental protection would require multilateral discussion, especially when,
developing countries are involved.209
207 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.50.
208 Ibidem.
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Therefore, the Panel did not feel that the Preamble justified interpreting Article XX
to allow the measure.
The fact that the US claimed sea turtles are a shared resource especially due to their
migratory nature led the Panel to the conclusion that if a resource is considered as
shared there must be a common interest. If such a common interest exists then it
would be better to address the matter through the negotiation of international
agreements.210 In addition, international standards would be a possible way to avoid
threatening the multilateral trading system.211
The US argued that there was no requirement in Article XX requiring a Member to
seek negotiation of an international agreement instead of, or before adopting
unilateral measures. In any case, the US claimed that it had offered to negotiate but
the complainants did not reply.
However, the Panel found that the efforts made by the US to seek international
agreement were not serious as there was no evidence that the US actually undertook
negotiations on an agreement on sea turtle conservation techniques which would
have included the complainants before the imposition of the import ban.212
As the measure was of the type that required negotiation of an international co¬
operative agreement and that the US had not made any serious efforts for
negotiation, the Panel concluded that the US was not entitled to adopt unilateral
measures.213
Finally, the US argued that the use of TEDs has become a recognised multilateral
environmental standard.214
210 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.53.
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Both the US and the complainants are parties to the CITES which covers sea turtles.
Therefore, none of the parties to the dispute contests the need to protect sea turtles.
However, CITES only covers trade in endangered species and not shrimps to which
the import ban was imposed. Therefore, the CITES does not require parties to use
specific methods of conservation such as TEDs.215 TEDs are a result of regional
agreements or voluntary individual initiatives and therefore do not constitute a
recognised international standard. Moreover, the provisions of the multilateral
agreements such as the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas216 effectively
address the objective of limiting by-catches of non-target species in trawling
operations, they do not require the application of specific methods such as TEDs.217
The Panel concluded that these arguments did not justify a different finding that the
measures adopted by the US were a threat to the multilateral trading system.
From this conclusion one can deduce that WTO panels would not permit the use of a
measure taken by a country which is a party to a MEA against another party to the
MEA, that is more restrictive than measures explicitly required by the agreement.
The Appellate Body in the Shrimps case218, correctly, rejected the interpretation of
the term "unjustifiable discrimination" of the Shrimps Panel as it did not approve of
the fact that the Panel did not examine the ordinary meaning of the words contained
in Article XX, the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX or the immediate
context of the chapeau of Article XX but immediately relied on the object and
purpose of the whole of GATT 1994 and WTO Agreement.219
In addition, the Appellate Body was of the view that the Panel did not consider the
fact that in order for a measure to be justified under the chapeau of Article XX
215 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.58.
216 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122.
217 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.59.
218 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body
Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.
219 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §121.
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regard should be had to the manner in which the measures were applied.220 Indeed,
the Panel focused on the design of the measure as it emphasised the fact that it was
considering "a particular situation where a Member has taken unilateral actions
which, by their nature, could put the multilateral trading system at risk."221
The Appellate Body went on to state that the Panel "formulated a broad standard and
a test for appraising measures sought to be justified under the chapeau" and that this
standard or test finds no basis in the text of the chapeau and that therefore, in effect,
the Panel "constructed an a priori test that purports to define a category ofmeasures
which, ratione materiae, fall outside the justifying protection of Article XX's
chapeau".222 Indeed, the Shrimps Panel found that countries were free to set their
own environmental objectives but they could not impose unilateral measures that
force an exporting country to change its environmental policies in order to be able to
retain access to the importer's market even though the importing country may
disagree with the structure of the exporting country's internal policies.
The Appellate Body, on the other hand, correctly pointed out, that unilateral
measures that condition access to the market of the importer were to some extent a
common aspect of measures falling within the scope of the exceptions contained in
Article XX.223 The Shrimps Appellate Body, therefore, reversed the interpretative
analysis of the Panel.
The Shrimps Appellate Body, unlike the Shrimps Panel, examined the ordinary
meaning of the words of the chapeau.
The Appellate Body started with a balancing test in determining whether the
measures were applied in a manner that constituted unjustifiable discrimination.
220 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §122. See also Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p22.
221 Shrimps, Panel Report, §7.60.
222 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §128.
223 Ibidem.
67
First, the Appellate Body stated that "it is not acceptable, in international trade
relations, for one WTO Member to use an economic embargo to require other
Members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to
achieve a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member's territory, without
taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of
those other Members".224
This interpretation differs from the one of the Shrimps Panel as the Appellate Body
seems to accept the fact that if the programme had been allowed to be comparable in
reality and that the circumstances of the exporting countries had been taken into
account, the measures would possibly have complied with the requirements
contained in the chapeau ofArticle XX.
The Appellate Body stated that although Section 609 provided for programmes that
were comparable to the US programme, in effect, these programmes had to be
essentially the same: "the 1996 Guidelines specify the only way that a harvesting
country's regulatory program can be deemed "comparable" to the United States'
program, and, therefore, they define the only way that a harvesting nation can be
certified under Section 609..."225 The Appellate Body also stated that "although the
1996 Guidelines state that, in making a comparability determination, the Department
of State "shall also take into account other measures the harvesting nation undertakes
to protect sea turtles", in practice, the competent government officials only look to
see whether there is a regulatory program requiring the use of TEDs.. ."226
In addition, the Appellate Body stated that although the US applied a uniform
standard throughout its territory it was not justified in requiring the same standard
from exporting countries.




The Appellate Body, therefore, concluded that the effect of the application of Section
609 was to "establish a rigid and unbending standard by which the United States
officials determine whether or not countries will be certified, thus granting or
refusing other countries the right to export shrimp to the United States" and was
therefore a standard that did not take into account the different circumstances of
exporting countries.
It is apparent that the Appellate Body promotes the idea that if exporting countries
are required to follow the importing country's programme there should be a
minimum amount of flexibility in the application of a measure which reflects the
situation of different countries failing which the application of the measure would be
unjustifiable. However, this argument overlooks the situation where there is no
comparable means of protecting sea turtles than using TEDs.
The Appellate Body, then considered the fact that the US did not permit imports of
shrimp harvested by commercial shrimp trawl vessels using TEDs comparable in
effectiveness to those required in the US if those shrimps originated in waters of
countries not certified under Section 609. The Appellate Body stated that this type of
requirement was difficult to reconcile with the policy objective of protecting and
conserving sea turtles.227 Indeed, although the US may wish to impose such
conditions to encourage and ensure that all shrimp caught in a country that wishes to
export shrimps to the US is caught using TEDs, it is unfair that the US requires the
exporting country to comply with US regulations if shrimps are destined to third
markets.
The Appellate Body noted, as did the Shrimps Panel, a failure on the part of the US
to engage in serious, across-the-board negotiations with the objective of concluding
bilateral or multilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of sea turtles
before enforcing the import prohibitions.228 This opinion seems to be consistent with
227 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §173.
228 Ibidem, §174.
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that of thelCJ: "the obligation [to negotiate] constitutes a special application of a
principle which underlies all international relations, and which is moreover
recognised in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations".229
The Appellate Body believed that the protection and conservation of highly
migratory species of sea turtles demands concerted and co-operative efforts on the
part of the many countries whose waters are traversed in the course of recurrent sea
turtle migrations. Again, as in the Panel Report, Principle 12 of Rio Declaration was
quoted230 to emphasise the fact that unilateral actions should be avoided and that
measures addressing transboundary or global environmental problems should be
based on international consensus. The Appellate Body also quoted the Convention on
Biological Diversity231, CITES232, Agenda 21233 of the UNCED and the 1996 Report
of the Committee on Trade and Environment234, which all call for the avoidance of
unilateral measures.
The fact that the US did negotiate and conclude an agreement with five countries, the
Inter-American Convention, for the protection and conservation of sea turtles led the
Appellate Body to conclude that this provided evidence that an alternative course of
action was reasonably available to the US for securing the legitimate policy goal of
its measures. The Appellate Body found that the effect of the US negotiating
seriously with some, but not with other Members (including the appellees) that
export shrimps to the US was discriminatory and unjustifiable.235
229 Continental Shelf Case, ICJ Rep., (1968), §86. See G. Marceau, "Conflicts of Norms and
Conflicts of Jurisdictions - The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other
Treaties, 35 JWT6 (2001), pi 125.
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The existence of the Inter-American Convention demonstrates that a less restrictive
device was available. The Appellate Body, therefore, in performing its balancing test
under the chapeau also used an LTRA test.
The Appellate Body concluded that the unilateral character of the application of
Section 609 heightened the disruptive and discriminatory influence of the import
prohibition and underscored its unjustifiable character.236
The Appellate Body then found that the application of Section 609, through the
implementing guidelines also resulted in differential treatment among various
countries desiring certification as some exporting countries had longer "phase-in"
periods during which their respective shrimp trawling sectors could adjust to the US
requirements.237 In addition, the fact that the US made varying efforts to transfer the
required TED technology to exporting countries led the Appellate Body to the
conclusion that the different treatment may not have been acceptable.238
The Appellate Body, therefore, concluded that the measures, in their cumulative
effect, constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" between exporting countries within
the meaning of the chapeciu of Article XX.
The Appellate Body stated "that the differences in the means of application of
Section 609 to various shrimp exporting countries are considered in their cumulative
effect" and "that those differences in treatment constitute "unjustifiable
discrimination" between exporting countries desiring certification in order to gain
access to the United States' shrimp market within the meaning of the chapeau of
Article XX".239
236 Shrimps. Appellate Body Report, §180.
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It is interesting to point out that it was the cumulative effect of the application of the
measure t hat w as c onsidered to beu ^justifiable discrimination s uggesting t hat t he
individual aspects of the application of the measure did not by themselves constitute
unjustifiable discrimination. However, it is very unlikely, considering the restrictive
approach panels have taken in interpreting Article XX and the nature of a balancing
test, that future panels would find that if not all these elements were present that the
application of the measure would not constitute unjustifiable discrimination.
The Appellate Body then considered whether the measures constituted arbitrary
discrimination. This suggests that unlike the Appellate Body in the Gasoline case,
the Appellate Body in the Shrimps case did not equate the terms "arbitrary" and
"unjustifiable" discrimination.
The Appellate Body relied on the fact that Section 609, in its application, imposed a
rigid and unbending requirement that countries requiring certification adopt a
comprehensive regulatory programme that was essentially the same as the US
programme, without inquiring into the appropriateness of the regulatory programme
for conditions prevailing in exporting countries240 to find that the measures not only
constituted unjustifiable discrimination but also arbitrary discrimination. In addition,
the Appellate Body found that there was little flexibility in how officials made the
determination for certification pursuant to these provisions and that this inflexibility
also constituted arbitrary discrimination.
The Appellate Body also relied on other factors in finding that the application of the
measures constituted arbitrary discrimination such as the fact that the administrative
procedures for acquiring certification were not transparent or predictable, that there
were no procedures for review or appeal for those applications that had been
rejected241 and that there was no way for exporting Members to be certain that the
measures were being applied in a fair and just manner by the US and that therefore
240 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §173.
241 Ibidem, §188.
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the exporting Members applying for certification whose applications were rejected
were denied basic fairness and due process, and were discriminated against, vis-a-vis
those Members that were granted certification.242
The Appellate Body in distinguishing between arbitrary and unjustifiable
discrimination certainly did not clarify the difference between these two forms of
discrimination. In certain instances, the measures were found to be applied in a way
that constituted both arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination and in other
circumstances only one form of discrimination was found to be present. The
Appellate Body failed to give the reasoning behind its differentiation and did not set
any criteria for establishing the nature of the discrimination. In other words, it is not
clear from the findings why one form of discrimination is identified as opposed to
another.
It is clear from the more recent panels that meeting the requirements contained in the
chapeau of Article XX is a very difficult hurdle for the importing country to
overcome. One of the main difficulties is that panels themselves do not precisely and
definitely know what actually constitutes arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and
whether these two forms of discrimination are in fact different. So far panels have
treated this phrase in a rather superficial and vague manner making it difficult to
determine the way future panels will decide.
Ambiguity will remain unless these terms are clearly defined and differentiated so
that panels are able to approach the interpretation of Article XX in a systematic and
consistent fashion.
The Shrimps Appellate Body, in appearance at least, widened the scope of the
chapeau of Article XX by recognising that unilateral measures that limit the
exporting countries' access to the importing country's market could under certain
circumstances be permitted. However, in practice, the result is to a large extent the
242 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §189.
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same as in the Shrimps Panel Report as there is extremely little room for unilateral
actions to be accepted, especially where the resource to be conserved is located in an
area of common property like the high seas.
Therefore, although, the Panel and Appellate Body decisions approach the
interpretation of Article XX in different ways, it is a common feature that unilateral
trade measures will only have an extremely small chance ofbeingj ustified under
Article XX especially where multilateral solutions are reasonably available. The
reason is that the WTO views unilateral attempts to impose standards on other
nations as depriving those nations of the freedom to balance environmental policies
with economic needs. These attempts create resentment especially on the part of
developing countries as they often fail to take into account their environmental
priorities and economic needs. Costly environmental measures inhibit the freedom to
develop economically and may not necessarily be the most efficient in a given
country. In addition, it is probably fair to say that a national government involved in
making policy is better able to express its own economic and environmental needs
than a foreign government enforcing its views unilaterally. Unilateral trade bans
undermine this principle by imposing standards upon other countries that reflect the
cost-benefit analysis of conditions and values of the importing country.
The Shrimps Appellate Body, however, did not consider whether unilateral measures
could be permitted, if it was not possible to address the issue through the negotiation
of an international agreement, for example, because there was no common interest
due to differences in the environmental priorities of countries, or if serious attempts
had been made to negotiate an international agreement but had not succeeded.
This i ssue was resolved in the Shrimps IIcase, where M alaysia made recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU concerning the Revised Guidelines for the Implementation
of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in
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Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations (the "Revised Guidelines").243 The certification
requirements were more lenient as certification would not only be granted if
countries used TEDs but also if substitutes for TEDs were used or if a country could
demonstrate that its shrimp fishing did not threaten sea turtles.
The Shrimps II Panel found that the Revised Guidelines were justified under Article
XX as long as "ongoing serious, good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement,
remain satisfied."244 In the Shrimps //Appellate Body case, Malaysia argued that the
Shrimps Appellate Body decision imposed an obligation to conclude a multilateral
agreement in order to comply with the chapeau.245 The Shrimps II Appellate Body
found, however, that the US could not be required to conclude an agreement.246 The
Appellate Body's conclusion appears to be justified as an obligation to conclude an
agreement would provide too much power to a country that did not wish to negotiate
an agreement.
This is a welcome development from an environmental/health perspective as it
implies that if a recalcitrant state does not wish to negotiate, trade-related
environmental/health measures may nevertheless be imposed under certain
conditions.
b) The balancing test - a variable trade-off device
The chapeau analysis in the Gasoline case was very close to the LTRA test, and the
Shrimps Appellate Body used a balancing approach combined with a LTRA test in
determining the consistency of the measure with the chapeau.
243 United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to
Article 21.5 of DSU by Malaysia, 21 November 2001, Appellate Body Report,
WT/DS58/AB/RW.
244 United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products - Recourse to
Article 21.5 ofDSU by Malaysia, Panel Report, 15 June 2001, WT/DS58/RW, §6.1.
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The necessity test in the analysis of the chapeau when Article XX(g) is invoked
supplements the broader balancing of rights and obligations, that are explicitly
required in the chapeau. The Shrimps Appellate Body stated that:
"The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is ... essentially the
delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the
right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of
the other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g. Article XI) of
the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the
other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations c onstructed by t he Members t hemselves i n t hat A greement. The
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed
and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and shape of the measures at
stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ. "247
Therefore, as an LTRA test is not performed under Article XX(g), a form of LTRA
test is part of the overall balancing test of the chapeau.
Presumably, where a measure is examined for consistency under Article XX(b), the
chapeau analysis also performs a balancing test but would pay less attention to the
LTRA test since this is already part of the necessity test under Article XX(b). In the
Asbestos case, the Appellate Body did not examine the chapeau of Article XX even
though the Panel had considered the chapeau and that the application of the chapeau
was appealed. The reason the Appellate Body did not make any findings with respect
to the chapeau, is that its analysis under Article XX(b) included in addition to the
LTRA t est, a m eans-end t est a nd a b alancing t est. T his s eems to i ndicate t hat t he
Asbestos case possibly went too far in its analysis of Article XX(b), leaving the
chapeau analysis superfluous.
The analysis under the chapeau appears to depend, in part, on the subparagraph of
Article XX that is under consideration. The effect of this interpretation by the DSB is
that human health or life is given the same importance as the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, thereby rectifying the rather unreasonable distinction
between Article XX(b) and (g).
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In general a balancing test weighs all factors and is less precise in its determination
of whether a measure is appropriate than a cost-benefit analysis or comparative cost-
benefit analysis and does not restrict the validation of a measure to whether it is
proportionate to the goal that it is supposed to achieve, as is the case with a
proportionality test, or whether more efficient alternatives would be preferable.248
In using a balancing test, the DSB has a huge discretion in determining the
compatibility ofmeasures with the requirements of Article XX. The balancing test is
one of the least predictable of the trade-off mechanisms examined.249 In addition, it
does not pay much attention to distributive concerns and the problem of interpersonal
comparison of utility is also present although to a lesser extent than the cost-benefit
analysis.250 However, the advantage of a balancing test is that non-commensurable
values can be taken into consideration,251 and that it complements the analyses of the
subparagraphs of Article XX.
The analysis of the trade-off devices used by the DSB has demonstrated that none of
them is ideal, whether used individually or cumulatively. However, the cumulative
use of the trade-off devices ensures that the deficiencies of one type of trade-off
device c an t o s orne e xtent bee ompensated b y t he a dvantages o f another t rade-off
mechanism. However, a major problem that is common to all devices is that the DSB
has the discretion to decide on the standards applied in these tests. In other words, the
application of the trade-off devices can be variable and unpredictable. Therefore, the
DSB should be encouraged to approach the standards applied when using these
trade-off devices in a consistent fashion and in a manner that promotes the objective
of increasing linkage between issue areas.
247 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, § 167.








The analysis of the panel and Appellate Body decisions demonstrated that the use of
unilateral trade-related environmental/health measures without serious across the
board negotiations has been the most important element and decisive factor for the
DSB in determining the consistency of these measures when applied
extrajurisdictionally.
However, some countries view environmental and health protection more highly than
others and try to force these values on trading partners. Unilateral trade measures are
effective and inexpensive as a government can set its policies without any
requirement of negotiation or assessment of any other country's opinion. A country
imposing unilateral measures receives full advantage of the environmental
protection, along with continued trade. On the other hand, the country targeted by the
unilateral measures must accept policies that interfere with its own development
strategy. This may have a negative impact on the exporting country's economy but
also possibly on the long-term development of its environmental law. However, it
could also be argued that if the importing country is not permitted to use unilateral
measures, its development strategy and the development of its environmental law
could also be jeopardised.
Nevertheless, a multilateral approach to environmental protection would prove
legitimate and most effective in the long-run for both the importing and exporting
country. It is clear that the WTO favours multilateral to unilateral linkage of issue
areas, although as the Asbestos case demonstrates, unilateral measures aimed at
protecting the domestic environment can be GATT 1994 consistent.252 The
promotion of multilateral co-operation is not unique to the international trading
system. For example, in the Lac Lanoux arbitration, the obligation to consult and
252 See Asbestos Appellate Body Report.
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negotiate in good faith was considered as customary law.253 In the Mox Plant case,
the ITLOS tribunal held that Ireland and the UK should cooperate and enter into
consultations.254
The WTO promotes the idea that countries should negotiate international co¬
operative agreements to deal with environmental problems. However, even if trade
measures are taken pursuant to MEAs this does not mean that measures would be
justified in the WTO. Indeed, measures taken pursuant to a MEA raise interesting
questions as to their compatibility with the GATT255 although assurance was given
by WTO officials that the WTO would not "stand in the way" of MEAs.256 In
addition, there are many obstacles to participation in multilateral agreements. Indeed,
there may be disagreement on how best to tackle problems, means-end relationships,
the costs of participation may deter potential participants, the fact that the costs are
known b ut t he b enefits uncertain, p roblems o f c ost a llocation o f r esponsibility for
dealing with a given problem, differences in priorities, preferences, per capita
income within a country and between countries, environmental endowments, the
degree of concern for future generations and socio-cultural traditions.257 The
interpretation of scientific evidence may also differ and there may be disagreement
over the existence of a problem and diverging expectations about the pace of future
technological innovations.258
In addition, Demsetz argues that users of a communal resource will not be able to
agree on the management of the resource even though it would be advantageous for
253 The Tribunal held that France had complied with its obligations under a treaty and customary
law to consult and negotiate in good faith before diverting a watercourse shared with Spain. Lac
Lanoux Arbitration, (France v. Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101.
254 The Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Request for Provisional Measures, Order, 3
December 2001, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, www.un.org. the Tribunal, § 1.
255 Chapter 5 deals more fully with this issue.
256 Address by former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero given on 17 March in Geneva at the
WTO's Symposium on "Strengthening Complementarities: Trade, Environment and Sustainable
Development", WTO Focus, April 1998, No.29, p7.
257 R. Blackhurst and A. Subramanian, "Promoting Multilateral Cooperation on the Environment"
in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds.), The Greening ofWorld Trade Issues, (1992), p257.
258 Ibidem.. p250.
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all users of the resource to co-operate and decrease their usage of the resource.259 As
Barrett notes "the reason is that if this improved situation is attained, every user will
earn even higher returns by free-riding on the virtuous behaviour of the remaining
co-operators".260 In game theory, this situation is represented by the "prisoners'
dilemma game", where countries "in the pursuit of their own private gains actors
impose costs on each other independently of each other's action; that is, in the
pursuit of its national interest State A makes State B worse off regardless of what the
latter does, and vice versa".261
Therefore, united action on the part of users can be expected to be unstable, co¬
operative agreements if they are reached will not persist.262
This p oint o f v iew i s o verly p essimistic a s i n r eality m any M EAs e xist a nd s ome
have been effective in achieving their goal.263 However, Demsetz's point of view
highlights the problem of free-riding on efforts to reduce an environmental problem.
Free-riding o ccurs b ecause p ublic goods a re n on-excludable i n t he s ense t hat i t i s
"impossible or very costly to deny access to an environmental asset".264 Since the
public can benefit from the public good no matter who pays for it, there is naturally
little incentive to voluntarily contribute to the cost of the good.265
259 H. Demsetz, "The Exchange and Enforcement of property Rights", 3 Journal of Law and
Economics (1964), pp 11-26. S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental
Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S. Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed.,
(1993), p446.
260 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.
Dorfmann (eds.), Economics ofthe Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), p446.
261 D. Snidal, "Coordination versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implication for International Cooperation
and Regimes", 79 The American Political Science Review (1985), pp926-7.
262 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.
Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), p446.
263 See for example 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
264 N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren, B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theory and Practice, (1997),
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Intervention by "the state, the courts or the leaders of the community" in order to
develop private property rights to a resource is necessary to overcome the common
property dilemma.266 However, even an international institution such UNEP that has
the mandate to co-ordinate international environmental protection requires the
consent of the parties involved.267 In other words, co-operation among sovereign
nations remains voluntary.268
Free-riding problems also occur where an externality is unidirectional, for example,
the destruction of the rainforest "the country causing the externality will, without a
negotiated settlement, i gnore the damages i ts activities i mpose on other countries.
This is the full non-co-operative outcome."269 In this case, all countries that are
affected by the externality would have the incentive to pay the polluting nation to
cease its activities.270 However, a contribution by any one country would confer
benefits on all others and, therefore, these other countries would be better off free-
riding.271
Where the externalities are reciprocal, such as is the case in fisheries management or
climate change, on the other hand, all countries have an incentive to take
environmental m easures e ven i n t he a bsence o f a b inding agreement.272 H owever,
266 H. Demsetz, "The Exchange and Enforcement of property Rights", 3 Journal of Law and
Economics (1964), ppll-26. S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental
Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S. Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed.,
(1993), p446.
267 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.
Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3r ed., (1993), p446.
268 R. Blackhurst and A. Subramanian, " Promoting Multilateral Cooperation on the Environment",
in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds.), The Greening ofWorld Trade Issues, (1992), p258.
269 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.
Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), p448.
270 Ibidem, p447.
271 S. Barrett, "The Economics of International Agreements for the Protection of Environmental and
Agricultural Resources", Report prepared for the Policy Analysis Division FAO Economic and
Social Department, http://www.fao.org/docrep/T4900E/T4900E00.htm. See also S. Barrett,
"International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S. Dorfmann
(eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), p447. H. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of
Property Rights", 57 American Economic Review (1967), pp349-57.
272 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.
Dorfmann (eds.), Economics of the Environment, 3rd ed., (1993), p449.
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this incentive is dependent on the actions of all other countries. Reciprocal
externalities imply that a country that reduces a certain activity that is harmful to the
environment will enjoy improved environmental quality provided other countries do
not increase detrimental activities so as to offset the efforts of the country reducing
environmental harmful activities.273 On the other hand, other countries will have an
incentive to not raise their environmental standards as they enjoy increased
environmental benefits without changing their policies.274
Finally, it should be noted that even where agreements are reached, these could come
too late or be insufficient to deal with the environmental or health problem.
However, the WTO seems to have recognised the difficulties entailed in reaching a
co-operative agreement, as only the party wishing to promote environmental/health
protection in a given field is required to negotiate in good faith but is under no
obligation to conclude a co-operative agreement.
This is a welcome development that increases the linkage between trade and
environmental/health issues.
273 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation for Environmental Protection", in R. Dorfmann and N.S.




WTO DISPUTES INVOLVING THE SANITARY AND
PHYTOSANITARY AGREEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, an in-depth analysis of Article XX of the GATT 1994 was
performed in order to evaluate its potential in defending environmental and health
interests within the dominant free trade framework of the WTO. However, measures
aimed at protecting human, animal and p lant 1 ife or health are also subject to the
disciplines of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures' (hereinafter "SPS Agreement"), which entered into force on 1 January
1995.
This chapter will evaluate the SPS Agreement as a means of integrating trade and the
protection of human, animal and plant life or health. An in-depth analysis of the case
law relating to the SPS Agreement will be performed and the analysis will also
consider whether and what changes should be made to the SPS Agreement or to the
interpretation of the SPS Agreement in order to achieve a fair balance between health
and trade concerns.
B. ORIGINS OF THE SPS AGREEMENT
The SPS Agreement was created following concerns during the Uruguay Round that
efforts in eliminating agricultural specific non-tariff barriers would be frustrated by
the use and proliferation of disguised protectionist sanitary and phytosanitary
The Uruguay Round Final Act, Annex 1A.
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(hereinafter "SPS") measures. It was believed that the GATT 1947 did not provide
an adequate framework for the regulation of SPS measures. Both Article XX of the
GATT 1947, where an SPS measure could be exempt from other GATT provisions if
it was "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"2 and did not
constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade"3, as well as the plurilateral 1979 Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade (hereinafter "Standards Code"), which regulated technical
requirements for food safety and animal and plant health measures such as labelling,
inspection requirements and pesticide residue limits, were not considered to provide
enough clear, specific and in-depth coverage of the subject matter. Neither Article
XX n or t he S tandards C ode s olely focused o n S PS r egulations b ut o n all p roduct
standards and technical regulations. In addition, the Standards Code was not binding
on all GATT Contracting Parties.4 Even in a situation where two countries were
bound by the Standards Code and were involved in a dispute over the Standards
Code, either country could block a request to convene a panel or block the adoption
of a panel report, as the dispute settlement process prior to the WTO dispute
settlement mechanism (DSM) was consensus-based.
The SPS Agreement, therefore, elaborated rules that are binding on all WTO
Members, that specifically deal with SPS measures and that expand on Article XX
by providing a specific framework of rules and guidelines for assessing SPS
measures.5
The TBT Agreement, analysed in Chapter 4, replaced and improved the Standards
Code, which now covers technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment
procedures to the extent that these are not SPS measures.
2 Article XX(b).
3 Article XX, Preamble.
4 G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map
of the W orld Trade Organisation LawofD omestic Regulation o f G oods", 3 6 J WT 5 (2002),
p813-814.
5 SPS Agreement, Preamble.
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c. APPLICABILITY OF THE SPS AGREEMENT
The following sections will examine under which circumstances the SPS Agreement
is applicable as this has in certain cases proved to be a subject of dispute.
I. In General
SPS measures are defined in the SPS Agreement as measures taken:
(a) "to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread ofpests,
diseases, disease-cariying organisms or disease causing organisms
(b) "to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms, in foods, beverages orfeedstuffs
(c) "to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof or
from the entry, establishment or spread ofpests and
(d) "to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from
the entry, establishment or spread ofpests ",6
The definition further clarifies that the term "SPS measure" covers:
"all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures that
seek t o regulatep roduct criteria; p rocess a ndproduction m ethods; testing,
inspection, certification and approval procedures; quarantine treatment;
provisions on relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and risk-
assessment methods; and packaging and labelling requirements related to
food safety".1
SPS Agreement, Annex A, § 1.
Ibidem.
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The EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)* (hereinafter
'Hormones") case was the first to deal with the interpretation of the SPS Agreement.
The dispute between the US and the EC and between Canada and the EC concerned
an EC ban on cattle meat and meat products treated with hormones for growth
promotion purposes.9
The US and Canada brought a claim under, inter alia, Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS
Agreement and Articles III, XI and XX of the GATT 1994.
All parties to the Hormones dispute agreed that the measures at issue were sanitary
measures as they were applied to protect human life or health from risks arising from
contaminants in food10, which includes veterinary drug residues.11 The SPS measures
were also considered to fall within the scope of Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement,
which provides that the Agreement applies to SPS measures, which may, directly or
indirectly affect international trade since the measures at issue resulted in an import
ban on meat and meat products from treated animals, they clearly affected
international trade.
Complaint by the United States, 18 August 1997, WT/DS26/R/USA, Complaint by Canada, 18
August 1997, WT/DS48/R/CAN. Report of the Appellate Body, 16 January 1998,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R.
The measure did not concern live animals and animals other than cattle to which growth
promotion hormones had been administered. Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.18-8.19; Canada
Panel Report, §8.21-8.22. The hormones at issue were melengestrol acetate (hereinafter
"MGA"), zeranol and trenbolone, which are synthetic hormones that mimic the action of natural
hormones and oestradiol-17, testosterone, progesterone which are natural hormones. The EC
Council adopted Directive 81/602/EEC in 1986, requiring the EC Member States to prohibit the
administration to farm animals of substances having a thyrostatic, o estrogenic, androgenic or
gestagenic action. MGA fell within the general prohibition of this Directive.
In 1988, the EC Council adopted Directive 88/146/EEC which brought the administration to
farm animals for growth promotion purposes of these five hormones within the general
prohibition imposed by Directive 81/602/EEC. Directive 88/146/EEC maintains the permission
to administer natural hormones to animals for therapeutic and zoo-technical purposes. Directive
88/299/EEC lays down the conditions for applying the derogations contained in Directive
88/146/EEC. On 1 July 1997, these directives were repealed and replaced by Council Directive
96/22/EC, of 29 April 1996 that confirmed and extended the above-mentioned prohibitions.
Indeed, the role of veterinarians and the provisions on control and testing were reinforced
thereby restricting the use of the natural hormones for therapeutic or zoo-technical purposes.
10 SPS Agreement, Annex A, § 1 (b).
11 Footnote 5 to Annex A clarifies that "contaminants" include "veterinary drug residues".
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In the Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon12 (hereinafter
"Salmon") case, the second case to deal with the SPS Agreement, Canada claimed
that certain Australian quarantine measures effectively banned the importation of
fresh, chilled or frozen ocean-caught Pacific salmon13 and freshwater and cultured
salmon14 and were, therefore, inconsistent with, inter alia, Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the
SPS Agreement and Article XI and XX of the GATT 1994.
The "Quarantine Proclamation 86A of 1975" ("QP86A")15 and published
requirements pursuant to QP86A: the "Conditions for the Importation of Salmonid
Meat and Roe into Australia"16 ("1988 Conditions"), the "Requirements for the
Importation of Individual Consignments of Smoked Salmon Meat" ("1996
Requirements")17, required salmonid product to be heat treated for certain prescribed
durations and temperatures prior to importation into Australia.
Australia performed a risk analysis with respect to fresh wild salmon the results of
which were set forth in a "Salmon Import Risk Analysis"18 ("1996 Final Report")19.
The measure according to the Panel, was the QP86A as implemented and confirmed
by the 1988 Conditions, the 1996 Requirements and the 1996 Final Report in so far
as it prohibits the importation into Australia of fresh, chilled or frozen salmon.20 The
Appellate Body, on the other hand, found that the measure at issue was the import
prohibition on fresh, chilled or frozen salmon set forth in the QP86A and confirmed
by the 1996 Final Report and not the 1988 Conditions and 1996 Requirements which
12 Panel Report, 12 June 1998, WT/DS18/R. Appellate Body Report, 20 October 1998,
WT/DS18/AB/R.
13 Fresh, chilled and frozen: adult, wild, ocean-caught Pacific salmon.
14 Adult, wild, freshwater-caught Pacific salmon, adult Pacific salmon cultured in seawater on the
Pacific coast, adult Atlantic salmon cultured in seawater on the Atlantic and Pacific coast.
15 Australian Government Gazette, No. S33, 21 February 1975.
16 ChiefQuarantine Officer (Animals) Circular Memorandum 166/88, 9 June 1988.
17 AQIS Quarantine Operational Notice 1996/022, 24 January 1996.
18 Australian Salmon Import Risk Analysis of December 1996.
19 The 1996 Report was preceded by a 1995 Draft Report.
20 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.19.
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lay out a separate measure that permits heat treated salmon21 to be imported. It is not
a consequence of the heat treatment of smoked salmon that the imports of fresh,
chilled and frozen salmon are prohibited. Therefore, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel's finding,22 which had treated these separate measures as "two sides of the
same coin"23 as the Appellate Body correctly noticed that smoked salmon is a
different product than fresh, chilled or frozen salmon.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the SPS Agreement applied to the measure in dispute
as it dealt with the protection of animal life and health from risks arising from "the
entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases ... or disease-causing organisms" in
general and because it affected international trade.24
In the Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products25 (hereinafter "Agricultural
Products") case, the US complained about Japan's import prohibition on agricultural
products26, that may carry codling moth.
Japan required testing and demonstration of quarantine efficacy of treatment with
methyl bromide (fumigation with MB) or a combination of fumigation with MB and
cold storage for each variety of a product that may carry this pest. Only once this was
done would the import ban be lifted and this only for the particular variety or
varieties tested ("varietal testing requirement"). The US contested the fact the import
prohibition would only be lifted variety-by-variety even if the treatment had proved
to be effective for other varieties of the same product.
21 Such as smoked salmon.
22 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §105.
23 Ibidem, §109.
24 Annex A, § 1 (a). See Salmon, Panel Report, §8.34.
25 Panel Report, 27 October 1998, WT/DS76/R. Appellate Body Report, 22 February 1999,
WT/DS76/AB/R.
26 Products such as apricots, cherries, plums, pears, quinces, peaches, nectarines, apples and
walnuts. See Plant Protection Law, Article 7 §1, item 1, 4 May 1950 and Plant Protection Law
Enforcement Regulations, Ministerial Ordinance of 30 June 1950.
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The US claimed, inter alia, violations of Article 2, 5, 7 and 8 of the SPS Agreement
and Article XI of the GATT 1994.
The question whether the varietal testing requirement could be considered a
phytosanitary measure was addressed by the Panel when examining the consistency
of the measure with transparency requirements in Article 7. Article 7 contains
requirements to notify and provide information in accordance with Annex B which
applies when the measure has been adopted, the measure is an SPS regulation and the
measure is applicable generally. Japan argued that since the varietal testing
requirement was not mandatory as exporting countries could demonstrate quarantine
efficiency b y o ther m eans, t hat t he m easure was n ot a " phytosanitary r egulation".
The Panel, however, stated that nowhere did the wording of the paragraph require
such measures to be mandatory or legally enforceable. The Panel also referred to
Annex A §1 that states, "phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees,
regulations, requirements and procedures". In addition, Annex B, §1 indicates that
the list is not exhaustive in nature as the words "such as" are used. The scope of
application is not limited to "laws, decrees or ordinances", but also includes other
instruments that are applicable generally and are similar in character to the
instruments explicitly referred to in Annex B §1. This is consistent with the object
and purpose of Annex B §1 that enables interested Members to become acquainted
with SPS regulations adopted or maintained by other Members in order to enhance
transparency regarding these measures.27 Since it was undisputed that the varietal
testing requirement was applicable generally and that the varietal testing requirement
had an actual impact on exporting countries, the Panel considered that the measure
was of a similar character to laws, decrees and ordinances, the instruments explicitly
referred to in the footnote to Annex B §1.28
In addition, it was clear that the purpose of the measure was to protect plant life or
health from the establishment and spread of pests and was therefore, considered to be
27 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §109.
28 Ibidem, § 110.
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a phytosanitary measure and that since the import prohibition clearly restricted
international trade, the SPS Agreement was applicable.
In the Japan — Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples case29 (hereinafter
"Apples" case), the US complained that multiple requirements and prohibitions on
the importation of apples imposed by Japan to prevent the introduction of fire blight
disease-causing organism (Erwinia Amylovora) in Japan were inconsistent with
Articles 2.2, 5.1, 5.2, 5.6, 5.7, 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
The Apples Panel decided to consider the multiple requirements30 imposed on
imported apples from the US as a single measure31 and identified the "phytosanitary
question at issue" as the risk of transmission of fire blight through apples.32 The
objective of the measure was the protection of plant life or health within the territory
of the Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of disease-
causing organisms. The regulations affected international trade as the import of
apples was restricted.
29 WT/DS245/R, 15 July 2003.
30 "(a) The prohibition of imported apples from US states other than apples produced in
designated areas in the states of Oregon or Washington; (b) the prohibition of imported apples
from orchards in which any fire blight is detected on plants or in which host plants of fire blight
(other than apple trees) are found, whether or not infected; (c) the prohibition of imported apples
from any orchard (whether or not it is free of fire blight) should fire blight be detected within a
500-meter buffer zone surrounding such orchard; (d) the requirement that e xport orchards b e
inspected three times yearly (at blossom, fruitlet, and harvest stages) for the presence of fire
blight for purposes of applying the above-mentioned prohibitions; (e) a post-harvest surface
treatment of apples for export with chlorine; (f) production requirements, such as chlorine
treatment of containers for harvesting and chlorine treatment of the packing facility; (g)
post-harvest separation of apples for export to Japan from fruits destined to other markets; (h)
certification by US plant protection officials that fruits are free of fire blight and have been
treated post harvest with chlorine; and (i) confirmation by Japanese officials of the US officials'
certification and inspection by Japanese officials of disinfection and packaging facilities."
Apples Panel Report, §8.25.
Japan maintains these restrictions and requirements through the Plant Protection Law (Law No.
151; enacted 4 May 1950), the Plant Protection Regulations (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry,
and Fisheries Ordinance No. 73, 30 June 1950, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries Notification No. 354, 10 March 1997) and related detailed rules and regulations,
including Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Circular 8103. Apples Panel Report,
8.7.
31 Apples Panel Report, §8.17.
32 Ibidem, §8.218.
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It is clear from the above that the applicability of the SPS Agreement depends on the
purpose ascribed to the measure by the defending party and on whether it affects
international trade regardless ofwhether the measure is voluntary or mandatory.
In determining whether a measure qualifies as an SPS measure, i t is important to
determine whether the purpose of the measure is to protect human, animal or plant
life from risks arising from hazards such as diseases, contaminants, additives, toxins
and pests. Therefore, in order for a measure to be considered as an SPS measure, two
elements must be present. First, the legitimate objective must be the protection of
human, animal or plant life and health and second, the risks must originate from one
of the identified hazards in the SPS Agreement.33
II. Application of the SPS Agreement to Measures Enacted Before
1995
The q uestion w as r aised i n t he Hormones c ase w hether t he p rovisions o f t he S PS
Agreement apply to measures enacted before the date of entry into force of the WTO
Agreement. Although the majority of the EC directives in dispute were enacted prior
to January 1, 1995,34 the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement, both the
Panel and the Appellate Body held that the SPS Agreement was applicable to the
dispute.35 Both the Panel and Appellate Body supported this position by referring to
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that "unless
a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its provisions
do not bind a party in relation to ... any situation which ceased to exist before the
date of the entry into force of the treaty". Therefore, since the measure did not cease
to exist when the SPS Agreement entered into force and since the Agreement did not
reveal an intention not to cover such measures, it is clear that the measure was
33 Annex A, §1.
34 EC Directives 81/602/EEC, 88/146/EEC and 88/299/EEC were enacted prior to 1 January 1995.
Directive 96/22/EC that replaced these earlier directives became effective on 1 July 1997.
Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.28 and Canada Panel Report, §8.31. Appellate Body Report,
§253(d).
91
subject to the requirements of the Agreement. The Appellate Body added that several
articles of the SPS Agreement indicated that the Agreement is intended to cover pre¬
existing measures, since they refer to "maintaining" SPS measures as opposed to
introducing or adopting such measures.36 In addition, Article XVI.4 of the WTO
Agreement which states that each Member "shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements", removes all doubt that the SPS Agreement does apply to the
previously enacted measures that remain in place once the Agreement enters into
force.37 Indeed, the issue was not raised again in the disputes that followed the
Hormones case.
In the next section, the relationship between the SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement
and GATT 1994 will be considered in order to further clarify the applicability of the
SPS Agreement.
III. Relationship between the SPS, TBT Agreement and the GATT
1994
According to the text of both the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement, these
agreements are mutually exclusive. The TBT Agreement covers all technical product
standards (voluntary or mandatory) except SPS measures.38 The TBT Agreement
enables Members to impose measures, which are technical regulations and standards
that lay down specifications regarding characteristics of a product, such as quality,
performance, safety or dimensions as well as requirements on how it should be
packaged or labelled, to the extent that these characteristics are not SPS issues39 and
that they aim to fulfil a legitimate objective such as the protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health or the environment40; the prevention of
36 SPS Agreement, Articles 2.2, 3.3, 5.6 and 5.8.
37 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.27 and Canada Panel Report, §8.30.
38 TBT Agreement, Article 1.5. See Chapter 4.
39 See Chapter 4.
40 TBT Agreement, Preamble and Article 2.2. See Chapter 4.
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deceptive practices; or national security requirements.41 The SPS Agreement states
that: "nothing in this Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the TBT
Agreement with respect to measures not within the scope of this Agreement".42
If a measure is clearly considered to be an SPS measure there is no doubt that the
SPS Agreement applies. Therefore, the Hormones Panel correctly considered the
applicability of the TBT Agreement when it found that since the measures at issue
were clearly sanitary measures, since the EC's initial legislation on the use of
hormones w as u ndeniably m otivated b y h ealth concerns, t hat t he T BT Agreement
was not applicable to the dispute.43
Therefore, the objective of the measure is critical to the determination of whether a
measure is subject to the disciplines of the TBT or SPS Agreement.
However, there may be instances where the application of the SPS and TBT
Agreement overlap.
Indeed, a defending party's measure could have multiple goals, some ofwhich would
qualify the measure as an SPS measure and others of which would qualify the
measure as a technical regulation or standard. For example, a measure that prohibits
the use of an additive might be adopted to safeguard human health (an SPS measure)
and to ensure the compositional integrity of a product (a TBT measure). Although
this case has not arisen so far in any dispute relating to the SPS Agreement, it could
be argued that the measure would be subject to both agreements. If it were possible
to distinguish between the TBT and SPS aspects of the measure under consideration,
then it could be argued that the SPS Agreement would apply to the particular aspect
of the measure that makes the measure an SPS measure and the TBT Agreement
would apply where the particular aspect of the measure is a product standard or
technical regulation.
41 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2. See Chapter 4.
42 SPS Agreement, Article 1.4.
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This reasoning is consistent with the findings of the Appellate Body in the European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas
(hereinafter "Bananas") case, where the scope of application of the GATT 1994 and
the GATS was examined:44
"Certain measures could be found to fall exclusively within the scope of the
GATT 1994, when they affect trade in goods as goods. Certain measures
could fall exclusively within the scope of the GATS, when they affect the
supply of services as services. There is yet a third category ofmeasures that
could be found to fall within the scope ofboth the GATT 1994 and the GATS.
These are measures that involve a service relating to a particular good or a
service supplied in conjunction with a particular good... Under the GATT
1994, the focus is on how the measure affects the goods involved. Under the
GATS, the focus is on how the measure affects the supply of the service or the
service suppliers involved. "
The relationship between the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement is also worth
investigating, as the obligations under these two agreements are also different.
The Hormones Panel considered the relationship between the SPS Agreement and
the GATT 1994, since the EC invoked Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. The parties
to the dispute did not believe that there was a conflict between the two agreements45
but considered which of the two agreements should be examined first. The EC was of
the opinion that the substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement only interpret
Article XX(b) of the GATT 199446 without adding new obligations whereas the
procedural provisions contained in the SPS Agreement contain requirements
additional to the GATT 1994. Therefore, the EC concluded that the substantive
provisions of the SPS Agreement can only be addressed if recourse is made to
Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994, i.e., if and only if, a violation of another provision
of the GATT 1994 is first established. The additional procedural provisions, on the
45 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.29 and Canada Panel Report, §8.32.
44 WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, §221-222.
45 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.32; Canada Panel Report, §8.35.
46 This is limited of course to SPS measures, since it was argued in Chapter 2, that Article XX(b)
does not exclusively refer to sanitary measures.
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other hand, can be examined directly and independently of prior GATT 1994
violation.
The implication of this interpretation is that if a measure complies with the national
treatment and MFN clauses contained in Article I and III of the GATT 1994 there
would be no reason to examine the measure under Article XX as the latter only
operates as an exception to these non-discrimination principles. The appeal of this
reasoning for the EC is that if the measures do not have to be examined under Article
XX, neither would they have to comply with the substantive requirements of the SPS
Agreement.
The US and Canada, on the other hand, argued that the SPS Agreement is the lex
specialis for a review of SPS measures and should, therefore, be addressed first. The
US claimed that the SPS Agreement is a freestanding agreement, which applies to all
SPS measures and imposes requirements additional to those contained in the non¬
discrimination clauses of the GATT 1994 or to those contained in Article XX of the
GATT 1 994. T herefore, t here w as n o b asis for applying t he S PS A greement o nly
after the GATT 1994 had been violated.
The Hormones Panel examined the relationship by considering the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of
the Agreement.47 The Panel, therefore, considered Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement,
which requires that the disputed measure is an SPS measure that affects international
trade but does not require there to be a prior violation of the GATT 1994.
In addition, the Panel noted that the SPS Agreement imposes substantive obligations
in addition to those contained in the GATT 199448, in particular Article XX(b), such
as t he o bjectives t o further t he u se o f h armonised S PS m easures a nd t o " improve
47 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, Article 31.
48 The Salmon Panel also affirmed this. Salmon, Panel Report, §8.39.
human health, animal health and phytosanitary situation in all Member States".49
However, it should be noted that these are objectives and not obligations.
The Panel also justified its view that the SPS Agreement contains additional
obligations that are not contained in the GATT 1994 by referring to Article 2.4 of the
SPS Agreement which provides that SPS measures "which conform to the relevant
provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the
obligations of the Members under the provisions of the GATT 1994 which relate to
the use of [SPS] measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b)" and Article
3.2 which provides that SPS measures "which conform to international standards,
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant
provisions of this Agreement and of GATT 1994".50
However, it shoidd be noted that the EC never considered that Article XX(b) would
not have to be interpreted in the light of the substantive requirements provided in the
SPS Agreement and that the procedural requirements of the SPS Agreement would
not have to be followed, but only that it would only have to comply with the
substantive obligations once Article XX(b) was examined. Therefore, the most
valuable finding made by the Panel is that there is no textual basis that supports the
proposal that the SPS Agreement only applies once there is a prior GATT 1994
violation.
The negotiating history of the SPS Agreement supports this finding as although, in
the early stages of the Uruguay Round the agreement was drafted as a Decision
interpreting the GATT 194751, it later evolved into a self-standing agreement in
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement.52 If the negotiators had intended the substantive
49 SPS Agreement, Preamble.
50 See Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.40 and Canada Panel Report, §8.43.
51 Decision of the Contracting Parties on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7, 20 November 1990, pi.
52 In April 1992, negotiators had agreed to change the form of the text into a freestanding
Agreement in the MTO Agreement, which later became the WTO Agreement. "Review of
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requirements of the SPS Agreement to merely interpret Article XX(b), then it would
have been more appropriate to incorporate them into the GATT 1994 as an
"Understanding" on the Interpretation ofArticle XX(b).
In addition, as the Panel correctly noted, the EC's argument that substantive and
procedural requirements should be treated differently does not have any textual basis
and would be difficult to perform as some provisions impose both substantive and
procedural requirements that cannot simply be dissociated.53
The Panel chose the most efficient manner to conduct its investigation by beginning
its analysis with the SPS Agreement since SPS measures must be consistent with the
SPS Agreement. If the measure had violated the GATT 1994 non-discrimination
rules, it would have been necessary to determine whether the measures were
consistent with Article XX(b) and, therefore, also the SPS Agreement.54 If the GATT
1994 non-discrimination rules had not been violated55, then it would have been
necessary to consider the SPS Agreement since consistency with the GATT 1994
does not imply consistency with the SPS Agreement. Indeed, only measures
conforming to the SPS Agreement are presumed consistent with the GATT 1994.56
Another provision that supports the findings of the Hormones and Salmon Panels that
was n ot m entioned bye ither P anel i s c ontained in a g eneral i nterpretative n ote t o
Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement that governs the relation between the GATT 1994
and other agreements of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round in case of conflict. This
provision provides that:
Individual Texts in the Draft Final Act, (Informal Note by the Secretariat), Document 707, 15
April 1992, p21 and Document 963, 10 June 1992, pi9.
53 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.37; Canada Panel Report, §8.40.
54 I disagree with the example given by the Panel that Article 5.1 contains both a procedural and a
substantive obligation, as will be discussed in section D.II.I.e.2. However, for example, Article
5.5 does contain both a procedural and a substantive obligation. Hormones, US Panel Report,
§8.42; Canada Panel Report, §8.45.
-5 Article XI on quantitative restrictions would not be considered, as it is mutually exclusive from
Article III.
56 SPS Agreement, Article 2.4.
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"In event ofconflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1 994 a nd a provision ofa nother A greement i n A nnex 1A ... the
provision ofthe other Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict. "
This interpretative note only refers to cases of conflict between two opposing
provisions where the "other Agreement" only takes precedence to the extent of the
conflict. Imposing supplementary obligations could be seen as a conflict with the
provisions provided in Article XX of the GATT 1994, if one favours a broad
definition of conflict,57 and, therefore, implies that the SPS Agreement takes
precedence to the extent of these supplementary provisions. In the case of the non¬
discrimination principles contained in the GATT 1994, these could be considered to
be in conflict with the fact that the discrimination principle provided for in the SPS
Agreement is one relating to arbitrary or unjustified discrimination as opposed to
national treatment or MFN. Steinberg who stated that the SPS Agreement requires
measures to be applied on a national treatment or MFN basis seems to have
misinterpreted this point.58 The reason why the SPS Agreement does not impose such
a standard is probably due to the fact that since there are differences in climate, pests
or diseases and food safety conditions, it is not always appropriate to impose the
same SPS requirements on food, animal or plant products originating from different
countries.
Therefore, from the above it can be concluded that the SPS Agreement would take
precedence over Article I and III and by implication Article XX of the GATT 1994
and that Article XX(b) has become redundant as far as SPS measures taken to protect
the territory of the importing state are concerned.
It should be emphasised that the application of the GATT 1994 is only excluded in
cases in which another agreement explicitly regulates rights or obligations with
regard to a certain trade measure that is similar in scope to one regulated by the
GATT 1994. The Appellate Body in the Bananas case also took this position in
57 See Chapter 5, section B.l.
58 R. Steinberg, "Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional
Trajectories ofRule Development", 91 AJIL (1997), p237 and footnotes 30, 31.
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finding that the Agreement on Agriculture is lex specialis in relation to Article XIII
of the GATT 1994.59 The GATT 1994, therefore, only applies to the extent that the
former does not contain a specific provision.
The SPS Agreement has created an alternative to the GATT approach of moving
from Article I, III and IX to Article XX. Under the SPS Agreements even non¬
discriminatory regulations permissible under the GATT 1994, Article I and III might
be challenged under the SPS Agreement as illegitimate. Therefore, in adopting the
SPS Agreement, WTO Members recognised that a discrimination-based test is
insufficient in distinguishing between legitimate SPS measures and those
implemented for protectionist purposes as even non-discriminatory measures have
the potential to hamper international trade.
This is similar to the far-reaching Cassis cle Dijon jurisprudence of the ECJ, where it
was held that it is not sufficient that a measure is non-discriminatory, it must also be
consistent with the "proportionality principle" or "rule of reason", which requires
that measures be necessary, reasonable and proportional.60
In this next section, the obligations of the SPS Agreement will be considered, as this
is, of course, an essential process in assessing the SPS Agreement. However, the
focus of this chapter will be on the provisions that have been subject to scrutiny by
the panels and the Appellate Body, beginning with the rules on harmonisation, which
have a substantial impact on the operation of the SPS Agreement.
59 Bananas, Appellate Body Report, pp94-95, §221-222.
60 Rewe Zentralverwaltung AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon),
Case 120/78, ECR 649, (1979). Proportionality implies that the trade impact and cost of a
measure should bear a reasonable relationship to the importance of the social objective it is
designed to achieve. In other w ords, a balance should be struck between different values and
interests involved. EC Commission v. Denmark, Case 302/86, 1 CMLR (1989), 619, p632. The
proportionality test is also used in other contexts. For example, in Canadian Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) Judgement, §74-85, it was recognised that under the rides
codified in the UNCLOS (Articles 225 and 298(1 )(b)) and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement
(Article 22(1 )(f)), enforcement of fishery conservation and management measures entails
minimal use of force, subject to principles of necessity and proportion. This was subsequently
reaffirmed the in 1999 M/VSaiga Judgment, §137-138.
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D. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE SPS AGREEMENT
I. Harmonisation
1.) Scope ofArticle 3 of the SPS Agreement
In order to prevent barriers to trade arising through the proliferation of national laws,
the SPS Agreement requires that wherever possible, internationally harmonised
standards be used.61
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement contains the rules on harmonisation and it was
designed "to harmonise [SPS] measures on as wide a basis as possible".62 In order to
reach this objective, Article 3.1 provides that "Members shall base their [SPS]
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they
exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, and in particular in
paragraph 3." Therefore, Article 3 of the SPS Agreement is not applicable if no
international standards exist for the SPS measure in question.63
2.) Determining the Existence of International Standards
The first step in determining whether a measure is consistent with Article 3 is to
establish the existence of an international standard.
The SPS Agreement uses the levels of protection specified in international standards,
guidelines, and recommendations as a baseline for examining the levels of protection
provided by measures implemented by parties to the Agreement. Annex A to the SPS
Agreement lists the applicable international standards for food safety, animal health
and zoonoses, and plant health. With respect to food safety, the applicable standards
61 SPS Agreement, Article 3.
62 Ibidem, Article 3.1.
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are those established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (hereinafter "Codex"),
an international body of which most WTO Members are member. Codex establishes,
inter alia, Acceptable Daily Intakes (hereinafter "ADIs") and Maximum Residue
Limits (hereinafter "MRLs") for various veterinary drugs.64
Codex found that, with respect to the natural hormones at issue, when used for
growth-promotion purposes in accordance with good animal husbandry practice,
ADIs and MRLs were "unnecessary" because the use of the hormones was unlikely
to pose a health hazard.65 The Codex, therefore, effectively established an
"unlimited" residue standard for natural hormones. With respect to the synthetic
hormones at issue, Codex established ADIs and MRLs for trenbolone and zeranol but
not for MGA.
The Panel, therefore, found that international standards exist in the sense of Article
3.1 for five of the six hormones at issue.66 MGA, for which no international standard
exists, is, therefore, not subject to the requirements of Article 3. The Panel's finding
was not appealed.
Once it has been determined that a measure is subject to the requirements of Article
3, measures must either fulfil the conditions ofArticle 3.1, Article 3.2 or Article 3.3.
63 In a case where no international standard is applicable, the measure must still comply with the
other provisions of the SPS Agreement. Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.251 and Canada Panel
Report, §8.254.
64 An ADI for a particular veterinary drug provides an estimate of the amount of that drug which
may be ingested over a lifetime without appreciable health risk. The corresponding MRL sets a
limit on the amount of drug residue permitted in food in order that the ADI not be exceeded.
65 See 32nd JECFA Report of 1988. The residue levels of these natural hormones found in meat
from treated animals were extremely low relative to the amounts produced daily in human
beings, or occurring naturally in other foods and the total residue levels found in meat from
treated animals fell within the normal range of levels found in meat from untreated animals.
66 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.70; Canada Panel Report, §8.73.
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3.) Measures Conforming to International Standards
The most unambiguous provision is Article 3.2, which covers measures that
"conform to" an international standard. This means that the measure must be
identical to the international standard.67
Article 3.2 provides that measures that "conform to" international standards are
"deemed to be necessary". Therefore, measures that are consistent with Article 3.2
will be deemed to be consistent with the necessity requirements contained in Article
2.2 and Article 5.6.68 In other words, the measures will be deemed to be "not more
trade restrictive than required" and not to have been applied for a longer period than
necessary.69
However, there are good reasons to believe that it is not appropriate to deem that
measures that conform to an international standard are necessary and only applied to
the extent necessary. First, an international standard may not be the best option as
there may be an alternative that is significantly less trade restrictive70 as the standards
may have become obsolete and, therefore, not necessary. Second, an international
standard is not able to prescribe the duration of the measures since these will often
have to be determined on a case-by-case basis suggesting that the measure that
conforms to an international standard is not necessarily only applied for a period of
time that is necessary.
Although the drafters should not have provided that measures that conform to an
international standard are deemed to be necessary, the drafters recognise that
measures conforming to international standards could be inconsistent with other
provisions of the SPS Agreement. For example, an importing country may restrict
67 Hormones Appellate Body Report, §170.
68 Although Article 3.2 only refers explicitly to Article 5.6, consistency with Article 5.6 implies
consistency with Article 2.2. See Section D.II.2.
69 See Section D.II.2. for analysis of necessity requirements.
70 Necessary in terms of Article 5.6 is not necessarily the least-trade-restrictive option. See section
D.II.2.b.
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trade with respect to a particular industry that it does not have within its territory.
This w ould m ean t hat t he m easure i s applied e xtra-territorially and, t herefore, n ot
within the scope of application of the SPS Agreement.71 Another example is where a
Member imposes an SPS measure restricting imports of diseased meat, when its own
production is already affected and would, therefore, be inconsistent with Article 2.3
which provides that measures should not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination.
Therefore, an importing country is advised to observe international standards where
they exist as this would increase the chances of the measure being found consistent
with the SPS Agreement. However, it should be noted that there is only a
presumption of consistency with the SPS Agreement.
4.) Measures Based on International Standards Analysis Under Article 3.1
Article 3.1 requires that the SPS measures be "based on" international standards.
The Hormones Panel found that although the SPS Agreement does not explicitly
define the words "based on" used in Article 3.1, "Article 3.2 ... equates measures
based on international standards with measures which conform to such standards."72
Although, there is no textual basis in the SPS Agreement to support this finding, the
Panel equated the meaning of "based on" and "conform to" in Article 3.1. The Panel
also found that for an SPS measure to be "based on" an international standard the
measure must reflect the same level of SPS protection as the international standard.73
The Panel supported this finding by referring to Article 3.3, which provides that:
"Members may introduce or maintain [SPS] measures which result in a
higher level of [SPS] protection than would be achieved by measures based
on relevant international standards, if there is a scientificjustification, or as a
71 SPS Agreement, Annex A § 1.
72 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.72 and Canada Panel Report, §8.75.
73 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.72-8.73 and Canada Panel Report, §8.75-8.76.
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consequence of the level of [SPS] protection a Member determines to be
appropriate in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1
through 8 ofArticle 5. "
The Panel concluded that since Article 3.3 "explicitly relates the definition of
sanitary measures based on international standards to the level of sanitary protection
achieved b y t hese m easures",74 t hat i n o rder t o d etermine w hether a m easure w as
based on an international standard it was necessary to consider the level of protection
achieved.
In other words, the Panel concluded that measures "based on" international standards
could be equated with measures that "conform to" such standards as used in Article
3.2 in interpreting both Article 3.1 and 3.3.
On the basis of these findings, the Panel found that since the SPS measures at issue
banned residues of the hormones when administered for growth-promotion purposes,
thereby establishing a "no residue" level and the Codex standards allowed
quantifiable residues for the five hormones, that the measures were not "based on"
international standards as mandated by Article 3.1.
In the appeal, the question was raised whether the Panel correctly interpreted Articles
3.1 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's
conclusion that the term "based on" used in Articles 3.1 and 3.3 has the same
meaning as the term "conform to" used in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.
The Appellate Body stated: "a thing is commonly said to be "based on" another thing
when the former "stands" or is "founded" or "built" upon or "is supported by" the
latter.75 In other words, a measure may be said to be "based on" an international
standard when "only some, not all, of the elements of the standard are incorporated
into the measure."76 In order to establish that a measure is "based on" an
74 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.72-8.73 and Canada Panel Report, §8.75-8.76.
75 Hormones Appellate Body Report, §163.
76 Ibidem, §163 and 171.
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international standard only some connection between measure and standard is
required. The Appellate Body found that the ordinary meanings of the terms were
different; "conform t o" is n arrower i n s cope t han " based o n", s o t hat i t w ould b e
possible for a measure to be "based on" a standard, while not conforming to the
standard. The Appellate Body took the view that in order to "conform to" something
expresses a sense of compliance that went beyond the meaning of "based on".77
Although the Appellate Body made it clear that the term "based on" does not require
identity between the measure and the international standard, the Appellate Body did
not describe in either quantitative or qualitative terms how much of a link between
the measure and the international standard must be present in order for a measure to
be considered as "based on". When international standards are framed in terms of
numerical limits, e.g., ADTs and MRLs, it is difficult to translate the Appellate
Body's general statement that less than equivalence is required between a measure
and a standard to find that the measure is "based on" the standard into numbers.
The Appellate Body also supported its finding by citing the interpretative principle of
in dubio mitius for the proposition that given multiple possible interpretations, the
meaning that is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation is preferred. Here, it
could not be assumed that the parties to the Agreement intended "based on" to be
read " conformed t o", b ecause s uch a n i nterpretation w ould i ncrease t he b urden o f
compliance relative to that imposed by interpreting "based on" less restrictively.78
The Appellate Body, further, supported its argument by stating that since "based on"
and "conform to" are phrases that are both used in the SPS Agreement suggests that
the phrases were intended to have different meanings.79
The Appellate Body also made the point that the Panel's interpretation did not
comply with the object and purpose of Article 3 as the aim of the SPS Agreement
77 Hormones Appellate Body Report, §163.
78 Ibidem, §165.
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was to "harmonise SPS measures on as wide a basis as possible..." and because the
desire was expressed in the Preamble "to further the use of harmonised SPS
measures between Members on the basis of international standards, guidelines and
recommendations developed by the relevant international organisations".80 These
phrases suggested that harmonisation is a future goal of Article 3, and that, therefore,
it was not appropriate to read Article 3.1 as requiring Members to harmonise their
SPS measures by ensuring that their measures conformed to international standards
in the present thereby giving them an obligatory character.81 In other words, the
Panel, by requiring compliance with international standards, was forcing
harmonisation in the present.
The Appellate Body correctly recognised that the SPS Agreement does not require
harmonisation of standards in the present. Indeed, if this were not the case it would
not have been necessary to include a provision on the acceptance of equivalent
standards which is a novelty that has been included in the SPS82 and TBT
Agreement83 inspired by the ECJ in the Cassis de Dijon case84, which introduced the
concept to compensate for the lack of harmonisation in standards in the EEC.85
However, the Appellate Body's argument is not very convincing since even if "based
on" and "conform to" were equated in Article 3.1 and Article 3.3, there would




83 Article 2.7. The TBT Agreement's concept of equivalence is weaker that of the SPS Agreement
as the TBT Agreement only requires Members to give "positive consideration" to accepting
equivalent measures of other Members.
84 Where the exporting country objectively demonstrates that its measures achieve the importing
Member's appropriate level of SPS protection and gives reasonable access to the importing
Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures, different standards would be
considered equivalent.
85 So far, no dispute settlement panel or Appellate Body has had to make findings on this issue.
This is certainly not because all standards are harmonised. The reason is that disputes between
countries d o n ot a rise b ecause a n e xporting c ountry i s faced with i rnport r estrictions b ecause
they have put in place measures that although reach the same level of SPS protection are
different in appearance but because countries do not share the same view on SPS protection
priorities.
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nevertheless be a possibility for a Member to impose measures that achieve a higher
level of SPS protection than the international standard. This suggests that the use of
harmonised standards, according to the Panel, is not obligatory.
McNeil criticised the Appellate Body's interpretation as opposed to the Panel's
interpretation for reiterating the objective of harmonising SPS measures on as wide a
basis as possible, thereby leaving the use of Codex standards voluntary, rather than
focusing on the mandatory language contained in Article 3.1 that Members "shall"
base measures on existing international standards.86 However, as was mentioned
above the Panel did not render the use of Codex standards obligatory. Therefore,
both the Panel and Appellate Body did, correctly, recognise that the use of
harmonised standards was voluntary.
McNeil's concern with respect to the voluntary use of Codex standards was that the
requirement contained in Article 3.1 had been "converted into an idealistic but
wholly unenforceable objective".87 This is not the case because, as will be discussed
further o n, e xceptions t o A rticle 3 .1 w ill h ave t o p ass a r igorous t est o f s cientific
justification, which creates an incentive for Members to base their measures on
international standards and, therefore, promote harmonisation.
What can be said is that the Panel's interpretation with regard to harmonisation is
more rigid than the Appellate Body's interpretation as a measure must conform to the
international standard except as provided in Article 3.3 as opposed to only being
based on the international standard.
The reason the Panel equated "based on" and "conform to" could be explained by
considering Article 3.3, which provides that a Member may introduce a measure
which achieves a higher level of protection than would be achieved by measures that
are "based on" an international standard. If the requirement of the measures being
86 D. McNeil, "The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The
European Union's Hormone Ban", 39 Virginia JIL 1 (1998), pi23.
87 Ibidem.
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"based on" an international standard is interpreted to mean that these measures do
not achieve the level of protection of the international standard, then two problems
could arise. First, this interpretation would imply that in order for a Member to
determine whether it has put in place a measure that achieves a higher level of
protection in terms of Article 3.3, it would have to determine that all measures that
could be considered as "based on" the international standard would result in a lower
level o f p rotection t han its m easure. T herefore, t here i s a p roblem t o q uantify t he
level of protection of measures "based on" an international standard because there
may be more than one measure that is "based on" a given international standard and
it is very unlikely that all these measures achieve the same level of protection. In
other words, it is difficult if not impossible to compare levels ofmeasures "based on"
an international standard with those achieved by a measure that is not. Only a
requirement that measures which achieve a higher level of protection than measures
that "conform to" an international standard would make sense as it would be clear
which level of protection the measure conforming to the international standards
achieves.
However, it is clear that "based on" cannot be equated with "conform to" as they do
not have the same meaning. Therefore, it would have been more logical for the
drafters of the SPS Agreement to provide in Article 3.3 an exception for measures
that achieve a higher level of protection than those that "conform to" international
standards. This would imply that Members should apply measures that "conform to"
international standards and that those measures that are merely "based on"
international standards or those standards that have no real relationship to the
international standard and achieve a higher level of protection than those measures
that "conform to" the international standard can be applied providing that they are
scientifically justified and applied in accordance with Article 5.
This i nterpretation w ould p reserve t he m eaning ofA rticle 3 .1 as m easures "based
on" international standards, although not benefiting from a presumption of
compliance with the SPS Agreement or with the GATT 1994 or being deemed
necessary, would have an advantage over those that are not "based on" an
international standard, in that they would have a greater chance of complying with
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Article 5.1, which requires that a measure be "based on" a risk assessment. Indeed,
international standards are usually developed on the basis of risk assessments, which
tends to suggest that if a measure is based on an international standard that it is also
"based on" a risk assessment.88 Unfortunately, no panel or Appellate Body decision
has been confronted with a situation where the measure was found to be consistent
with Article 3.1 and had to make a subsequent finding under Article 5.1.
The above analysis demonstrates that using measures that are "based on"
international standards can be advantageous in ensuring the consistency of a measure
with the SPS Agreement. However, establishing whether measures are based on
international standards is problematic and, therefore, introduces a relatively high
degree of uncertainty in the determination of whether or not a measure is consistent
with Article 3.1. In addition, the techniques provided for in Article 3.1 and Article
3.2 are arguably not very effective from an SPS protection point of view as
international standards generally provide for a fairly low level of protection, since
they are the products of consensus. Article 3.1 also has the disadvantage of enabling
WTO Members to choose a level of protection that is even lower than that the one
provided for in the international standard. Nevertheless, the SPS Agreement does
permit Members to impose measures that reflect a higher level of protection than the
level protection of an international standard, and, therefore, at least, does not thwart
efforts by some Members to impose high levels of SPS protection. This option will
be analysed in the following section.
A Member is not obliged to perform its own risk assessment. Hormones Appellate Body Report,
§190. See G. Goh and A.R. Ziegler, "A Real World Where People Live and Work and Die -
Australian SPS Measures After the WTO Appellate Body's Decision in the Hormones Case", 32
JWT 5 (1998), p282.
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5.) Analysis ofArticle 3.3 of the SPS Agreement
In order for a measure to be consistent with Article 3.3, a Member must demonstrate
that the measure adopted achieves a level of protection that is higher than that
achieved by a measure based on an international standard.89
The right to adopt more stringent measures is, of course, not unqualified, as there are
two alternative and independently sufficient conditions included in Article 3.3. First,
there must be a "scientific justification" for the adoption ofmore stringent measures
or it must be established that as a consequence of the level of SPS protection a
Member determines to be appropriate,90 the measure is consistent with Article 5.
Walker has argued that the reason both conditions were included could be that the
adoption of particular science policies used to complete risk assessments should be
viewed asan aspect o f selecting an appropriate 1 evel o f protection.91 Therefore, a
more protective measure that a Member justifies by its adopted science policies
should be evaluated under the second condition of Article 3.3. On the other hand, a
more protective measure that is justified by appeal to purely scientific reasoning
should be evaluated on its merits as a scientific justification under the first condition
ofArticle 3.3.
However, in practice, the distinction between these two conditions is in fact more
apparent than real.92 Indeed, both exceptions have the same effect since both refer to
a situation where the basis for departing from the relevant international standard is
that the international standard is not sufficient to achieve the Member's appropriate
89 Therefore, although Article 3 .3 enables Members to impose a higher level ofprotection than
reflected by a measure that is based on an international standard, the level of protection could
still theoretically be lower than the level of protection reflected in the international standard.
90 Annex A, §5 defines the appropriate level of protection as the level of protection deemed
appropriate by the Member establishing an SPS measure to protect human, animal or plant life
or health within its territory.
91 V. Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
C1LJ 2 (1998), p276-277.
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level of protection.93 In addition, although the requirement that there be a "scientific
justification" does not refer to Article 5, the last sentence of Article 3.3 clearly states
that all measures falling within its purview "shall not be inconsistent with any other
provision of this Agreement". Textually, "other provisions" include both Article 5
and Article 2. Second, the definition of "scientific justification" contained in the
footnote to Article 3.3 provides for an examination and evaluation of available
scientific information, which could be viewed as a risk assessment as provided for in
Article 5 and defined in Annex A.94
Both the Hormones Panel and Appellate concluded that, despite the fact that "Article
3.3 is evidently not a model of clarity in drafting and communication"95 and despite
the disjunctive nature of Article 3.3, compliance with Article 3.3 requires compliance
with Article 5 and Article 2. For example, the Agricultural Products Appellate Body
stated that there is a scientific justification for a measure, within the meaning of
Article 3.3, if there is finding of sufficient scientific evidence according to Article
2.2, in other words a rational relationship between the SPS measure at issue and the
available scientific information.96 Therefore, although Article 3.3 allows for
measures that achieve a higher level of SPS protection, drawing the line between a
genuine SPS measure and a protectionist measure is left to other disciplines of the
Agreement.
It is these disciplines that will be considered in the following sections.
II. Obligations under Article 2.2
Article 2.2, one of the basic obligations of the SPS Agreement, imposes three
cumulative requirements on Members imposing SPS measures. SPS measures shall
92 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §177.
93 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.81 and Canada Panel Report, §8.84.
94 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.81 and Canada Panel Report, §8.84. See also Agricultural
Products, Appellate Body Report, §82.
95 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §175.
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be " applied o nly t o t he extent n ecessary top rotect h uman, a nimal o r p lant 1 ife o r
health", be "based on scientific principles" and "not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence, except as provided for in paragraph 7 ofArticle 5".
Each of these requirements will be examined beginning with the requirement that the
measures be "based on scientific principles" and "not be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence". These requirements will be considered together since
compliance with them will depend on whether the measure is based on a risk
assessment.
1.) Measures Based on Scientific Principles and Not Maintained Without
Sufficient Scientific Evidence
a) Relationship between Articles 2.2, 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS
Agreement
The Hormones Panel considered that Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement contains
basic obligations, which should be analysed in the light of Article 5.1 that contains
more specific requirements.97 Article 5.1 requires that SPS measures be "based on an
assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or
plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the
relevant international organisations". The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel and
"stress[ed] that Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should constantly be read together. Article 2.2
informs Article 5.1: the elements that define the basic obligation set out in Article 2.2
impart meaning to Article 5.1".98 Both the Panel and Appellate Body in the Salmon
and Agricultural Products99 agreed but also included Article 5.2 in the specific
96 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §82.
97 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.93; Canada Panel Report, §8.96.
98 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, § 180.
99 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.450 and Appellate Body Report, §78.
112
obligations interpreting Article 2.2, which provides for factors to be taken into
account when performing a risk assessment.100
The Salmon Panel stated that:
"Articles 5.1 and 5.2 ... may be seen to be m arking out and elaborating a
particular route leading to the same destination set out in" Article 2.2.
Indeed, in the event a [SPSJ measure is not based on a risk assessment as
required in Articles 5.1 and 5.2, this measure can be presumed, more
generally, not to be based on scientific principles or to be maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence. We conclude, therefore, that if we find a
violation of the more specific Article 5.1 or 5.2 such finding can be presumed
to imply a violation of the more general provisions of Article 2.2. We do
recognise, at the same time, that given the more general character ofArticle
2.2 not all violations ofArticle 2.2 are covered by Articles 5.1 and 5.2".101
Indeed, there are three requirements to be fulfilled in Article 2.2. Article 5.6
interprets more specifically the requirement of applying measures only to the extent
necessary, a nd t herefore a lso d etennines c onsistency w ith A rticle 2.2. In a ddition,
Article 5.7 permits the application of temporary measures that are otherwise
inconsistent with the requirements of providing scientific evidence in Article 2.2.
Therefore, determining whether the measure is "based on" a risk assessment is only
one factor w hich m ay 1 ead t o a finding o f i nconsistency with t he r equirements i n
Article 2.2, but it will lead to a finding of whether the measure is based on scientific
principles and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.
In this next section, therefore, the requirements of a risk assessment will be
considered in detail to determine when a measure is justified on scientific grounds.
100 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §146.
101 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.52.
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b) The relationship between risk assessment and risk
management
Risk assessment is a means of interpreting and characterising scientific evidence that
involves making scientific determinations in four subcategories: hazard
identification, dose-response assessment or hazard characterisation, exposure
assessment and risk characterisation.102 Hazard identification aims to determine the
hazardous properties of a substance103 and identify the types of adverse health effects
these properties can cause. Dose-response assessment or hazard characterisation
evaluates the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the casual relationship between a
given dose or level of exposure of a dangerous substance and the occurrence or
severity of adverse effects. Exposure assessment evaluates the probability,
magnitude, duration, and timing of the doses that population is exposed to as a result
of different ways of exposure to a dangerous substance. Finally, risk characterisation
is a quantitative or qualitative estimate that is based on the three elements considered
above and establishes the total risk of adverse health effects to a given population. It
is this final determination that serves as a basis for decision-making by risk
managers.
In the Hormones case, the Panel stated that: "an assessment of risks is, at least for
risks to human life or health, a scientific examination of data and factual studies"104
and that "a risk assessment ... is a scientific process aimed at establishing the
scientific basis for the sanitary measure"105 and that therefore, only the first three
factors of Article 5.2 which provides an indication of the factors that should be taken
into account in the assessment of risk such as "available scientific evidence",
"relevant processes and production methods", "relevant inspection, sampling and
testing methods", "prevalence of specific diseases or pests", "existence of pest- or
102 See for example the Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on the Application of
Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues convened at the request of Codex in March 1995.
103 Such as establishing carcinogenicity.
104 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.94; Canada Panel Report, §8.97.
105 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.107; Canada Panel Report, §8.110.
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disease-free areas", "relevant ecological and environmental conditions" and
"quarantine or other treatment", should be considered.
The Panel found that the factors provided in Article 5.2,
"do not seem to cover the general problem ofcontrol (such as the problem of
ensuring the good observance of good practice) which can exist for any
substance. The risks related to the general problem of control do not seem to
be specific to the substance at issue but to economic or social incidence
related to a substance or its particular use (such as economic incentives for
abuse). These non-scientific factors should, therefore not be taken into
account in a risk assessment but in risk management. "106
However, the Panel was probably not convinced of its differentiation when it stated
that even if these factors could be taken into account in a risk assessment none had
been made of such a risk.
The Panel differentiated between risk assessment and risk management, viewing risk
assessment as a purely scientific exercise, which would provide Members with a
basis on which to decide, on the basis of its own value judgements, whether it can
accept the risks that have been identified and in doing so a Member sets its
"appropriate level of [SPS] protection". The determination and application of the
appropriate level of protection by a Member was considered to be part of risk
management.107
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's categorical distinction between scientific
and non-scientific factors and found that the risks identified by the EC such as risks
arising from a failure to observe the requirements of good veterinary practice, in
combination with multiple problems relating to detection and control of such abusive
failure, in the administration of hormones to cattle for growth promotion were
relevant to the present case.108 Indeed, Annex C of the SPS Agreement states:
106 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.146 and Canada Panel Report, §8.149.
107 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.160; Canada Panel Report, §8.163.
108 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §205.
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"control, inspection and approval procedures include, inter alia, procedures for
sampling, testing and certification".
The Appellate Body found these factors to be consistent with the object and purpose
of the SPS Agreement to examine and evaluate all risks for potential for adverse
effects on human health arising form the presence of contaminants and toxins in
food, although it stated that potential abuse in the administration of controlled
substances need not be, or should be evaluated in each and every case.109
The Appellate Body stated that it was an error to exclude all matters not susceptible
of quantitative analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory methods
commonly associated with the physical sciences from the scope of a risk assessment
in the sense of Article 5.1.110
Some of the other factors considered in Article 5.2 such as "relevant processes and
production methods" and "relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods" are not
necessarily o r wholly susceptible of investigation according to laboratory m ethods
of, for example, biochemistry or pharmacology. In addition, the Appellate Body
noted that this might not have been intended to be an exhaustive list of factors.111
Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded, somewhat theatrically, that the risk to be
evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 "is not only the risk ascertainable in
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but also risk in
human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse
effects on human health in the real world where people live and work and die".112
The Appellate Body correctly recognised that the Panel's strict distinction between
scientific factors and non-scientific factors is not realistic. Indeed, all risk
assessments involve scientific uncertainty, due to a lack of knowledge, which creates
109 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §206.
110 Ibidem, §187.
111 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, § 187.
112 Ibidem.
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an inherent potential for error in scientific information. These errors can occur from
the validity or reliability of the available data such as data gaps, uncertainties on the
particular variables used to gather data, the measurements taken, the samples drawn
or from the accuracy ofmodels used and model inputs.
Scientific uncertainty suggests that there may more than one scientifically plausible
outcome113, for example, because there may be more than one scientifically plausible
model implying that there may be different conclusions that can be drawn from the
data that are equally valid and reasonable.
When science does not provide a definitive answer on the data, models and
assumptions to be used, risk assessors usually evaluate the scientific plausibility of
alternative models and model inputs and choose between alternative models or model
inputs by following science policies rules, that specify how to deal with
uncertainties. Science policies, however, are not solely scientific in nature, as they
may stipulate that a conservative approach to human health should be taken or
prescribe the use of default assumptions. Therefore, the scientific process of risk
assessment necessarily requires inferences, choices and assumptions that reflect
policy preferences.114 Since science policies are a function of risk management
policies, it is clear that risk assessment and risk management interact, as elements of
risk management based on non-scientific factors are also present in risk assessments.
In addition, scientific experts carrying out risk assessments routinely make a range of
judgements on matters such as which risks are within the scope of their assessment
and which are not; how much depth of scientific analysis is justified on a particular
question or risk; where adequate scientific data do or do not exist to support an
assessment; which evidence is most central or most credible on a particular point. In
deciding t hese m atters, experts a re guided t o s ome e xtent b y t heir o wn subjective
"J In the sense of a scientifically plausible outcome that is supported by empirical data not mere
speculation and by a line of reasoning that results in a rational basis for drawing a conclusion.
114 D. Wirth, "The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA Trade Disciplines", 27 CILJ
(1994), p834.
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beliefs on what is important, relevant and reasonable. For example, a scientist may
have to decide on whether the dose-response relationships should be extrapolated
according to best estimates or according to upper confidence limits. Another example
is whether a scientist should take a conservative approach to the interpretation of
results or should introduce in the weighting given to various variables in the
assessment a mixture of fact, experience and personal values. This is further
evidence that non-scientific factors are also contained in risk assessments.
It has been argued that risk assessment and risk management can be distinguished as
risk assessment is limited to drawing inferences supported by science combined with
explicit science policies115, but does not include risk management decisions based on
cost-benefit or feasibility analysis or how scientific analysis may influence the
regulatory process, or decide on the risk appetite, that is, the acceptability of a risk
level.
In other words, risk assessments normally evaluate a single target exposure, which
involves a mixture of scientific analysis, scientific opinion and value judgements
rather than evaluate a number of risk management alternatives that provide an array
of different benefits and costs for national authorities to consider.
However, since risk management goals are incorporated in the science policies it is
probably quite difficult to draw a clear line between risk assessment and risk
management. Indeed, it could be argued that a conservative approach to risks is a
decision that has been taken on the basis of a determination on the acceptability of a
risk. Therefore, science policies reflect risk management policies on what is safe and
acceptable. It is also true that risk assessments are an integral component of risk
management as these are normally taken into account in determining the policy to be
implemented.
11 ;" In order to preserve risk assessments from an overwhelming intrusion of values, it may be best
for Members to use explicit science policies that allow risk assessments to remain more
objective as transparency and consistency in demonstrated in the face of scientific uncertainty.
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Although, the Appellate Body recognised that the Panel's strict distinction between
scientific factors and non-scientific factors was unrealistic, the Appellate Body
criticised the Panel for distinguishing between "risk assessment" and "risk
management" as the latter has no textual basis in the Agreement. The Appellate
Body went on to state that the rules of treaty interpretation require an interpretation
of the words actually used.116 However, the fact that the Panel stated that "Article 5.4
to 5.6 are particularly relevant to the risk management decision"117 is in fact correct.
Risk management "is the process of identifying, evaluating, selecting and
implementing actions to reduce risk"118, which includes determining the appropriate
level of protection, establishing measures to achieve that level of protection and
accepting measures established by other Members as being equivalent to its own.
Factors that are taken into account in risk management include goals of health and
environmental policy, relevant legislation, legal precedent, and application of
social119, economic and political values.120
The aim of these provisions, unlike Article 5.1 to 5.3121, is not to assess risks but to
enable Members within a trade conscious framework to implement strategies for
116 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §181.
117 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.96 and Canada Panel Report, §8.99. Article 5.4 establishes the
objective of minimising negative trade effects in the determination by a Member of its
appropriate level of protection. Article 5.5 aims at achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of protection. Article 5.6 provides that the sanitary measure, which
is finally adopted, shall not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the appropriate
level of protection of the Member concerned.
118 The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management 1
(1997), 1.
119 The occurrence of low probability, high consequence event can cause the public's evaluation of
the re-occurrence of an event to be biased upward, thereby increasing the pressure for stricter
regulations. This was the case with the hormones ban for growth promotion as the ban to some
extent was imposed to deal with public anxieties that emerged in the 1980's following the
"oestrogen scandal" in Italy when residues of hormone Diethylstilbestrol (DES) were found in
baby food and had caused young children to grow breasts. The public's perception of risk is also
influenced by non-scientific factors such as whether the risk is natural or man-made, whether the
risk is taken voluntarily or involuntarily, the distribution of the risk and the distribution of risk
over time.
'20 w Ruckelshaus, "Risk, Science, and Democracy", Issues Sci. & Tech., (1985), p28.
121 Article 5.3 sums up relevant economic factors to be taken into account in assessing risks to
animal or plant life or health such as potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in
the event of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease, the costs of control or
eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and the relative cost-effectiveness of
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accepting or mitigating identified risks. Therefore, the Appellate Body by rejecting
the term risk management obviously did not attempt to investigate its meaning.
In conclusion, a risk assessment is not purely scientific and risk management is not
purely value based. To consider a risk assessment as purely scientific is to reject the
role of science policy in risk assessments and to consider risk management as purely
value-based is to ignore the role of science, for example, in cost-benefit analysis, in
risk management decisions.
Therefore, a clean separation between science and economic and social welfare
policy is unrealistic and illusory.
With these considerations in mind, the meaning of the requirement in Article 5.1 that
a measure should be "based on" a risk assessment will be examined.
c) The interpretation of a measure "based on" a risk assessment
In order to determine whether a measure is "based on" a risk assessment it is first
necessary to determine whether a risk assessment exists in the sense of the SPS
Agreement.
(1) Establishing the existence of a risk assessment
The SPS Agreement defines a "risk assessment" of SPS measures as:
"the evaluation ofthe likelihood ofentry, establishment or spread ofa pest or
disease within the territory of an importing Member according to the [SPS]
measures which might be applied, and of the associated potential biological
and economic consequences "l22
or
alternative approaches to limiting risks. Article 5.3 is limited to animal and plant life or health
but not human life or health.
I2- SPS Agreement, Annex A, §4.
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"the evaluation ofthe potentialfor adverse effects on human or animal health
arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs. "123
In the Hormones case the second definition is applicable as it is closely related to the
definition of an SPS measure aimed at protecting human life from risks arising from
additives. In the Salmon case the first definition is applicable as it is closely related
to the definition of an SPS measure aimed at protecting animal life or health from
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of diseases.124 In the
Agricultural Products case, the first definition is applicable as the measure was
aimed at protecting plant life or health from risks arising from the entry,
establishment or spread of pests. In the Apples case, the first definition is applicable
as the measure aims to protect plant life or health from risks associated with the
entry, establishment or spread of a disease-causing organism.
In interpreting the requirement to evaluate the potential for adverse effects on human
health arising from contaminants, the Hormones Panel elaborated a risk assessment
as a two step process that should first, identify the adverse effects on human health
arising from the use of the hormones at issue when used as growth promoters in meat
and meat products and second, where adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or
probability of occurrence of such effects".125
The Hormones Panel, based on the findings of the scientific experts advising it,
found that with respect to all hormones except MGA, several of the scientific reports
invoked by the EC126 appeared to meet the requirements of a risk assessment.127 With
respect to MGA, the Panel found that since the EC had not submitted any scientific
evidence in which the potential for adverse effects on human health ofMGA residues
was evaluated, that the EC had not met its burden of demonstrating the existence of a
123 SPS Agreement. Annex A, §4.
124 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.68.
125 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.98 and Canada Panel Report, §8.101.
126 In particular the Lamming Report and 1988 and 1989 JECFA Reports.
127 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.111; Canada Panel Report, §8.114.
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risk assessment and therefore the EC measures had not been based on a risk
assessment.128
The Appellate Body noted that the Panel used the term "probability" as an alternative
for "potential". The Appellate Body believed this to be incorrect as the ordinary
meaning of "potential" relates to "possibility" and is different to "probability" which
relates to "likelihood". Although, the Appellate Body's interpretation is satisfactory
to the extent that "probability" should not be considered as synonymous with
"potential", it stated that "probability" implies a higher degree or a threshold of
"possibility". This is the case if probability is equated with the fact that an event is
probable and possibility is equated with the fact that there is a moderate chance
(which is less than probable) that an event occurs. However, probability is a term that
can also simply refer to the chance of an event occurring without necessarily being
probable. In this case, both possibility and probability would have a similar meaning,
which is the likelihood of an event occurring. This interpretation of possibility,
however, does not really grasp the meaning of potential as it has an element of
likelihood. "Possibility" should, therefore, be interpreted to relate to the ability not to
the likelihood of an event occurring.
If the latter interpretation were to be considered then the requirements to assess the
potential of a risk to human or animal health arising from the presence of additives,
contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs
would be less restrictive than under the Appellate Body's test and evaluating the
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of
an importing Member according to the SPS measures which might be applied would
also b e 1 ess r estrictive w hile s till b eing n arrower t han t he r equirement toe valuate
potential.
According to the Appellate Body, the implication of the Panel's interpretation was
that the Panel introduced a quantitative dimension to the notion of risk by requiring a
128 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.258; Canada Panel Report, §8.261.
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Member to quantify the potential for adverse effects on human health.129 However,
the Appellate Body's interpretation of potential also required the risk assessment to
quantify or at least qualify the potential. The only difference is that the Appellate
Body found probability to imply a higher degree of possibility. The Salmon Panel
and Appellate Body found, unlike the Hormones Appellate Body's interpretation, that
the evaluation of likelihood or probability could not only be expressed quantitatively
but also qualitatively.130 Indeed, a probability can be expressed, for example, as a
percentage and therefore be quantitative or it can be expressed as, for example,
"low", "medium" or "high" and therefore be qualitative. However, in order to
determine the qualitative expression of a probability a quantitative estimation is still
necessary. It should be noted that no method of expressing risk should be considered
as right in an absolute sense. A full understanding of risk often implies expressing it
in as many ways as possible.131
In the Salmon case, the risk assessment was required to contain an evaluation of the
likelihood not of the potential of entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease
within the territory of an importing Member according to the SPS measures that
might be applied and of the associated potential biological and economic
consequences. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body equated "likelihood" and
"probability" on the basis of the Hormones Appellate Body's findings and on the
basis of the definition of risk and risk assessment developed by Office International
des Epizooties ("OIE").132
129 EC's appellant's submission, §392-397.
130 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §130.
131 R. Wilson and E. Crouch, "Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction", Economics of
the Environment, R. Dorfnran and N. Dorfman (eds.), 3rd ed., (1993), p409.
132 OIE "Guidelines on Risk Assessment", OIE Code, Chapter 1.4.2, p33 and 34.
"Risk - means the probability of an adverse event of aquatic animal health, public health or
economic importance, such as a disease outbreak, and the magnitude of that event. Risk
assessment - means the processes of identifying and estimating the risks associated with the
importation o f a c ommodity and e valuating t he c onsequences o f t aking t hose r isks". I n t hese
guidelines factors that should be identified for the estimation of the likelihood of some risk are
loosely grouped into four categories: country factors, commodity factors, exposure factors and
risk reduction factors. Depending on the commodity and disease agent, any number of these
factors may be used to estimate the probability of an adverse event for the importing country.
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The Appellate Body stated that in this case:
"it is not sufficient that a risk assessment conclude that there is a possibility
of entry, establishment or spread of diseases and associated biological and
economic consequences. A proper risk assessment of this type must evaluate
the "likelihood", i.e., the "probability", of entry, establishment or spread of
diseases and associated biological and economic consequences as well as the
"likelihoodi.e., "probability", ofentry, establishment or spread ofdiseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied".133
Therefore, in considering whether the 1996 Final Report was a risk assessment
within the meaning of Article 5.1, the Panel and Appellate Body considered that the
three elements contained in the definition of risk assessment required: identification
of the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread a Member wants to prevent
within its territory, as well as the associated potential biological and economic
consequences; evaluation the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these
diseases, as well as the associated potential biological and economic consequences;
and evaluation the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of these diseases
according to the SPS measures which might be applied.134
Both the Panel and Appellate Body found that the 1996 Final Report identified the
diseases whose entry, establishment or spread Australia wanted to prevent as well as
the potential biological and economic consequences associated with the entry,
establishment or spread of such diseases.135 The Panel was hesitant in applying the
last two requirements, by stating or suggesting that some evaluation of the likelihood
would be sufficient. The Panel stated that to some extent the 1996 Final Report
addressed some elements of probability of occurrence of the identified risk,136
although it:
Point estimates or probability distributions are employed to represent the values associated with
each factor....".
133 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §123.
134 Ibidem, §121.
135 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.73 and Appellate Body Report, §132.
136 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.82.
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"... lends more weight to the unknown and uncertain elements of the
assessment than the 1995 Draft Report (on which the 1996 Final Report is
based). This on occasions, results in general and vague statements ofmere
possibility of adverse effects occurring; statement which constitute neither a
quantitative nor a qualitative assessment ofprobability".137
With respect to the third requirement, the Panel found that "for most of risk reduction
factors, the 1996 Final Report provides some evaluation of the extent to which these
factors could reduce risk".138 The Panel added that the SPS measures that might be
applied are those, which reduce the risks of concern, and are referred to in the 1996
Final Report as risk reduction factors.
The Panel's finding with regard to the quarantine policy options considered to reduce
the total risk associated with all diseases of concern stated that:
"... the 1996 Final Report does not substantively evaluate the relative risks
associated with these different options. Even though the definition of risk
assessment requires 'an evaluation ... according to the sanitary ... measures
which might be applied', the 1996 Final Report identifies such measures but
does not, in any substantial way, evaluate or assess their relative effectiveness
in reducing the overall disease risk. "I39
The Panel concluded that since the 1996 Final Report addresses and to some extent
evaluates a series of risk reduction factors that, "for the purpose of further
examination we shall, therefore, assume - without making a finding on this issue -
that the 1996 Final report meets the requirements of a risk assessment set out in
Articles 5.1 and 5.2"140 with respect to ocean-caught Pacific salmon. Therefore, the
Panel assumed that since the "1996 Final Report addresses some elements of both
probability and possibility" implied that it met the other two requirements.141 The
Panel also examined whether the heat-treatment requirement with respect to
freshwater and cultured salmon was based on a risk assessment. The Panel found that
137 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.83.
138 Ibidem, §8.89.




since no risk assessment was submitted by Australia, the measure could not have
been based on a risk assessment.
The Appellate Body limited its examination to the question whether the 1996 Final
Report constituted a risk assessment for ocean-caught Pacific salmon. The Appellate
Body considered whether the Panel assumption that there was a risk assessment for
ocean-caught Pacific salmon was warranted.142
The Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel, holding that the risk assessment
requires a full evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
diseases and associated biological and economic consequences as well as the entry,
establishment or spread of diseases according to the SPS measures which might be
applied, rather than either a statement of the possibility of such events occurring or a
finding of some likelihood of such events occurring.143
The Appellate Body's interpretation seems to be correct, as there is no textual basis in
Annex A, §4 of the SPS Agreement that a risk assessment only requires some
evaluation of these events occurring. The Panel's lack of scrutiny in determining
whether a proper risk assessment had been performed could have arisen from the fact
that the Hormones Appellate Body Report had introduced a less restrictive
interpretation of the requirements concerning risk assessment. However, the
Appellate Body in the Salmon case clearly showed that such a broad interpretation
was not appropriate.
The Appellate Body, therefore, correctly, found that the requirements for a risk
assessment had not been fulfilled and that therefore, the measure could not be based
on a risk assessment. The Appellate Body, therefore, held that Article 5.1 was
violated with respect to ocean-caught Pacific salmon.144
142 SPS Agreement, Annex A, §4.
143 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §124.
144 Ibidem.
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In the Agricultural Products case, the Appellate Body found that since the 1996 Pest
Risk Assessment of Codling Moth (hereinafter "1996 Risk Assessment") did not
discuss or even refer to the varietal testing requirement or to any other phytosanitary
measure that might be taken to reduce the risk. The 1996 Risk Assessment, therefore,
did not "evaluate the likelihood of the entry, establishment or spread" of codling
moth "according to the SPS measures which might be applied". Therefore, the
Appellate Body found that the varietal testing requirement as it applies to apricots,
pears, plums and quince was inconsistent with Article 5.1.
In the Apples case, the Panel found that 1999 Pest Risk Analysis (hereinafter "1999
PRA") did not evaluate the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of fire blight,
and was not performed "according to the SPS measures which might be applied".145
In making this finding, the Apples Panel, consistent with previous practice,
considered the specificity of the risk assessment. The Panel found that although the
1999 PRA identified apples as a possible host of fire blight, the risk assessment was
not "sufficiently specific" and that although "some" evaluation of the likelihood of
entry of the disease and possible mitigation through the existing measure had been
performed that this type of evaluation was insufficient.146
The Panel supported this point of view by stating that "the conclusion of the [1999]
PRA [did] not purport to relate exclusively to the introduction of the disease through
apple fruit, but rather more generally, apparently, through any susceptible
host/vector",147 that the risk assessment "intertwined" the risk of entry through
apples w ith t hat o f o ther p ossible v ectors, a nd t hat t lrese o ther v ectors w ere m ore
likely to lead to contamination than apples.148 The Panel also found that the analysis
of apples in the 1999 PRA related only to the possibility not the probability of entry,
establishment or spread of fire blight through this vector.149 In addition, the Panel
145 Apples Panel Report, §8.253.
146 Ibidem, 8.287.
147 Apples Panel Report, §8.271.
148 Ibidem, §8.278.
149 Apples Panel Report, §8.275.
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noted that experts had found that certain stages in the evaluation of the probability of
entry had been omitted in the 1999 PRA.150
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding stating that the "obligation to conduct
an assessment of "risk" is not satisfied merely by a general discussion of the disease
sought to be avoided by the imposition of a phytosanitary measure."151 The Appellate
Body added that "Members are free to consider in their risk analysis multiple agents
in relation to one disease, provided that the risk assessment attribute a likelihood of
entry, establishment or spread of the disease to each agent specifically".152
With respect to the issue whether the 1999 PRA was consistent with the requirement
contained in Annex A to the SPS Agreement, that a risk assessment must contain an
evaluation of the entry, establishment or spread of a disease be conducted "according
to the sanitary or phytosanitary measures which might be applied", the Apples Panel
found that the 1999 PRA did not consider, in addition to the particular measure in
place, a "potential range of relevant measures".153 The Appellate Body agreed with
the Panel that "measures which might be applied were not those that were being
applied"154 and that, therefore, a "risk assessment should not be limited to an
examination of the measure already in place or favoured by the importing
Member".155
The Hormones, Salmon, Agricultural Products and Apples cases clearly demonstrate
that the SPS Agreement differentiates between risk assessments that cover the entry,
establishment or spread of a pest or disease on the one hand, and those that cover the
presence of additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms on the
150 Apples Panel Report, §8.279.
151 Apples Appellate Body Report, §202.
152 Ibidem, §204.
153 Apples Panel Report, §8.283 and 8.285
154 Ibidem, §8.283.
155 Apples Appellate Body Report, §208.
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other. However, the rationale behind this differentiation is questionable as both
situations may have equally serious consequences.156
Where it has been determined that a risk assessment exists, it is necessary to
determine whether the measure is "based on" the risk assessment.
(2) Is there a "minimum procedural requirement" in Article 5.1?
The Hormones Panel determined that a risk assessment with respect to the five
hormones at issue except MGA existed and therefore considered the issue ofwhether
the measure with respect to five hormones was based on a risk assessment. The Panel
determined that Article 5.1's requirement that an SPS measure be "based on" a risk
assessment has both a procedural and a substantive aspect. These will be considered
in turn.
The Hormones Panel after considering the ordinary meaning of the words "based
on", read in the light of the object and purpose of Article 5, stated that "there is a
minimum procedural requirement contained in Article 5.1" that: "the Member
imposing a sanitary measure needs to submit evidence that at least it took into
account a risk assessment when it enacted or maintained its sanitary measure in order
for that measure to be considered as based on a risk assessment".157 This procedural
requirement implies that a Member, imposing an SPS measure enacted prior to the
date of entry into force of the SPS Agreement, is obliged to take into consideration a
risk assessment in the continued maintenance of SPS measures and in the case of an
SPS measure enacted since the entry into force of the SPS Agreement, a Member
must take into consideration a risk assessment prior to the implementation of the
measure.
156 A similar issue arose with regard to Article XX where the conservation of natural resources was
considered to be more important than human, animal or plant life or health. See Chapter 2,
section C.IV.3.
157 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.115 and Canada Panel Report, §8.118.
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Therefore, any new evidence gathered during the dispute settlement process would
not be considered, from a procedural point of view, to be part of a risk assessment
upon which the measures could be based158 if the Member had not previously taken a
risk assessment into account.
The Panel found that the EC did not provide any evidence that a risk assessment was
considered in advance as the preambles to the EC measures never mentioned the
scientific studies invoked by the EC in the Panel proceedings or that the studies it
referred to or the scientific conclusions derived from these studies had been taken
into account by the competent EC institutions.159 Therefore, the Panel found that the
EC had not met its burden of proving that it had satisfied the "minimum procedural
requirement" it had found in Article 5.1 and that therefore, the measures were
inconsistent with the requirements of Article 5.1.
The Panel's finding is surprising as there is no textual basis for a procedural
requirement in Article 5.1 and because the Panel itself found that there was no
specific p rocedural r equirement for a M ember t o b ase i ts S PS m easures o n a r isk
assessment in Article 5.1.160
In addition, preambles of the kind identified by the Panel are not required by the SPS
Agreement and are not normally used to demonstrate that a Member has complied
with its obligations under international agreements. The Appellate Body noted that
the content of preambles of legislative acts is driven by considerations of WTO
Members' internal legal orders.161 In other words, a measure's preamble cannot be
taken as objective evidence of the process behind its implementation.
The Appellate Body found that the Panel's "minimum procedural requirement" was
unwarranted. The Appellate Body was of the view that "based on" refers "to a certain
158 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.115 and Canada Panel Report, §8.118.
159 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.114 and Canada Panel Report, §8.117.
160 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.113 and Canada Panel Report, §8.116.
161 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §191.
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objective relationship between two elements, an objective situation that persists and
is observable between an SPS measure and a risk assessment".162 The fact that a risk
assessment has to be "taken into account" does not imply that the measure will be
"based on" this risk assessment.163
The Appellate Body, therefore, reversed the Panel's finding that the term "based on"
as used in Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement entails a "minimum procedural
requirement".
The Panel, possibly, introduced a procedural requirement in order to promote the
SPS Agreement's ultimate goal of harmonisation of SPS measures. When Members
are forced to consider the available scientific evidence before implementing
measures they may when implementing measures dealing with the same subject
matter work on the basis of the same scientific evidence. Although exposure to the
same scientific evidence does not guarantee harmonisation, such exposure, combined
with Members' realisation that their measures must withstand scrutiny under the SPS
Agreement, may promote harmonisation. This argument is mainly applicable to those
measures that are yet to be implemented. However, the argument does not take into
account that the fact that the main obstacle of harmonisation are the differences in
SPS standards due to differences in values and priorities of Members rather than
divergent scientific evidence.
Another reason the Panel may have included a procedural requirement is due to the
fact that a Member's responsibility to ensure that its SPS measures are based on a
risk assessment only arises when a measure is litigated and that since the majority of
SPS measures are not the subject of litigation, there may be a higher incentive
without a p rocedural r equirement t o i mpose p rotectionist m easures, a s t hey w ould
not have to show in case of dispute that a risk assessment was taken into account
prior to the implementation of the measure.
162 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §191.
163 por a detailed analysis of the phrase "take into account" in treaty language, see Chapter 5.
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The Panel may also have included a procedural requirement because it drew parallels
with Article 3.1 which calls on Members to base their SPS measures on an
international standard and, therefore, implies that there is a high chance that the
international standard was examined prior to implementation of the SPS measure.
However, the fact remains that this procedural requirement has the unwarranted and
unwise effect of possibly disregarding new scientific information that could be
crucial for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. Indeed, all
scientific work is incomplete whether it be observational or empirical and is
therefore is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge.164
Walker argued that although the Appellate Body did not require historical evidence
that the EC had relied on risk assessments, it did require though that risk assessments
exist and be produced in a dispute settlement proceeding, thereby also establishing a
procedural requirement which it believed was not required by Article 5.1.165
However, if the Appellate Body did not require a risk assessment to be presented at
the t ime o f t he p roceeding, i t w ould h ave b een difficult tod etermine w hether t he
measure was in fact based on a risk assessment. Therefore, although this could be
considered a procedural requirement, it does not impose any obligation that is more
restrictive than provided by the SPS Agreement, unlike the Panel's interpretation.
(3) The substantive requirement of Article 5.1 - rational
relationship between the measure and the risk assessment
The Hormones Panel after having considered the procedural requirements turned to
the "substantive requirements" of Article 5.1. The Panel identified two kinds of
operations, in order to determine whether the measure is "based on" a risk
assessment, that were not present in the procedural requirement. First, identifying the
164 Bradford Hill, cited in J. Mausner and S. Kramer, Mausner and Baum Epidemiology - an
Introductory Text, 1985, Philadelphia, p 191.
165 y Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
CILJ 2(1998), p299.
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scientific conclusions reached in the studies referred to by the EC as well as the
scientific conclusions reflected in the measure. Second, examining whether the
scientific conclusions reflected in the EC measures conform to those reached in the
studies referred to by the EC.166
The Panel noted that the conclusion of the scientific studies and reports invoked by
the EC, which qualified as a risk assessment, concluded that the use of the hormones
at issue (except MGA) for growth promotion purposes did not indicate an
identifiable risk for human health providing that good veterinary practice was
followed and were, therefore, safe.167 The EC measures, on the other hand,
concluded the opposite. The Panel found that the scientific conclusions implicit in
the EC measures did not conform to any of the scientific conclusions reached in the
scientific studies the EC had submitted as evidence and, therefore, concluded that the
EC measures were not based on a risk assessment.168
The Hormones Panel's requirement of conformity of measure with the conclusions of
a risk assessment, suggests that the scientists performing the risk assessment are de
facto fact-finders for the Panel. Indeed, a Member would simply need to put together
a team of sympathetic scientists169 that would produce a risk assessment that fully
complies with the SPS measure.
The Panel, nevertheless, did turn to its experts for advice in order to decide on the
meaning and the merits of the risk assessment before it.170 Therefore, while stating
that it was not for a panel to do its own risk assessment, the Panel agreed with the
166 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.117 and Canada Panel Report, §8.120.
167 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.124 and Canada Panel Report, §8.127.
168 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.137 and Canada Panel Report, §8.140.
169 V. Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
C.1LJ 2 (1998), p301.
170 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.127 and Canada Panel Report, §8.130.
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conclusions of the risk assessments that the use of hormones for growth promotion
purposes was safe.171
The reason for this contradiction is that the Panel must understand the meaning of the
assertions made by scientists and not merely perform a matching exercise between
the conclusions and the measures and determine whether a risk assessment exists.172
The Hormones Appellate Body stated that the relationship between those two sets of
conclusions was "certainly relevant" but that they could not "be assigned relevance
to the exclusion of everything else".173 The Appellate Body was of the view that in
order for a measure to be "based on" a risk assessment, the measure had to be
rationally related to a risk assessment and not that it had to "conform to" the risk
assessment. The Appellate Body stated that Article 5.1 requires that the results of the
risk assessment must sufficiently warrant, that is, reasonably support the SPS
measure at stake.174 Therefore, the Appellate Body was consistent with its
interpretation of the term "based on" in Article 3.1. It seems appropriate that the
language appearing in both Articles should be given an analogous meaning since
Articles 3.1 and 5.1 perform similar functions.175 The Appellate Body adopted a less
stringent test than the Panel that again, wrongly equated "based on" with "conform
to".
171 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.127 and Canada Panel Report, §8.130.
172 V. Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
CILJ 2 (1998), p302.
173 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §193.
174 Ibidem.
175 Articles 3.1 and 5.1 both evaluate a measure for a basis in some objective standard. In the case
of Article 3.1, that objective standard is an international standard, guideline, or recommendation;
in the case of Article 5.1, that objective standard is a scientifically based risk assessment. Both
provisions can be read as specific applications of Article 2.2's mandate that measures be based
on scientific principles, and not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.
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The Hormones Appellate Body nevertheless found "that the scientific reports
submitted by the EC did not rationally support the EC import prohibition."176
The Appellate Body concluded that the measures were inconsistent with Article 5.1
and 5.2 and that since for an SPS measure to be consistent with Article 3.3, it had to
comply with Article 5.1, the measures could not be justified under Article 3.3 of the
SPS Agreement. If the Appellate Body had reversed the Panel's conclusion in respect
of the inconsistency of the EC measures with Article 5.1, it would have been
logically necessary to inquire whether Article 2.2 might nevertheless have been
violated. McNeil argued that the failure of the Panel and Appellate Body to reach a
conclusion on the issue of "whether the hormone ban was maintained without
sufficient scientific evidence, undermines the credibility of the WTO system to
handle such controversial disputes".177 However, the fact that the Panel made a
finding of inconsistency with Article 5..1 implies that the measures were not
maintained with sufficient scientific evidence and were therefore, inconsistent with
Article 2.2.
It is unfortunate that because none of the evidence which qualified as a risk
assessment supported the EC's position and, therefore, could not be considered to be
"based on" a risk assessment, the Appellate Body was not forced to describe the
requirements of the rational relationship test with precision. The Appellate Body
described the test in terms of "reasonable relationship",178 sufficiently or reasonably
supported,179 and sufficiently or reasonably warranted.180 However, the Appellate
Body's analysis of the evidence found by the Panel not to constitute a risk assessment
provides significant insight into the "rational relationship" test.
176 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §197.
177 D. McNeil, "The First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: The
European Union's Hormone Ban", 39 Virginia JIL 1 (1998), pl20.
178 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §194.
179 Ibidem, §186 and 193.
180 Ibidem.
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First, the requirements for establishing a valid risk assessment complement the test
by limiting the evidence to be evaluated under the test.181 This means that a less
stringent test is required to determine the correlation between a measure and a risk
assessment because the evidence subject to evaluation has already been established
as pertinent.
Second, the Hormones Appellate Body stated that measures taken that are based on
the opinion of a minority of the scientific community "does not necessarily signal the
absence of a reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk
assessment".182
The Hormones Appellate Body considered that a risk assessment did not have to
come to a conclusion that coincided with the scientific conclusion or view implicit in
the SPS measure.183 Indeed, "Article 5.1 does not require that the risk assessment
must necessarily embody only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific
community" but can also contain the opinions of scientists that have a different or
opposing view.184 The risk assessment would therefore demonstrate a state of
scientific uncertainty where scientists may come to different conclusions concerning
the same scientific evidence. The interpretation of the Appellate Body, therefore,
recognises that not necessarily the majority of scientists will in the end be proven
correct and that Members may base their measures on a minority view contained in
the risk assessment. The Appellate Body, therefore, appreciated the reality of
scientific uncertainty.
The Appellate Body examined Dr. Lucier's estimate, presented at the joint meeting of
the experts, that approximately one out of every one million women would develop
181 Both the Panel and the Appellate Body required that in order for a study to constitute a risk
assessment it had to be specific enough.
182 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, § 194.
183 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §194.
184 Ibidem.
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cancer as a result of consuming meat treated with hormones.185 The Appellate Body
considered that if Dr. Lucier's estimate had met the requirements of a risk
assessment, then the estimate would have been sufficient to support the EC's
measures. This conclusion implies that a minority viewpoint, supported by objective
evidence, may overwhelm a substantial body of contrary evidence representing
mainstream scientific opinion and that a single estimate of a one in a million risk
would support a measure establishing "no-residue" level of protection. This suggests
that a weak relationship between a measure and a risk assessment will be sufficient
to satisfy the "rational relationship" test.
Although, the Appellate Body stated that measures based on the opinion of a
minority of the scientific community "does not necessarily signal the absence of a
reasonable relationship between the SPS measure and the risk assessment, especially
where the risk involved is life-threatening in character and is perceived to constitute
a clear and imminent threat to public health and safety"186, which seems to suggest
that measures based on minority views will have a greater chance of being
considered to have a reasonable relationship with the risk assessment where the risk
is of a considerable magnitude or gravity, the treatment of Dr Lucier's statement
seems to indicate this is not a determining factor as the Appellate Body found that
under t he S PS A greenrent t hat t here isnom inimum t hreshold o f r isk i mposed o n
Members.
However, the Appellate Body's finding that a measure may be based on a minority
viewpoint does not mean that the requirements of Article 5.1 are substantially less
restrictive. The Appellate Body's finding does not indicate that unsubstantiated
claims are sufficient to support SPS measures. Even if a risk assessment represents
both majority and minority viewpoints, both must be supported by objective
evidence. Therefore, the fact that a risk assessment is based on a minority viewpoint
does not mean that i 11 acks an objective b asis. This finding w as s upported by the
185 Hormones, US Panel Report, Annex, §819; Canada Panel Report, Annex, §819.
186 Ibidem.
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Agricultural Products Appellate Body in interpreting Article 2.2 and, in particular
the meaning of the word "sufficient" in the phrase "sufficient scientific evidence".
Third, although any quantifiable risk could serve as a basis for the SPS measures,
theoretical risk could not. The Appellate Body rejected the Hormones Panel finding
that a risk which "only represents a statistical range of 0 to 1 in a million" is "not a
scientifically identified risk".187 The Panel, therefore, implied that a 0 to 1 in a
million risk would not be sufficient to serve as a basis for a sanitary measure188 if one
were to interpret the term "scientifically identified risk" as an ascertainable risk.189
The Panel thereby prescribed implicitly that a certain magnitude or threshold level of
risk had to be demonstrated in a risk assessment if an SPS measure based thereon
was to be regarded as consistent with Article 5.1.
The Appellate Body rejected the finding that a threshold level of risk is required
before a risk assessment can be considered valid in the sense of Article 5.1 as it
found that any quantifiable risk could serve as a basis for SPS measures. This was
also reiterated by the Appellate Body in the Salmon case.190
However, the Appellate Body did agree with the Panel that if there is no scientific
evidence of an identifiable risk, there was no basis on which to adopt a measure
under the SPS Agreement.191 If a risk assessment points to no risk except the
theoretical uncertainty inherent in scientific investigation, then there is nothing
concrete to serve as a basis for comparison with the measure, and a meaningful
comparison between the measure and risk assessment is impossible. Therefore,
theoretical uncertainty concerning the existence of a risk, that is, uncertainty arising
from the fact that scientists cannot assure with absolute certainty that there is no risk
either in the present or in the future, was not the type of risk to be assessed under
187 Hormones, US Panel Report, footnote 331 and Canada Panel Report, footnote 437.
188 Ibidem.
189 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §186.
190 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §130.
191 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.153; Canada Panel Report, §8.156.
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Article 5.1.192 This shows that scientific uncertainty works both ways. Indeed, if
science is not able to prove the casual relationship leading to possible damage, then it
may also be unable to divert the possibility of its existence. Therefore, requiring
science to prove the absence of risk is not possible.193
Therefore, the Appellate Body distinguished between risk evaluation in a risk
assessment and the determination of the appropriate level of SPS protection. The
"risk" evaluated in a risk assessment must be an ascertainable risk not a theoretical
uncertainty is which is not the same as a Member not being able to determine its own
appropriate level of protection to be "zero risk".
The Appellate Body's finding that a risk assessment need not demonstrate a threshold
level of risk in order to serve as a basis for an SPS measure is of great importance
because if this were not the case, then a Member would be unable to establish
standards to protect their populations against quantifiable, although relatively minor,
threats to health and life. This is not the intent of the SPS Agreement as in its
preamble it is provided that: "no Member should be prevented from adopting or
enforcing measures necessary to protect ... life or health."
Fourth, in determining whether a measure is reasonably supported by the risk
assessment it is necessary that the risks assessments must be specific.
The reason the Appellate Body did not take Dr Lucier's opinion into account is
because the opinion did "not purport to be the result of scientific studies ... focusing
specifically on residues of hormones in meat from cattle fattened with such
hormones."194 Since, Dr. Lucier did not assert that his estimate was based on a study
of hormones as found in meat or meat products, as administered for growth
promotion purposes, the estimate could not be considered a valid risk assessment, or
192 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §186.
193 O. Godard, "Social Decision-making Under Conditions of Scientific Controversy, Expertise and
the Precautionary Principle" in (eds.) Joerges, Ladeur and Vos, Integrating Scientific Expertise
into Regulatory Decision-Making, (1997), p68.
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a valid component of a risk assessment. Therefore, the Appellate B ody c oncluded
that, "the single divergent opinion expressed by Dr. Lucier is not reasonably
sufficient to overturn the contrary conclusions reached in the scientific studies
referred to by the European Communities that related specifically to residues of the
hormones in meat from cattle to which hormones had been administered for growth
promotion."195
In addition, the Appellate Body agreed with the findings of the Panel that the
scientific material to which the EC referred to in respect of the hormones involved
apart from MGA were too general as they referred to entire classes or categories of
hormones instead of focusing on the particular hormones at issue196 and that the
potential of those hormones were not evaluated when used specifically for growth
promotion purposes197 or the dangers of the presence of hormone residues in food or
more specifically in meat or meat products. The Appellate Body agreed that the
general studies although relevant were not sufficiently specific to the case at hand.
The Appellate Body added that the evidence provided by the EC only related to risks
involved, where hormones were used in accordance with good veterinary practice.
The EC had not shown that the control or prevention of such abuse of the hormones
involved was more difficult than the control of other veterinary drugs, the use of
which is allowed in the EC and did not provide evidence that control would be more
difficult in the absence of import restrictions. The Appellate Body, therefore, agreed
with the Panel's finding that no risk assessment had been performed to evaluate the
risks resulting from the failure to administer hormones for growth hormone purposes
in accordance with good veterinary practice.198
194 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §198.
195 Ibidem.
196 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.110, 8.130, 8.257; Canada Panel Report, §8.113, 8.133, 8.260;
Appellate Body Report, §199, 200.
197 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.110, 8.124, 8.130; Canada Panel Report, §8.113, 8.127, 8.133;
Appellate Body Report, §198, 199, 200.
198 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §208.
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The A ppellate B ody a lso u pheld t he P anel's c onclusion t hat w ith r espect t o MGA
that the measure was not based on a risk assessment.199 The EC had referred to
reports that did not cover MGA but hormone progesterone. The EC argued that these
reports were highly relevant because MGA is an anabolic agent that mimics the
action of progesterone.200 However, the EC had not included any study that
demonstrated how closely related MGA is chemically and pharmacologically to
other progestins and what effects MGA residues would actually have on human
beings when such residues were ingested along with meat from cattle to which MGA
had been administered for growth promotion purposes.201
The Salmon Panel also considered whether the heat treatment requirement202, with
respect to ocean-caught Pacific salmon was based on the 1996 Final Report. The
Panel concluded that this was not the case203 since the 1996 Final Report was not
specific enough. Indeed, the 1996 Final Report did not even refer to the heat
treatment requirements.204
It is clear that risk assessments must be specific in order for a measure to be
"rationally supported" by the risk assessment. Risk assessments are to be specific
with respect to specific substances used in specific ways even where there is very
little evidence as in the case of MGA. This suggests that specificity is an absolute
requirement that is not dependent on the amount of scientific evidence available.
However, although the Appellate Body required that the risk assessment evaluate the
measure precisely, it found that Article 5.1 does not insist that a Member that adopts
an SPS measure must have carried out its own risk assessment. Therefore, an
assessment performed by another Member or international organisation could also be
referred to. This, however, does not necessarily make it easier for a Member to
199 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §201.
200 Ibidem and EC's appellant's submission, §179.
201 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §201.
202 The Panel considered this requirement to be the measure to be examined.
203 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.101.
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provide proof that a measure is based on a risk assessment since the Member still
needs to demonstrate that the measure is reasonably related to the risk assessment.
Unlike the Hormones and Salmon cases, both the Agricultural Products Panel and
Appellate Body chose to examine the measure under Article 2.2 before makings
findings under Article 5.1. Both the Panel and Appellate Body relied on the
interpretation of "based on" a risk assessment by the Hormones Appellate Body, as
they found that for an SPS measure not to be "maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence" requires that there be a rational or objective relationship between
the SPS measure and the scientific evidence.205 The Agricultural Products Appellate
Body s tated t hat t he o rdinary meaning of" sufficient" i s "of a q uantity, e xtent, o r
scope adequate to a certain purpose or object" and concluded, therefore, that
"sufficiency" is a relational concept which requires the existence of a sufficient or
adequate relationship between two elements, in casu, between the SPS measure and
the scientific evidence.206
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that Article 2.2 and 5.1 are closely
related and that Article 5.1 provides guidance for the examination as to whether SPS
measures are "maintained without sufficient scientific evidence". The Appellate
Body stated that the presence of a rational relationship is to be determined on a case-
by-case basis, and depends on amongst other things the characteristics of the measure
at issue and the quality and quantity of the scientific evidence.207
The Panel did not find that there was a rational relationship between the varietal
testing requirement and the scientific evidence submitted before the Panel because
there had been no instance in Japan or in any other country where the treatment
approved for one variety of a product had to be modified to ensure an effective
204 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.88-8.98.
205 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §8.29, 8.42.
206 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §74.
207 Ibidem, §87.
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treatment for another variety of the same product208 and that varietal differences were
not as significant for quarantine efficacy as had been reflected in the Japanese
varietal testing requirement.209
Therefore, the Panel held that the varietal testing requirement was maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence in the sense of Article 2.2210 and concluded that
there was no need to examine whether the measure was based on a risk assessment.
However, the Appellate Body considered that this was an error in logic since the
Panel's finding of inconsistency with Article 2.2 only covered the varietal testing
requirement as it applied to apples, cherries, nectarines and walnuts.211 With respect
to apricots, pears, plums and quince, the Panel found that there was insufficient
evidence before it to conclude that this measure was inconsistent with Article 2.2.
The Appellate Body noted that since the Panel found that the measure with respect to
apricots, pears, plums and quince was not inconsistent with Article 2.2, there was a
need to determine whether the measure was inconsistent with Article 5.1 in order to
ensure the effective resolution of the dispute.212 Therefore, the Panel improperly
applied the principle of judicial economy.213 The Appellate Body, as noted above,214
found that the measures were not based on a risk assessment because the 1996 Risk
Assessment was not a risk assessment in the sense of the SPS Agreement.
The Apples Panel considered the risk of transmission of fire blight inherent in
mature, symptomless apples, as well as the risk associated with other apples
(immature apples, or mature but damaged apples) that might be introduced into Japan
as a result of human or technical errors, or of illegal actions.215
208 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.464.
209 Ibidem.
210 Ibidem, §9.465.
2,1 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §8.43.
212 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §114.
213 Ibidem.
2,4 See Section, D.II.I.e.1.
215 Apples Panel Report, §8.154.
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In determining the consistency of the measure with Article 2.2, the Apples Panel
found that the infection ofmature, symptomless apples had not been established and
that it was unlikely that mature, symptomless apples would be infected by fire blight.
Indeed, the Panel found that the possible presence of endophytic216 bacteria in
mature, symptomless apples was not generally established and that scientific
evidence did not support the conclusion that mature, symptomless apples could
harbour endophytic populations of bacteria,217 and, finally, that the presence of
epiphytic218 bacteria in mature, symptomless apples was also considered to be very
rare.219
The Panel found that scientific evidence suggested a negligible risk of possible
transmission of fire blight through apples,220 and did not support the view that apples
are likely to serve as a pathway for the entry, establishment or spread of fire blight
within Japan.221 The Panel also concluded that the measure was maintained "without
sufficient scientific evidence" within the meaning of Article 2.2222 as there was no
"rational or objective relationship" between the measure and the relevant scientific
evidence.223 In addition, the negligible risk identified on the basis of the scientific
evidence and the nature of the elements composing the measure, lead the Panel to
conclude that the measure at issue was "clearly disproportionate" to that risk.224
It is surprising that both the Agricultural Products and the Apples Panel began their
analysis by focusing on Article 2.2 instead of Article 5.1. It would have been more
216 In this context, "endophytic" is used when the bacterium occurs inside the apple in a non¬
pathogenic way. Apples Panel Report, §2.10.
217 Apples Panel Report, §8.128 and 8.171.
218 "In this context, "epiphytic" is used when the bacterium occurs on the outer surface of a plant or
fruit in a non-pathogenic relationship." Apples Panel Report, §2.10.
219 Apples Panel Report, §8.142 and 8.171.
220 Apples Panel Report, §8.169.
221 Ibidem, §8.176.
222 Ibidem, §8.199.
223 Apples Panel Report, §8.101-8.103 and 8.180. See also Agricultural Products, Appellate Body
Report, §73-74, 82, and 84.
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efficient to determine first whether the measure was based on a risk assessment.
Indeed, if a measure is found to be consistent with Article 2.2 it is essential to
determine whether the specific provisions have been fulfilled.
This section has demonstrated that there must be scientific evidence in the form of a
risk assessment that supports an SPS measure in order for a measure to be based on a
risk assessment. The next section will consider the relevance o f the precautionary
principle in interpreting the requirement of scientific justification.
(4) Does the precautionary principle override Article 5.1?
In the Hormones case, the EC invoked the "precautionary principle" in support of its
claim that the measures were "based on" a risk assessment as required by Article 5.1
and, therefore, implicitly with the requirement that there was sufficient scientific
evidence and that the measures were based on scientific principles in accordance
with Article 2.2. Although, the EC did not specify what it meant by the precautionary
principle, presumably the EC considered that this principle implies that in a state of
scientific uncertainty, lack of full scientific proof of a casual relationship between a
substance and an adverse health effect would not preclude a Member from taking
preventive action.225
224 Apples Panel Report, §8.198. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that Japan's
phytosanitary measure at issue is maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence" within the
meaning of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. Apples Appellate Body Report, §168.
22~ The precautionary principle is not defined in the EC Treaty. However, "according to the
Commission the precautionary principle may be invoked when the potentially dangerous effects
of a phenomenon, product or process have been identified by a scientific and objective
evaluation, and this evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient
certainty." Activities of the European Union, Summaries of Legislation,
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/132042.htm.
In a Communication on Precautionary Principle, adopted by EU Commission,
Brussels, 2 February 2000, the precautionary principle was considered to apply "where
preliminary objective scientific evaluation, indicates that there are reasonable grounds for
concern that the potentially dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant
health may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen for the Community."
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The EC claimed that the fact that the precautionary principle had reached the status
of a customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law meant
that it could override the explicit wording ofArticle 5.1 and 5.2.226
Whether the precautionary principle has attained the status of a customary rule of
international law or a general principle of law is subject to debate. These issues will
be considered in turn.
Some authors have argued that there is currently sufficient state practice to view the
precautionary principle as a rule of customary international law, while recognising
that the principle is still evolving.227 However, it should be noted that, as discussed
by Birnie and Boyle, the precautionary principle is not universally applied since
states have been selective in adopting it in some Conventions228 and not in others229
and that the meaning, application and implementation of the precautionary principle
have varied substantially in different contexts.230 The precautionary principle may
impose tougher requirements on magnitude or probability or irreversibility of harm
depending on its formulation and on whether the principle is applied231 as opposed to
226 Hormones, US Panel Report, §4.209 and Canada Panel Report, §4.212. See also Appellate Body
Report, pi8.
227 See J. Cameron, "The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law", in J. Cameron
and T. O'Riordan (eds.), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London), (1994), p283 and P.
Sands, Principles ofInternational Environmental Law, Vol. I, Manchester, (1995), p212.
Other authors have argued that the precautionary principle has not yet achieved the status of a
customary rule of international law. See See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the
Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pp 118-119 and D. Bodansky, in Proceedings of the 85th Annual
Meeting ofthe American Society ofInternational Law {1991), p415.
228 Art. 4(3)f of the Convention on the Ban of Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary
Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, (Bamako Convention),
Bamako, January 29, 1991, (1991) 30ILM 773. Art. 2(5)(a) of the Transboundary Watercourses
Convention. Art. 3(2) of the Baltic Sea Convention. Art. 3(3) of the Climate Change
Convention.
229 1994 Protocol under the 1979 Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1994
Nuclear Safety Convention and the 1995 Washington Declaration on the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law
and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pi 19.
230 Ibidem.
231 Art. 2(2)(b) of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East
Atlantic (OSPAR Convention), Paris, September 22, 1992, (1993) 32 ILM 1069. Art. 3(2) of the
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, (Baltic Sea
Convention) Helsinki, April 9, 1992, BNA Intl. Env. Rep., Ref. File No. 35:0401.
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only being considered or used as a guiding principle.232 In addition, the fact that the
precautionary principle is frequently used should not be confused with evidence of a
general practice accepting the principle as a rule of law.233
The 1CJ in the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros case234, considered by Boyle as "the most
significant case on international law relating to the environment that has so far been
decided by the International Court of Justice"235 or alternatively as "the frst case of
its kind to contribute, in the spirit of the 1992 Rio Declaration, to the "further
development of international law in the field of sustainable development""236, did not
refer to the precautionary principle.237 The ICJ recognised that "new norms and
standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the
last two decades. Such new norms have been taken into consideration, and such new
standards given proper weight".238 However, the ICJ did not identify the
precautionary principle among these new norms. In addition, the ICJ did not
determine whether this principle could override the obligations of the Treaty between
Czechoslovakia and Hungary of 16 September 1977 concerning the building and
232 Art. 130r(2) of the 1992 Treaty on European Union, Art. 2(5)(a) of the Convention on the
Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, (Transboundary
Watercourses Convention), Helsinki, March 17, 1992, (1992) 31 ILM 1312. Art. 3(3) of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Climate Change Convention), Rio
de Janeiro, May 9, 1992, (1992) 31ILM 849. See P. Bimie and A. Boyle, International Law and
the Environment, 2nd ed, Oxford, (2002), pi20. A. Nollkaemper, "What you risk reveals what
you value", and Other Dilemmas Encountered in the Legal Assaults on Risks", in (eds.) D.
Freestone and E. Hey, The Precautionary Principle in International Law - The Challenge of
Implementation, (1996), p80, believes this different wording does not necessarily create
differences in law provided that the "precautionary principle is a principle".
233 See Lowe, in A.E. Boyle and Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable Development
(Oxford), (1992), p24.
234 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, ICJ Judgement, 25 September 1997.
235 A.E. Boyle, "The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles", 8 YIEL (1997), pl3.
236 Ibidem.
237 Ibidem, p 17. See also 101. Request for an Examination of the Situation in accordance with
Paragraph 63 of the Court's Judgement, of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New
Zealand v. France) case, Order of 22 September 1995.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Weeramantry pointed out that important principles of
environmental law are involved in this case, such as the precautionary principle. Judge
Weeramantry regretted that the Court had not availed itself of the opportunity to consider this
principle, http://www.un.org/law/icjsum/9529.htm.
238 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, §140.
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operation of the Gabcikovo/Nagymaros System of Locks.239 Although, this suggests
that the ICJ does not recognise the precautionary principle as a new norm, it may
also have considered that the application of the precautionary principle in this case
was not warranted.240
However, the fact that substantial debate is taking and has taken place on whether the
precautionary principle constitutes a customary rule of international law and the fact
that in some cases there is an unease in taking position on the matter,241 in itself casts
considerable doubt on whether the precautionary principle has reached the status of a
customary rule of international law.
The same argument could also be put forward against the proposition that the
precautionary principle is a general principle of international law. However, it is far
more plausible that the precautionary principle is a general principle rather than a
customary rule of law. Indeed, a general principle does not amount to an obligation
that requires specific normative responses.242 As Cassese notes, general principles
are "sweeping and rather loose standards of conduct that can be deduced from the
various rules by extracting and generalising some of their most significant common
points".243
"General principles of law" include common legal maxims244 originating in domestic
law such as the right to a fair and equitable legal process but also principles
recognised by international law such as consent, reciprocity, equality of states, good
faith, freedom of the seas and basic principles of human rights.245 The Court has
239 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case, §140.
240 A.E. Boyle, "The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case: New Law in Old Bottles". 8 YIEL (1997), p 17.
241 See Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §123.
242 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pi20.
243 A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, (2001), p 151.
244 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pi8.
245 Ibidem, pi 9, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., Oxford, (2003), p 17-
19. See Lowe, in A.E. Boyle and Freestone (eds.) International Law and Sustainable
Development (Oxford), (1992), p23 making the argument concerning the status of sustainable
development in international law.
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referred to general concepts of state responsibility,246 the principle of estoppel or
acquiescence,247 and made occasional general references to abuse of rights and good
faith,248 although as Birnie and Boyle note, most references to general principles
have been analogies of domestic law.249
Since one of the purposes of general principles of law is to enable courts to fill
inevitable gaps in the law250, including a broad range of principles seems appropriate.
The precautionary principle could be considered as a general principle of
international law as it has been included in many treaties and international
declarations, used by courts at the national and international level, and the essence of
the principle has reached international consensus.251 As Birnie and Boyle state:
"Use by national and international courts, by international organisations,
and in treaties, shows that the precautionaryprinciple does have a legally
important core on which there is international consensus - that in performing
their obligations of environmental protection and sustainable use of natural
resources states cannot rely on scientific uncertainty to justify inaction when
there is enough evidence to establish the possibility ofa risk ofserious harm,
even if there is as yet no proof of harm. In this sense the precautionary
principle is a principle of international law on w Inch decision makers and
courts may rely... "252
Neither the Hormones Panels nor the Appellate Body made any definitive findings
with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in international law.253
246 Chorzow Factoiy (Indemnity; Jurisdiction), PCIJ, Ser.A, no.9, p31. Chorzow Factory (Merits),
PCIJ, Ser.A, no. 17, p29. 1. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford,
(1998), pl9.
247 Eastern Greenland case (1933), PCIJ, Ser.A/B, no.53, pp52-62 and 69 and Arbitral Award of the
King ofSpain, ICJ Reports (1960), 192 at 209, 213.
248 For example, Free Zones case (1930), PCIJ, Ser.A, no. 24, p 12 and (1932), Ser. A/B, no.46,
pl67.
249 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), p20.
2-° Ibidem, pl9. A. Cassese, International Law, Oxford, (2001), p 151.
251 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2"d ed., (2002).
252 Ibidemy\2Q. See also Lowe, in A.E. Boyle and Freestone (eds.) International Law and
Sustainable Development (Oxford), (1992), p21.
253 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.157; Canada Panel Report, §8.160; Appellate Body Report.
§123.
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Although, the Appellate Body viewed the precautionary principle as incorporated in
the SPS Agreement, it also recognised that the precautionary principle does not, by
itself, and without a clear textual directive to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty
of applying the normal customary international law principles of treaty interpretation
in considering provisions of the SPS Agreement.254 The Panel was referring to
Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (hereinafter
"1969 Vienna Convention"), which provides that the ordinary meaning of the words
actually used in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement should be examined.255
Even if the Appellate Body had considered that the precautionary principle is a
customary rule of international law that is relevant in the sense that the subject matter
of the customary norm is related to the treaty norm being interpreted and applicable,
in other words, that the customary norm is legally binding (other than qua treaty) on
the parties disputing the interpretation to be given to a particular treaty or that the
precautionary principle is a general principle of international law that is relevant in
the interpretation of the treaty norm and had examined the relationship between the
precautionary principle and Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement under Article 31(3)(c)
of the Vienna Convention, the Appellate Body's finding would have remained
unchanged. Indeed, although Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention
promotes integration of general international law by reconciling norms arising in
treaty in one area of international law and custom in another256, by providing that
"other relevant rules of international law" relating to the same subject matter must be
taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty text, the customary rule or general
principle of international law would still need to be interpreted into the treaty norm
and n ot applied i nstead of i t.251 T herefore, u nder Article 3 1 (3)(c) t he t reaty b eing
254 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §124.
2-5 For a more detailed analysis of the 1969 Vienna Convention, see Chapter 5
256 P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilisation of International
Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development,
Oxford, (1999), p41.
257 Ibidem, p57. See Chapter 5, section B.II.3.a.
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interpreted retains a primary role. Customary norms and general principles have a
secondary role as they cannot partly or wholly replace the treaty norm.258
Therefore, the Hormones Panels and Appellate Body were justified in finding that
the precautionary principle does not override the explicit wording of Article 5.1 and
5.2.
The Panel further supported its finding the precautionary principle would not
override Article 5.1 and 5.2 because the precautionary principle had been given
specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, which enables Members that
have not fulfilled the requirements of basing a measure on a risk assessment to
provisionally adopt SPS measures while "Members ... seek to obtain the additional
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risk", but that the EC had
explicitly stated in this case that it was not invoking Article 5.7.259
However, even if Article 5.7 had not been included in the SPS Agreement this would
not change the fact that the precautionary principle could not override the wording of
Article 5.1 and 5.2 for the reasons discussed above.
Although the "precautionary principle" cannot create a risk assessment or sufficient
scientific evidence where there is none, and, therefore, be sufficient to imply the
consistency of a measure with Article 5.1, the requirement that measures be based on
a risk assessment does not prevent a Member from being cautious in its risk
assessment exercise since risk assessments are infused with science policies that set
out a conservative approach or from adopting a conservative approach with regard to
2:18 P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilisation of International
Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (eds.), International Law and Sustainable Development,
Oxford, (1999), p57. See Chapter 5 section B.II.3.a. for a more in-depth discussion.
259 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.157; Canada Panel Report, §8.160.
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risks that have been identified regardless of their magnitude as a Member may
choose its appropriate level of protection.260
In addition, the Appellate Body stated that a panel evaluating whether "sufficient
scientific evidence" exists to warrant the maintenance by a Member of a particular
SPS measure "should, bear in mind that responsible, representative governments
commonly act from perspectives of prudence and precaution where risks of
irreversible ... damage to human health are concerned".261 In other words, a panel
should operate in the shadow of the precautionary principle, especially in instances
where a provision of the Agreement calls for particular subjectivity such as the
amount of evidence that is required to be considered "sufficient" under Article 2.2.
This probably means that full scientific proof is not required but that a reasonable
relationship between the scientific evidence and the measure is, nevertheless, needed.
Therefore, it is clear that although the precautionary principle may be reflected in the
risk assessment exercise, the precautionary principle cannot override the explicit
requirements of Article 5.1.
d) Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement as an exception to the
requirement that measures must be based on scientific
principles and sufficient scientific evidence
As noted in the last section, the EC in the Hormones case could have invoked Article
5.7 where a Member can provisionally impose measures although these are not based
on a risk assessment and, therefore, not on scientific principles and sufficient
scientific evidence. However, the EC did not attempt to justify its measures under
Article 5.7 since it considered its ban to be final and not provisional. This may have
260 The sixth paragraph of the Preamble and in Article 3.3, both recognise the right of Members to
individually determine the appropriate level of SPS protection to be reflected in their SPS
measures. The SPS Agreement allows the use of measures that achieve a higher level of
protection than implied in the international standard are therefore allows for more cautious
measures.
261 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.157; Canada Panel Report, §8.160.
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been the reason for its desperate attempt to use the precautionary principle as a trump
card to justify its measures under Article 5.1.
The question, therefore, arises which requirements need to be fulfilled in order for a
measure to be justified under Article 5.7.
(1) The requirements ofArticle 5.7
The Agricultural Products Panel, which was the first to deal in detail with Article
5.7, found Article 5.7 to provide for four cumulative conditions. The first sentence of
Article 5.7 provides that provisional measures are permitted if they are imposed with
respect to a situation where "relevant scientific information is insufficient" and
adopted "on the basis of available pertinent information". The second sentence
requires that Members "seek to obtain additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk" and review the SPS measure accordingly "within a
reasonable period of time".
Japan argued that the wording "except as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5" in
Article 2 .2 r efers o nly t o t he first s entence o fA rticle 5 .7. T his, o f c ourse, h as n o
basis in the text of either Article 2.2 or 5.7. Article 2.2 clearly refers to Article 5.7 as
a whole. The Panel started by examining the requirements of the second sentence,
possibly to emphasise this point.
However, for methodological reasons this section will first deal with the
requirements of the first sentence.
(a) "relevant scientific information is insufficient"
Although, the Agricultural Products Panel found and the Appellate Body upheld that
Japan had acted inconsistently with the requirements of the second sentence of
Article 5.7 and, therefore, did not examine the requirements of the first sentence, the
US raised an interesting issue in its submission with respect to the interpretation of
whether r elevant sc ientific i nformation w as i nsufficient. T he U S a rgued that for a
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measure to fall within the ambit of Article 5.7, there had to be insufficient relevant
scientific evidence in order to perform a risk assessment but that there was in fact
sufficient evidence to perform such an assessment.262 In other words, the US
interpreted Article 5.7 as not covering situations where there was insufficient
scientific evidence to support the SPS measures if there was sufficient evidence to
conduct a risk assessment that supported another position.
This issue was resolved in the Apples case. The Panel found that the measure at issue
was not a provisional measure justified under Article 5.7, since the measure was not
imposed in respect of a situation where "relevant scientific evidence is
insufficient".263 The Panel supported its findings by stating that with regard to the
risk of transmission of fire blight through mature, symptomless apples that a "large
quantity" and a "high quality of scientific evidence has been produced over the years
that describes the risk of transmission of fire blight through apple fruit as negligible",
and that "this is evidence in which the experts have expressed strong and increasing
confidence." 264 With respect to endophytic bacteria in mature apples,265 the Panel
found, based on the opinions of experts, that there was also a large volume of
relevant scientific evidence available on this matter.266 In addition, the Panel found
that Japan could not demonstrate that the scientific evidence was inconclusive or
unreliable.267
The Appellate Body considered Japan's claim that the Panel had interpreted Article
5.7 "too narrowly" and "too rigidly".268 The Appellate Body stated that the
assessment of whether relevant scientific evidence is insufficient should not be
restricted to evidence "in general" on the phytosanitary question at issue, but should
also cover a "particular situation" in relation to a "particular measure" or a
262 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §4.235.
263 Apples Panel Report, §8.221-8.222.
264 Ibidem, §8.219.
265 Ibidem, §8.220.
266 Apples Panel Report, §8.220.
267 Ibidem, §7.9. See also § 8.128, 8.168, and 8.171.
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"particular risk".269 In addition, the Appellate Body found that relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient within the meaning of Article 5.7, if the available scientific
evidence, "general" or "specific", does not permit in either "quantitative or
qualitative terms, the performance of an adequate assessment of risks as required
under Article 5.1."27° In other words, if available scientific evidence would enable
the execution of a risk assessment, then a measure that is not based on a risk
assessment cannot be justified under Article 5.7.271
It can be concluded that Article 5.7 can only be successfully invoked in situations
where little or no reliable evidence is available.272 Scientific uncertainty that is
inherent in scientific assessments does not fall within the scope of the phrase
"insufficient scientific evidence". As the Appellate Body stated, "the application of
Article 5.7 is triggered not by the existence of scientific uncertainty, but rather by the
insufficiency of scientific evidence".273
(b) "on the basis of available pertinent information"
The r equirement t hat p rovisional m easures m ust b e t aken o n t he b asis of r elevant
information that is available seems to suggest that although scientific evidence is
insufficient, there must be more than no scientific evidence. Unfortunately, it is
unclear how specific information needs to be in order to be considered "pertinent".
Certainly, it would be inappropriate that the information would be required to have
the same specificity as that requested by the Appellate Body in the Hormones case
when considering whether the measure was based on a risk assessment, however, it is
conceivable that the kind of information provided by Dr Lucier which was not
considered specific enough for the purposes of Article 5.1 would probably be
considered as relevant information under Article 5.7.
268 Apples Appellate Body Report, § 178.
269 Ibidem, §179.
270 Ibidem.
271 See Apples Panel Report, §8.222 and 9.1(b) and Appellate Body Report, §188.
272 Apples Panel Report, §8.219. Apples Appellate Body Report, §183.
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(c) "seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more
objective assessment of risk"
In considering the requirement that the Member imposing an SPS measure must seek
to obtain additional information necessary to perform a more objective assessment of
risk, the Panel found that the fact that exporting countries provided additional
information when they applied for access to the Japanese market did not satisfy the
obligation in Article 5.7 as this information was designed and carried out in order to
comply with the varietal testing requirements and not to "examine the
appropriateness" of the requirement.274 In addition, the information provided by
exporting countries did not address the core issue, whether varietal characteristics
caused a difference in quarantine efficacy.275 The Appellate Body agreed with the
Panel,276 although the Appellate Body noted that neither Article 5.7 nor any other
provision of the SPS Agreement sets out explicit prerequisites regarding the
additional information to be collected or a specific collection procedure,277 and that
Article 5.7 does not specify what actual results must be achieved. Nevertheless,
Article 5.7 states that the additional information is to be sought for in order to allow a
Member to conduct "a more objective assessment of risk". Therefore, the
information sought must be germane to conducting such a risk assessment.278 This
suggests that the information that must be sought under Article 5.7 similarly to
Article 5.1 needs to be specific enough.279
The Appellate Body noted that the obligation is to "seek to obtain" information.
However, if a Member would only be required to "seek to obtain" information in
order to maintain its measure, then the requirements of Article 5.1 would be rendered
meaningless. Indeed, a Member could maintain its "provisional" measure for an
273 Apples Appellate Body Report, § 184.
274 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.478.
275 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.478.
276 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §95.
277 Ibidem.
278 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §95.
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undetermined period of time on the basis that information is being sought for and,
therefore, would have no incentive to comply with the requirements of Article 5.1 to
base the measure on a risk assessment.
Therefore, Article 5.7 must be interpreted restrictively and must be read in its
systematic context, which means that if a measure is to remain consistent with the
SPS Agreement, a Member must have found information within a reasonable period
of time and not merely shown its willingness to do so.
(d) "review the [SPS] measure accordingly within a reasonable
period of time"
The Agricultural Products Panel noted that the varietal testing requirement was first
applied i n 1 969 for H awaiian p apayas o f t he S olo v ariety. T herefore, t he i ssue o f
varietal testing and the question of whether it can be justified had been around for 30
years. With respect to the specific products and pest at issue, varietal testing had
been around for over 20 years as the first import ban was lifted in 197 8.280 The Panel
believed that Japan had been in a position to obtain further information on varietal
differences and their q uarantine efficacy over this p eriod o f time and that since 1
January 1995 it was under an explicit obligation to do so. The Panel did not elaborate
on what was a reasonable time period or which factors had to be taken into account
in determining a reasonable time period. It seems that the Panel in finding that the
measure was not supported in a proper way for 20 to 30 years was a contributing
factor in determining that, although the obligation only arose from 1 January 1995,
that 3 and a half years was not a reasonable time.281 The Appellate Body, correctly,
only focused on the fact that three and a half years was unreasonable282 since there
was no obligation to do so before the SPS Agreement entered into effect. The
279 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §200.
280 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.479.
281 Although Australia did not claim that the measures were provisional, the Salmon Panel
nevertheless stated that since the measure in dispute was imposed more than 20 years ago, could
not be considered as a provisional measure.
282 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §96.
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Appellate Body came to this conclusion as it recalled the experts' conclusion that the
collection of information was relatively simple, an argument which the Panel used to
justify its finding that there was no justification that no additional information was
sought for.
Therefore, the Appellate Body clarified the meaning of "reasonable period of time"
to some extent by stating that the factors to be considered were the difficulty of
obtaining the additional information necessary for the review and the characteristics
of the provisional measure.283 However, the Appellate Body stated that the meaning
of reasonable period of time was to be established on a case-by-case basis but that
"an overly broad and flexible interpretation of that obligation would render Article
5.7 meaningless".284
In conclusion, the obligation that additional information be obtained and used to
review the measures ensures that the measures reflect the newest information.
However, where no additional information becomes available or when this new
information is insufficient in order for the Member to be able to provide a risk
assessment that reasonably supports the measure, within a reasonable time period
suggests that sufficient scientific evidence cannot be found and therefore there seems
to be no reason to maintain the measure.
(2) How effectively does Article 5.7 deal with scientific
uncertainties?
The GATT and the WTO have often come under fire for neglecting environmental
concerns in favour ofminimising negative impacts on trade. The question that arises
is to what extent Article 5.7 leaves room for a precautionary approach to SPS issues
and therefore, whether scientific uncertainties have been sufficiently provided for. In
order to evaluate Article 5.7, consideration will be given to the precautionary
principle in other contexts.
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Although, as m entioned i n s ection D .II. 1 .b.4, t he p recautionary p rinciple d oes n ot
have a unique formulation, the precautionary principle is most often phrased in such
a way that uncertainties should be taken into account in the decision-making process,
that measures may be taken in the absence of full scientific evidence but that there
must nevertheless be some scientific basis for predicting the possibility285 or
likelihood286 and magnitude287 of harmful effects or "some reasonable grounds for
concern"288 which encourages prudent action.289
This is consistent with the fact that although states are required by international law
to e nsure t hat a ctivities w ithin t heir j urisdiction ore ontrol d o n ot c ause or p ermit
serious or significant harm to the environment of other states,290 this obligation to
adopt a precautionary approach only arises once risks are reasonably foreseeable and
a determination of the likelihood and seriousness and magnitude of harm is made.291
Of course, it could be argued consistent with the findings in the Trail Smelter case
283 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §96.
284 Ibidem, §83.
285 when harm to humans or to the environment may be caused: Art. 4(3)(f) of the Bamako
Convention.
286 "[I]s likely to cause" significant adverse transboundary effects, Art. 2(5)(a) of the 1992 OSPAR
Convention, Art. 2(1) and (2) of the 1992 Transboundary Watercourses Convention.
287 "Threats of serious or irreversible damage": Art. 3(3) of the 1992 Climate Change Convention.
288 Art. 2(2)(a) of the 1992 OSPAR Convention.
289 O'Riordan and Cameron have argued that the present line "is to act prudently when there is
sufficient scientific evidence and where action can be justified on reasonable judgements of cost
effectiveness and where inaction could lead to potential irreversibility or demonstrate harm to
the defenders and future generations" rather "than to claim scientific uncertainty as a reason for
delay. Interpreting the Precautionary Principle, (eds.) T. O'Riordan and J. Cameron, London,
(1994), pl8.
290 See for e xample, Trail Smelter c ase, 3 5 ,4 JIL (1941), p716: " no s tate has t he r ight t o use o r
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory
of another"; Advisory Opinion on the Legality or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, ICJ Rep.
(1996), p226, §29 where it was held that "the existence of the general obligation of states to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other states
or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment"; 1982 UNCLOS, Articles 192-194; ILC 2000 Draft Convention on the Prevention
of Transboundary Harm, Article 3. See also 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human
Environment, P rinciple 2 1; R io D eclaration, P rinciple 2 ; Convention o n B iological D iversity,
Article 3; Convention on Climate Change, Preamble.
P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), ppl09-l 12.
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that such an obligation arises only when there is clear scientific proof of actual or
threatened harm.292 However, this interpretation clearly leaves no room for scientific
uncertainty.293 Therefore, although there must be some scientific basis, full scientific
certainty is not required.
A common feature of the precautionary principle is that it does little to protect the
environment against the unknown but helps when information is poor or
inconclusive. Therefore, the precautionary principle does not come into play merely
on the basis of personal intuition or speculation.
This was also the position taken in Case C-180/96, United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland v. Commission of the E uropean C ommunities294 (hereinafter
"BSE") case, where the European Commission adopted measures pursuant to powers
granted by two Community directives where there is "an outbreak ... of any
zoonoses, diseases or other cause likely to constitute a serious hazard to animals or to
human health".295 The ECJ adopted a precautionary approach in assessing the
legality of the measures: "where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of
risk to human health, the institutions may take protective measures without having to
wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become fully apparent".296 The
ECJ emphasised that the link between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jacob, although not
291 Trail Smelter case, 35 AJIL (1941), p684. ILC 2001 Draft Convention on the Prevention of
Transboundary Harm, Article 2. See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the
Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pi 15.
292 See P. Birnie and A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., (2002), pi 15.
293 Ibidem.
294 Judgement of the Court, ECR 1-2265, 5 May 1998.
295 Directive 90/425, Article 10(1) and Directive 89/662, Article 9(1).
296 United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and Northern Ireland v. Commission, Case C-180/96, ECR I-
2265 (1998), §99. This view is corroborated by Article 130r( 1) of the EC Treaty, which states
that protecting human health is one of the objectives of Community policy on the environment.
Article 130r(2) provides that this policy is to be based on the precautionary principle and on
preventive action.
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proven, had "ceased to be a theoretical hypothesis", had become a "possibility"297
and that there was a "probable link".298
The ECJ supported its statement by referring to the Scientific Veterinary Committee
of the EU, which concluded that on the basis of the available data, it was not possible
to prove that BSE was transmissible to humans, but that there was a possibility.299 In
addition, it noted that the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC),
an independent scientific body advising the UK government, stated that although
there was no "direct evidence of a link on current data"300, but that "the most likely
explanation" for the disease was exposure to BSE before the introduction of the
specified ovine offal ban in 1989.301
Therefore, the requirement that measures must be based on available pertinent
information in Article 5.7 does not seem to be more restrictive than what would
usually allow for the operation of the precautionary principle.
In addition, Article 5.7 does not require that the measures only be aimed at serious or
irreversible or imminent threats or that considerations of cost-effectiveness must be
taken into account unlike Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which provides that,
"where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation" or the EC Directives mentioned above which
provide for "serious hazards" or the position taken by the ECJ in the BSE case.
Indeed, the ECJ supported the Commission's decision to contain the disease in the
297 BSE case, §52.
298 Ibidem, §61.
299 BSE case, § 13.
300 BSE case, §9.
301 Ibidem, §9 and 52.
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territory of the UK because of the urgency of the situation, the seriousness of the
matter,302 and the seriousness of the hazard to public health.
Therefore, the formulation of the precautionary principle in Article 5.7 appears to be
less restrictive than in other contexts.
The more restrictive requirements imposed by Article 5.7 are that these measures be
provisional and that further information is to be collected within a reasonable period
of time. However, although these obligations are not mentioned in the Rio
Declaration or the EC Directives, this requirement does not seem to be unreasonable
because if this were not the case, then a country would have no incentive to
determine whether the precautionary measures are in fact based on sound scientific
grounds. In fact the ECJ adopted the same approach as it referred to temporary
measures and the fact that further scientific information was needed. Indeed, the ECJ
found that the Commission had not reacted in an inappropriate manner by imposing
on a temporary basis and pending the production of a more detailed scientific
information, a general ban on exports of bovine animals, bovine meat and derived
products.303 In addition, the ECJ stated that whether or not there was a causal link
between BSE and the Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease was a question that "requiredfurther
scientific research ",304
Therefore, Article 5.7 similarly to Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, the 1985
Ozone Convention and its 1987 Montreal Protocol as well as the EC provide for the
operation o f t he precautionary principle b efore cause and e ffect are d emonstrated.
However, stronger versions of the precautionary principle that reverse the burden of
302 The measures were also justified because of the uncertainty of the risk and the uncertainty of the
adequacy and effectiveness of the measures adopted prior to the total export ban. BSE case, §62.-
303 BSE case, §110.
304 Ibidem, §14.
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proof so that an activity may not take place until proven not to cause harm to the
environment305 are not covered by Article 5.7.
Nevertheless, claims that the SPS Agreement does not sufficiently provide for
scientific uncertainty seem to be unjustified.
2.) Measures Applied Only to the Extent Necessary
Apart from the requirements to base measures on "scientific principles" and "not
maintain measures without sufficient scientific evidence" except as provided for in
Article 5.7, Article 2.2 also requires that measures must be "applied only to the
extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health". The focus of the
following sections will be on this latter requirement.
a) Relationship between Article 2.2 and 5.6
Since both other basic obligations of Article 2.2 have been more specifically
interpreted, it would seem appropriate to consider the obligation that measures must
be "applied only to the extent necessary" in the light of the more specific obligation
contained in Article 5.6.
Article 5.6 provides that when Members establish or maintain SPS measures to
achieve their appropriate level of protection they "shall ensure that such measures are
not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of
protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility". An inteipretative
footnote to Article 5.6 states that:
"For the purposes ofparagraph 6 ofArticle 5, a measure is not more trade-
restrictive than required unless there is another measure, reasonably
305 Resolutions suspending the dumping of low-level radioactive waste at sea without prior approval
of the Paris and London Dumping Conventions, the suspension of industrial dumping in the
Oslo Commission area without prior justification to the Oslo Commission. See P. Birnie and A.
Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed, Oxford, (2002), p 125.
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available taking into account technical and economicfeasibility, that achieves
the appropriate level of [SPS] protection and is significantly less restrictive to
trade".306
The Salmon Panel and Agricultural Products Panel noted that Article 5.6 must be
read in context, in the light of the more general language of Article 2.2.307 However,
the Panels did not dwell on the matter and swiftly proceeded to examine Article 5.6.
The Appellate Body in the two cases did not even address the relationship between
Article 5.6 and Article 2.2.
The reason for the evasiveness over the relationship is probably due to the fact that
Article 2.2 unlike Article 5.6 seems to deal with the application rather than the
substantive requirements of the measure that is under review. This is consistent with
the interpretation given to a nearly identical NAFTA provision, Article 712(5).308
The emphasis is on the word "applied" and would therefore mean, for example, that
the provision would prevent a country from imposing a two-year quarantine if a one-
year quarantine is sufficient in achieving its appropriate level of protection.
The term "necessary" in Article 2.2 would, in this case, be given its ordinary
meaning as the measure would be applied as long as needed to achieve the
appropriate level of protection.
This interpretation, however, does not require that the measure be "necessary" in the
sense of Article 5.6. In Article 5.6, the emphasis is not on the application of the
measure but on the measure itself. In order for the measure to be "necessary", the
measure should not be more trade restrictive than required to achieve the Member's
desired level of protection. In other words, there can be no other measure that is
economically and technically feasible and significantly less restrictive to trade that
achieves the Member's appropriate level of protection. The standard applied in the
306 SPS Agreement at footnote 3.
307 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.167.
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LTRA test in examining measures under the SPS Agreement is more lenient than the
one applied in determining the consistency of a measure with Article XX(b) as only
alternatives that are significantly less trade-restrictive are compared.309
A second interpretation of the requirement in Article 2.2 is that measures are only
applied to the extent necessary, if the application of the measure does not cause more
trade restriction than is required to achieve the appropriate level of protection. This
interpretation therefore, gives the term "necessary" in Article 2.2 the same meaning
as in Article 5.6. Although, this interpretation focuses mainly on the content of the
measure, it could be argued that implicitly a measure that is necessary in achieving
the appropriate level of protection is no longer necessary once that goal is achieved.
Therefore, this interpretation would also incorporate the meaning given by the first
interpretation that measures are no longer necessary when the appropriate level of
protection is achieved.
The advantage of this interpretation is that it also covers the situation where in the
process of achieving the level of protection another measure may become
significantly less trade restrictive in achieving the appropriate goal. In other words, a
measure may have been necessary for a certain period of time but it might not be for
the whole time of achieving the appropriate level of protection.
In addition, the Salmon Appellate Body stated that the establishment or maintenance
of an SPS measure that implies or reflects a higher level of protection than the
appropriate level of protection could constitute a violation of the necessity
requirement ofArticle 2.2.310 This would presumably be the case if there was another
measure reasonably available that reflects the same level of protection as the
appropriate level of protection. Therefore, the Appellate Body in this footnote
interpreted Article 2.2 in such a way that "applied to the extent necessary" requires
308 Article 712(5) provides: "Each Party shall ensure that any [SPS] measure that it adopts,
maintains or applies is applied only to the extent to achieve its appropriate level of protection",
North American Free Trade Agreement, 17 December 1992, 32 1LM 296 and 32 1LM 605.
309 See Chapter 2, section C.II.2.b.
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that the measure is necessary in terms of Article 5.6. In other words, the Appellate
Body read "applied to the extent necessary" as applied to the extent that the measure
is necessary to achieve the appropriate level of protection.
In order to ensure that there is no confusion in the interpretation of Article 2.2 and
the relationship between Article 2.2 and Article 5.6, it would have been preferable to
provide in Article 2.2 that the measure must be necessary and applied only to the
extent necessary and using Article 5.6 not only to interpret the requirement of what is
"necessary" but also the exact meaning of "applied to the extent necessary".
Alternatively, the drafters could have provided that Article 2.2 obliges Members
applying measures to ensure that these are "necessary". Article 5.6 could have
specifically defined the requirement of necessity and emphasised that a necessary
measure ceases to be necessary once the appropriate level of protection is achieved
or if another measure becomes significantly less trade restrictive.
The reason for the confusion around the meaning of Article 2.2 could have been the
wording of Article 2.1, which states that Members have the right to take measures
that are necessary. It could be that the drafters did not want to phrase the necessity of
a m easure a s a r ight a nd a n o bligation. S ince n ecessary i s a n o bligation, i t w ould
have been more suitable to draft the requirement that a measure must be necessary.
However, despite the lack of clarity of the wording of Article 2.2, it can be
concluded that a measure may only be applied to the extent that it is necessary to
achieve the Member's appropriate level of protection. This is, of course, subject to
the fact that there is an identifiable risk that must be protected against.
The next section will take a closer look at the conditions for fulfilling the
requirement that measures must not be "more trade restrictive than required" as
provided in Article 5.6.
3,0 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, footnote 166.
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b) "Measures not more trade restrictive than required"
The Salmon Panel and Appellate Body311 as well as the Agricultural Products Panel
and Appellate Body examined whether the measures that they were examining were
"more trade restrictive than required". In doing so they considered whether there was
another S PS m easure t hat w as " reasonably available t aking i nto account t echnical
and economic feasibility", which achieved "the appropriate level of [SPS]
protection" and that was "significantly less restrictive to trade" than the SPS measure
contested. These elements were considered to be cumulative in nature.312 Therefore,
the SPS Agreement only condemns SPS measures that are significantly more trade
restrictive, when these achieve the Member's level of protection and when they are
economically and technically feasible.313
The Salmon Panel stated that most of the reports before it only related to ocean-
caught Pacific salmon and therefore, did not make any findings with respect to
freshwater and cultured salmon.314 The Panel noted that the 1996 Final Report
identified five potential quarantine policy options such as heat treatment,
certification, inspection, evisceration and filleting. The Panel considered whether any
of the policy options apart from heat treatment would meet the three elements of the
three-pronged test. The Panel excluded the heat treatment as it viewed it to be the
SPS measure against which the other four options could be examined. Since the other
four options were described to be options "which merit consideration" in the 1996
Final Report, the Panel felt that there were other measures "reasonably available
taking into account technical and economic feasibility".
311 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §203.
312 Ibidem.
313 Although it is not explicitly stated in either the SPS or the TBT Agreement or the GATT 1994,
there seems to be no reason to restrict alternative measures only to those covered by WTO
Agreements. Although this has not been the case so far in disputes relating to the SPS
Agreement, this has been the case in disputes involving Article XX where panels and the
Appellate Body have considered that it was preferable for the importing countries to engage in
discussions in order to establish an international agreement rather than to impose trade
restrictions.
See Chapter 2, section C.II.2. Shrimps Panel Report, §7.53 and Appellate Body Report, §174.
314 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.60.
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With respect to determining whether these options achieved Australia's appropriate
level of protection, the Panel stated that nowhere did the SPS Agreement explicitly
impose an obligation on WTO Members to identify or quantify the appropriate level
of protection315 but that the SPS measure applied to a given situation inherently
reflects and achieves a certain level of protection with respect to that situation and
that this level of protection, implied in the SPS measure selected by a Member, can
be presumed to be at least as high as the level of protection considered to be
appropriate by that Member.316 Based on this view the Panel stated the alternatives
would have to be examined to determine whether they met the level of protection
currently achieved by the measure at issue.317 Although, the Panel did not conclude
that the other measures achieved Australia's appropriate level of protection, it found
that Canada had raised a presumption that these other options did achieve Australia's
appropriate level of protection that was unrebutted by Australia. The Panel,
therefore, concluded that this second requirement was met.
In considering whether there were measures that were significantly less restrictive to
trade, the Panel noted that the alternative policy options did not provide for an
outright ban as did the heat treatment and, therefore, concluded that these options
were significantly less restrictive.318
The Panel concluded that since all three elements had been met, that Australia had
imposed measures that were more trade restrictive than required with respect to
ocean-caught Pacific salmon and had, therefore, acted inconsistently with Article
5.6.319 The Panel referred to its earlier ruling that "the measure in dispute is
315 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.107.
316 Ibidem.
317 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.173.
318 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.182.
319 Ibidem, §8.183.
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inconsistent with Article 2.2"320 and, therefore, decided that it "shall not further
address the legal relationship between Articles 5.6 and 2.2"321.
Since the Appellate Body found that the Panel had erred in finding that the heat
treatment as opposed to the import prohibition was the measure at issue, the
Appellate Body concluded that the Panel should have examined whether the import
prohibition was "not more trade-restrictive than required" to achieve Australia's
appropriate level ofprotection.
The Appellate Body found, based on the factual findings of the Panel, that there were
other measures reasonably available taking into account technical and economic
feasibility.322 However, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's reasoning in
finding that there were other measures that achieved the Member's appropriate level
of protection. Indeed, the Appellate Body noted that the level of protection reflected
in the SPS measure at issue was a "zero-risk level" of protection but found that the
appropriate level of protection as determined by Australia was not as high as the
level of protection reflected in the measure since Australia had determined its
appropriate level to be "... a high or "very conservative" level of SPS protection
aimed at reducing risk to "very low levels", "while not based on a zero risk
approach".323 The Appellate Body stated that the appropriate level of protection "is a
prerogative of the Member concerned and not of a panel or of the Appellate
Body".324 The "appropriate level of protection" established by a Member and the
"SPS measure" have to be clearly distinguished.325 "The first is an objective, the
second is an instrument chosen to attain or implement that objective".326 The
Appellate Body stated that "it is the appropriate level of protection that determines
the SPS measure to be introduced or maintained, not the SPS measure introduced or
320 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.99.
321 Ibidem, §8.165.
322 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §204.
323 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.107 and Appellate Body Report, §206.
324 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §207.
325 Ibidem, §209. See also Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §214.
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maintained which determines the appropriate level of protection".327 This is the case
since measures do not always achieve the appropriate level of protection. The
Appellate Body continued to state that Article 5.6 requires an examination of
whether possible alternative SPS measures meet the appropriate level of protection as
determined by the Member concerned328 not the current level achieved by the
measures that are in place. Therefore, the alternatives should not be measured against
the zero-risk level but the very low risk level.
It is interesting to note that Australia's appropriate level of protection was lower than
the level of protection achieved by the import prohibition. This suggests that there is
no measure available, according to Australia, which achieves a very low level of risk
apart from a measure that achieves a zero-risk level. Therefore, it is logical to
determine whether an alternative measure can achieve a very low level of risk, which
is not necessarily a zero-risk level.
Although the SPS Agreement does not contain an explicit provision that obliges
WTO Members to determine the appropriate level of protection, it is implicit in
several provisions of the SPS Agreement such as Article 3.3 and Article 5.4 of the
SPS Agreement.329 Indeed, Article 3.3 permits measures reaching a higher level of
protection than those based on international standards "... as a consequence of the
level of ... protection a Member determines to be appropriate" and Article 5.4
encourages M embers " when determining t he appropriate 1 evel ... o f p rotection" t o
"take into account the objective ofminimising negative trade effects".
In addition, the SPS Agreement also indicates that the "appropriate level of
protection" logically precedes the establishment or decision on maintenance o f an
"SPS measure".330 Indeed, Article 5.3 provides that "in assessing the risk to animal
326 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §209.
327 Ibidem, §212.
328 Ibidem, §213.
329 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §214.
330 Ibidem, §210.
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or plant life or health and determining the measure to be applied for achieving the
appropriate level of [SPS] protection from such risk" and Article 5.6 states that
"...when establishing or maintaining [SPS] measures to achieve the appropriate level
of [SPS] protection...".
Therefore, the provisions indicate that the appropriate level of protection needs to be
determined and that this is "separate" from the e stablishment or maintenance of a
measure.331 Although, the level need not be established in quantitative terms, it must
not be vague or equivocal.332 This is logical as if the Member did not determine its
appropriate level of protection with sufficient clarity it would be rather difficult to
determine whether alternative SPS measures achieve the appropriate level of
protection.333 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body stated that if this level of protection
is not determined or determined with insufficient precision, then the Panel could
establish the level of protection on the basis of the level of protection reflected in the
SPS measure actually applied.334 The Appellate Body, therefore, contradicted itself
by establishing that the SPS Agreement implicitly requires the appropriate level to be
determined and that this level of protection was not the same as the level of
protection reflected in the measure and then stating that if the appropriate level of
protection is not determined then the level of protection implicit in the measure
would be considered as the appropriate level of protection.
The Appellate Body tried to determine whether the alternatives could achieve the
level of protection that Australia had set. Due to the fact that the 1996 Final Report
did not evaluate the relative risks associated with the different options and due to
insufficient factual findings of the Panel and of facts that were undisputed between
the parties, the Appellate Body was unable to conclude whether any of the alternative
measures achieved Australia's appropriate level ofprotection and, therefore, could
331 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §212.
332 Ibidem,§215.
333 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §214.
334 Ibidem, §216.
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not come to a conclusion on the consistency of the measures, relating to all salmon,
with Article 5.6.335
The fact that the Panel did not make a finding on freshwater and cultured salmon was
considered by the Appellate Body to be an error of law as this salmon also came
within the terms of reference of the Panel.336 In addition, this was false judicial
economy as the Panel considered that the measure was not inconsistent with Article
2.2 there was a need to determine whether the measure was inconsistent with Article
5.5 or 5.6.337
In the Agricultural Products case, the US claimed that the Japanese measures were
more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve Japan's appropriate level of
phytosanitary protection. The US stated that because there were no varietal
differences that affected the efficacy of a quarantine treatment, the same established
treatment would achieve for all varieties of a product the appropriate level of
protection. The US suggested that an alternative measure would be that the testing
should be performed product by product as opposed to variety by variety of a given
product. T he e xperts a dvising t he P anel s uggested t hat i f, and t o t he extent, t here
were differences between varieties, these would be mainly or exclusively related to
different levels of sorption of the fruit338 and that, therefore, Japan "could either
monitor or test the sorption characteristics of the different varieties of the products at
issue".339
The Panel found that the US alternative would be significantly less restrictive to
trade and would be reasonably available taking into account technical and economic
feasibility. The more difficult question was whether the US alternative achieved
Japan's appropriate level of protection. In this case, the appropriate level of
335 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §217-221.
336 Ibidem, §223.
337 Ibidem.
338 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.497.
339 Ibidem.
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protection is the level ofmortality that Japan seeks with respect to codling moth, in
other words, complete mortality in large-scale tests on a minimum of 30,000 codling
moths.340 The Panel found on the basis of the experts opinions that it was not
possible to state with certainty that the same treatment would be effective for all
varieties of a product. The Panel, therefore, found that there was insufficient
evidence t o c onclude t hat t he U S a lternative a chieved Ja pan's a ppropriate 1 evel o f
protection.341
However, the Panel found that the scientific experts'342 alternative was not only
significantly less restrictive to trade but also achieved the appropriate level of
protection determined by Japan.343 Therefore, the Panel found that the measure
imposed by Japan was inconsistent with Article 5.6.344
The US appealed the finding of the Panel that the alternative measure that it
proposed did not achieve Japan's appropriate level of protection. The US argued that
the Panel in finding that the US proposal was not an alternative that met the
appropriate level of protection, had used a "no hypothetical risk" standard as the
Panel concluded that Dr. Ducom's statement was sufficient to preclude a finding that
testing by product" does not achieve Japan's appropriate level of protection.345
However, the Agricultural Products Appellate Body supported the Panel's decision
by stating that the Panel did not exclusively base its conclusion on one expert
opinion, and that even if it did it could not understand how the US thought that this
was applying a "no hypothetical risk" standard.346 The Appellate Body noted that the
Panel had stated that it had carefully examined all the evidence before it in light of
the opinions received from its experts and that it subsequently came to the conclusion
that it was not convinced that there was sufficient evidence to find that the US
340 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.504.
341 Ibidem, §9.506.
342 The experts: Dr Ducom and Dr Taylor. Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.522.
343 Agricultural Products, Panel Report, §9.525.
344 Ibidem, §9.526.
345 See US Appellant's submission, §38.
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alternative would achieve Japan's appropriate 1 evel o f protection.347 The Appellate
Body believed that the US challenged the Panel's consideration and weighing of
evidence before it and that an assessment of facts falls outside the scope of the
appellate review under Article 17.6 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter "DSU").348 However, unlike the
Appellate Body stated, the Panel only referred to Dr Ducom's opinion in making its
findings. The fact that the Panel's conclusion is in accordance with Dr Ducom's
opinion supports the US claim to the extent that the conclusion is based on that
scientist's opinion. However, it has been recognised by the Hormones Appellate
Body that a measure could be based on a minority opinion without lacking an
objective basis.
Conclusion
The analysis of the case law relating to the SPS Agreement suggests that the level of
protection chosen by a Member (the "appropriate level of protection") in respect of
an SPS problem, may not necessarily be reflected in the measure that the Member
imposes. For example, a Member's appropriate level of protection may be a zero risk
level, but the Member may impose a measure that does not achieve that zero risk
level of protection.
When examining alternative measures available to the Member imposing a measure,
the level of protection achieved by an alternative measure should be compared to the
"appropriate level of protection" set by the Member and not the level of protection
reflected in the measure imposed by the Member.
In evaluating whether an alternative measure achieves the Member's appropriate
level of protection, it would be preferable that a Member be required to express its
346 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §102.
347 Ibidem, §101.
348 Agricultural Products, Appellate Body Report, §101. See also Salmon, Appellate Body Report,
101.
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appropriate level of protection in quantitative rather than in qualitative terms.
Comparing quantitative rather qualitative values would ensure a more objective
assessment of the efficacy of different measures.
With respect to the condition that the alternative measure is reasonably available
taking into account technical and economic feasibility, there has been no extensive
interpretation. The drafters of the SPS Agreement presumably, included the words
"technical and economic feasibility" in Article 5.6 as they recognised that an
alternative measure may involve substantially higher regulatory or compliance costs,
or might be impractical to implement. This is a development from the interpretation
of the necessity requirement in Article XX(b), analysed in Chapter 2, where the
Panel in the Thai Cigarette case found that less trade restrictive measures were
available without considering the economic impact that maintaining an alternative
regulatory regime would have for Thailand.
Although this element of Article 5.6 is especially important for developing countries
that have more limited technical and economic resources than developed countries,
this d oes n ot m ean t hat developed c ountries c annot b enefit from t his r equirement.
However, it is very likely that developed countries will be faced with a higher
compliance threshold than developing countries. Therefore, I would argue that the
requirement of "technical and economic feasibility" is a subjective consideration
assessed on the individual characteristics of the country imposing an SPS measure.
With regard to the requirement that an alternative measure must be significantly less
restrictive t o t rade, t here h as b een nop recise i nterpretation i n t he c ase 1 aw s o far
whether it be in quantitative or in qualitative terms. The ordinary meaning of the
words used only suggests that a measure that is "significantly less restrictive to
trade" is a measure whose impact on trade is considerably, appreciably lower than
that of the measure in place.
Therefore, the drafters of the SPS Agreement possibly formulated a less restrictive
requirement with the intention of preventing a Member from being bombarded with
various alternatives that may only be marginally less trade restrictive. Without
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ascribing a figure as to how much less trade restriction must result from the
alternative measure, the requirement should be interpreted restrictively.
Although, the SPS Agreement requires that measures be compared, the
proportionality of a measure has not been considered by the WTO DSB in disputes
involving the consistency of an SPS measure with the necessity requirement.
However, the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case, discussed in Chapter 2, included
in the necessity test, a means-end test, which to an extent can be viewed as akin to a
proportionality test. Since the interpretation of Article XX flavours that of the SPS
Agreement and vice versa, this will most probably influence future interpretation of
the SPS Agreement. This would imply, however, that a Member's right to impose
measures that achieve the Member's appropriate level of protection may be
jeopardised.349
Hudec argued that the concept of necessity implies an incremental cost-benefit test:
"whether a burdensome regulation is necessary to achieve a domestic environmental
or health and safety objective "is really an interlocking decision about whether, as
compared with the next least restrictive alternative, the burden is worth the extra
gain"".350
Esty also argues that the necessity should include a proportionality test: "the pivotal
word "necessary" should b e r einterpreted torn ean "not clearly disproportionate i n
relation to the putative environmental benefits and in the light of equally effective
policy alternatives that are reasonably available".351
349 See Chapter 2, section C.II.2.b.
350 Personal communication from R. Hudec cited in C. Ford Runge, Freer Trade, Protected
Environment 18 n. 12 (1994). The same requirement is also contained in the TBT Agreement,
Annex 3 relating to standards. Although the meaning of this requirement is not further
developed, it is probable that this requirement is interpreted in the same way as for technical
regulations.
351 D. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future, (1994), p222.
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This approach has been adopted by the ECJ concerning environmental matters in the
Danish Bottlesi52case where it held that the Danish restrictions on unauthorised
containers were too damaging to trade in comparison to the slight improvement in
container recycling they would bring. In other words, the measure was
"disproportionate to the objective pursued".353
The use of a proportionality test in addition to the least trade restrictive test is less
attractive from an environmental perspective since it imposes a supplementary hurdle
to Members imposing SPS measures. Although panels and the Appellate Body have
not interpreted SPS necessity requirements in the light of the means-end test so far,
possibly because the SPS provisions do not explicitly authorise such a test, this is set
to change.
This will create an important change in the interpretation of the SPS Agreement that
up until now was rooted in a risk assessment paradigm rather than in an economic
paradigm where normative rules for designing SPS measures are based on cost-
benefit analysis. This is not necessarily a welcome development as although sound
science is compatible with sound economics, some SPS measures may have net
economic costs while having a sound scientific justification.
In addition, applying the proportionality principle in the WTO also has the
disadvantages of comparing costs and benefits as was noted in Chapter 2. Supposing
that it would be scientifically plausible that the use of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) is unsafe, then, if the proportionality principle were to apply, it
would be necessary to weigh the commercial costs of the country exporting the
genetically modified food in the case of an import ban to the environmental benefits
of not accepting genetically modified food.354 The question then arises whether the
costs are gross costs, in other words, the loss of trade in genetically modified food
with the importing country or the net costs, that is, the loss subtracting the revenue
352 Commission v Denmark, Case 302/86, ECR 4607, (1988).
353 Ibidem, p4632.
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earned in selling the genetically modified food to another importer. Another question
in the computation of costs is whether the costs are recurring or whether it is
expected that exporting country adapt to the new situation. The calculation of
benefits can also be tricky since how does one, for example, evaluate in monetary
terms the value of not consuming genetically modified food. Therefore, these
methodological problems suggest that the use of the proportionality principle will
lead to equivocal results regarding costs and benefits.
III. Obligations under Article 2.3
In addition, to the general obligations contained in Article 2.2, the SPS Agreement
also requires in Article 2.3 that SPS measures "do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably
discriminate between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail,
including between their own territory and that of other Members" and that SPS
measures "shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised
restriction on international trade".
Article 2.3 is almost identical to the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994.355
Article 2.3 only explicitly states what is implied in Article XX, that SPS measures
should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members including
between their own territory and that of other Members and that this discrimination
should not occur between Members where not only similar conditions prevail but
also where these are identical.356
354 See S. Charnovitz, "Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade", 27 CILJ (1994), p483.
355 See Chapter 2, section C.II.2. G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade
Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade - A Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of
Goods", 36 JWT 5 (2002), p823.
356 "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the European Communities under
Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225 6 March 2003, §29.
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However, e ven with t his c larification, t his p rovision i s far from b eing a model o f
clarity as discussed when analysing Article XX in Chapter 2.357
The SPS Agreement has attempted to shed more light on the meaning of the general
obligation in Article 2.3 by including a specific obligation in Article 5.5 that
interprets Article 2.3. Therefore, the next sections will examine the requirements of
Article 5.5 and determine to what extent it is helpful in interpreting Article 2.3.
1.) Relationship between Article 2.3 and 5.5
Article 5.5 provides that:
"With the objective ofachieving consistency in the application of the concept
ofappropriate level of [SPS] protection... each Member shall avoid arbitrary
or unjustifiable distinction in the levels it considers to be appropriate in
different situations, ifsuch distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade. Members shall co-operate in the
Committee, in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, to
develop guidelines to further the practical implementation of this provision. In
developing the guidelines, the Committee shall take into account all relevant
factors, including the exceptional character of human health risks to which
people voluntarily expose themselves
The Hormones Panel stated that:
"Article 2.3 deals, in general terms, with [SPS] measures which discriminate
between Members or which are applied in a manner which would constitute a
disguised restriction on i nternational trade. Article 5.5, on the other hand,
deals more specifically with distinctions in levels ofprotection (which will
normally be reflected in one or more [SPS] measures) which result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade ",358
357 "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the European Communities under
Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225 6 March 2003, §29.
358 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.168 and Canada Panel Report, §8.171.
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The Appellate Body added that "when read together with Article 2.3, Article 5.5 may
be seen to be marking out and elaborating a particular route leading to the same
destination set out in Article 2.3."359
The Salmon Panel affirmed360 that Article 5.5 must be read in the light ofArticle 2.3:
"Indeed, even though Article 5.5 deals with arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions in levels of protection imposed by one Member for different
situations and Article 2.3 addresses, rather, [SPSJ measures which (1)
arbitrary or unjustifiably discriminate between WTO Members or (2) are
applied in a manner which woidd constitute a disguised restriction on trade;
the third element under Article 5.5 also requires that the measure in dispute
results in discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade. We conclude,
therefore, that if we were to find that all three elements under Article 5.5 -
including, in particular, the third element - are fulfilled and that, therefore,
the more specific Article 5.5 is violated, such finding can be presumed to
imply a violation of the more general Article 2.3. We do recognise, at the
same time, that, given the more general character of Article 2.3, not all
violations ofArticle 2.3 are covered by Article 5.5 361
The Salmon Panel emphasised the fact that Article 5.5 appears to have developed a
test for determining whether Article 2.3 is complied with, without however covering
every possible violation. Therefore, a violation of Article 5.5 implies that the
measure i s inconsistent with Article 2 .3 but consistency with Article 5 .5 does not
imply that Article 2.3 is complied with. Unfortunately, although, the Salmon Panel
was right it did not clearly state what those other factors were that would cause a
violation of Article 2.3. It is likely, though, that it was referring to findings, for
example, m ade b y t he United States - Import Prohibitions ofCertain Shrimp a nd
Shrimp ProtfitcA362(hereinafter "Shrimps") Appellate Body in concluding that the
measures that it was reviewing were inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XX.
Indeed, the Appellate Body's findings were made without investigating different but
359 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §212.
360 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.109.
361 Ibidem.
362 Adopted 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R.
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comparable situations as it focused on, among other things, on the lack of
transparency and due process in the administration of the measures.363
2.) Analysis underArticle 5.5
In considering the obligation to ensure that arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in
the levels of protection do not cause discrimination or disguised restriction on
international trade364, the Hormones and Salmon Panel and Appellate Body found
that Article 5.5 has three elements, which cumulatively can lead to a violation of
Article 5.5.365 First, the Member imposing the measure adopts different appropriate
levels of SPS protection in different situations; second, the levels of protection
exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in their treatment of different situations;
third, arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in discrimination or disguised
restriction of international trade.366 These three elements will be considered below.
a) Different levels of protection in different situations
(1) Different situations
The Hormones Panel in interpreting the term "different situations" stated that
situations that involved the same substance or the same adverse health effect could
363 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, § 169-194.
364 The Hormones Panel and Appellate Body considered that arbitrary and unjustifiable distinctions
that result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade must be avoided,
both were of the opinion that the statement of the goal in Article 5.5 that "each Member shall
avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different
situations" does not establish a legal obligation of consistency of appropriate levels of protection
as this goal is to be achieved in the future with the assistance of the Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures that aims to develop guidelines for the practical implementation of
Article 5.5. Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.169 and Canada Panel Report, §8.172 and
Appellate Body Report, §213. The Appellate Body added that the goal is not to achieve absolute
or perfect consistency as governments set their appropriate levels of protection often on an ad
hoc basis and over time, as different risks arise at different occasions. Hormones, Appellate
Body Report, §213.
365 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.174; Canada Panel Report, §8.177; Appellate Body Report,
§214-215 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.108 and Appellate Body Report, §151.
366 Ibidem.
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be compared to one another367 but also implicitly found that situations were both the
substance and the adverse health effect are the same could be compared. Of course,
where both the substance and the adverse health effect are the same, the substance
must be used for different purposes, in order for there to be two comparable but
different situations.
The Hormones Panel considered the following situations to be comparable: natural
and synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion purposes compared to
natural hormones occurring endogenously in meats (natural hormones for growth
promotion and occurring endogenously were considered to be the same substance
and to have the same adverse health effect whereas synthetic hormones although
being considered as different substances to the endogenously occurring natural
hormones were believed to have the same adverse health effects); natural hormones
administered for growth promotion purposes compared to natural hormones
administered for therapeutic or zoo-technical purposes (again these were considered
to be the same substance and have the same adverse health effect); natural and
synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion purposes compared to
carbadox and olaquindox (this comparison covered according to the Panel different
substances with the same adverse health effect).
The EC disagreed with the Panel, as it was of the opinion that although a common
element, such as the substance or drug or the health risk, must be present it was not
necessarily sufficient to ensure a rational comparison.368 The Appellate Body stated
the obvious by finding that situations exhibiting differing levels of protection could
not "be compared unless they were comparable", in other words, unless they
presented "some common element or elements sufficient to render them
comparable".369 The Appellate Body did not, however, expressly accept that
"different situations" that could be compared were situations involving the same
367 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.176 and Canada Panel Report, §8.179. See also Salmon, Panel
Report, §8.115.
368 EC's appellant's submission, §455.
369 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §217.
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substance or the same adverse health effect370 or both the same or similar substance
and adverse health effect or the comparisons identified by the Panel.
The Salmon Panel and Appellate Body took a similar approach to the Hormones
Panel by finding that "...in the circumstances of this dispute, we can compare
situations under Article 5.5 if these situations involve either a risk of "entry,
establishment or spread" of the same or a similar disease or of the same or similar
"associated biological and economic consequences" and this irrespective of whether
they arise from the same product or other products".371 The Salmon Panel and
Appellate Body, however, specified that both the same or similar hazards would
render a situation comparable.
In addition, the Panel did not consider that its analysis had to be limited to diseases
that were positively detected in fresh, chilled or frozen ocean-caught Pacific salmon.
The Panel stated that:
"...to the extent that both the other products and the salmon products further
examined a re known to be h osts to one of t hese d isease a gents or- for the
salmon products - give rise to an alleged concern for that disease agent, they
can be associated with the same kind of risk, namely a risk of entry,
establishment or spread ofthat disease ",372
The Appellate Body added that in order to compare ocean-caught Pacific salmon
products with other products it was not necessary that the other products be the
potential hosts to all disease agents of concern.373 Indeed, if the Panel or Appellate
Body was to find that only products which are known to be host to all 24 disease
agents of concern to Australia can be compared to the ocean-caught Pacific salmon
products, it would be sufficient for a WTO Member imposing an SPS measure, in
370 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.176 and Canada Panel Report, §8.179. See also Salmon, Panel
Report, §8.115.
371 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.117 and Appellate Body Report, §154. It should be noted that "same
product" refers to ocean-caught Pacific salmon and the other types of salmon.
372 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.119.
373 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §160.
183
order to avoid application ofArticle 5.5, to list a series of disease agents allegedly of
concern to it, the totality of which is not known to occur in any other product.
Therefore, even if ocean-caught Pacific salmon products were to be host to more
disease agents than the other products they are compared to, this would not affect the
comparability of the products as "different situations" under Article 5.5. This factor
may, however, be a reason to justify a distinction in levels of protection imposed for
these different situations under the second element of Article 5.5.374
The Panel determined that the import prohibition on fresh, chilled or frozen ocean-
caught Pacific salmon and the admission of imports of uncooked Pacific herring, cod
and haddock, Atlantic cod and haddock, European and Japanese eel, Japanese plaice
and Dover sole for human consumption; herring in whole, frozen form for use as bait
and live ornamental finfish, are "different situations which can be compared under
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement".375 The Appellate Body accepted the Panel's
comparisons of measures relating to other types of fish and fish products, as it
considered them to be different situations.376
It is clear that a "different situation" in terms of Article 5.5 is a situation that is not
identical to another situation, but it is a situation that can be compared to another
situation. Therefore, the interpretation of "different situation" is restrictive.
(2) Different levels of protection
After having identified different but comparable situations, the Hormones and the
Salmon Panel considered the levels of protection applied by, respectively the EC and
Australia, in these situations.
374 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.119.
375 Ibidem, §8.128.
376 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §161.
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The Hormones Panel noted that with respect to natural and synthetic hormones
administered for growth promotion purposes, the EC had adopted a "no residue"
level as its appropriate level of protection, whereas, with respect to natural hormones
occurring endogenously in meats, natural hormones administered for therapeutic or
zoo-technical purposes, and carbadox and olaquindox administered for growth
promotion purposes, the EC had adopted an "unlimited residue" level. Therefore, the
Panel considered that the EC had adopted different levels of protection in different
but comparable situations, thus establishing the first element ofArticle 5.5.
The Salmon Panel found that the rather substantial difference between the fact that
fresh, frozen and uncooked ocean-caught Pacific salmon could not be imported and
allowing the imports of the other products often without control,377 reflected a
difference in the appropriate levels of protection for each of the four comparisons.378
The Appellate Body did not consider whether there was a difference in the levels of
protection, as this issue was not appealed.379
Again as noted in section D.II.2.)b), the Panel incorrectly assumed that the
appropriate level of protection determined by the importing country is, necessarily,
the level of protection reflected in the measure. The appropriate level of protection
was a very low level of risk not a zero level of risk. However, since the other
products were subject to very little control, a difference in the levels of protection is
nevertheless clear. Therefore, in this particular case the Panel's error is of no
consequence.
The fact that the Panel found that the size of the difference was a determining factor
in deciding whether the appropriate levels of protection in comparable situations
were different should also be criticised. There is no requirement that the difference
be of a particular magnitude in order to establish the first element of Article 5.5.
377 Ornamental finfish only after control.
378 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.129.
379 Salmon, Panel Report, footnote 106.
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b) Arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in levels of protection
The second element of Article 5.5 that needs to be demonstrated is that the
differences in levels of SPS protection adopted in comparable situations are
"arbitrary or unjustifiable".
The three comparable situations for the Hormones case will be discussed in
sequence.
(1) Natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth
promotion purposes compared to natural hormones occurring
endogenously in meats
With respect to natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion
purposes, as compared to natural hormones occurring endogenously in meat, the
Panel found that the distinctions in the levels of protection adopted by the EC were
arbitrary and unjustifiable, because the EC had not submitted any evidence that the
risk related to the added hormones used as growth promoters was higher than the risk
related to endogenous hormones.380
With respect to added natural hormones, the conclusions reached in the 1988 JECFA
Report suggested that the total residue level of natural hormones in meat from treated
animals fell within the physiological range of levels found in meat from untreated
animals.381 A ccording t o d ata s ubmitted t o t he Panel, t he r esidue 1 evels o f n atural
hormones in various natural food products were higher than the residue levels of
these hormones in meat from treated animals.382 The Panel rejected the argument that
the practical difficulties of detecting residues of natural hormones for growth
380 With respect to added natural hormones: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.193 and Canada Panel
Report, §8.196. With respect to synthetic hormones: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.213,
8.246-8.266 and Canada Panel Report, §8.216, 8.267-8.269.
381 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.194; Canada Panel Report, §8.197.
382 Such as eees, soya oil and broccoli. Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.194 and Canada Panel
Report, §8.197.
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promotion from e ndogenous n atural h ormones could n ot j ustify d ifferent 1 evels o f
protection because the difficulties could be avoided under a different regulatory
regime that would not distinguish between endogenous and added natural
hormones.383 In other words, the Panel came to a rather unpersuasive conclusion that
natural hormones added for growth promotion should be allowed because their
residues could not be distinguished from those arising from endogenous natural
hormones.
With respect to synthetic hormones, the scientific experts advising the Panel were of
the opinion that synthetic hormones could be better detected and controlled than
natural hormones.384
The Panel also noted that there was a marked gap between a "no-residue" level of
protection against added natural and synthetic hormones used for growth promotion
and the "unlimited-residue" level of protection with regard to hormones occurring
naturally in meat and other foods was relevant in finding that the measures were
arbitrary or unjustifiable.385
The Appellate Body rejected the Panel's conclusion as it considered that the marked
difference in levels of protection was justified on the grounds that while it is possible
to eliminate through regulation the residues of hormones which have been
administered for growth promotion purposes, it is not possible to eliminate the
residues of natural hormones occurring endogenously without "a comprehensive and
massive governmental intervention in nature and in the ordinary lives of people."386
Therefore, the Appellate Body considered added natural or synthetic hormones and
natural endogenous hormones to be fundamentally different. Indeed, it would be
unreasonable to require the EC to prohibit the production and consumption of such
383 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.195 and Canada Panel Report, §8.198.
384 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.213, 8.264-8.266; Canada Panel Report, §8.216, 8.267-8.269.
385 with respect to added natural hormones: Hormones, US Panel Report, § 8.196-8.197; Canada
Panel Report, §8.199-8.200. With respect to synthetic hormones: Hormones, US Panel Report,
§8.213-8.214, 8.264-8.266; Canada Panel Report, §8.216-8.217, 8.267-8.269.
386 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §221.
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foods to limit the residues of naturally occurring hormones in food. In addition, even
though it is not empirically possible to distinguish between residues of hormones that
arise from endogenous or exogenous hormones, consumers would be exposed to
greater amount of residue if hormones were added for growth promotion purposes.
The Appellate Body concluded that the "considerations cited by the Panel, whether
taken separately or grouped together, do not justify the Panel's finding of
arbitrariness."387 The Appellate Body correctly stated that the comparison was
absurd,388 thereby implying that in some situations it was not sufficient that there be
a same or similar substance and hazard to health for there to be a comparable
situation.
(2) Natural hormones administered for growth promotion purposes
compared to natural hormones administered for therapeutic or
zoo-technical purposes
Unlike the use of natural hormones administered for growth promotion purposes that
occurs in a regular and continuous manner, and on a herd-wide basis, the EC argued
that the use of natural hormones for therapeutic or zoo-technical purposes occurs
only on a small scale as it is targeted at animals carrying a disease and only occurs
occasionally, that is once a year. In addition, the EC argued that the use of hormones
for t herapeutic o r z oo-technical p urposes u nlike for g rowth p romotion p urposes i s
subject to strict conditions such as administration by a veterinarian, stringent
withdrawal periods and administration to cattle normally intended for breeding not
consumption.389 Therefore, the EC argued that the differences in use and control
ensured that any risk related to the therapeutic or zoo-technical use of these
hormones was prevented and that in practice a level of "no residue" was achieved,
thereby suggesting that the differences were justified.
387 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §221.
388 Ibidem.
389 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.198-8.199; Canada Panel Report, §8.201-8.202; EC Appellant's
submission, §82-84 and Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §223-224.
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However, because the Panel had determined that the distinctions in the levels of
protection of natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion
purposes compared to natural hormones occurring endogenously in meats were
arbitrary and unjustifiable, the Panel found it unnecessary to consider this
comparable situation.
The Appellate Body, however, considered this situation, since unlike the Panel390, it
had concluded that the differences in levels of protection with respect to natural and
synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion purposes compared to natural
hormones occurring endogenously in meats were not arbitrary and unjustifiable.
The Appellate Body also found that the distinctions in levels of protection were not
arbitrary and unjustifiable in this comparable situation.391 The Appellate Body
justified its finding on the b asis of the arguments put forward by the EC that the
distinctions were justified by the differences in frequency and scope of
administration of the hormones and the tighter regulations imposed on the
administration of hormones for therapeutic and zoo-technical purposes. Although,
the Appellate Body did not specify how the arguments were weighted in its analysis,
it is likely that the first consideration carried greater weight. Indeed, there is no
reason why hormones administered for growth-promotion purposes could not be
more tightly regulated as well. The first argument may also be criticised if the Panel's
scientific experts opinion were taken into account that a "no residue" level could not
be achieved in practice because these activities could occur regularly and on a large
scale and that residues would remain once the animal was slaughtered.392
390 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.200; Canada Panel Report, §8.203.
391 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §225.
392 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.199; Canada Panel Report, §8.202.
(3) Natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth
promotion purposes compared to carbadox and olaquindox
The Panel rather unexpectedly considered the distinctions in the levels of protection
of natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion purposes
compared to carbadox and olaquindox administered for growth promotion purposes
as the Panel felt that since it had already found that the differences in the levels of
protection for natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth promotion
purposes compared to natural hormones occurring endogenously in meats were
arbitrary and unjustifiable, that it was not necessary to determine whether the
differences in the levels of protection of natural hormones administered for growth
promotion purposes compared to natural hormones administered for therapeutic or
zoo-technical purposes were arbitrary or unjustifiable.393
The Panel found that the distinctions in the levels of protection between natural and
synthetic hormones, and carbadox and olaquindox, administered for growth
promotion purposes, were arbitrary and unjustifiable.394 In reaching this conclusion,
the Panel rejected seven arguments that the EC had put forward.
First, the Panel noted that the fact that the EC contended that carbadox and
olaquindox were anti-microbial agents, and not hormones, was insufficient, as it gave
no reason why this difference alone could justify a different regulatory treatment in
the light of their potential carcinogenic effect. Since different substances with the
same adverse health effects can be compared, the Panel found that it was necessary
to give a justification why these substances were treated differently.395
Second, the EC argued that carbadox and olaquindox had preventive therapeutic
effects on animals and only indirectly acted as growth promoters by suppressing the
393 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.200; Canada Panel Report, §8.203.
394 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.238; Canada Panel Report, §8.241.
395 With respect to carbadox: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.231, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel
Report, §8.234, 8.270-8.273.
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development of bacteria, and aiding the intestinal flora of piglets as opposed to
hormones used for growth promotion purposes that directly acted as growth
promoters. However, the Panel felt that the substances could not be distinguished on
this ground because the hormones at issue could also have therapeutic effects while
being used for growth promotion purposes.396
Third, the EC claimed that carbadox and olaquindox were only commercially
available in prepared feedstuffs in predetermined dosages and that, therefore, their
administration was less open for abuse. The Panel, however, noted that all five
hormones at issue for implantation or injection also contained predetermined
dosages. In addition, the scientific experts advising the Panel were of the opinion that
administering the hormones through injections and implants is more accurate and
reliable than putting additives in the feedstuffs because of carry-over risks from
treated to untreated food and because the additives may be harmful for the people
handling the feedstuff.397
Fourth, the fact that the EC stated that there were no alternatives to carbadox and
olaquindox for therapeutic purposes did not convince the Panel as the scientific
experts stated that there were alternatives that existed such as oxytetracycline.398
Fifth, the EC's argument that the potential for abuse for carbadox and olaquindox
was smaller than for hormones at issue since the former only exerted growth
promotion effects in piglets up to four months and were subject to a strict withdrawal
period was not compelling because there is no guarantee that treated piglets would
not be slaughtered. In addition, the honnones at issue may also be subject to strict
conditions.399
396 With respect to carbadox: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.232, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel
Report, §8.235, 8.270-8.273.
397 With respect to carbadox: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.233, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel
Report, §8.236, 8.270-8.273.
398 With respect to carbadox: Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.234, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel
Report, §8.237, 8.270-8.273.
399 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.235, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel Report, §8.238, 8.270-8.273.
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Sixth, the EC's argument that carbadox and olaquindox are used in small quantities
and are hardly absorbed implying that effectively there would be no residues
remaining in meat destined for human consumption was also rejected as the scientists
advising the Panel stated that once a substance has been administered there would
always be residues in the meat of that animal.400
Finally, the EC argued that it had already taken action to review carbadox and
olaquindox. However, the Panel did not find that this reason could be used to justify
distinctions and that on the contrary it suggested that the distinctions were not
justified.
After briefly recapitulating the first six of the arguments and counter-arguments
summarised above, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel's conclusion that the
differences in levels of protection were arbitrary and unjustifiable.401 The fact that
the 36th JECFA Report submitted by the US considered carbadox as a known
genotoxic carcinogen that not only promotes but also induces cancer402 and the fact
that the experts advising the Panel agreed with this finding was probably also
decisive in determining that the differences in the levels of protection were
unjustifiable. Unfortunately, t he A ppellate B ody did n ot specify whether i t agreed
with all the counter-arguments made by the Panel or which of these carried the most
weight.
The Appellate Body could have criticised the Panel's finding with respect to two of
the EC's arguments. First, the fact that carbadox and olaquindox are food additives
implies that the only way to abuse the administration of hormones is to overfeed the
animals. This abuse would be rather limited since there are physical limitations on
400 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.235, 8.267-8.270; Canada Panel Report, §8.238, 8.270-8.273.
401 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §228-235.
402 Evaluation of Certain Veterinary Drug Residues in Food: Thirty-sixth Report of the Joint
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives, Technical Report Series 799 (World Health
Organisation, 1 990), pp45-50. See also Hormones, Appellate B ody Report, § 226. The Codex
Commission declined to establish an MRL for the compound.
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how much animals can eat. Unfortunately, however, the EC also banned MGA that is
also added to animal feed, which makes the EC's argument less tenable.
Second, the fact that carbadox and olaquindox only provide growth promotion
effects in piglets up to four months means that contamination by these additives is
limited to a fixed period of time,403 as opposed to growth promotion hormones that
are administered on a regular and continuous manner during the lifetime of the
animals could have justified a finding that the differences in the levels of protection
were not arbitrary or unjustifiable. This would have been consistent with the
Appellate Body's findings with respect to the difference in the levels of protection
between natural hormones administered for growth promotion purposes and to
natural hormones administered for therapeutic or zoo-technical purposes where the
Appellate Body considered that the method of administration and frequency of use of
the hormones was relevant in determining whether a different level of protection was
arbitrary or unjustifiable.
Therefore, the Appellate Body's findings provide relatively little guidance on how to
achieve consistency with Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement as it is difficult to predict
which elements the Appellate Body will consider as contributing to a finding of
arbitrary or unjustifiable differences or which elements carry the most weight in
making this finding. In addition, neither the Panel nor the Appellate Body
distinguished between "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable", which as was discussed in the
last chapter should be given separate meanings.404
In the Salmon case, the Panel began its analysis by noting that the differences in the
levels of protection for ocean-caught Pacific salmon products and the other four
categories of fish and fish products405 could be justified if, for example, a higher risk
of "entry, establishment or spread" of the same or a similar disease would be
403 This argument of course ignores the possibility that carbadox and olaquindox might be
administered for purposes other than growth promotion after four months. However, neither the
Panel nor the Appellate Body made this argument.
404 See Chapter 2, section C.II.2.
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associated with imported ocean-caught Pacific salmon.406 The Panel, however,
found, based on scientific experts' opinions, reports and studies submitted to them,
that some other fish categories, in particular, herring used as bait and live ornamental
finfish, although being subject to a lower level of protection could be presumed to
represent at least as high a risk if not a higher risk than the one associated with
ocean-caught Pacific salmon.407 Therefore, the Panel found that the distinctions
between ocean-caught Pacific salmon and herring used as bait and live ornamental
finfish were arbitrary and unjustifiable. In addition, the Panel noted that the
biological and economic consequences of disease introduction would generally be
similar in a given country, irrespective of the product introducing the disease.408 The
Panel, therefore, found this was further evidence that the distinctions in the levels of
protection between ocean-caught Pacific salmon and herring used as bait or live
ornamental finfish were arbitrary and unjustifiable.409 The Appellate Body upheld
this finding.410
Therefore, both the Hormones and Salmon cases demonstrated that in a comparable
situation, the Member must provide a reasonable explanation for this difference.
However, there is no principled way to go about evaluating arguments put forward
by the parties. Therefore, the panels and the Appellate Body are left with substantial
discretion in determining whether a Member has acted consistently with this second
requirement of Article 5.5. Unfortunately, the only indication given by Article 5.5 is
that risks taken intentionally can be distinguished from risks taken involuntarily.
Therefore, if a Member imposes a higher standard of protection from pesticide
exposure and a lower standard of protection from risks arising from voluntary
activities such as smoking, then although the risks to human health are similar, the
405 See section D.II1.2.b.
406 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.133.
407 Ibidem, §8.134.
408 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.121, 8.135.
409 Ibidem, §8.135.
410 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §166.
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fact that the exposure is voluntary implies that the difference in levels of protection
would not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions. In other words, the SPS
Agreement accepts the public's different perception of risk when that perception
depends on whether or not exposure to the hazard is voluntary.
c) Differences resulting in "discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade"
The third element of Article 5.5 is that the "arbitrary and unjustifiable" differences in
the levels of SPS protection must result in "discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade."
The Panel and the Appellate Body in the Hormones and Salmon cases considered
that the "distinctions in the levels of protection" that must result in discrimination or
a disguised restriction on international trade in order to establish the third
requirement of Article 5.5 should be read as requiring that the SPS measure
reflecting an arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction must not result in "discrimination
or a disguised restriction on international trade". Although, this interpretation is not
supported by the text of Article 5.5, the panels and the Appellate Body came to this
conclusion because "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions" would necessarily result
in d iscrimination b etween c omparable p roducts. I n o ther w ords, i f t he distinctions
and not the measure were examined for this third requirement, then arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions would be sufficient to demonstrate inconsistency with
Article 5 .5 and the phrase "discrimination or disguised restriction on international
trade" would have no meaning.
Therefore, although referring to distinctions in the levels of protection that result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, the panels and the
Appellate Body are in fact referring to the measure. The term "discrimination" in
Article 5.5 is, therefore, considered to mean arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between Members.
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In other words, Article 5.5 provides that where a finding of discrimination between
comparable products is made, a finding of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between Members could under certain circumstances also be made.
The Hormones Panel found that the differences in levels of SPS protection were not
only arbitrary and unjustifiable but also resulted in "discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade".411
In coming to this conclusion, the Panel, began by drawing on an analogy from the
Appellate Body Report of the Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (hereinafter
"Alcoholic Beverages") case,412 which found that dissimilar taxation needs to be
"applied ... so as to afford protection to domestic production"413 in order to be
inconsistent with the national treatment clause in the GATT 1994 and that in some
situations the magnitude of the dissimilar taxation could be sufficient to support this
finding.414
The Panel also recalled the decision of the Appellate Body in the Gasoline case that
"arbitrary discrimination", "unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction
on international trade" found in Article XX of the GATT 1994, may be read side by
side and impart meaning to one another.415 This is also in line with the interpretation
of "disguised restriction on international trade" by the ECJ in Commission v.
Germany (hereinafter "German Beer") case.416 In this case, Germany only allowed
beer to be sold and labelled as "Bier", if no additives were used in producing the
beer. Germany justified its rule in part on the ground that the additives constituted a
411 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.241, 8.268; Canada Panel Report, §8.244, 8.271.
412 Adopted 1 November 1996, WT/DS8/AB/R.
413 Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, p24, states that in order for an internal tax
measure to be inconsistent with Article 111:2, second sentence, three conditions must be satisfied:
(1) the products must be "directly competitive or substitutable"; (2) they must be "not similarly
taxed"; and (3) the tax measure must be applied "so as to afford protection to domestic
production."
414 Ibidem, p30.
415 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p25.
416 Case 178/84, ECR 1227, (1997).
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risk to human health. However, the ECJ rejected this argument because for all
beverages, other than beer, German law specifically allowed some of the additives
that were banned in beer. Therefore, the arbitrariness of the distinctions was
considered by the ECJ to be a disguised restriction to protect German brewers from
other EU brewers that used additives in their production of beer due to technical
reasons related to the nature of the ingredients.
However, the Hormones Panel noted that:
"... in order to give effect to all three elements contained in Article 5.5 and
giving full meaning to the text and context of this provision, we consider that
all three elements need to be distinguished and addressed separately.
However, we also agree that in some cases where a Member enacts, for
comparable situations, [SPS] measures which reflect different levels of
protection, the significance of the difference levels ofprotection, combined
with the arbitrariness thereofmay be sufficient to conclude that this difference
in levels ofprotection "result(s) in discrimination or a disguised restriction
on international trade" in the sense ofArticle 5.5".417
Although, the Panel recognised that the fact that distinctions in the levels of
protection which are found to be arbitrary and unjustifiable combined with the fact
that there is a large magnitude in the difference in the levels of protection, could be
sufficient to imply that the distinctions resulted in "discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade",418 it found that this element together with the
failure on the part of the EC to provide a plausible explanation for the difference and
the fact that the distinctions in the level of protection resulted in an import ban on
treated meat that restricted international trade suggested that the distinctions in levels
of p rotection r esulted i n " discrimination o r a d isguised restriction o n i nternational
trade".419
The Panel also cited three additional factors in support of its conclusion.
417 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.202; Canada Panel Report, §8.205. See also Gasoline,
Appellate Body Report, p25.
418 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.184; Canada Panel Report, §8.187.
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First, that the EC had multiple objectives in mind when implementing the measures
at issue as reflected in the preambles of the measures in dispute, reports of the
European Parliament, and opinions of the EC Economic and Social Committee
including, harmonising the regulatory schemes of the EC Member States, bringing
about an increase in the consumption of beef, and providing more favourable
treatment to domestic producers.420
Second, because prior to the EC ban on treated meat, a significantly higher
percentage of animals were treated with hormones in the US and Canada than in the
EC, the EC ban resulted in discrimination against US and Canadian meat in favour of
EC meat.421
Finally, the EC ban affected the bovine meat sector, where the EC seeks to limit meat
supplies, and is less concerned with international competitiveness, whereas carbadox
and olaquindox, the residues of which are unrestricted, are used in the p ork meat
sector where there are no domestic surpluses, and where international competition is
a higher priority.422
The Appellate Body only considered the Panel's finding with respect to the third
comparable situation: natural and synthetic hormones administered for growth
promotion purposes compared to carbadox and olaquindox administered for growth
promotion purposes since the Appellate Body found that only in this situation the
distinctions in the levels of protection were arbitrary and unjustifiable.
The Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding of "discrimination or a disguised
restriction on international trade"423 for various reasons.
419 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.203, 8.216, 8.241, 8.268; Canada Panel Report, §8.206, 8.219,
8.244,8.271.
420 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.204, 8.217, 8.242; Canada Panel Report, §8.207, 8.220, 8.245.
421 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.205, 8.217; Canada Panel Report, §8.208, 8.220.
422 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.243; Canada Panel Report, §8.245.
423 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §246.
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First, the Appellate Body found that the Panel was unjustified in assuming the
applicability of the reasoning of the Appellate Body in the Alcoholic Beverages case
"about the inference that may be drawn from the sheer size of a tax differential for
the application of Article 111:2, second sentence, of the GATT 1994, to the quite
different question of whether arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in levels of
protection against risks for human life or health, "result in discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade".424 Indeed, the second sentence of Article
111:2 "is concerned with the impact of a tax on the competitive relations between
directly competitive or substitutable products" whereas "discrimination and
disguised restriction in the sense of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement are entirely
different concepts".425 Article 5.5 does not deal with "like products" but comparable
products and does not require that the national treatment clause be complied with but
that no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on
international trade occurs when read in the context of Article 2.3. In addition, the
Appellate Body a rgued that a t ax d ifferential w as d ifferent toad ifferential i n t he
levels of protection as the impact of tax differentials on international competitiveness
could be more easily quantified than the relationship between differentials in the
levels of protection and a finding of discrimination or disguised restriction on
international trade.426 The Appellate Body also found that "the degree of difference,
or the extent of the discrepancy, in the levels of protection, is only one kind of factor
which, along with others, may cumulatively lead to the conclusion that
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade in fact results from the
application of a measure or measures embodying one or more of those different
levels of protection".
Second, the Appellate Body also disagreed with the Panel as it found that due to the
different structures of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article 5.5
of the SPS Agreement, the reasoning in the Gasoline Appellate Body Report could
424 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §239.
425 EC's appellant's submission, §486.
426 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, footnote 251.
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not be simply imported into a case involving Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement.427
Although, the Appellate Body did not clearly indicate what it meant by the difference
in structures, it seems that it agreed with the EC that the elements in Article XX and
Article 2.3 were alternative whereas the elements in Article 5.5 were cumulative in
nature.428
Therefore, the Appellate Body in rejecting the Panel's analogies also rejected the
Panel's finding that the degree of difference in levels of protection together with a
finding of an arbitrary or unjustifiable difference alone could be sufficient to
demonstrate that the third requirement of Article 5.5 has been met.429 Therefore, the
Appellate Body although recognising that the arbitrariness of a measure, combined
with a large difference in levels of protection for comparable situations could support
the fact that discrimination has resulted or that disguised restriction on international
trade has resulted considered that this might not always be the case.
Third, the Appellate Body stated that it "did not attribute the same importance as the
Panel to the supposed multiple objectives of the [EC] in enacting the EC Directives
that set forth the EC measures at issue."430 The Appellate Body mentioned that the
goals of harmonising the regulatory schemes of the EC Member States, and bringing
about an increase in the consumption of beef, were justified and not protectionist.
Fourth, the Appellate Body found that the documentation which preceded and
accompanied the enactment of the ban clearly demonstrated the depth and extent of
the anxieties experienced within the EC concerning the results of the general
scientific studies showing carcinogenicity of hormones, the dangers of abusing
hormones used for growth promotion and the quality and drug-free character of the
meat available in its internal market.431 Therefore, the Appellate Body concluded that
427 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §239.
428 Ibidem, §237.
429 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §240.
430 Ibidem, §245.
431 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §245.
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the measures were designed to protect the EC's population from risks of cancer and
not to protect the domestic beef producers in the EC.432
The Appellate Body's analysis reveals that the intent of the Member imposing SPS
measures must be taken into account in determining the measure's compliance with
the "discrimination or disguised restriction on international trade" requirement.
Indeed, the Appellate Body found that the EC's "arbitrary and unjustifiable
distinctions" did not result in "discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade" because it considered that the measures were intended to protect
the EC's population from the risk of cancer.
Although, the Appellate Body found that the intent of the EC was not to protect the
domestic beef industry, it is understandable that the Panel believed that this was the
case. The Panel noted that the EC ban affected the bovine meat sector in a favourable
manner, whereas carbadox and olaquindox were used in the pork meat sector where
there were no domestic surpluses. Indeed, the EC swine industry is more efficient
than the beef sector that relies on costly domestic price support measures, import
protection and export subsidies to maintain producer profitability.
Hurst criticised the Appellate Body's analysis for ignoring the fact that both
"discrimination" and "disguised restriction" must be given meaning and that
although, i n t he a nalysis o fw hether d istinctions i n 1 evels o f p rotection r esult i n a
"disguised restriction on international trade", the intention of the party imposing the
measure is relevant, motive is not relevant in determining whether arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions result in "discrimination".433 In determining whether
discrimination is implied by arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the level of
protection the intent434 of the Member is not relevant as either the distinctions
suggest or do not indicated that a Member has an unfair trading. In other words, the
432 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §245.
433 D. Hurst, "Hormones'. European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products", 9
EJIL 1 (1998), p23.
434 See Chapter 2, section C.II.2.
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Appellate Body's inquiry was not whether the Member imposing a measure
discriminated but rather whether the Member intended to discriminate.435
As was already noted, in Chapter 2, when discussing the Shrimps case, the
determination of whether a measure results in arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between Members should not be dependent on the intent of the
Member imposing the measure.436
However, in the Hormones Appellate Body's defence, it could be that it did not
consider that from the findings of the Panel that the measure resulted in arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination. Therefore, it is probable that the Appellate Body only
found it relevant to consider whether the intention behind imposing different
standards was to protect the domestic beef industry and, therefore, make a finding on
whether the measure constituted a disguised restriction on international trade. In
other words, the conclusion that the Appellate Body only believed the intention of
the Member to be relevant in each and every case might have been justified.
Hurst also argued that the Appellate Body's conclusion that the EC's good intentions
save its measures from violating Article 5.5 runs counter to the objectives of the SPS
Agreement, which requires that Members impose measures that are based on
scientific evidence and is manifestly not designed to protect measures that have no
basis in science, regardless of whether the Member imposing such measures intends
to restrict international trade 437 This point can also be criticised because it ignores
435 D. Hurst, "Hormones: European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products", 9
EJ1L 1 (1998), p24.
436 In the Shrimps case, the Appellate Body focused on considerations of whether the measure could
be reconciled with the policy objective of the Member imposing the measure, whether
comparable measures in the exporting country were rejected, whether efforts were shown to
engage in negotiations to conclude a bi-lateral or multilateral agreement, whether procedures for
exemption from the measure advantaged some exporting countries over others, whether there
was a lack of flexibility, transparency, predictability, or due process in the administration
procedures for obtaining an exemption, and whether officials in deciding exemption were left
with wide discretionary powers. Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §169-194. See Chapter 2,
section C.II.5.a.
437 D. Hurst, "Hormones'. European Communities - Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products", 9
EJIL 1 (1998), p24.
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the fact that the requirement that Members base their measures on scientific evidence
is not an objective but a requirement, and that this requirement is already provided
for in Article 2.2 and Article 5.1. In addition, Hurst failed to consider the ordinary
meaning of the words used in Article 5.5 or the object and purpose ofArticle 5.5.
In the Salmon case, the Panel identified "warning signals" as well as several more
substantial "additional factors"438 that cumulatively led the Panel to find that the
distinctions constituted "a disguised restriction on international trade".
The first warning signal detected by the Panel was the arbitrary or unjustifiable
character of the differences in the levels of protection,439 confirming the point of
view of the Appellate Body in the Hormones case which recognised that the arbitrary
or unjustifiable character of differences in levels of protection operates as a
"warning" signal that the measure in its application might be a discriminatory
measure or might be a restriction on international trade disguised as an SPS measure
for the protection of human life or health.440
The second warning signal considered by the Panel was the rather substantial
difference in levels of protection between an import prohibition on ocean-caught
Pacific salmon and tolerance for imports of herring used as bait and of live
ornamental finfish.441 This again is in line with the Hormones Appellate Body Report
where it was stated that the degree of difference is an element to be considered in
determining whether a measure results in discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.442 Both the first and second warning signals are very similar. The
fact that there was a "rather substantial" difference in the levels of protection
suggested that it could be treated as a separate signal.443 Although, it was clear in this
case that the difference was in the words of the Panel "rather substantial", or could
438 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.149 and 8.158.
439 Ibidem, §8.149.
440 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §215.
441 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.150.
442 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §240.
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even be qualified as substantial, this may not always prove to be an easy task. In fact,
it is probably impossible to precisely define what constitutes a "rather substantial"
difference.
The third "warning signal" considered by the Panel was the inconsistency of the
measure with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 of the SPS Agreement. The Panel stated that its
earlier finding of inconsistency with Articles 5.1 and 2.2 could "...together with other
factors, lead to the conclusion that the measure at issue results in a "disguised
restriction on international trade"".444 The Appellate Body agreed445 with this
finding. Therefore, the fact that a measure is not based on sufficient scientific
evidence may be a sign that the measure was in fact implemented to protect the
domestic industry. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body should have emphasised
that this warning signal could only lead to the conclusion that the measure at issue
results in a "disguised restriction on international trade" if the measure was also
inconsistent with Article 5.7 in order to avoid any confusion.
The first additional factor considered by the Panel was the fact that the substantially
different SPS measures that Australia applied to salmon compared to herring used as
bait and live ornamental finfish was discriminatory. The Panel viewed that the
concept of "disguised restriction on international trade" in Article 5.5 includes,
among other things, restrictions constituting arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between certain products.446 The Appellate Body found that this additional factor
was not different from the first warning signal and that all "arbitrary or unjustifiable
distinctions" in levels of protection will lead logically to discrimination between
products, whether these are the same or comparable.447 Therefore, this additional
factor was considered to be a combination of the first two warning signals and
therefore should not be treated as a separate element.
443 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §173.
444 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.151.
445 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §175.
446 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.153.
447 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §178.
204
The second additional factor considered by the Panel was the substantial but
unexplained change in conclusion between the 1995 Draft Report and the 1996 Final
Report. Indeed, the former allowed the importation of ocean-caught Pacific salmon
under certain conditions whereas the latter recommended the continuing import
prohibition.448 The Panel suggested that this change of position could have been
inspired b y Australian p rotectionism i n t hat i ndustry.449 T he P anel c onsidered t hat
the 1995 Draft Report was a recommendation of an SPS measure and "part of the
architecture" or "part of a process" leading to the 1996 Final Report. Australia
argued that a draft recommendation did not have the status of an SPS measure and
that no provision of the SPS Agreement requires the implementation of draft
recommendations that may not include new scientific evidence. In addition, Australia
contended that the Panel had not considered its arguments and evidence on the role
of draft reports and recommendation in the decision-making process of governments
and that the Panel erred in speculating about the presence and role of lobbying in
Australia's decision to adopt the 1996 Final Report.450 The Appellate Body, however,
agreed with the Panel.451
This finding would probably have been different if Australia had presented new
evidence that justified a change in position between the time the draft report and the
1996 Final Report.
The third additional factor considered by the Panel was the absence of controls on
the internal movement of salmon products within Australia compared to the
prohibition of the importation of ocean-caught Pacific salmon.452 Therefore, the
Panel expressed its doubts on whether Australia applied similarly strict SPS
standards on the internal movement of salmon products within Australia as it does on
the importation of salmon products as a factor to be taken into account when
448 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §179.
449 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.154.
450 Australia's Appellant's Submission, §281-289.
451 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §181.
452 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.155.
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examining Article 5.5. The Appellate Body agreed that this factor could be taken into
consideration although recognising that this factor did not carry much weight.453 The
Appellate Body, however, did not explain why this was the case.
The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that taken the warning signals and certain
"additional factors" considered cumulatively implied that the distinctions in the
levels of protection imposed by Australia resulted in a "disguised restriction on
international trade" and, therefore, acted inconsistently with Article 5.5 and by
implication Article 2.3.454
The Appellate Body continued to apply Article 5.5 to the case of freshwater and
cultured salmon, as it found that Australia's statements regarding its appropriate
level of protection applied to all salmon. The Appellate Body found that the same
analysis that applied to ocean-caught Pacific salmon under Article 5.5 also applied to
freshwater and cultured salmon.
Again, as in the Hormones case, the Appellate Body did not clearly indicate what
standard or priority should be used or given to balance the factors considered
relevant.
Conclusion
The analysis under Article 5.5 has shown a lot of subjectivity which signals that there
is no systematic way of determining the consistency of a measure with the
requirements contained in Article 5.5 and, therefore, also with Article 2.3. It is
difficult to see what the advantage of including Article 5.5 as an interpretation of
Article 2.3 is. Article 5.5 does not interpret the requirement in Article 2.3. Article 5.5
only says that in determining whether measures constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade that discrimination
between comparable products could lead to this finding without giving an indication
453 Salmon, Appellate Body Report, §185.
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of what those circumstances are. Therefore, it only adds even more confusion to an
already ambiguous and vague provision that is Article 2.3. Even though, Article 5.6
calls for the Committee on SPS Measures to develop guidelines for the practical
implementation of this article, to date there are no published guidelines to this effect.
Therefore, unless the terms used in Article 2.3 and 5.5 are clearly defined, panels and
the Appellate Body will continue to have difficulties in approaching the
interpretation of these articles in a predictable and consistent fashion.
However, even if the terms are clearly defined, the subjective inquiry into the intent
ofMembers imposing SPS measures will remain problematic. Indeed, panels and the
Appellate Body are faced with a politically sensitive challenge as their decisions can
be considered as an implicit finding that the stated objective of the measure is not its
actual purpose. In addition, examining the Member's intent can be deceptive as
legislation often reflects mixed objectives and even if it were feasible to determine a
Member's intent there is no systematic way to go about the inquiry. Therefore, panels
or the Appellate Body must not only rely on facts but also on its instincts thereby
introducing substantial unpredictability in the analysis of Article 2.3 and 5.5.
Article 2.3 and 5.5 could, therefore, potentially be a major stumbling block for
Members imposing genuine SPS measures and, therefore, be counter-productive in
increasing linkage between trade and health issues. Therefore, Schoenbaum's
conclusion that "only those SPS standards that are political fabrications are in danger
of being invalidated at the WTO"455 is in fact too simplistic.
IV. Implications of the Substantive Issues
The aim of this section is to consider the implications of the Appellate Body's
interpretation of the substantive requirements of the SPS Agreement in the
454 Salmon, Panel Report, §8.160 and Appellate Body Report, §187.
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Hormones, Salmon, Agricultural Products and Apples cases, for Members that
impose SPS measures, and this irrespective of whether these measures are aimed at
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health from risks arising from
additives, contaminants, diseases or pests.
First, the Member imposing an SPS measure must be aware that the only situation
where a Member can presume that the SPS measures it imposes will be found to be
consistent with the SPS Agreement is when these measures conform to international
standards, guidelines or recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission for food safety, the International Office of Epizootics for animal health
and zoonoses or the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention for
plant health.
Therefore, if the international standard, guideline or recommendation specifically
provides for the prevention of a risk that the Member wishes to protect itself from
and the Member imposes an SPS measure that is identical to the international
standard, guideline or recommendation, then there is only a very slim chance that the
Member's measure will be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. In this situation, the
Member can be sure that the connection between the measure and the international
standard is objectively reviewed since either the levels of protection achieved by the
measure and the international standards are identical or they are not.
Therefore, where international standards do not exist, a Member imposing SPS
measures is advised to participate in the negotiation of such standards in order to able
to have a standard to which it can conform to, and thereby ensure that in the event of
a dispute before the WTO that the outcome will be in its favour.
In a case where the Member's measure is found to be based on an international
standard, it is quite likely that the measure will also be considered to be based on a
risk assessment, not significantly more trade restrictive than another measure that
455 T. Schoenbaum, "International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search
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achieves the Member's appropriate level of protection, that is technically and
economically feasible and not to constitute arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate or
result in a disguised restriction on international trade. However, the determination of
whether a measure is in fact based on an international standard is more of a
subjective inquiry as the panels and the Appellate Body have the discretion to decide
when this threshold has been met.
In a case where the Member wishes to have more flexibility in setting its own
appropriate level of protection, in order to achieve a higher level of protection and
therefore chooses not to base its measures on an international standard, the Member
must, at least, demonstrate that the measure is based on risk assessment except where
the measure is imposed on a temporary basis as provided for in Article 5.7, that the
measure is necessary and that it does not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.
Therefore, again the determination of whether the measure meets these conditions is
a subjective inquiry made by the panels and the Appellate Body, the result of which
may be unpredictable.
Indeed, the determination of whether the threshold of "based on" a risk assessment
has been met, or where this is not the case whether a measure can be considered as a
temporary measure, that is taken pursuant to pertinent information, that the Member
has c ollected i nformation n ecessary for a m ore objective a ssessment o f facts; t hat
there is no other measure that is significantly less trade restrictive, technically and
economicallyfeasible and achieves the Member's appropriate level of protection; and
that the measure does not result in arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a
disguised restriction on international trade, will require a considerable amount of
subjective interpretation on the part of the reviewing body.
or Reconciliation", 91 AJIL (1997) 2, p285.
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The advice that can be given to Members that do not impose measures that conform
to international standards is to ensure that the risk assessments they present as
evidence are specific in the sense that they analyse the risks associated with a
particular event occurring under particular conditions and secondly, that the Member
avoid relying on opinions expressed by a minority of scientific experts as a basis for
its measures as these opinions will be subject to very close scrutiny and will have to
be convincing in order compete with the view held by a majority of scientists.
It could be argued that the high degree of specificity and reliance on the majority
view may be excessive for the purpose of determining the scientific plausibility of a
proposal and that this does not leave much room for scientific uncertainty, but it will
probably be decisive in ensuring that the measure is found to be based on a risk
assessment.
SPS measures that are not supported by completed specifically focused studies are
potentially inconsistent with the SPS Agreement. Members should in these
circumstances invoke Article 5.7 in order to justify these measures on a temporary
basis. However, under Article 5.7 the obligation is clearly on the Member
maintaining the measures to seek to obtain additional information and ultimately of
providing a risk assessment within a reasonable amount of time and not the exporting
country. Therefore, Members are advised to be pro-active in finding a solid scientific
basis for their measures even though they benefit from a grace period.
However, in a situation where domestic regulatory programmes automatically bar the
import of a new product until the product supplier produces sufficient data, studies
and risk assessments that proves its safety, for example, pesticides that are generally
toxic by design or food additives that may have dangerous side effects would not
realistically be considered inconsistent with the scientific justification requirements
of the SPS Agreement. The object and purpose of the SPS Agreement is avoid
unnecessary restrictions on international trade not to prevent a Member from
protecting human, animal and plant life from substances that are likely to be
dangerous. The fact that the exporting country is required to provide a risk
assessment of a new substance before being permitted access to the importer's
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market would probably be less trade restrictive, time consuming and costly for the
exporter than if the importer would impose an outright ban on the product.
With respect to the requirement that the measure must only be applied to the extent
that it is not more trade restrictive than required to achieve the Member's appropriate
level of protection, it is advisable for Members to continuously reassess the measures
in place to ensure that there is no alternative measure that is feasible, notably less
restrictive to trade, and achieves the Member's level of protection.
Finally, in order for Members imposing SPS measures to comply with the
requirements of Article 2.3 and 5.5 on arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and
disguised restrictions on international trade, Members should ensure that their risk
management policies are consistent, transparent and predictable so that similar risks
occurring from different events are treated in a comparable manner. In addition,
Members should take into account the special and different circumstances of each
country affected by the measures, should recognise equivalent measures used by
exporting countries, and should show their willingness to engage in negotiations in
order to achieve multilateral solutions.
E. PANEL'S SELECTION AND USE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS
After analysing the substantive issues arising under the SPS Agreement, this section
examines a procedural issue of particular importance, especially in the context of
SPS measures, namely the selection and use of scientific experts.
Due to the complexity of many environmental/health disputes from a scientific point
of view and the scientific criteria contained in agreements like the SPS Agreement,
panels have been advised by scientific experts.456 A panel has the right to seek advice
456 por exampie) Asbestos, Thai Cigarettes, Shrimps, Hormones, and Agricultural Products cases.
See also J. Pauwelyn, "The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement", 51 ICLO April 2002,
p326.
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pursuant to Article 13 of the DSU457, and Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement458. The
panel decides whether it wishes to appoint experts. Even if the parties to a dispute
request that experts be consulted, the panel is under no obligation to do so. The
opinions of the experts are not binding on the panels459 but assist panels in
performing an objective assessment of facts.460
In addition to assisting panels with scientific questions, the use of experts also adds
transparency and neutrality to the decision-making process, thereby adding
legitimacy to the WTO decisions. It is therefore, worth considering whether
reference to scientific experts where scientific issues are involved should not be
mandatory. So far, though panels have systematically involved scientific experts
where disputes arose under the SPS Agreement.461
In the Hormones Appellate Body Report, it was considered whether the Panel acted
within the scope of its authority in its selection and use of experts and found,
contrary to the allegations of the EC, that the Panel had not erred in consulting
individual experts rather than forming an expert review group. The EC had
contended that in seeking opinions from experts in their individual capacities, the
Panel had deprived the EC of the procedural guarantees provided for expert review
groups by Appendix 4 of the DSU. In particular, an expert review group speaks with
a single voice, for example, in the form of an advisory report, whereas by consulting
individual experts, the Panel put itself in a position to choose among different
457 Article 13.2 of the DSU states that: "Panels may seek information from any relevant source and
may consult experts to obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a
factual issue concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a
panel may request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for the
establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4."
458 Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement states: "In a dispute under this Agreement involving
scientific or technical issues, a panel should seek advice from experts chosen by the panel in
consultation with the parties to the dispute. To this end, the panel may, when it deems it
appropriate, establish an advisory technical experts group, or consult the relevant international
organisations, at the request of either party to the dispute or on its own initiative."
459 Appendix 4, §5 of the DSU.
460 See J. Pauwelyn, "The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures as
Applied in the First Three SPS Disputes", J1EL (1999), pp661-662.
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scientific o pinions. T he Appellate Body found t hat u nder b oth A rticle 1 1.2 o f t he
SPS Agreement and Article 13.2 of the DSU, the formation of an expert review
group is left to the discretion of a panel. When such a group is formed, its operation
is governed by the rules and procedures set forth in Appendix 4 of the DSU.
Although, there are no explicit rules in appointing individual scientific experts, the
Appellate Body found that the procedures followed by the Panel in both proceedings
were consistent with the DSU and the SPS Agreement.462
In appointing individual scientific experts, panels have, so far, applied the rules
regarding the appointment of expert review groups.463 The process of selection of
experts is based on their expertise and experience in the field in question,
professional s tanding464 a nd n ationality.465 N eutrality s eems t o b e r espected i n the
selection of experts and although there is no specific rale to this effect, experts are
generally chosen by the panel in consultation with the parties to the dispute.466 Lists
of experts are generally provided by an international organisation, for example,
Codex Alimentarius or the International Office of Epizootics. Of course, there is no
guarantee that the process is completely unbiased as international organisations could
be proposing experts that support their agenda.467 Even if this were the case,
scientific experts, presumably, are acting with integrity. In addition, although this is
not a right, parties to the dispute can object to the appointment of scientific experts
and can rank the proposed experts according to their preference.468
461 Scientific experts were also involved in the Shrimps and Asbestos cases involving Article XX of
the GATT 1994.
462 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §253(f).
463 Appendix 4 to the DSU. See J. Pauwelyn, "The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement", 51
ICLQ April 2002, p340.
464 Appendix 4 to the DSU, §2.
465 Appendix 4 to the DSU, §3. Nationals of parties to the dispute shall not serve without the
agreement of all the parties "except in exceptional circumstances when the panel considers that
the need for specialised scientific expertise cannot be fulfilled otherwise".
466 Article 11.2 of the SPS Agreement.




The advantage of seeking advice from individual experts provides the panel with
more flexibility as far as gathering advice and determining the result is concerned. In
addition, the use of individual experts is less time consuming, as no report needs to
be drafted by the scientific experts as a whole.469 However, seeking advice from
individual experts gives more discretion to panels in selecting which scientific
opinion a panel should base its decision on.
The use of an expert review group reduces a panel's possible bias in relying on
scientific opinions. However, an expert review group would not necessarily be more
advantageous for Members imposing environmental/health measures. Indeed, an
expert report may in fact only represent a consensus on a specific issue or a majority
view. This, of course, may not be beneficial to those seeking to maintain
environmental/health issues based on minority scientific opinions.
The choice of individual experts or an expert review group may, however, not have a
significant impact on the outcome of a dispute. Indeed, the Shrimps Appellate Body
clearly communicated that the authority of a panel to "seek" information as well as
scientific and technical advice embraces more than the choice and evaluation of the
source of information or advice it may seek.470 The authority of a panel includes that
of deciding not to seek such information or advice as well as accepting or rejecting
any information or advice, which it may have sought and received.471 Where the
panel has determined the acceptability or relevance of information or advice, it also
has authority to decide what weight to ascribe to it.472
469 See J. Pauwelyn, "The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement", 51 ICLO April 2002,
pp328-329.
470 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §108.
471 Ibidem.
472 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, § 108.
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It is important to emphasise that although a panel enjoys a wide discretion in its
assessment of facts, it should not intervene in scientific debates473 but rather
determine whether there is a reasonable scientific basis for a given measure.474
In a state of scientific uncertainty, a panel should determine whether there is support
from reputable scientists concerning the Member's risk assessment by considering
whether the theories, methodologies, assumptions and models used in the risk
assessment are reasonable,475 in order to distinguish between plausible and
implausible scientific accounts but should not decide which scientifically plausible
account it believes to be true as the WTO does not have the resources or the mandate
to examine and assess an evolving scientific discussion 476
It would be inappropriate for the WTO to resolve scientific issues, if the scientific
community is able to do so. However, if scientific experts cannot resolve the issues,
then the dispute will become a matter of political/judicial judgement.
F. CONCLUSION
The most striking development of the SPS Agreement is the mandatory use of
science in differentiating between sound and unsound SPS measures.
However, the presence of scientific uncertainty and the resulting use of science
policies in risk assessments render the SPS Agreement's reliance on science as a
neutral trade-off mechanism rather more complicated than it might appear at first
sight.
473 See J. Pauwelyn, "The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement", 51 1CLQ April 2002, p329.
474 V. Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
CILJ 2 (1998), p280.
475 Scientists normally consider the individual elements of a risk assessment in order to determine
whether it is plausible.
476 y Walker, "Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-science Organisation":
Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute", 31
CILJ 2 (1998), pp280-283.
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Risk assessment has the advantage of introducing an exposure factor into the
environmental decision-making process that not only determines the extent of the
harm of a substance but also determines in which conditions or environment a
substance is most harmful and in which circumstances the hazards can be
mitigated.477 In other words, risk assessment represents a shift from the
determination of potential for harm that ensues from an analysis of the properties of a
product to a prediction of harm that can be deduced by integrating an exposure factor
into the assessment.478 Therefore, risk assessment enables to compare risks in a more
thorough way and to prioritise risk reduction measures, as some substances might
need to be controlled more urgently.
In addition, risk assessments provide a structured process of decision-making that
can also be standardised, which helps supervise, limit arbitrariness and conflicts of
interest in the decision-making process.479 In addition, a risk assessment relies to
large extent on scientific methodologies and can often only be carried out or verified
by scientists. The fact that risk assessment and science go hand-in-hand increases the
credibility of institutions that base their SPS measures on risk assessments as the
scientific community is usually reputed for its objectivity, neutrality and rigorous
handling of facts.480
Therefore, risk assessments help regulators assemble data in a thorough, consistent
and transparent way so that decisions are made on a sound technical basis.
However, there are not only advantages in carrying out risk assessments.
477 V. Heyvaert, "Reconceptualising Risk Assessment", 8 RECIEL 2 (1999), pi37.
478 Ibidem, pp 137-8.
479 Ibidem, pi38.
480 V. Heyvaert, "Reconceptualising Risk Assessment", 8 RECIEL 2 (1999), pi38. See also S.
Jasanoff, "Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science" 17 Social Studies of Science,
(1987), pl96.
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Risk assessment i s a time-consuming, resource intensive and arduous process that
can paralyse decision-making and thereby places a great burden on national
regulatory authorities to justify their SPS measures.
In addition, risk assessments are not necessarily reliable, as uncertainties may not be
properly reflected in the assessment.
For example, in the case of hazard identification, tests may be made on animals,
which implies that difficult and inaccurate comparisons are often made between the
effects of a substance on an animal and on a human being. In addition, animals are
usually exposed to high doses of the substance in order to observe an effect. This
makes it difficult to then extrapolate the effect of a low dose on a human being,
thereby introducing uncertainty into the results of the risk assessment. The problem
becomes even more complicated when there are no animal data, or if no statistically
significant effect can be observed. Scientists in these cases resort to less direct means
of estimating risks based on analogies such as chemical similarity and acute toxicity
and thereby increase the uncertainty factor in their evaluation. In addition, these tests
are performed on relatively small samples and therefore may not highlight all
adverse exposure effects where there is a low occurrence rate but where significant
risks exist. Therefore, ruling out alternative reasons for adverse effects is a difficult
exercise as results obtained on these alternatives may also contain a degree of
uncertainty.
Problems with respect to the reliability of data may also occur with dose-response
and exposure assessment as these assessments are based on models, predictions and
assumptions.481 Therefore, risk assessment can be under or over cautious depending
on how conservative the assumptions are that are used, and how suitable the model
used is, which can lead to unsound science and to systematic under or over-
estimations of risks.
481 V. Heyvaert, "Reconceptualising Risk Assessment", 8 REC1EL 2 (1999), pi39.
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In addition, science policies that are used to complete risk assessments have the
disadvantage that they may be unresponsive to the development of new scientific
methodologies that may be more reliable.
Therefore, there is little chance that there is only a "single, unique way to analyse the
even purely scientific significance"482 of most empirical data. The analysis of data
requires the use of scientific assumptions, hypotheses, theories, which suggests that
there may be more than one scientifically plausible outcome and thereby yielding a
series of regulatory results. Therefore, where there are various possible results,
science may in fact not be very helpful.
In addition, scientific review is more conciliatory than adjudicatory. The results are
not usually bi-polar, in the sense of "yes" and "no" out-come, that is normally
contemplated by an adjudicatory process.483 Instead, there is "protracted give and
take among experts"484 and continuous search for knowledge.
However, despite the fact that risk assessments are by means no infallible, they will
provide useful guidance to risk managers on the appropriate measures to be
implemented in order to minimise identified risks. Indeed, the difference between
managing risks on the basis of a risk assessment and managing risks on the basis of
value judgements, can be compared to managing risks on the basis of an estimate of
the risks rather than on the basis of a mere guess. The probability that the measures
taken on the basis of an estimate of the risks are more efficient and effective will be
greater than ifmeasures are based on a guess.
Therefore, although the requirement in the SPS Agreement that measures must be
supported by a risk assessment within a reasonable period of time can be seen as a
supplementary hurdle for Members in justifying their SPS measures, it can also be




viewed as a welcome development for the protection of human, animal, plant, life or
health from risks arising from diseases, disease causing organisms, contaminants,
additives and toxins.




THE AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
AND ENVIRONMENTAL/HEALTH REGULATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The following chapter focuses on the TBT Agreement, which along with Article XX
of the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement is central to the analysis of the
relationship between trade and environmental/health issues.
The TBT Agreement aims to prevent technical regulations, standards and conformity
assessment procedures being prepared, adopted or applied in such a way as to create
unnecessary barriers to international trade,1 while recognising that "no country
should be prevented from taking measures necessary... for the protection of human,
animal or plant life or health" or of the environment.
The fact that the number of technical product requirements have grown considerably
in recent years due in part to consumers' demand for products that are safe from a
health point of view and environmentally-friendly and that compliance with these
requirements involves lost market opportunities2 and increased costs arising from
losses in economies of scale3, conformity assessments4, adjustments in production,
Technical regulations increase unit costs of production and/or transportation and, therefore,
create obstacles to free trade. C.M. Correa, "Implementing National Public Helath Policies in the
Framework ofWTO Agreements," 34 JWT 5, (2000), pl03.
K.W. Abbott, "US-EU Disputes over Technical Barriers to Trade and the "Hushkits" Dispute, in
E-U. Petersmann and M.A. Pollack (eds.) Transatlantic Economic Disputes - The EU, the US,
and the WTO, New York, (2003), p259.
Due to the production of different products for different markets.
For example, testing, certification or inspection costs.
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for producers and exporters, it is essential that the TBT Agreement achieve a balance
between trade and environmental/health objectives.5
The following analysis will attempt to consider how the TBT Agreements fares as a
tool for accommodating these concerns. In addition, suggestions will be made, where
appropriate, to improve current rules or the interpretation given to these rules by the
WTO DSB.
B. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE TBT AGREEMENT
I. Technical Product Requirements
As noted above, the TBT Agreement covers technical regulations, standards and
conformity assessment procedures.
In order for a measure to be considered under the TBT Agreement, it cannot be
subject to the SPS Agreement6 as the TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement are
mutually exclusive.
As discussed in Chapter 3, an SPS measure is one that aims:
(a) "to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread ofpests,
diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease causing organisms
(b) "to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the
Member from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-
causing organisms, in foods, beverages orfeedstuffs";
See J.H.H. Weiler and S. Cho, "International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World
Trade Organisation", Lecture Papers on Technical Barriers to Trade (2003),
www.kentlaw.edu/classes/schol/intltradelaw/coursedocs/wto-2003-unit%20ix.pdf.
Article 1.5. See also chapter 3.
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(c) "to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from
risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof or
from the entry, establishment or spread ofpests and
(d) "to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Memberfrom
the entry, establishment or spread ofpests "?
Therefore, the determination of whether a measure falls under the SPS Agreement
depends on the purpose of the measure. If the aim of the measure is to protect human
or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from SPS risks, then the
SPS Agreement applies.
In the Asbestos case, Canada claimed before the Panel that the French Decree was
inconsistent with Articles 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 2.8 of the TBT Agreement.
The measure at issue was clearly not an SPS measure as the objective of the measure
was to protect human health or life from the risks associated with asbestos fibres
which are not pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease causing
organisms, or additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms found in
foods, beverages or feedstuffs.
The same reasoning can be applied to seat-belt requirements in cars to protect human
life or health, requirements that fish reach a certain length before they can be caught
to protect animal health or labelling requirements that aim to inform consumers of
health risks.
In the European Communities - Trade Description of Sardines case8 (hereinafter
Sardines case) the EC imposed Council Regulation 2136/89 (the "EC Regulation"),9
which establishes common marketing standards for preserved sardines whereby only
Scirdina pilchardus Walbaum can be marketed as "sardines". The objective of the EC
SPS Agreement, Annex A, § 1.
European Communities—Trade Description ofSardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October
2002.
Adopted by the Council of the European Communities on 21 June 1989 and became applicable
on 1 January 1990.
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Regulation is clearly not to protect human life or health from SPS risks but to ensure
that consumers are not mislead when purchasing sardines.
Another example is re-cycling requirements for paper and plastic products to protect
the environment.
In a situation where a measure seeks to inform consumers of potential of risks that
fall into the category of SPS risks, the TBT Agreement applies. Therefore, a WTO
Member can either formulate the measure as a SPS measure or as a TBT measure by
introducing a subjective determination of the purpose of the measure. Since there are
no rules on determining the objectives of a measure, a WTO Member by claiming
that a measure has a particular objective can ensure that a measure would be
considered under the TBT or SPS Agreement.
For example, the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement could apply to the
regulation of GM products. If the measure aims to protect human, animal or plant
health or life from contamination of food through genetic manipulation, then the SPS
Agreement applies. However, if the measure intends to inform consumers of the
health risks of genetic manipulation then the TBT Agreement would apply.
Once it has been established that a measure does not fall within the ambit of the SPS
Agreement, it is necessary to establish whether the measure is a technical regulation,
standard or conformity assessment procedure as these measures are subject to
different requirements under the TBT Agreement.
A technical regulation is defined in Annex 1.1 as a:
"Document which lays down product characteristics or their related
processes and production methods, including the applicable
administrative provisions, with which compliance is mandatory. It
may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a
product, process orproduction method. "
A standard, on the other hand, is defined in Annex 1.2 as a:
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"Document approved by a recognised body, that provides, for common and
repeated use, rides, guidelines or characteristics for products or related
processes and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory.
It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or
production method. "
Therefore, a technical regulation is mandatory whereas a standard is voluntary.10
The difference between a standard and a technical regulation lies not only in
compliance but also in the implications for international trade. Indeed, the incidence
of technical regulations on international trade is generally greater than that of
standards. An imported product that does not fulfil the requirements of a technical
regulation is denied market access. On the other hand, an imported product that does
not comply with a standard will be allowed entry onto the market of the importing
country, but the market share may be affected as a result of consumer preferences for
products that comply with national standards.
Finally, conformity assessment procedures are procedures that are "used, directly or
indirectly, to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or
standards are fulfilled", such as "procedures for sampling testing and inspection:
evaluation, verification and assurance of conformity; registration, accreditation and
approval".11
Once it is established that a measure is either mandatory, voluntary or a conformity
assessment procedure, it is necessary in the case of technical regulations to detennine
whether the measure covers product characteristics or their related PPMs.12
In the Asbestos case, Canada claimed that the French Decree was a technical
regulation as it considered that all asbestos fibres and products containing such fibres
The Asbestos Appellate Body found that the measure regulated the products in a binding or
compulsory fashion. Asbestos Appellate Body Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted by Dispute
Settlement Body, 5 April 2001, §68. The Sardines Panel and Appellate Body found that
compliance with the provisions contained in the EC Regulation also were mandatory. Sardines
Panel Report, §7.35. Sardines Appellate Body Report, §193.
Annex 1.3.
Annex 1.1. Such as size, shape, design, functions and performance, or the way it is labelled or
packaged before it is put on sale.
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pose public health risks.13 The EC, on the other hand, claimed that the Decree was
not a "technical regulation" because it was a general prohibition on the use of a
product for the protection of human health,14 and that if such prohibitions would fall
within the ambit of the TBT Agreement that the provisions of the GATT 1994 would
be redundant.15 In addition, although the Decree prohibits asbestos fibres at all
stages, the EC claimed that the Decree did not specify the characteristics for asbestos
fibres and asbestos-containing products or the products exempt from the prohibition
measure.16
The Asbestos Panel considered the Decree contained a general prohibition on
asbestos and asbestos-containing products as well as "exceptions" which permitted,
on a temporary basis, the use of certain products containing asbestos. The Panel
concluded t hat p rohibitions i mposed b y t he D ecree d id n ot constitute a "technical
regulation" unlike the exceptions.17 However, the Panel decided not to examine
claims under the TBT Agreement because it was of the view that they only related to
the general prohibitions.18
The Asbestos Appellate Body stated that a "technical regulation" i s a "document"
that must provide "product characteristics" such as "terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements" and that these ""product
characteristics" include, not only features and qualities intrinsic to the product itself,
but also related "characteristics", such as the means of identification, the presentation
and the appearance of a product".19 The Appellate Body also stated that the French
Decree "aims primarily at the regulation of a named product, asbestos"20 and that if it
only imposed a prohibition on asbestos fibres, as such, in other words, that the
13 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.20.
14 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.22.
15 Ibidem, §8.23.
16 Ibidem..
17 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.72(a).
18 Ibidem, §8.72.
19 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §67.
20 Ibidem, §71.
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prohibition on these fibres did not, in itself prescribe or impose any "characteristics"
on asbestos fibres, but only banned them in their natural state, then it would not be a
technical regulation.21
Although, the Appellate Body recognised that, asbestos fibres have "no known use in
their raw mineral form"22, and that the regulation of asbestos can only be achieved
through the regulation of products that contain asbestos fibres, it found that the
Decree when examined as a whole also prohibited products containing asbestos
fibres.23 In addition, the Appellate Body considered that the Decree was a technical
regulation despite the fact that the measure imposed "objective features, qualities or
"characteristics" on all products".24
In other words, a measure must be examined "as an integrated whole"25 and must
either lay down "characteristics" for a single product or for all products.26
In addition, the Appellate Body noted that a measure could be subject to the TBT
Agreement if it is imposed in either a positive or a negative form,27 in other words, as
a requirement or prohibition.
In the Sardines case, the Panel reiterated the Asbestos Appellate Body's finding that
"a document may prescribe or impose product characteristics in either a positive or
negative form" and concluded that "by requiring the use of only the species Sardina
pilchardus as preserved sardines, the EC Regulation in effect lays down product
characteristics in a negative form, that is, by excluding other species, such as
Sardinops sagax, from b eing "marketed as preserved sardines and under the trade
description referred to in Article 7" of the EC Regulation".28
21 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §71.
22 Ibidem, §72.
23 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §75.
24 Ibidem, §72.
25 Ibidem, §75.
26 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §75.
27 Ibidem, §69.
28 See Sardines Panel Report, §6.4.
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The above cases deal with measures that relate to "product characteristics". Annex
1.1 also refers to documents that lay down "product characteristics or their related
[PPMs]" and Annex 1.2 on standards refers to "rules, guidelines or characteristics for
products or related [PPMs]". These phrases imply that the TBT Agreement covers
product-related PPMs but not non-product related PPMs.
However, the second sentences of Annex 1.1 and Annex 1.2, which refer to
"terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as they apply
to a product, process or production method" do not require product-relatedness of
PPMs.29
The issue of whether the TBT Agreement covers non-product related PPMs remains
controversial due to the ambiguous language used in defining technical regulations
and standards,30 and also to the lack of consensus by the WTO Members on this
issue.31
The negotiating history of the TBT Agreement suggests that non-product related
PPMs are not included.32 However, if only product-related PPMs are covered under
the TBT Agreement, then this would imply that the more controversial type of TBT
29 WTO Document, "Marking and Labelling Requirements", Submission from Switzerland,
WT/CTE/W/192, G/TBT/W/162, 19 June 2001, §25.
30 Ibidem.
31 Developing countries, the US are opposed to including non-product related PPMs within the
ambit of the TBT Agreement unlike the EU and Switzerland. WTO Document, CTE, Report of
the Meeting Held on 7 July 2003, Note by the Secretariat, Restricted, WT/CTE/M/34, 29 July
2003, §57; WT/CTE/W/212, 12 June 2002, G/TBT/W/150, 2 November 2000, WT/CTE/W/192,
19 June 2001. See also M. Joshi, "Are Eco-labels Consistent with the World Trade Organisation
Agreements?", 38 JWT 1 (2004), pp81-85. See S.W. Chang, "Gatting a Green Trade Barrier -
Eco-labelling and the WTO Agreement on Trade Barriers to Trade", 31 JWT 1 (1997), pi39.
32 WTO Secretariat, "Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards, and Production and
Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to the Product Characteristics, G/TBT/W/11, 29
August 1995, §110, 131 and 146. See also S. Charnovitz, "The Law of Environmental "PPMs"
in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of Illegality", 27 Yale JIL (2002), p65. See S.W. Chang,
"Gatting a Green Trade Barrier - Eco-labelling and the WTO Agreement on Trade Barriers to
Trade", 31 JWT 1 (1997), pp 142-147.
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measure would be subject to the more lenient requirements ofGATT 1994.33 Indeed,
the Shrimps Appellate Body examined non-product-related PPMs under Article
XX.34 The measure under scrutiny in the Shrimps case could be considered a
technical regulation provided that the TBT Agreement applies to non-product related
PPMs as well as extraterritorial measures. Unlike the SPS Agreement that limits the
jurisdictional application of SPS measures, the TBT Agreement is silent on this
issue. Again if the TBT Agreement does not apply to extraterritorial measures these
would be dealt with under the more lenient rules of GATT 1994 despite the fact that
they are more contentious.35 Therefore, to exclude non-product related PPMs and
extraterritorial measures from the scope of the TBT Agreement would be
paradoxical.
However, from an environmental point of view it is preferable that non-product
related PPMs and extra-territorial measures be dealt with under the GATT 1994 and
not the TBT Agreement unless the non-discrimination requirement under the TBT
Agreement is interpreted less restrictively than under the GATT 1994.
The final step in determining whether a measure can be considered under the TBT
Agreement is ascertain that the measure applies to an identifiable product or group of
products.36
The Asbestos Panel considered that the product(s) to which the characteristics refer
must be clearly identifiable in the document37 and that a technical regulation is a
regulation that sets out the specific characteristics of one or more identifiable
33 G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map
of the W orld Trade Organisation Law o f Domestic Regulation of Goods", 3 6JWT 5 (2002),
p861.
34 Shrimps case. See Chapter 2.
3:1 Ibidem.
36 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.36.
37 Ibidem.
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products rather than general characteristics that may be shared by several unspecified
products.38
Although, the Asbestos Appellate Body agreed with the Panel that a technical
regulation must be applicable to an identifiable product or group of products,39 it
considered that a technical regulation must not necessarily apply to "products that are
actually named, identified or specified in the regulation".40
In the Sardines case, the Appellate Body found that Sardinops sagax is an
"identifiable" product41 and that the even if the term "preserved sardines" in the EC
Regulation would refer exclusively to preserved Sardina pilchardus, it would still be
applicable to a range of "identifiable" products beyond Sardina pilchardns. Indeed,
preserved products made of Sardinops sagax are prohibited from being identified and
marketed under the term "sardines".42
Therefore, a product does not have to be explicitly referred to in a document in order
for that product to be identified.43 The implication of this interpretation is that the
Members will not be able to circumvent the rules of the TBT Agreement by omitting
to explicitly mention a product in a regulation.
The above analysis suggests that the measure at issue in the Gasoline case,44
examined in Chapter 2, is a technical regulation.
The Gasoline Rule was clearly not an SPS measure as the objective was to protect an
exhaustible natural resource. In addition, the requirements of the Gasoline Rule were
compulsory. The Gasoline Rule also specified chemical ingredients for an
identifiable product: gasoline.45 The fact that an averaging technique was used to
38 Asbestos Panel Report, §8.39.
39 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §70.
40 Ibidem, §180. Asbestos Panel Report, §8.57
41 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §183.
42 Ibidem, §184.
43 Ibidem, §180 and 183.
44 Gasoline Panel Report, WT/DS2/R.
45 Ibidem, §3.75.
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determine consistency with the Gasoline Rule, which implied that the requirements
on chemical ingredients did not need to be satisfied by each shipment, does not
change the fact that an examination of the properties of each individual gasoline
shipment was required.46 Although, the importers remained free to import different
varieties of gasoline provided that the annual average met the requirements, the fact
that compliance is required on a yearly basis as opposed to on a shipment basis
should not exclude a measure from the scope of the TBT Agreement.47 In this case,
annual production was simply the unit of production to which the standard was
applied.48
After examining whether a measure is a technical regulation, standard or conformity
assessment procedure, the question arises whether the TBT Agreement applies to
measures adopted prior to the entry into force of the TBT Agreement.
III. Temporal Application of the TBT Agreement
The Sardines Panel and Appellate Body consistent with the reasoning of the
Appellate Body in the Hormones case in the context of the SPS Agreement49, found
that the TBT Agreement applies to measures that entered into force after 1 January
1995 as well as to measures that were adopted prior to 1 January 1995 but which
have not ceased to exist.50
Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement refers to "preparing, adopting or applying a
technical regulation". Article 2.6 states that Members are to participate in preparing
international standards by the international standardising bodies for products, which
46 Gasoline Panel Report, §3.75.
47 Ibidem, §4.6
48 Gasoline Panel Report, §3.76.
49 See Chapter 3.
50 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §197.
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they have either "adopted, or expect to adopt technical regulations." Clearly, a
technical regulation can only be applied if it is already in existence.51
This interpretation is also supported by Article XVI:4 of the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organisation which provides a general context for all
the covered agreements, and states that each Member shall ensure the conformity of
its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in
the annexed Agreements.52
In addition, the fact that many TBT Agreement provisions consider international
standards important for promoting harmonisation and facilitating trade53 indicates
that excluding existing technical regulations would undermine the role of
international standards in furthering the objectives of the TBT Agreement.54
III. Relationship with GATT 1994
The TBT Agreement does not define its relationship with the GATT 1994. However,
as the Asbestos Appellate Body stated:
"...although the TBT Agreement is intended to "further the objectives of the
GATT 1994", it does so through a specialised legal regime that applies solely
to a limited class of measures. For these measures, the TBT Agreement
imposes obligations on Members that seem to be different from, and
additional to, the obligations imposed on Members under the GATT 1994. "55
51 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §211.
52 Ibidem, §213.
53 Sardines Appellate Body, §214 and 215. Article 2.5 establishes a rebuttable presumption that
technical regulations that are in accordance with relevant international standards do not create
unnecessary obstacles to trade. Article 2.6 encourages Members to participate in international
standardising bodies with a view to harmonising technical regulations. The important role of
international standards is also apparent in the Preamble to the TBT Agreement. The third recital
of the Preamble recognises the contribution that international standards can make by improving
the efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of international trade. The eighth recital
recognises the role that international standardisation can have in the transfer of technology to
developing countries.
54 Sardines Appellate Body, §215.
55 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, §80.
231
Indeed, the TBT Agreement requires measures to be non-discriminatory, imposes
transparency obligations and encourages the use of international standards as a basis
for TBT measures.
Similarly to the analysis of the relationship between the SPS Agreement and GATT
1994 perfonned in Chapter 3, the TBT Agreement is lex specialis for a review of
TBT measures and should, therefore, be addressed first. If a measure falls within the
scope of the TBT Agreement, there is no need to demonstrate a prior violation under
the GATT 1994.
A general interpretative note to Annex 1A of the WTO Agreement that governs the
relation between the GATT 1994 and other agreements of the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round in case of conflict provides:
"In event ofconflict between a provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and T rcide 1 994 a nd a provision ofa nother A greement i n A nnex 1A ... the
provision ofthe other Agreement shall prevail to the extent of the conflict. "
This interpretative note, according to the analysis performed in Chapter 3, only refers
to cases of conflict between two opposing provisions where the other agreement only
takes precedence to the extent of the conflict. The fact that the TBT Agreement
requires non-discrimination unconditionally suggests that there is potentially a
conflict with GATT 1994. In such a situation, the TBT Agreement would take
precedence over GATT 1994. In addition, the fact that the TBT Agreement also
imposes supplementary obligations could be seen as a conflict with the provisions
provided in Article XX of the GATT 1994, if "conflict" is defined broadly56 and,
therefore, implies that the TBT Agreement could take precedence to the extent of
these supplementary provisions.
56 See Chapter 5, section B.I.
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In the Gasoline57 case, the Panel found that it was not necessary to consider the
issues that were raised under the TBT Agreement since the measures were
inconsistent with Article XX of the GATT 1994.58 However, the Panel should have
determined first whether the measures at issue fell within the scope of the TBT
Agreement as these provisions take legal precedence over GATT 1994.59
GATT 1994 has become redundant to the extent that measures regulating trade in
goods are SPS measures or technical regulations, standards or conformity assessment
procedures as defined in the TBT Agreement. However, it should be emphasised that
the application of the GATT 1994 is only excluded in cases in which another
agreement explicitly regulates rights or obligations with regard to a certain trade
measure that is similar in scope to one regulated by the GATT 1994.60
In the following sections, the obligations arising under the TBT Agreement will be
analysed.
C. OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TBT AGREEMENT
I. Non-discrimination
The non-discrimination rules provided for in the TBT Agreement are very similar to
those contained in the GATT 1994. Indeed, the TBT Agreement requires "treatment
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to like
57 Adopted 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R.
58 Venezuela claimed that certain regulations of the US Clean Air Act violated, inter alia, Article 2
of the TBT Agreement. Gasoline Panel Report, §6.43.
59 See European Communities - Trade Description ofSardines, Panel Report, WT/DS231/R, (2002)
§7.16: "Arguably, the TBT Agreement deals "specifically, and in detail" with technical
regulations. If the Appellate Body's statement in EC - Bananas III is a guide, it suggests that if
the EC Regulation is a technical regulation, then the analysis under the TBT Agreement would
precede any examination under the GATT 1994".
60 Bananas Appellate Body Report, pp94-95, §221-222. As was noted in Chapter 3, the Appellate
Body in the Bananas case also took this position in finding that the Agreement on Agriculture is
lex specialis in relation to Article XIII of the GATT 1994.
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products originating in any other country".61 However, the TBT Agreement does not
contain an equivalent to Article XX and non-discriminatory regulations permissible
under the GATT 1994, Article I and III might be challenged under the TBT
Agreement as illegitimate. Similarly to the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement has
created an alternative to the two-stage approach of moving from Article I, III and IX
to Article XX of the GATT 1994.
The TBT Agreement is more restrictive than the GATT 1994. However, the extent to
which this is the case depends in part on the way the DSB will interpret "like
products" in the context of the TBT Agreement. It could be argued that "like
products" should be interpreted less restrictively under the TBT Agreement than
under GATT 1994,62 since the requirements of national and MFN treatment, provide
a higher standard of non-discrimination than the TBT agreement seeks to achieve in
its Preamble. Indeed, the Preamble states "that no country should be prevented from
taking measures necessary ... at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the
requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between Members where similar conditions prevail or a
disguised restriction on international trade".63
In the next section, consideration will be given to the necessity test under the TBT
Agreement.
61 Article 2.1 on technical regulations, 5.1.1 on conformity assessment procedures, Annex 3(D) on
standards.
62 G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map
of the W orld Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods", 3 6 JWT 5 (2002),
p822.
63 As was discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, this type of discrimination requirement is less burdensome
on a Member imposing TREMS or health measures.
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II. Necessity Test of the TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement specifies that trade, measures must pursue a legitimate goal
such as the "protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or
the environment",64 and be necessary65.
The TBT Agreement, unlike Article XX and the SPS Agreement, includes the
protection of the environment as a legitimate objective. However, as was noted in
Chapter 2, this addition may be more symbolic than real.
The necessity obligation under the TBT Agreement differs from Article XX(b) of the
GATT 1994 since as was noted in the previous section, the necessity requirement in
Article XX only comes into play if it is invoked to justify a TREM that is in violation
of the non-discrimination or quantitative restriction obligations.66
WTO Members must ensure that measures falling within the scope of the TBT
Agreement are "not prepared, adopted, or applied with a view to or with the effect of
creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade".67 Furthermore, measures
"shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective,
taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create", in the case of technical
regulations, and taking into account risks of non-conformity in the case of
conformity assessment procedures.68
Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not contain a footnote that
clarifies the meaning of the phrase "not more trade-restrictive than necessary".
64 Article 2.2: "Such legitimate objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the
prevention of deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or
health, or the environment".
65 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2, 5.1.2, Annex 3(E).
66 See G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A
Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods", 36 JWT 5
(2002), p831.
67 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2, 5.1.2, Annex 3(E).
68 TBT Agreement, Annex 3 on standards does not contain an equivalent phrase.
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Therefore, whether the DSB will consider the reasonable availability of alternative
measures and whether alternative measures must significantly less restrictive to trade
remains an open question.69
However, it can be assumed that the DSB would apply the LTRA test not only to
Article XX and the SPS Agreement but also to the TBT Agreement.
The TBT Agreement is restrictive as measures that are "not more trade-restrictive"
than necessary are required taking i nto account "risks o f non-fulfilment" or "non¬
conformity". In assessing the risks of not attaining legitimate objectives, "available
scientific and technical information, related processing technology or intended end-
uses of products" are to be considered in the context of technical regulations.70
The reference to risks of non-fulfilment introduces a balancing test in the
determination of consistency with the TBT Agreement71, although it is unclear
whether the DSB would use similar variables to those used in the interpretation of
GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement.72 However, again, it is likely that interpretation
of the TBT Agreement will be influenced by the interpretation of the GATT 1994
and SPS Agreement.73
Finally, it should be noted that Article 2.8 of the TBT Agreement requires Members,
whenever appropriate, to specify standards and technical regulations on the basis of
performance rather than design or descriptive characteristics, in order to avoid
unnecessary restrictions on trade. For example, a technical regulation on fire-
69 See SPS Agreement, Article 5.6.
70 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2.
71 See Document TER/W/16 and corr.l, which contains draft Article 2 .2 which reads that "this
provision is intended to ensure proportionality between regulations and the risks non-fulfilment
of legitimate objectives would create". G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic
Regulation of Goods", 36 JWT 5 (2002), p831.
72 See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, § 172, Korea - Beef, Appellate B ody Report, § 163 and
166. See also Chapter 2 and 3.
73 See G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A
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resistant doors could specify that "the door must be resistant to fire for 30 minutes"
rather than requiring that the "door must be made of steel that is 2 centimetres
thick".74
This requirement provides producers with more leeway in adapting production for a
given market without compromising the attainment of health or environmental
objectives.
III. Scientific Justification and Precautionary Action
Unlike the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement does not require that risk
assessments be perfonned or that measures must be based on scientific evidence.
However, determining compliance with other obligations contained in the TBT
Agreement such as necessity and the balancing test may require the demonstration of
a scientific basis.75 However, the rigour of scientific justification under the SPS
Agreement is unlikely to be applied in the examination of the TBT Agreement.76
If a scientific basis is required, it is highly likely that where scientific evidence is
insufficient or unavailable that a precautionary approach would be authorised.77
The question that arises is whether the TBT Agreement should include more rigorous
requirements of scientific justification. Although reliance on scientific risk
Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods", 36 JWT 5
(2002), p855.
74 See J.H.H. Weiler and S. Cho, "International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World
Trade Organisation", Lecture Papers on Technical Barriers to Trade (2003),
www.kentlaw.edu/classes/schol/intltradelaw/coursedocs/wto-2003-unit%20ix.pdf.
75 G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map
of t he W orld Trade O rganisation L aw o fD omestic R egulation o fG oods", 3 6 J WT 5 (2002),
p836.
76 Ibidem. See also N. Covelli and V. Hohots, "The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods under the
WTO Agreements", 6 JIEL 4 (2003), p787.
77 G. Marceau and J. P. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - A Map
of the W orld Trade Organisation Law o fD omestic Regulation o fGoods", 3 6 J WT 5 (2002),
p836.
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assessments adds neutrality to the determination of the consistency of measures
aimed at protecting health or the environment with the WTO agreements, their value
should not be over-estimated as was discussed in Chapter 3.
The next section analyses the harmonisation requirements contained in the TBT
Agreement.
IV. The Use of International Standards
The harmonisation of measures falling under the TBT Agreement can lead to higher
producer benefits as the technical compatibility of products is promoted, thereby
enabling costs related to the designing, manufacturing, and delivery of different
versions of the same product to be reduced.78 In addition, consumer welfare can
increase through the harmonisation of technical aspects of products, as markets will
become more competitive, provided that harmonised standards do not suppress
innovation or the entry of new or improved products on the market. In a competitive
environment, consumers benefit from a greater range of products at more
competitive prices.79
1.) "Relevant international standards"
With respect to technical regulations, Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement provides:
"Where technical regulations are required and relevant international
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or
the relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except
when such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective
or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued,
for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or
fundamental technological problems. "
78 See J.H.H. Weiler and S. Cho, "International and Regional Trade Law: The Law of the World




WTO Members must use "relevant international standards" that exist or are about to
be completed80 as a basis for their technical regulations except under certain
circumstances.
In the Sardines case, the Panel analysed whether Codex Stan 94 was a "relevant
international standard" within the meaning of Article 2.4. Peru exports products of a
different species called Sardinops sagax, which according to Codex Stan 94 can be
referred to as sardines provided that a further qualification is added which indicates
the country or region of origin, or the name of the fish species.
The EC claimed that Codex Stan 94 was not a "relevant international standard",81
because it was not adopted by consensus. Annex 1.2 of the TBT Agreement, which
defines the term "standard", refers to documents "approved by a recognised body"
without specifying the need for "consensus". However, an explanatory note to Annex
1.2 provides that "standards prepared by the international standardisation community
are based on consensus" and that the TBT Agreement "covers also documents that
are not based on consensus".
The Sardines Appellate Body upheld the Panel's interpretation of the rather
confusing explanatory note that documents that do not reach consensus fall within
the scope of the term "standard", but cautioned that this conclusion was only relevant
for the purposes of the TBT Agreement.82 Although a country may not have agreed
to certain standards, it must nevertheless take them into account in order to increase
the chances of compatibility of a technical regulation with Article 2.4 of the TBT
80 Article 2.4: "[wjhere ...relevant international standards exist or their completion is imminent".
Article 2.6 provides that "with a view to harmonising technical regulations on a wide a basis as
possible, Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation
by appropriate international standardising bodies of international standards for products for
which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations". This article would be
redundant if a Member could claim that such standard need not be used as a basis for its
technical regulation on the ground that it was already in existence before the standard was
adopted. Sardines Appellate Body Report, §204.
81 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §217.
82 Ibidem, §227.
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Agreement. A similar interpretation can be applied in the context of standards as
Annex 3(F) and Article 2.4 are comparable.
The Appellate Body claimed that this interpretation is only relevant to the TBT
Agreement. However, the DSB would also have to take into account standards in the
interpretation of the SPS Agreement that are not adopted by all WTO Members as
will be discussed in Chapter 5.
The E C a lso a rgued t hat C odex S tan 9 4 i s n ot a " relevant i nternational s tandard"
because its product coverage is different from that of the EC Regulation. The EC
considered that its regulation only deals with preserved sardines (Sardina
pilchardus), whereas Codex Stan 94 also covers other preserved fish that are
"sardine-type".83
However, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding that the EC Regulation did
not only relate to preserved Sardina pilchardus since the regulation had legal
consequences for other fish species that could be sold as preserved sardines,
including preserved Sardinops sagax.M
The DSB's interpretation of a "relevant international standard" ensures that the
harmonisation obligations imposed by the TBT Agreement will not be circumvented
if an international standard includes products that are not explicitly mentioned in the
national regulation.
After establishing that a given international standard is relevant to a particular
technical regulation, it is necessary to consider whether the technical regulation or
standard is based on the international standard.
In the Sardines case, the EC argued that the measure was based on Codex Stan 94
because it adopted the part of the Codex standard that reserves the term "sardines"
83 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §230.
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exclusively for sardine pilchardus and that the relationship between the standard and
the measure constituted a "rational relationship".
The Sardines Appellate Body considered that the EC's argument that a "rational
relationship" between an international standard and a technical regulation is not
sufficient to conclude that the former is used "as a basis for" the latter as this was not
supported by the text ofArticle 2.4.85 A similar conclusion would apply for standards
as the text ofAnnex 3(F) is equivalent in this respect.
The conclusion of the Sardines Appellate Body is surprising considering that the
rational relationship test was used in the context of determining whether SPS
measures w ere b ased o n r isk a ssessments, a lthough t here w as n o t extual b asis for
assuming that "based on" could be equated with a rational relationship.86
The Sardines Appellate Body found that in order for a standard to be used "as a basis
for" a technical regulation, it must be "used as the principal constituent or
fundamental principle for the purpose of enacting the technical regulation."87 In
addition, the Appellate Body noted that something cannot be the "basis" for another
if the two are contradictory.88
The EC Regulation contradicted the portion of Codex Stan 94 that permits the use of
the term "sardines" in combination with, inter alia, the name of the country of
origin.89 In making this determination, the Appellate Body found that the phrase
"relevant parts ofthem'' in Article 2.4:
84 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §233. Sardines Panel Report, §7.70.
85 EC appellant's submission, §155 and Sardines Appellate Body Report, §246-247.
86 See Chapter 3.
87 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §242-3.
88 Ibidem, §248.
89 Ibidem, §257. The Appellate Body determined that the relevant parts of Codex Stan 94 are those
relating to the use of the term "sardines" to identify fish products, and not only those portions
that reserve the term "sardines" alone for sardina pilchardus. Sardines Appellate Body Report,
§251.
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"defines the appropriate focus ofan analysis to determine whether a relevant
international standard has been used "as a basis for" a technical regulation.
In other words, the examination must be limited to those parts of the relevant
international standards that relate to the subject-matter of the challenged
prescriptions or requirements. In addition, the examination must be broad
enough to address all of those relevant parts; the regulating Member is not
permitted to select only some of the "relevant parts" of an international
standard. Ifa "part" is "relevant", then it must be one of the elements which
is "a basisfor" the technical regulation. "90
Therefore, the Appellate Body, consistent with the Panel's findings, held that the
measure was not "based on" a relevant international standard.91
The DSB has taken a restrictive approach in determining whether measures are based
on an international standard, thereby sending a strong signal that harmonisation is be
promoted. However, as was discussed in Chapter 3, international standards tend to
provide a limited level of protection in the health/environmental field. Therefore,
from an environmental point of view, the requirement of a close nexus between the
regulation and the international standard is undesirable.
2.) "Ineffective" or "inappropriate" International Standards
Members must base their measures on relevant international standards "except when
such international standards or relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate
means for the fulfilment of the legitimate objectives pursued".92
The TBT Agreement imposes stricter requirements for Members wishing to deviate
from international standards than the SPS Agreement. Indeed, divergences are only
permitted in exceptional circumstances where international standards impede on the
fulfilment of legitimate objectives. In order to justify a measure that is not based on
an international standard it is not sufficient to demonstrate that this measure is a
90 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §250
91 Sardines Panel Report, §7.112. Sardines Appellate Body Report, §258.
92 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4.
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more effective alternative but that the international standard is "ineffective" or
"inappropriate".
In the case of standards, the requirement is more lenient as a measure does not have
to be based on an international standard if there is no international standard capable
ofproviding a sufficient level of protection.93
According to the Sardines Panel, an "ineffective" means is one that does not have the
function of accomplishing the legitimate objective pursued, and an "inappropriate"
means is one that is not specifically suitable for the fulfilment of the legitimate
objective pursued.94 Therefore, a measure may be either an inappropriate or
ineffective or both.95
The Sardines Appellate Body agreed that the "term "ineffective or inappropriate
means" refers to two questions—the question of the effectiveness of the measure and
the question of the appropriateness of the measure—and that these two questions,
although closely related, are different in nature".96
The Appellate Body also noted that a "consideration of the appropriateness ofCodex
Stan 94 and a consideration of the effectiveness of Codex Stan 94 are interrelated—as
a consequence of the nature of the objectives of the EC Regulation. The capacity of a
measure to accomplish the stated objectives—its effectiveness—and the suitability of
a measure for the fulfilment of the stated objectives—its appropriateness—are both
decisively influenced by the perceptions and expectations of consumers in the
European Communities relating to preserved sardine products."97
The DSB's interpretation does not shed much light on the factors that will be taken
into account in ascertaining the appropriateness and effectiveness of an international
93 XBT Agreement, Annex 3(F).
94 Sardines Panel Report, §7.116.
95 Ibidem, §7.117.
96 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §285.
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standard. This suggests that Members are faced with considerable uncertainty in
determining the suitability of an international standard.
A decision by the TBT Committee provides that criteria such as transparency,
openness, impartiality and consensus, effectiveness and relevance, coherence,
concerns of developing countries can be used in determining the consistency of an
international standard with the TBT Agreement.98 Although, these factors provide
some guidance to Members imposing technical regulations and standards, the relative
importance of these factors has not yet been established.
3.) Presumption of Consistency of Measures with the TBT Agreement
Article 2.5 provides that a technical regulation adopted for a legitimate objective "in
accordance with" international standards, is presumed not "unnecessarily obstruct
international trade". The phrase "in accordance with" contrasts with the terminology
used in the SPS Agreement which refers to "conform to" suggesting that a technical
regulation could benefit from a presumption even if it is only "based on" an
international standard.
In addition, the presumption in the TBT Agreement contrasts with the one in Article
3.2 of the SPS Agreement99 as the use of the term "deemed" in the SPS Agreement
implies that it is established irrefutably that the measures are necessary, which is not
the case in the TBT Agreement.
97 Sardines Appellate Body Report, §289.
98 Decision by the TBT Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards
Guides, Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 3 and Annex 3 of the TBT, 2000,
G/TBT/9. See G. Marceau and J. Trachtman, "The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade - A Map of the World Trade Organisation Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods", 36
JWT 5 (2002), pp840-841.
99 TBT Agreement, Article 2.5.
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This section clearly demonstrated that the TBT Agreement obligations are applied
restrictively and that even if a measure is in accordance with an international
standard may still be invalidated under the TBT Agreement.
D. CONCLUSION
The controversy over GMOs is gaining momentum in the WTO as the three major
GM food producers, the US'00, Canada101 and Argentina102 have requested the
establishment of a panel to review the EC regulations on GM products. The
regulation of GMO products can be subject to the requirements of the TBT
Agreement.
The EC moratorium on the approval of biotech products that restricts imports of
agricultural and food products,103 the national marketing requirements and import
bans on biotech products maintained by EC Member States as well as the EC
Directive adopted with respect to the mandatory labelling of GM products104 are
technical regulations to the extent that they do not aim to protect human health from
risks arising from "contamination" of food through genetic manipulation.
If the mandatory labelling requirements, for example, aim to raise consumer
awareness with respect to the health risks of products that are genetically modified,
then the TBT Agreement applies to these requirements.105
100 European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing ofBiotech Products -
Request for the Establishment ofa Panel by the United States, 8 August 2003, WT/DS291/23.
101 European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing ofBiotech Products -
Requestfor the Establishment ofa Panel by Canada, 8 August 2003, WT/DS292/17.
102 European Communities - Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products -
Request for the Establishment ofa Panel by Argentina, 8 August 2003, WT/DS293/17.
103 Directive 90/220/EC.
104 Directive 2001/18/EC.
105 See N. Covelli and V. Hohots, "The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods under the WTO
Agreements", 6 JIEL 4 (2003), p787.
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At present, scientific evidence that supports the proposition that GM food poses a
risk to human health is sparse. Although the TBT Agreement does not explicitly
require that Members demonstrate that their technical regulations have a strong
scientific basis, it is likely that the DSB will consider available scientific evidence in
determining the necessity of a technical regulation.
In addition, the DSB will consider whether WTO Members specify technical
regulations on the basis of performance rather than design.106 The fact that the EU
regulates the process used to create GM products suggests that the regulations are
inconsistent with the necessity requirements.107
In other words, it is unlikely that the EC measures will be upheld by the DSB under
the TBT Agreement.
The fact that labelling requirements will be examined rigorously by the DSB under
the TBT Agreement is, in my opinion, inappropriate.
Indeed, market-based measures such as labelling requirements are far less costly in
terms of trade diversion than command-and-control measures.108 Although, both
forms of regulation involve the market, market-based regimes make a maximum use
of the market and give producers greater flexibility in meeting targets.109
Labelling is often identified as a market-based instrument that reduces negative
impact on trade and that is a potentially effective instrument of environmental/health
106 Article 2.8.
107 See N. Covelli and V. Hohots, "The Health Regulation of Biotech Foods under the WTO
Agreements", 6 JIEL 4 (2003), p788.
108 Environmental/health measures that have been examined by the DSB so far have taken the form
of command-and-control measures. For example, quantity regulations or specific technical
product/process standards. See S. Johnson, "Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based
Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?", 56 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 33
(1999), pi 14. N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren, B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theory
and Practice, (1997), pp58-97. See also J.R. Nash, "Too Much Market? Conflict between
Tradable Pollution Allowances and the "Polluter Pays" Principle", 24 Harv. ELR (2000), 465.
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policy as it encourages the development of environment/health conscious
consumers.110
The recent World Summit on Sustainable Development has given strong support to
the use of market-based mechanisms in promoting sustainable development.111
Members of the UN of which many are also WTO Members recognised the
importance of consumer infonnation in relation to sustainable consumption.112
In addition, labelling requirements are not appropriate measures where a product
poses identifiable risks to public health. Very little quantitative data exists on the
extent to which consumers base their purchasing choice on eco-labels,113 and,
therefore, whether it can truly be considered as a measure capable of protecting
health. Labels are mainly informative and leave it up to the consumer to decide
whether or not to purchase a given product.
Therefore, labelling requirements are more valuable in protecting consumer choice
than in protecting consumers from identified health risks. Where no identifiable risk
can be ascertained by scientists or where no risk assessment has been performed on
the health risks associated with a given product, eco-labelling could enable
consumers to choose products according to their preferences. Indeed, it can be
assumed that eco-labels are effective where consumers place a high value on the
environmental/health characteristics of products or PPMs.
109 H. Nordstrom and S. Vaughan, "Trade and Environment", WTO Special Studies, p5,
www.wto.org.
110 Conclusions and recommendations of the CTE to the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference.
WT/CTE/1. Report of the CTE, (1996). Paragraph 32 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration
mandates the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) "in pursuing work on all items
on its agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to labelling for
environmental purposes" and "report to the Fifth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference,
and make recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the
desirability of negotiations." WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1. Ministerial Declaration. November 2001.
111 Report of the WSSD, September 2002.
112 "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the European Communities under
Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003, §13.
113 Eco-labelling: Actual Effects of Selected Programmes, OCDE/GD(97)105, OECD (1997), p39.
Morris & Scarlett, Buying Green, Consumers, Product Labels and the Environment (1996), p3.
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Labelling schemes where no value judgements are expressed on the labels, should
be, in my opinion, exempt from the necessity requirements of the TBT Agreement
under certain conditions. For example, voluntary single attribute labelling stating
terms such as "recyclable", "dolphin safe" "ozone friendly", "biodegradable", "GMO
free", "growth hormone free" give positive environmental information about one
attribute of a product, would enable consumers to purchase goods according to their
individual preferences. Eco-labels that cover elements that are not product-related
PPMs should also be authorised, since as was noted in Chapter 2, the differentiation
between product related and non-product related PPMs is artificial and cannot be
substantiated from an environmental/health point of view.
If goods are produced in a manner that is safer from an environmental/health
perspective, or that a consumer considers safer, there should be no reason to prevent
consumers from choosing this type of product.114
This type of labelling could open a new market, for example, for non-hormone
treated beef, GMO free food115 provided consumers are willing to pay a premium for
these products. It would be inappropriate for the WTO to impede on the development
of a new market.
It could be argued that an exemption from certain disciplines of the TBT Agreement
provisions would be inappropriate as eco-labels could inadvertently stigmatise a
product by suggesting that there is some health risk associated with the consumption
of a food even i f s cientific e vidence d oes n ot s upport t hat v iew. H owever, u nless
consumers live in splendid isolation, it is unlikely that controversial issues such as
the use of GMOs or growth hormones would not already have been stigmatised by
the media.
114 See Commission Regulation 880/92, Art. I, 1992 O.J. (L 99) 1.
115 See C.F. Runge and L.A. Jackson, "Labelling, Trade and Genetically Modified Organisms - A
Proposed Solution", 34 JWT 1 (2000), p 121, who argue that labelling is a partial solution to the
impasse over GMOs in the WTO.
248
Nevertheless, t he eco-labels s hould n ot b e d iscriminatory and s hould b e p repared,
adopted and applied in a transparent way that promotes the mutual supportiveness of
trade, environment and development objectives.116 Eco-labels should be accessible to
all producers on a non-discriminatory basis and should not contain requirements that
favour domestic producers or which are too costly or arduous.117 In addition,
encouraging the use of appropriate international standards in the preparation,
adoption and implementation of eco-labelling schemes would further ensure that eco-
labels are not unnecessarily trade restrictive.118 Members should also be encouraged
to accept as equivalent, technical regulations of other WTO Members if they
adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations.119
Producers should also be able to participate in the design and implementation of eco-
labelling schemes and notification as well as the publication of existing and new
schemes should also be required.120 In addition, the situation of developing countries
should also be taken into consideration. WTO Members should provide technical
assistance and enable developing country Members to enjoy reduced fees in
acquiring such labels.121
116 "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the European Communities under
Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225, 6 March 2003.
The TBT Agreement includes notification obligations to the WTO Secretariat and the
establishment of national enquiry points. Notification obligations allow for the dissemination of
information. They permit exporters to be informed of the new requirements that are developed in
their export markets before their entry into force, to provide comments on these requirements, as
well as, to have their comments taken into consideration and finally, to prepare themselves for
compliance. Enquiry points are designed to increase transparency by contributing to the flow of
information. The TBT Committee acts as a forum for consultation and negotiation on all issues
pertaining to the Agreement.
See TBT Agreement, Article 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, 3.2, 3.3, 5.2, 5.6 5.7, 10, Annex 3 (J), (L) - (Q).
117 See T. Schoenbaum, "International Trade and the Environmental Protection", in P. Birnie &
A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p720.
118 See the 1999 ISO standard 14024. "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the
European Communities under Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225 6 March 2003, §28.
119 D. Abdel Motaal, "Overview of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade", paper
presented at the CUTS International Workshop Negotiating Agenda for Market Access: Cases of
SPS and TBT, 24-25 April 2001, Geneva.
120 "Labelling for Environmental Purposes", Submission by the European Communities under
Paragraph 32(iii), WT/CTE/W/225 6 March 2003, §28.
121 Ibidem, §29. See TBT Agreement, Article 12.
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CHAPTER 5
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND MEAS: THE
NEED FOR COHERENCE
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters analysed the limitations of Article XX of the GATT 1994, the
SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement as well as the interpretations given to these
provisions by WTO panels and the Appellate Body.
Disputes under Article XX of the GATT 1994, the SPS Agreement and the TBT
Agreement have centred on unilateral measures. However, it is also necessary to
consider the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
and the WTO agreements, since the Appellate Body has suggested1 that parties
should co-operate on environmental measures as a means of avoiding unilateral
measures in the context of Article XX and since the SPS Agreement and the TBT
Agreement encourage the use of international standards as a basis for SPS and TBT
measures. The CTE has also promoted the ralley that the WTO supports multilateral
solutions to global and transboundary environmental problems and that unilateral
action in this context should be avoided.2
The implications of these suggestions and requirements need to be clarified since
important MEAs contain trade provisions.3 Indeed, the need for incentives to
See Shrimps case discussed in Chapter 2.
See Report of the CTE to the Singapore Ministerial Conference, WT/CTE/1, (1996).
For example the 1987 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, (Montreal), 26 !LM
(1987), 1550 (Montreal Protocol), 1989 Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, (Basel) 28 ILM (1989), 657 (Basel
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participate in MEAs and enhance the effectiveness of sanctions for non-compliance
explains why certain MEAs have included trade measures.
The fact that no dispute has arisen so far may suggest that WTO Members have
reached a consensus "on the legal value of these MEAs and their relationship with
the WTO".4 However, this is unlikely as the continuing debates in the CTE and the
proposals to amend the W TO agreements to accommodate MEAs do not seem to
show any common understanding.5 In addition, the lack of a clearly defined
relationship between the WTO and other international agreements has been a source
of continuing controversy and concern.
Clarifying t he c omplex relationship b etween t he W TO a nd M EAs w ould improve
coherence between the international trading system and other sources of international
law and therefore between trade, developmental and environmental policies. This
ultimately will contribute to the achievement of the goal of sustainable development,
a goal that, as noted in Chapter 2, is included in the Preamble to the WTO
Agreement.
In addition, the current uncertainty can have a negative impact on MEA negotiations
as was the case in the negotiations of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention of Biological Diversity (Biosafety Protocol)6. Clarification of the issue
would help MEA negotiators choose the most suitable and effective means and
mechanisms to realise the objectives of an MEA.
Convention) and the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
(Washington), 12ILM 1085 (1973), (CITES). See also WTO Matrix" on MEAs,
WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.l. Although trade measures are considered as second best policies as was
discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, they are often considered by governments as a useful mechanism
for encouraging participation in and enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements. See
D. Esty, Greening the GATT, (1994), p50.
G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), pl28.
Ibidem.
Biosafety Protocol adopted in Montreal on 29 January 2000. The Convention was opened for
signature on June 5 1992 and by 4 June 1993 received 168 signatures. The Convention entered
into force on 29 December 1993. Article 19 of the Biological Diversity Convention calls for the
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In this chapter, consideration will be given to whether and to what extent MEAs can
be used in the resolution of disputes concerning TREMs in order to improve
coherence in the implementation of trade and environment policies.
The analysis will consider the extent to which the WTO is an open system and,
therefore, to what extent it can take into account other sources of international law, in
particular MEAs. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties7
(hereinafter "1969 Vienna Convention") as well as factors that determine whether
other rules of international law will be taken into account are examined. The
analysis, of course, will include a discussion of relevant WTO panel and Appellate
Body decisions in order to identify past trends and thereby forecast the future
directions panels and the Appellate Body will or could take with respect to these
issues.
The appropriate forum for the settlement of disputes concerning TREMs that are
taken pursuant to an MEA is also central to this chapter. The focus will be on the
application of trade measures taken pursuant to an MEA where both parties are
members of both the MEA and the WTO. Two recent cases, the Swordfish8 case and
the Southern Bluefin Tuna9 case, will be analysed as they both highlight problems
concerning jurisdiction over disputes that are multi-faceted and that could be
reviewed under more than one treaty.
Consideration is also given to the proposition that differences between the dispute
settlement mechanism (DSM) of the WTO and the adjudicative systems of MEAs
could influence the choice of the dispute settlement forum, irrespective of which
adoption of a protocol on international aspects of biotechnology that may adversely affect
human health and conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, concluded on May 23, 1969, entered into force on
January 27, 1990, U.N. Doc. A/ CONF. 39/27, 8 ILM. 679 (1969).
Chile-EC: Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploitation ofswordfish stocks in
the South-eastern Pacific Ocean, ITLOS, Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000.
See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Provisional Measures), ITLOS No. 4 (1999) and Southern
Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, www.worldbank.org/icsid.
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forum is in fact the most "appropriate" for dealing with a given dispute. In this
respect, the proposal of an international environmental court is also evaluated.
Finally, options available to WTO Members to further accommodate MEAs in the
WTO are assessed in order to determine how coherence between different policy
objectives within the WTO system could be promoted most effectively.
The advantages and disadvantages of further legislative action rather than the panels
and the Appellate Body establishing the "line of equilibrium" between environmental
and trade considerations on a case-by-case basis will also be discussed.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WTO AND OTHER SUB¬
SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES A ND RULES
OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
I. Trade Measures Taken Pursuant to an MEA
It has been clear throughout the discussions in the CTE on the relationship between
the WTO and MEAs, that environmental problems should be resolved by resorting to
co-operative or multilateral action under an MEA10. This is consistent with the
approach endorsed by political leaders in 1992 at the UNCED and with the WTO's
focus on finding co-operative, multilateral solutions to problems in the area of
trade.11
The Appellate Body in the Shrimps case has stated that MEAs and/or international
co-operative agreements are a useful means of avoiding trade disputes. The
Appellate Body noted that the WTO CTE endorsed and supported "multilateral
solutions based on international co-operation and consensus as the best and most
effective way for governments to tackle environmental problems of a transboundary
10 See 1994 Decision on Trade and Environment, WTO Agreement, Annex 4, preamble and §2(b).
11 See Principle 12 of the Rio Declaration.
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or global nature. WTO agreements and MEAs are representative of efforts of the
international community to pursue shared goals, and in the development of a
mutually supportive relationship between them, due respect must be afforded to
both".12 Fonner Director General of the WTO Mike Moore has described this
approach as "conventional wisdom".13
The Shrimps Panel also stated that the "negotiation of a multilateral agreement or
action under multilaterally defined criteria is clearly a possible way to avoid
threatening the multilateral trading system".14
The Shrimps Appellate Body did not explicitly accept that an MEA would be a sound
basis for an exception under Article XX, although it welcomed environmental
measures, and recommended that these should not be unilateral.15
Schoenbaum considers that "the Shrimp/Turtle opinion provides a principled basis
for upholding multilateral and bilateral environmental agreements under Article
XX(b) and (g). By interpreting the requirements of (g) (and impliedly (b)) in a pro-
environmental manner, it is virtually certain that MEAs, as well as bilateral
environmental agreements, would be upheld. They would meet the requirements of
the chcipeciu unless they contained substantial flaws or were disguised protectionist
measures. Thus, the Shrimp/Turtle case provides an important new basis for
upholding trade-restrictive international environmental agreements".16
As discussed in Chapter 2, the reasons given by the Appellate Body for finding that
the US measure constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination centred on the
unilateral character of the measure coupled with the lack of willingness on the part of
12 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §176. See also the Report of the Committee on Trade and
Environment, WT/CTE/1, 12 November 1996, §171.
13 WTO, CTE Document, WT/CTE/W/178, 28 November 2000.
14 Panel Report, §7.55.
15 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §174-180.
16 T. Schoenbaum, "International Trade and Environmental Protection", in P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2"d ed., Oxford, (2002), pp712-713.
254
the US to find a negotiated solution to the problem. This would suggest that
Schoenbaum's view is correct. However, it should also be noted that the Appellate
Body stated that:
"The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is ... essentially the
delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium between the
right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the rights of
the other Members under varying substantive provisions (e.g. Article XI) of
the GATT 1994, so that neither of the competing rights will cancel out the
other and thereby distort and nullify or impair the balance of rights and
obligations constructed by the members themselves in that Agreement. The
location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed
and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and shape of the measures at
stake vary and as thefacts making up specific cases differ. "X1
Therefore, the circumstances in which the line of equilibrium is reached are uncertain
and hence it may be overly optimistic to consider that TREMs taken pursuant to
MEAs would, in general, be upheld. In addition, no panel or the Appellate Body has
actually made any findings with respect to the circumstances in which a measure
taken pursuant to an MEA would in fact be found consistent with WTO obligations.
Measures taken pursuant to an MEA encompass a rather broad category ofmeasures,
which include measures that are explicitly required by the MEA, explicitly
authorised but not required by the MEA and measures that are allegedly taken
pursuant to an MEA but that are not explicitly required or authorised by the MEA.
Where a measure is explicitly required by the MEA, it clearly represents a product of
international agreement. However, determining whether a TREM permissible under
an MEA, but taken by a party alone and more restrictive than the MEA requires, is a
product of international agreement or a unilateral action can be challenging.
Even w here T REMs a re c onsidered t o b e t he p roduct o fm ultilateral a ction, t hese
measures may nevertheless be inconsistent with WTO obligations. As further
developed in section B.H.2., important MEAs require or permit the use of trade
measures are potentially inconsistent with WTO requirements.
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1.) Situation Where Both Parties to a Dispute are Both Members of the
WTO, but Only One is Party to the MEA
Where both parties to a dispute are Members of the WTO but only one of them is
party to the MEA, the MEA cannot displace a non-party's rights under the WTO if
that Member is not bound by the MEA18, unless a waiver has been agreed, or if the
WTO expressly subordinates certain of its obligations to other international
agreements.19 However, so far waivers for MEAs or express provisions
subordinating WTO law to MEAs have not been negotiated and are not contained in
the WTO agreements.
If a n M EA p rovision i ncorporates o r h as acquired s tatus o f c ustomary rule o fj us
cogens, then the WTO provision is to that extent invalid, or becomes invalid,
pursuant to Article 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Article 53 of the 1969
Vienna Convention provides that treaty obligations are superseded by a customary
norm ofjus cogens and Article 64 contemplates the emergence of new rules of jus
cogens in the future. Therefore, a WTO panel would be able to give environmental
norms a higher status than those provided for in the WTO but only if it were able to
declare the environmental norms to be jus cogens. However, as Hudec has
commented, the field of international environmental law does not seem to be ready
for such an analysis.20 Indeed, in the Gcibcikovo-Ncigymciros Case, the ICJ impliedly
found that none of the norms of environmental law that were relied on by Hungary
17 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §167.
18 Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention considers that if only one of the parties is party to the
later treaty then the earlier treaty will govern their relations. Where a state has not given its
consent to a given rule it cannot generally be held accountable under that given rule, (pacta
tertiis nec nocent neeprosunt). See 1969 Vienna Convention, Articles 34-38.
19 R. Hudec, "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process - Can it Reconcile Trade Rules and
Environmental Needs" in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996), pp 131 and 136. See national security exceptions,
international commodity agreements, determinations of the IMF relative to balance of payment
issues.
20 R. Hudec, "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process - Can it Reconcile Trade Rules and
Environmental Needs", in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996), pl47.
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were jus cogens21. In addition, although the concept ofjus cogens has been referred
to in ICJ cases22, its content and scope remains contentious.23
2.) Situation Where Both Parties are Members of an MEA and the WTO
a) Lex posterior, lex specialis
If both parties to an MEA are members of the WTO and a measure is explicitly
required by the MEA but conflicts with WTO obligations, the rules contained in
Article 30 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the relationship of successive treaties
could apply unless the MEA regulates its relationship with the WTO agreements.
Indeed, the WTO agreements do not contain a provision regulating their relationship
with other treaties in case of conflict.
Of course, Article 30 of the Vienna Convention could only apply if the treaties under
consideration cover at least with respect to the particular measure at issue the same
subject matter. However, presumably, where two treaty rules do not address the same
subject matter, a dispute is not likely to arise as to which prevails.24
If a dispute arises over a measure that is explicitly required by an MEA but conflicts
with WTO obligations, WTO Members that have signed up to an MEA have waived
21 Gabcikovo-Nagymciros Case, ICJ Rep. (1997), §97. P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle, International Law
and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p81 and pl54, footnote 15.
22 See ICJ's reference to jus cogens in North Sea Continental Shelfcases, ICJ Rep. (1969), pp97-8,
182, 248. See also Judge Ammoun, sep. op., Barcelona Traction case (Second Phase), ICJ Rep.
(1970), 304, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986), ppl00-l, §190, Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 11,
p273, §352-67; Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (ICTY) 38 ILM 317 (1999), §144, 153-156; Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belgium), ICJ Rep., (2002), §56.
23 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, (1984), pi 8 and
pp203-241. Yearbook of the International Law Commission, (1966-11), p241. P. Reuter,
Introduction au Droit des Traites, (1972), ppl41-3.
24 P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International
Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (ed.), International Law and Sustainable Development,
Oxford, (1999), p49. See R. Jennings & A. Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law,
(1996), pl212.
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their rights under any WTO obligations in conflict with such provisions where the
MEA is lex posterior25 and/or lex specialist
However, the rules on treaty interpretation concerning conflicting treaty norms
cannot always be conclusively applied. In the case of lex posterior, for example,
Pauwelyn points out, that rules such as those contained in the WTO agreements and
many MEAs are "part of a framework or system that is continuously confirmed,
implemented, adapted, and expanded, for example, by means of judicial decisions,
interpretations, new norms, and the accession of new state parties"27. The implication
is that it is not always reasonable to fix the consent of states to rules to the precise
time when the treaty was signed, as these treaties deal with continuing norms.28
In addition, it should be noted that the lexposterior rule can be overruled not only by
a situation where a prior obligation is jus cogens29 but also and far more plausibly in
the context of conflicts between WTO and MEA obligations by inter se agreements
consistent with Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention30 as will be discussed in
the next section.
b) Inter se modifications
Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides:
"Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an
agreement to modify the treaty as between themselves alone if:
25 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UNTS Vol. 1155 No. 18232, (1969), Art 30(3),
30(4).
26 Principle applied in Chemin de Fer Zeltweg, 3 RIAA, (1934) 1795, 1803; Chorzow Factory
(Jurisdiction), PCIJ (ser.A), No.9, 30; European Commission of the Danube, PCIJ (ser.B),
No. 14, 23, Rights ofPassage Case, ICJ Rep. (1960) 6 Cf.
27 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), pp545-546.
28 Ibidem.
29 Article 53 and 64 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. See section B.I. 1.
30 Article 41 may take precedence over Article 30(4) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Article 30(5)
of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides that "[pjaragraph 4 [lex posterior] is without prejudice
to article 41". Article 41 can be viewed as an exception to Article 30(4).
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(a) the possibility ofsuch a modification is providedfor by the treaty; or
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and:
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their righ ts under the
treaty or the performance oftheir obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with
the effective execution ofthe object and purpose ofthe treaty as a whole. "
In the context of the WTO a free trade arrangement authorised by Article XXIV of
the GATT 1994 would constitute a modification provided for by the treaty under
paragraph (a).31
An inter se agreement falling under the scope of Article 41(1 )(b) would cover at least
two WTO Members agreeing not to challenge a measure inconsistent with Article
XX of the GATT 1994.32
In both cases, if such an inter se agreement validly modifies an existing WTO
agreement, then it will prevail to the extent of the conflict, as between.the parties to
the inter se agreement.33 It should be noted that inter se agreements whether
explicitly permitted by a treaty or not. can only validly modify a treaty between the
parties to the inter se agreement if it does not affect the enjoyment by the other
parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations and if it
is not incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole.34
The question that arises is whether inter se agreements would affect the enjoyment
by the other parties of their rights under the WTO agreements or the performance of
31 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJ1L{2001), p548.
32 Ibidem.
33 Inter se modifications cannot alter the rights and obligations of third parties without their
consent, [pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt). Article 34 of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
34 Article 41(1 )(b)(i) and (ii) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
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their obligations or would otherwise be incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty as a whole.
If WTO obligations are considered to be of a "collective" nature, in the sense that the
obligations "apply between a group of states and have been established in some
collective interest",35 that a breach of these obligations by one party affects the
individual rights of all other parties, since the obligations to the parties cannot be
"differentiated or individualised"36, and that therefore, all parties both "injured
states"37 as well as other states can invoke responsibility in the collective interest of
the group of states,38 or in the case of erga omnes obligations that all states could
35 Commentary to the ILC Articles, Report on the work of its 5 3ld Session, General Assembly-
Official Records, 55th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), p320.
36 Ibidem, p297.
37 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 42 provides that: "A State is entitled as an
injured state to invoke the responsibility of another state if the obligation breached is owed to:
(a) That State individually; or (b) A group of States i ncluding that State, or the international
community as a whole, and the breach of the obligation: (i) Specially affects that State; or (ii) Is
of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the
obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation.'
-,8 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 48(l)(a): "Any State other than an injured
State is entitled to invoke the State responsibility of another State in accordance with paragraph
2 if: (a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group".
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claim responsibility in the collective interest,39 albeit to a limited extent,40 then
modifying these obligations inter se would contravene Article 41 41
On the other hand, ifWTO obligations are considered to be of a reciprocal, bilateral
nature, in the sense that obligations are owed to individual states for the "mutual
interchange of benefits",42 not to the parties as a whole and that responsibility for
breach can only be invoked by an "injured" state,43 then inter se modifications will
probably not affect the rights of parties that have not agreed to these modifications
and will, therefore, not contravene Article 41.44
39 1LC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 48(l)(b) addresses the issue of erga omnes
obligations: "Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the State responsibility
of another State in accordance with paragraph 2 if: ...(b) The obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole".
40 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 48(2): "Any State entitled to invoke
responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible State: (a) Cessation of the
internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in accordance with
Article 30; and (b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with preceding
articles, in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached."
"Other statefsj" falling under the scope of Article 48 cannot claim reparation for themselves
unless the obligations are of an interdependent nature, that is if the obligation is "of such a
character a s radically to change the position of a 11 the o ther s tales to which the obligation i s
owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation, in which case every state of a
given group enjoys full rights. (ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 42(b)(ii))
Commentary to the ILC Articles, Report on the work of its 5 3!li Session, General Assembly,
Official Records, 55th Session, Supplement No.10 (A/56/10), p300: all states will thus be
"injured states". J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO
Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?", 14 EJ1L (2003), pp919-925.
41 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJ1L (2001), pp549-550.
42 Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Gerald Fitzmaurice, UN Doc. A/CN.4/115, YI.LC, Vol.
II, 16, 54. See J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO
Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003), p911.
43 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 42(a). ILC Articles on State Responsibility
(2001) In addition, in case of a material breach, the suspension of the treaty can only take place
between the defaulting state and the state that is at the other end of the bilateral relationship.
Article 60(1) and 60(2)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. This contrasts with obligations of a
collective nature. For example, in the case of a material breach of interdependent obligations, all
parties a re e ntitled t o suspend t he treaty i n whole o r i n p art a gainst a 11 p arties. 1 969 V ienna
Convention, Article 60(2)(c). See J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations:
Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003), p923.
44 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p549.
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Pauwelyn, in my view, correctly argues that the WTO agreements are essentially a
"bundle" of bilateral obligations between WTO Members, modification of which
inter se would not impact the enjoyment of rights and performance of obligations by
the other parties and would not jeopardise the object and purpose of the treaty.45 The
bilateral nature of WTO obligations transpires in the main objective of the WTO
agreements, the protection of trade, which is an exchange of goods and services
between two countries, and therefore, a bilateral exchange; the fact that trade
concessions a re n egotiated a nd renegotiated on a state-to-state, b ilateral 1 evel; and
the fact that the remedy of suspension of concessions also occurs on a bilateral
basis.46
Various arguments could be put forward for the proposition that WTO obligations
are of a collective nature. It could be argued that due to economic interdependence, a
breach of a WTO obligation could have repercussions on the economic interests of
many WTO Members, including those that have not participated in the inter se
agreement,47 that the MFN standard points to the interdependent nature of WTO
commitments, and that the fact that WTO obligations are contained in a multilateral
treaty implies that these obligations are necessarily of a collective nature suggesting
that inter se modifications would not comply with the requirements of Article 41 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention.48
45 J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or
Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL ( 2003), pp928-941.
46 J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or
Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003), pp928-936. On negotiation process of the WTO, see
European Communities - Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS62/AB/R, adopted 22 June 1998, §109: the Appellate Body stated that
"[tjariff negotiations are a process of reciprocal demands and concessions, "give and take"". On
the breach and enforcement on WTO obligations see DSU, Article 22 and see also Chapter 5 and
6.
47 The Appellate Body stated in the Bananas case, §136: "Members have a greater stake in
enforcing WTO rules than in the past since any deviation from the negotiated balance of rights
and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly or indirectly."
48 J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or
Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003), p936.
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It is true that economic interdependence may cause a number of WTO Members to
suffer a negative impact on their economic situation due to, for example, the ripple
effects of a breach of the MFN clause on world prices, however, it does not
necessarily follow that the individual legal rights of all WTO Members are violated
when such a breach occurs.49 It should also be noted that in order to invoke
responsibility for a breach of a WTO obligation, the complainant must demonstrate
that potential or actual trade opportunities have been affected. The Appellate Body in
the Bananas case found that the US could bring a case to the DSB although it
produced only a small amount of bananas and that this production was not
exported.50 In other words, the potential trade opportunities of the US were affected
by the EC measure.
It is also true that the MEN standard indicates that WTO obligations are
interdependent, however, it should be remembered that departures from the MFN
standards are authorised and that, therefore, adhering strictly to the MFN standard is
not essential either to protect the rights of the parties or to ensure that the object and
purpose of the WTO is preserved. Moreover, it is also difficult to see how, for
example, raising environmental standards between certain parties in breach of the
MFN standard would negatively impact trade with parties that have not concluded an
inter se agreement. On the contrary, it is very likely that the terms of trade between
an importer and a third party exporter would be improved.51
Finally, it should be emphasised that the fact that obligations are contained in a
multilateral treaty does not imply that these obligations are of a "collective" nature.52
As Birnie and Boyle note: "international lawyers have traditionally distinguished
between legal obligations owed to another state, which can be enforced only by that
49 Ibidem..
50 Bananas, Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R. J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral
Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003),
pp942-3.
51 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p549.
52 J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or
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state, and legal obligations owed to the whole international community of states,
which can be enforced by or on behalf of that community".53
On the basis that the WTO obligations can be validly modified inter se, an MEA
concluded after the WTO agreements could be considered to be an inter se
modification of the WTO obligations with respect to environmental measures,
provided that a whole new treaty can be considered an inter se modification of an
existing treaty.
However, there does not seem to be a valid reason for excluding obligations in a new
treaty as being potential modifications of obligations contained in another treaty.
Therefore, in a case where a later MEA modifies WTO obligations inter se, MEA
rules will prevail over conflicting prior WTO commitments where the parties to a
dispute are party to both agreements. The application of Article 41, therefore, leads
to the same result as the application of the lex posterior rule.
If an MEA was concluded prior to the WTO agreements, then the question arises
whether a WTO obligation could be considered an inter se modification of an MEA
obligation.
Pauwelyn argues that WTO rules cannot modify MEA rules inter se since MEAs
contain obligations of a collective nature.54 Indeed, obligations that arise, for
example, in relation to biodiversity55, climate change56, the pollution of the high
Collective in Nature?", 14 EJIL (2003), p928.
53 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p99
and 196. See ILC Articles on State Responsibility (2001), Article 48, Barcelona Traction Case,
ICJ Rep. (1970), 3 and Nuclear Tests Case. ICJ Rep. (1974), 253, 387 and 457.
54 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJ1L (2001), p549.
55 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 ILM (1992), 818, Preamble: "the conservation of
biodiversity is a common concern of humankind".
56 Convention on Climate Change, 31 ILM (1992), 851, Preamble. UN General Assembly
resolution 43/53 declares that global climate change is "the common concern of mankind". See
P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p503.
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seas57, and ozone depletion58 are established in the collective interest, to protect the
global environment or areas of common concern or interest59 that require common
action by all states to be successfully protected.60
in this case, the application of Article 41 leads to a result that differs from the
application of the lex posterior rule as the inconsistent WTO obligation is not a legal
modification of the conflicting MEA obligation at issue.
3.) Limitations of the Rules Concerning Conflicting Treaty Provisions
The rules on conflicting treaty obligations considered in previous sections are
restricted to situations where there is a conflict between two treaty provisions.
Measures that are only explicitly authorised or adopted under discretionary powers
pursuant to an MEA would not constitute a conflict between provisions of two
treaties and are, therefore, not covered by these rules.
It could also be argued that a conflict does not exist if a party has an explicit right to
impose trade restrictions in an MEA and an obligation not to restrict trade in the
WTO. Indeed, a strict definition of conflict implies that a conflict only arises when a
party to two treaties cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both
37 See 1982 UNCLOS, Preamble:. "Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely
interrelated and need to be considered as a whole", 1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, Chapter 17 of the Agenda 21, which considers that the oceans, seas and
adjacent coastal areas as an "integrated whole that is an essential component of the global life-
support system". P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed.,
Oxford, (2002), p97. See also J. Pauwelyn, "A Typology ofMultilateral Treaty Obligations: Are
WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?", 14 EJ1L (2003), p934. See J. Crawford,
Special R apporteur t o t he ILC, T hird R eport o n S tate Responsibility, A'CN.4/507, 10 March
2000, 106(b).
58 The definition of the 1985 Convention regards the stratospheric ozone layer as a global unity. In
addition, injury resulting from the destruction of the ozone layer may affect the community of
states as a whole. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle. International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed.,
Oxford, (2002). pp 98 and 503.
59 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed.. Oxford, (2002), pp 97-
9? and 196-197.
60 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pp 97.
See J. Crawford, Special Rapporteur to the ILC, Third Report on State Responsibility,
A/CN.4/507, 10 March 2000, 88.
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agreements.61 In this scenario, if the obligation not to restrict trade were complied
with, then the fact that a right to restrict trade is available in an MEA but not resorted
to does not lead to non-compliance with the MEA and there is, therefore, no
conflict.62
In addition, relying on these rules does little to integrate rules arising in various sub¬
systems of international law. Indeed, these rules do not enhance coherence between
different rules of international law that would ensure that WTO law evolves in a
manner that reduces, rather than enhances, conflict or incompatibility with evolving
law in other international legal regimes.63 These rules do not promote linkage
between trade and environmental issues, an objective that is considered necessary to
achieve sustainable development. Of course, it is not possible to exclude the use of
these rules in a situation where there is a real conflict between treaty provisions and
where neither of the treaties regulates its relationship with other treaties with respect
to conflicts. However, many incompatibilities can be resolved through interpretation
that takes into account other rules and principles of international law.
The next section will consider the extent to which the mandate of the WTO allows
other rules and principles of international law to be relied upon when interpreting the
WTO agreements.
61 See W. Jenks, "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties", BYIL (1953), p425 et seq. Encyclopedia
of Public International Law (North-Holland 1984), p468. See also Guatemala - Anti-Dumping
Investigation regarding Portland Cement from Mexico, WT/DS54, 55, 59 and 64/R, Appellate
Body Report, adopted on 23 July 1998, §14.29-14.36.
62 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p551. See also G. Marceau, "Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions -
The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and MEAs and other Treaties", 35 JWT 6
(2001), pl083-6.
63 R. Howse, "Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The
Early Years of the WTO Jurisprudence", in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The ED, the WTO and the
NAFTA - Towards a Common Law of International Trade, Oxford, (2000), p58. The case law of
the ICJ also demonstrates that an integrated approach to international law should be promoted.
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, ICJ Rep. (1997), 7, §112 and 140 and Advisoiy Opinion on the
Legality of the Use or Threat ofNuclear Weapons (UNGA), ICJ Rep. (1996), p226. P. Birnie &
A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p80.
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II. To What Extent can the DSB Draw on Other Rules of International
Law to Interpret WTO Obligations?
Whether "non-WTO law", including rules contained in MEAs, can be used in the
resolution of WTO disputes depends on whether the WTO system is able to draw
from developments in other legal contexts.
1.) The WTO as Part of the Broader Corpus ofPublic International Law
The WTO DSB is not a court of general jurisdiction and as such it does not have
jurisdiction to decide on matters where the compatibility with the WTO covered
agreements is not at issue.64
Therefore, the DSB does not have jurisdiction to decide on all alleged violations of
international law, including violations ofMEAs.65
Article 7 of the DSU, concerning the terms of reference of panels, states that panels
shall:
"...examine, in the light of the relevant provisions of the covered agreements cited by
the parties to the dispute, the matter referred to the DSB ... and to make such findings
as will assist the DSB in making recommendations or in giving the rulings provided
for in those agreements".
Therefore, a panel's terms of reference are limited to the covered agreements, which
only include WTO agreements according to Annex I of the DSU. In addition, Article
11 of the DSU specifies that the function of panels is to assess the applicability of
and confonnity with the covered agreements. It should also be noted that WTO
64 See J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. 1LJ 2 (1999), p338.
This excludes ministerial decisions and declarations that are part of the Final Act. See J.
Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95 AJIL
(2001), p554.
65 Except if the parties to the dispute by mutual consent grant the WTO jurisdiction pursuant to
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Members have not granted WTO remedies for the enforcement of rights and
obligations other than those under the "covered agreements".66
To the same extent that the WTO is not a court of general jurisdiction, the WTO is
not a closed system. WTO rules are part of international law, as a treaty is by
definition governed by international law.67 Although, it is possible to contract out of
certain rules of general international law, to which all states are, in principle, bound
by, it is not possible "to contract out of the system of international law".68
The fact that the WTO Agreement69 states that it aims at an optimal use of resources
while seeking to protect and preserve the environment in a manner consistent with
the respective needs and concerns of countries at different levels of economic
development, and the fact that there are environmental, health, security exceptions to
WTO obligations, suggests that the WTO is necessarily connected to other sub¬
systems of international law.70 In addition, Article 3.2 of the DSU provides that the
DSM "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered
agreements and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law".71
Article 7.3 and 25 of the DSU.
66 See DSU. See also G. Marceau, "WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights" 13 EJIL 4
(2002), p753.
67 Article 2(l)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention defines a "treaty "as: "an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law...".
68 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p539.
69 Preamble.
70 See G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), ppl07-8.
71 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), pp537, 541-543. Pauwelyn notes that "the absence of explicit contracting out" of
general international law to which the customary rules of interpretation belong, "must be
regarded as a continuation or implicit acceptance of the rales in question". The implication is
also that not only customary rales of treaty interpretation are to be applied but also other
customary rales of international law and general principles of law that constitute general
international law. However, it could also be argued that explicit provision of a rule implies that
the treaty has contracted out of all other rales of general international law. (expressio unius est
exclnsio alterius).
See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, (2000), p201. Chorzow Factoiy
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In the next sections, consideration will be given to the extent to which non-WTO law
influences the interpretation ofWTO law.
2.) Non-WTO Rules that are Incorporated in the WTO Agreements
Non-WTO rules may enter into WTO dispute settlement if these are incorporated
into the WTO agreements either by treaty language or by a waiver.
Incorporation of non-WTO rules in the WTO agreements should not be confused
with explicit references to non-WTO rules. The SPS Agreement, for example,
explicitly refers to the application of relevant international standards, guidelines, and
recommendations developed by relevant international organisations such as the
Codex Alimentarius, International Office for Epizootics as well as international and
regional organisations operating within the framework of the International Plant
Protection Convention (IPPC) as a basis for SPS measures.72 The international
standards although explicitly referred to, are not "incorporated" in the WTO
agreements and, therefore, cannot be subject of an independent claim before the
WTO DSB.73 However, these international standards can used to determine whether
measures are compatible with the respective agreements.74
(Ger. v. Pol.), Merits, 1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept.13). Legal Consequences for States
of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding
Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 47, §96 (June 21).
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (US v. Italy), ICJ Rep. (1989) 15, 42, §50.
72 SPS Agreement, Preamble and Article 3.4.
73 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p555.
74 However, it should be noted that it is not essential that particular international standards be
explicitly referred to in order to assist in the determination of the consistency of a measure with
the WTO agreement. International standards will also need to be taken into account in the
evaluation of the consistency of a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement although the
TBT Agreement only provides that "where technical regulations are required and relevant
international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or
relevant parts of them" except where these are inappropriate or ineffective and does not
explicitly refer to particular international standards. TBT Agreement, Article 2.4 and Annex 3.
Similarly, Articles 208-212 of UNCLOS imply that, for example, the 1972 London Dumping
Convention. 1973/78 MARPOL Convention and IMO codes should be used in determining
whether measures are compatible with UNCLOS although they are not explicitly referred to in
UNCLOS. The 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention also seems to imply that other international
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However, if specific provisions of agreements are incorporated into the WTO
agreements such as provisions of the Bern, Paris and Rome Conventions in the
TRIPs Agreement, then these rules can be enforced by the DSB as they have become
part of WTO law.75 Presumably, the WIPO interpretations of the incorporated rules
do not bind the WTO, although account would probably be taken of these
interpretations.76
It is unclear whether the rights and obligations brought into the WTO are only those
that were in effect at the time the WTO Agreements became effective, or whether
these change as the agreements develop.77 Neither the GATT 1994 nor the SPS
Agreement refer to this issue. The only indication that the obligations are only those
brought into the WTO agreements when they became effective is contained in
footnote 2 to the TRIPS Agreement, which states that references to the intellectual
property conventions are to specific versions of those conventions.78 This, however,
seems to contrast with the willingness of the Shrimps Appellate Body to adopt what
it considered a dynamic interpretation of the term "exhaustible natural resources" in
Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994.79
The extent to which the WTO DSB is willing to interpret another agreement that has
been incorporated through a waiver has been illustrated in the Bananas case.80
standards can be used but these appear to have more of a guidance function. See Articles 10-16
and the preamble to the 1994 Nuclear Safety Convention. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International
Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p353 and pp461-462.
75 J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p554.
76 D.W. Leebron, "Linkages", 96 AJIL 5 (2002), pi9.
77 D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation - Practice
and Procedure, The Hague, (1999), p53. The same problem of identifying which standards or
which version of the standards is relevant also applies to the UNCLOS context.
78 D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis, "The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law", AJIL (1998), p409.
79 Shrimps, Appellate Body Report, §129. See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, ICJ Rep. (1997),
7, §112 and 140.
80 European Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas,
Appellate Body Report, 9 September 1997, WT/DS27/AB/R.
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Both the Panel and the Appellate Body held that they had jurisdiction to interpret the
Lome Convention due to the incorporation of that agreement through a prescribed
waiver in GATT 1994.
In 1994, the WTO General Council granted a waiver to the EC from its obligations
under Article I of the GATT 1994 to allow the EC preferential treatment provided for
products originating in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Indeed, the
Lome Convention requires the EC to give to ACP bananas "treatment not less
favourable than in the past" for traditional imports and "more favourable treatment
than granted to third countries benefiting from the MFN clause" for all imports of
bananas.81
The Panel interpreted the Lome Convention in order to clarify the EU's legal
obligations and determine how EU measures under the waiver were necessary to give
effect to its Lome Convention obligations. This was despite the fact that the EC and
the ACP argued that the Panel was not competent in determining what the Lome
Convention required. The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel as it stated: "to
detennine what is 'required' by the Lome Convention, we must look first to the text
of that Convention and identify provisions of it that are relevant to trade in
bananas."82
Therefore, the Appellate Body considered whether the Lome Convention justified all
the measures taken by the EC in relation to the banana regime and whether the
waiver also covered Article XIII ofGATT 1994.
According to the Appellate Body, the Lome Convention requires the duty-free access
for traditional ACP bananas as well as the allocation of tariff quota shares for
traditional ACP bananas. In addition, the Appellate Body found that the Lome
Convention requires the duty-free access granted to 90.000 tonnes of non-traditional
ACP bananas, the margin of tariff preference of 100 ECU/tonne but not other
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advantages, such as the allocation of tariff quota shares in excess of best-ever export
volumes prior to 1991, the tariff quota shares for non-traditional ACP exporters and
the import licensing regime allowing cross-subsidisation favouring EC operators
marketing traditional ACP bananas.
As far as the applicability of Article XIII of the GATT 1994 was concerned, the
Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that the Lome Waiver waived not only
the obligations under Article I of GATT 1994 but also those under Article XIII of
GATT 1994. The Panel considered that the interrelation between those articles and
the need to interpret the waiver in a manner that would allow it to achieve its
objectives justified this finding. The Appellate Body, on the other hand, found that
since Article XIII was not mentioned in the Lome Waiver, it could not be included
within its scope.
The Appellate Body supported its finding by referring to the GATT practice to
interpret waivers restrictively, since they constitute exceptions to the general rule. In
addition, the Appellate Body considered that during the drafting of the Lome Waiver,
the Members replaced the expression "foreseen" in "preferential treatment foreseen
by the Lome Convention" by "required", thereby narrowing its scope83. Finally, the
Appellate Body referred to the exceptional nature of waivers under Article XIII.84
It is clear that international agreements that are incorporated through a waiver will be
interpreted by the WTO DSB where appropriate but only to the extent necessary in
interpreting the WTO agreements.
81 Protocol 5 and Article 168(2)(a)(ii) of the Lome Convention.
82 Bananas Appellate Body Report, §167 and 169.
83 Bananas, Appellate Body Report, §168 and 186.
84 Ibidem, §187.
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3.) Non-WTO Rules that are Not Incorporated In the WTO Agreements
Non-WTO rules may also enter into WTO dispute settlement if these are referred to
in the WTO agreements.
The DSB will not only have to consider non-WTO rules that are explicitly provided
for in the WTO agreements but also those that are not explicitly referred to in the
WTO agreements.85 Indeed, as noted in section B.II.l, the DSB must follow the
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.86
a) Rules on the Interpretation of Treaties - The 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of the Treaties
WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have observed the principles of treaty
interpretation contained in Article 31 and 3 287 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
despite the fact that certain Members of the WTO, including the US are not party to
this convention.88 However, the Appellate Body in Japan-Taxes declared that the
1969 Vienna Convention represented a codification of customary international law
and was, therefore, binding on all states.89 The Appellate Body in the Gasoline case
85 See footnote 70 above.
86 Article 3.2 of the DSU.
87 Article 31 has been used more extensively than Article 32, since Article 32 provides
supplementary means of inteipretation, in order to "confirm the meaning resulting from the
application of Article 31" or where Article 31 does not resolve the interpretation problem, but
where the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or "leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable".
These supplementary means of interpretation include travaux preparatoires and the
circumstances of the conclusion of a treaty. In the Bananas case (Appellate Body Report, §168)
reference was made to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention, where the travaux preparatoires
were considered to confirm the Panel's conclusions flowing from the application of Article 31.
The travaux preparatoires were also referred to by the Appellate Body in the Periodicals case ,
p24 in support of a textual inteipretation of Article III(8)(b) of GATT 1994. The Shrimps
Appellate Body, §157 and the Gasoline Appellate Body, p22 referred to the negotiating history
in order to confirm its textual inteipretation of the chapeau of Article XX, respectively that the
chapeau made the use of the exceptions in Article XX limited and conditional and that the role
of the chapeau was to prevent abuse of the Article XX exceptions.
88 See J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body", 50 ICLO April 2001, p254.
89 Japan-Taxes Appellate Body Report, plO. See e.g. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
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stated that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention had "attained the status of a rule of
customary or general international law".90 The position of the Appellate Body is
supported by other courts such as the ICJ. For example, in the Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions Case the ICJ stated:
"It is accordingly incumbent upon the Court to decide the meaning of the text
in question by applying the rules of interpretation that it recently had
occasion to recall in the case concerning the Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Chad):
"in accordance with customary international law, reflected in Article 31 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty must be
interpreted in goodfaith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose".91
Sinclair notes that although not all provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention can be
considered a codification of customary international law, that Articles 31-33 are
declaratory of customary law.92 In other words, it is not necessary for a state to be
party to the agreement, for certain rules contained therein to be applicable, as they
are customary rules of international law.93
Questions (Qatar v. Bahrain) Case, ICJ Rep. (1995), p6.
90 Gasoline Appellate Body Report, pi7.
91 ICJ. Rep. 1994, Judgment, pp. 21-22, §41. See also Golder Case, ECHR, 57 ILR 214, Beagle
Channel (Argentina/Chile) C ase, C ourt o f Arbitration, 5 2 I LR 9 3. The ICJ i n the Gabcikovo
Case observed that it has no need to dwell upon the question of the applicability or non-
applicability in the present case of the Vienna Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties, as
argued by the Parties. It needs only to be mindful of the fact that it has several times had
occasion to hold that some of the rules laid down in that Convention might be considered as a
codification of existing customary law.
The term "context" in Article 31(1) includes not only the treaty text, including its preamble and
annexes but also "any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty" (Article 31(2)(a)) and "any instrument which was
made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the
other parties as an instrument related to the treaty".(Article 31 (2)(b))
92 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, (1984), pplO-21,
especially pi9. See also A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, (2000), pp 10-1.
93 Ibidem, p9. However, it should also be noted that not all custom is binding on every state.
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WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have often considered Article 31(1) of the 1969
Vienna Convention in the interpretation of WTO agreements.94 It has become a legal
test, which if not applied can result in panel rulings being overturned by the
Appellate Body.95
The Appellate Body has emphasised that the wording of the treaty text must be the
starting point of the analysis, that obligations should not be imposed on Members
that have no basis in the text and that the text should not be interpreted in such a way
that the actual wording is irrelevant.96 This ensures that the adjudicative bodies do
not make assumptions concerning the purpose before the text is carefully examined
and t hat t hereby t he f indings d o n ot e xpose the " importation o r p rioritisation o f a
single purpose into a legal text crafted to balance diverse, and possibly competing
values"97.
The DSB must also apply Article 31(3) in interpreting the WTO agreements. Article
31(3) provides that together with the context "any subsequent agreement between the
parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions",
"any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation", and "any relevant rules of
international law applicable in the relations between parties" shall be taken into
account.
94. For example, in the Gasoline case, the Appellate Body found that the Panel had not given full
effect to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention in interpreting Article XX(g). The Appellate
Body criticised the Panel Report for applying the "necessary" test to Article XX(g). According
to the Appellate Body, the Panel disregarded the text of Article XX, in particular, the Article's
use of "relating to" as opposed to "necessary". The Appellate Body found that this disregard
amounted to a fundamental error in treaty interpretation in light of the Vienna Convention,
Article 31(1), ppl6-7. The Shrimps Appellate Body rejected a rigid "original intent" when
interpreting Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 and applied a more dynamic interpretation that
puts Article XX(g) in a contemporary context. (§128-131.)
95 J. C ameron a nd K .R. G ray, "Principles o f I nternational Law i n t he WTO D ispute S ettlement
Body", 50 ICLQ April 2001, p256.
96 Gasoline Appellate Body Report, p22 and Japan-Taxes Appellate Body Report, pi2.
97 R. Howse, "Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The
Early Years of the WTO Jurisprudence", in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the
NAFTA - Towards a Common Law of International Trade, Oxford, (2000), p54.
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Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention imposes an obligation to take into
account rules and principles that may not be explicitly referred to in the WTO
covered agreements.
Article 31(3) reflects a 'principle of integration' as it implies that rules should not be
considered in isolation of general international law,98 thereby promoting coherence in
the interpretation of treaty obligations. However, it should be noted that the fact that
rules are to be "taken into account" does not imply that these rules must be applied.99
Subsequent agreements and practice under Article 31(3)(a) and (b) only bind those
parties that have agreed to such practice or agreement unless the subsequent practice
or agreement codifies customary international law.100 As Sinclair states: "Article
31(3)(b) does not cover subsequent practice in general, but only a specific form of
subsequent practice - that is to say concordant subsequent practice common to all the
parties".101
Relying on Article 31(3)(c), which provides that "any relevant rules of international
law applicable in the relations between parties" shall be taken into account, rather
than Article 31(3)(a) and (b) has the advantage that it is not necessary that, for
example, an MEA be considered a subsequent agreement or practice in order to be
98 P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International
Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (ed.), International Law and Sustainable Development,
Oxford, (1999), p49.
99 See Articles 24 and 25 of the 1958 High Seas Convention, which refer to "taking account" of
"existing treaty provisions" and "any standards and regulations which may be formulated by the
competent international organisations", however, as Birnie and Boyle note there is no obligation
to "follow the standards set by these international regulations". P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p351.
100 See J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body", 50 ICLQ April 2001, p266.
101 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, (1984), pi38.
"Subsequent practice which does not fall within this narrow definition may nonetheless
constitute a supplementary means of interpretation with the meaning of Article 32 of the
Convention". In the Separate opinion of Judge Bedjaoui in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, it
was stated that subsequent law should only be taken into account in very special situations. ICJ
Rep. (1997), §8. See also A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, (2000), pp 191-
5: "It is not necessary to show that each party has engaged in a practice, only that all have
accepted it, albeit tacitly".
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taken into account. The phrase "any relevant rules of international law" in Article
31(3)(c) is broad enough to include customary rules of international law, general
principles of international law102 and relevant international conventions103, including
MEAs.
Determining whether a rule of an international agreement is "relevant" in terms of
Article 31(3)(c) may require an examination of the subject matter of the rule or
possibly the membership of the international agreement. Indeed, in order for a rule of
an international agreement to be considered "relevant" it may be necessary that all
the parties to a dispute must be party to both the agreement that is to be interpreted
and to the agreement that is to be taken into account, or that at least one of the parties
to the dispute is party to both agreements, or all parties to an agreement must also be
party to the agreement that is to be taken into account, or that a substantial part of all
parties to an agreement are also party of the other agreement that is to be taken into
account or that at least one of the parties to an agreement is also party to the
agreement that is to be taken into account.
The ambiguity of the term "parties" in Article 31(3) is partly responsible for the
uncertainty.104 Indeed, "parties" could either be taken to mean all the parties to an
agreement, some of the parties to an agreement or the parties to the dispute.105
If one were to argue that the "parties" refers to "the parties to the dispute" then the
MEA may only be applicable and relevant to the interpretation of the WTO
agreements if both parties to the dispute are Members of the WTO and the MEA. If
102 See Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. The European Court of Human Rights in the Colder case
has held that the reference to "relevant mles of international law" includes general principles of
international law, 57 ILR 201, 217 (1975).
103 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, (1984), pi 19.
104 Unfortunately, the ILC Commentary on Article 31 provides no guidance. See commentary to
Article 27, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, (1966), Vol.II, p220-222.
105 I. Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Manchester, (1984), pi. As
Sinclair notes:
"The Convention is the product of many conflicting interests and viewpoints and the customary
vices of compromise. Among these is a tendency to overcome points of difficulty by expressing
rules at a level of generality and abstraction sufficient to hide underlying divergencies."
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only one party to the dispute is party to the MEA, then account should only be taken
of customary rules or general principles of law contained in the MEA. It could be
argued that the emphasis in Article 31(3)(c) is that other rules are to be taken into
account rather than being applied and enforced106 and, therefore, other rules that do
not necessarily bind the parties could be taken into account. However, this
interpretation seems overly broad as Article 31(3)(a) and (b) which also "only" need
to "taken into account", are to be interpreted restrictively as was discussed above.
The interpretation that the "parties" refers to "the parties to the dispute" is not
convincing. According to Article 2(l)(g) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, a "party" is
"a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in
force".107 Therefore, it seems unlikely that the "parties" specifically refers to "the
parties to the dispute". In addition, if Article 31(3)(c) is examined in the context of
Article 31(3) as a whole, this interpretation seems improbable.
The term "parties" in the context of Article 31(3) does not seem to refer to all parties
to a treaty. This position can be supported by the fact that in Article 31(2)(a)
reference was made to "all the parties". If "parties" referred to all the parties, this
would have been expressly stated in Article 31(3). However, it could also be argued
that the reason that in Article 31(2)(a) reference was made to "all the parties" was to
distinguish this paragraph from Article 31 (2)(b) which refers to "one or more of the
parties". Therefore, if "parties" is unqualified it could be taken to mean "all the
parties" to the agreement.
In the Shrimps case, however, the Appellate Body found that an MEA did not need to
have identical membership to that of the WTO in order to be taken into account.
Indeed, the Appellate Body in interpreting the term "exhaustible natural resources"
in Article XX(g), extensively consulted agreements that are not WTO covered
106 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT5 (1999), pl25 and 127.
107 See J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?" 95
AJIL (2001), p575.
278
agreements. The Appellate Body referred to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
UNCLOS and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Animals in demonstrating that Article XX(g) includes both living and non-living
resources.108
This seems to be a more appropriate and effective interpretation. If identical
membership were required there would be very little use for Article 31(3)(c), since it
is very rare that two treaties have identical membership. In addition, over time,
memberships may change in MEAs and/or the WTO, thereby creating the possibility
that an MEA may be relevant at a particular point in time, but if membership does
not evolve consistently with that of the WTO, then it will no longer be relevant until
membership would be identical again. This would, of course, suggest that the
interpretation of the WTO agreements would be very unpredictable.
In addition, if an inter se agreement can be concluded between at least two WTO
Members,109 and is applicable in the interpretation of the WTO agreements between
these Members alone, it seems illogical that MEA rules that have been agreed to by
two or more WTO Members should not be taken into account in a dispute where both
parties are MEA parties.110
It is more likely that the term "parties" in the context of Article 31(3) refers to a
subset of parties to an international agreement. It could, of course, also be argued that
if the drafters had intended to refer to a sub-set of members of a treaty in Article
31(3)(c), the drafters would have explicitly provided for "some parties" or by "one or
more parties" and accepted by "the other parties".
108 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §176.
109 Article 41 of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides:
"[two] or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the
treaty as between themselves alone if: ... (b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the
treaty and: (i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or
the performance of their obligations; (ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of the object and puipose of
the treaty as a whole."
110 G. Marceau, "WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights", 13 EJ1L 4 (2002), p782.
279
However, the interpretation that "parties" refers to a subset of parties to an
international agreement can be supported in the context of the WTO by the fact that
the applicable standards with respect to food safety are those established by Codex
Alimentarius, an international body to which most WTO Members are members but
not all.111 Although, it should be noted that all WTO Members are subject to the
disciplines of the SPS Agreement and have, therefore, agreed to the standards
contained in these international agreements as a basis for determining the consistency
of SPS measures with the SPS Agreement.
The interpretation given above implies that MEA rules would be taken into account
in a dispute settlement proceeding provided that these rules reflect the intentions of
the parties of the agreement that is interpreted.112 In other words, the rules must bind
the parties, in order to be taken account into account. This would be the case with
rules that reflect customary international law accepted by all states or general
principles of law. Whether other MEA rules would be considered as applicable in the
relations between the parties is less clear.
The analysis suggests that the value of Article 31 (3)(c) in providing a basis for taking
into account MEAs and the rules contained therein when interpreting the WTO
agreements is limited. In addition, it was noted in Chapter 3, that even if a rule of
111 See J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body", 50 ICLQ April 2001, 248 and SPS Agreement, Article 3.4.
112 An interpretation of an agreement should be "consistent with the intentions (or perceived
intentions) of the parties". See A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge, (2000),
pi95. However, this does not require that only regard be had to "international law at the time the
treaty was concluded ... but also to contemporary law". Article 31(3)(c) justifies the use of the
Appellate Body of an evolutionary interpretation of the terms of the agreement.
ILC commentary to Article 31 (3)(b): "The text provisionally adopted in 1964 spoke of a practice
which "establishes the understanding of all the parties". By omitting the word "all" the
Commission did not intend to change the rule. It considered that the phrase "the understanding
of the parties" necessarily means "the parties as a whole". It omitted the word "all" merely to
avoid any possible misconception that every party must individually have engaged in the
practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the practice." Quoted in D. Rauschning,
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Travaux Preparatoires, Frankfurt (1978), p254.
In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ stated that when a case is decided on the basis of general
customary international law, it must discover that law from the practice of states as a whole and
that it is not sufficient that only the parties to a dispute have a common view of what that law is.
Nicaragua (Merits) case, §184.
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international law could b e used to interpret specific WTO provisions, it could not
override the explicit language of treaty provisions,113 without a clear textual directive
to that effect.114
The rule of international law would still need to be interpreted into the treaty norm
and not applied instead of it.115 This is consistent with Judge Bedjaoui's Separate
Opinion in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, that the "interpretation" of a treaty
should not be confused with its "revision".116
There is a definite trend that the Appellate Body is attempting to consider treaty
norms o utside t hat o f t he W TO, t hereby t o s ome e xtent s eparating i tself from t he
image of a self-contained regime.117
However, the degree to which rules of international law covered by Article 31 (3)(c)
will be taken into account will depend on the circumstances of each dispute. In
general, the greater the number ofWTO Members that are party to an MEA, the fact
that the MEA is open to all WTO Members,118 and the fact that both parties to a
dispute are both party to the MEA, the more likely the MEA will be considered to
reflect the intentions of the parties, and, therefore, be relevant and applicable in the
interpretation of the WTO agreements. If the rule in an MEA can be said to be a
113 Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.157; Canada Panel Report, §8.160; Appellate Body Report,
§123.
114 Hormones, Appellate Body Report, §124. P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom,
and the Cross-fertilization of International Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (ed.),
International Law and Sustainable Development, Oxford, (1999), p57.
115 P. Sands, "Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International
Law", in A.E. Boyle and D. Freestone (ed.), International Law and Sustainable Development,
Oxford, (1999), p57.
116 Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case, ICJ Rep., (1997), §5.
117 See Shrimps case.
118 In the Shrimps case, the Appellate Body, §176 referred to MEAs with a wide membership and
that are open to all Memberssuch as the Convention on Biological Diversity, UNCLOS and the
Convention on the Conservation ofMigratory Species ofWild Animals.
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customary rule of international law accepted by all states or a general principle of
law, then these factors would be less significant.119
Article 31(3)(c) provides a useful tool in enabling other rules of international law to
be taken into account in the process of determining the compatibility ofmeasures
with WTO law thereby ensuring a higher degree of coherence in international law.
Article 31(3)(c) provides a means of ironing out potential incompatibilities between
WTO rules and MEA rules. The next sections will consider potential
incompatibilities between WTO rules and MEA rules and the way in which these can
be resolved through interpretation.
b) WTO obligations and obligations arising in MEAs
MEAs such as CITES, the Montreal Protocol, and the Basel Convention provide for
trade measures that are potentially incompatible with certain rules contained in the
WTO agreements.
Indeed, certain CITES provisions could be considered to be inconsistent with GATT
1994 that covers restrictions on trade in goods, to which a restriction on trade in
endangered species belongs.120 CITES requires restrictions on trade in species of
wild fauna and flora threatened or that could become threatened with extinction
whether the state is a party or non-party to the CITES agreement. These provisions
are potentially inconsistent with GATT Article XI on quantitative restrictions.
However, the measures could be justified under Article XX(b) that provides for the
protection of animal and plant life or health. Alternatively, the measures could be
justified under Article XX(g) that provides for the protection of natural resources. As
was discussed in Chapter 2, the definition of "natural resources" is rather wide and
would also cover endangered species.
119 See North Sea Continental ShelfCases, ICJ Rep., (1969).
120 See for example the Shrimps case examined in Chapter 2.
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However, the fact that CITES enables contracting parties to adopt more stringent
measures than under the agreement,121 suggests that it may be more difficult to
satisfy the necessity test or the arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination test in Article
XX as the measures may be viewed as unilateral.
The Basel Convention122 prohibits certain categories of movements of waste
whenever there is reason to believe that it will not be managed in an environmentally
sound manner. The Basel Convention also contains provisions that may be
incompatible with GATT 1994 as GATT 1994 would cover restrictions on trade in
hazardous waste as, ironically, hazardous waste would be qualified as a "good".
Indeed, the Convention requires prior notification and informed consent of the
receiving country of hazardous wastes as a precondition for authorising international
waste shipments.123 Exports of hazardous wastes intended for disposal, reuse, or
recycling are banned from industrialized countries (OECD, EU, and Liechtenstein) to
developing countries.124 In addition, exports and imports between parties and non¬
parties are also prohibited except under bilateral or multilateral agreements, which
provide for the same level of environmental protection as the Basel Convention.125
These provisions could be considered inconsistent with GATT Article XI on
quantitative restrictions. In addition, parties to the Basel Convention are permitted to
use more stringent measures against non-parties which indicates that non¬
discrimination standards could be violated.
However, these incompatible Basel Convention provisions could be reconciled with
the WTO provisions as it could be argued that the measures are necessary to protect
human life or health under Article XX(b) of the GATT 1994. Nevertheless, the fact
121 CITES, Article XIV(l).
122 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, opened for signature March 22, 1989, ILM 28 (1989), 649.
123 Basel Convention, Article 4 and 6.
124 The Conference of the Parties to the Convention adopted this amendment in 1995. See T.
Schoenbaum, "International Trade and Environmental Protection", in P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p727.
125 Basel Convention, Article 4(5) and Article 11.
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that the parties are also permitted to use more stringent measures than those provided
for in the agreement as well as more stringent measures against non-parties suggests
that the measure may not pass the necessity test or the arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination test in Article XX, especially if the measures are considered to be
unilateral.
The Montreal Protocol126 could also be found to be inconsistent with GATT 1994, as
products containing CFCs are "goods", and with the TBT Agreement as mandatory
restrictions on products with certain characteristics such as products containing CFCs
would be considered a technical regulation.127 The Montreal Protocol provides for
the gradual phase out of CFCs and allows for restrictions on trade of products
containing or produced using CFCs to be used on a party or non-party to the
agreement. The fact that parties to the Montreal Protocol can use stricter measures
with non-parties and that the Montreal Protocol regulates products manufactured
using CFCs implies that non-discrimination requirements contained in GATT and the
TBT Agreement would be violated.
It is questionable whether non-product related PPMs would be justified under Article
XX(b) or (g) of the GATT,128 as was demonstrated in Chapter 2. In addition, even if
these measures were justified under Article XX, they could be considered
inconsistent with the TBT Agreement, if the TBT Agreement were interpreted to
include non-product related PPMs, which requires that the national treatment and
MFN standards be respected without exception.129
The Biosafety Protocol is an MEA charged with devising a comprehensive
international regulatory approach to the protection of biodiversity. The Biosafety
Protocol establishes rules to manage environmental risks of transboundary
126 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Sept. 16,
1987, ILM 26 (1987), 1550; amended and adjusted, ILM 30 (1991), 537 (entered into force Jan
1, 1989).
127 TBT Agreement, Annex 1, §1. See Chapter 4.
128 See Chapter 2, section B.IV. 1.
129 TBT Agreement, Article 2. See also Chapter 3, section C.III.
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movements of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). The Biosafety Protocol also
contains apart from its environmental orientation significant potential implications
for trade in GMOs since it regulates international trade in Living Modified
Organisms (LMOs).130 The Biosafety Protocol provides that parties may be entitled
to impose import restrictions or an import ban for LMOs intended for use as food,
feed, or for processing, that are also subject to the SPS Agreement, providing that the
measures are "consistent with the objective of the Protocol." 131
The use of the precautionary principle in the Biosafety Protocol has been identified
as a probable source of conflict. The Protocol adopts the precautionary principle,
allowing import regulation where there is "lack of scientific certainty due to
insufficient relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of the
potential adverse effects of a living modified organism...".132 According to
Schoenbaum this undoubtedly will result in future conflict with the SPS Agreement,
which allows the precautionary principle only for preliminary regulatory
decisions.133
Although, the difficulties in reaching agreement on the Biosafety Protocol were
mainly due to the precautionary principle, in Chapter 3 it was also demonstrated that
although the precautionary principle could only justify measures on a temporary
basis, this in effect did not necessarily add a more restrictive requirement. In
addition, the fact that under the SPS Agreement, there is an obligation to continue to
seek new information and evidence in order to perform a satisfactory risk assessment
130 An LMO is defined as "any living organism that possesses a new combination of genetic
material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology".
131 The transboundary movement of LMOs, except pharmaceuticals, LMOs in transit, contained-use
LMOs, and LMOs 'intended for d irect use as food, feed, or for processing.'as well as those
exempted by the COP, are subject to the Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) Procedure under
which the movement may proceed only after prior written consent by the importing country. The
procedure requires notification by the party of export, acknowledgment of receipt of notification
by import country, a decision procedure, and possible review of decisions in the light of new
scientific information. Decisions regarding importation must be made using scientifically sound
risk assessment procedures and techniques. See Articles, 5-10, 15, 16.
132 Article 11.8 of the Biosafety Protocol.
133 T. Schoenbaum, "International Trade and Environmental Protection", in P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p738.
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while temporary measures are in place whereas under the Protocol no such
conditionality is imposed, does not suggest that this would be a contentious issue.
Indeed, reliance on the precautionary principle cannot be justified indefinitely and
the obligation to do further research is implicit.
However, the regulation of PPMs in the Protocol could be a source of
incompatibility. Indeed, genetic engineering can be considered a process and it can
be argued that the non-transgenic use of the process, that is where genetic material
from the same species is selected, does not change the characteristics of the product
and would therefore be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement that does not cover
non-product related PPMs.134 A clearer case would be processed foods, as the
refining process often eliminates any trace of GMOs in the product and can,
therefore, not be considered as a modification of the characteristics of the product.
This section demonstrated that there are situations in which incompatibility could
arise between WTO agreements and MEAs. However, as discussed in the next
section it is possible to iron out most of these potential conflicts through
interpretation. Should incompatibilities remain, then these need to be resolved in
accordance with the law of treaties or under relevant provisions of the MEA if it has
any.
The next section will consider how Article 31 (3)(c) can be used successfully by the
DSB to avoid incompatibility between different rules of international law.
c) Using Article 31(3)(c) to interpret WTO provisions
Where the MEA rules under consideration are binding on the parties and the measure
at issue is explicitly required by the MEA but, for example, regulates non-PPMs then
non-discrimination provisions of the WTO could with the help of Article 31(3)(c), be
read in the light of the presumption against conflict of treaties, and therefore, be
134 P. Phillips and W. Kerr, "Alternative Paradigms - The WTO Versus the Biosafety Protocol for
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reinterpreted to differentiate products on the basis of their non-product PPMs. In the
context of the TBT Agreement, this would be of particular importance as non¬
discrimination standards must be respected as was noted above.
In the context of the GATT and the SPS Agreement, this type of reinterpretation
would not be essential as a breach of a non-discrimination requirement can be
justified under certain circumstances. Therefore, the MEA measure could simply be
presumed to be compatible with Article XX of the GATT 1994 and the SPS
Agreement,135 again with the help of Article 31 (3)(c) the provisions could be read in
the light of the presumption against conflict of treaties.136
If t he m easure, h owever, i s n ot e xplicitly r equired b ut o nly explicitly p ermitted i t
could be argued that when relying on Article 31 (3)(c) to assist in the interpretation of
GATT 1994, the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement, that the principle of
effective interpretation should be taken into account, and that, therefore, no provision
to which both WTO Members and parties to the MEA have committed themselves to
is rendered redundant.137
If t he m easure i s o nly "taken p ursuant t o a n M EA", j ustifying t he m easure u nder
GATT, the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement is more difficult. However, if
evidence is brought forward that the measure is based on the MEA and that it is not a
typical unilateral measure, the principle of effective interpretation could be taken into
account.
The nexus of the measure with the MEA requirements will have an important
influence on the DSB in determining whether the measure can benefit from the
application of Article 31 (3)(c) in the interpretation of the WTO agreements.
Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms", 34 JWT 4 (2000), p71.
135 To the extent that the MEA rule would reflect an international standard, this would already be
the case under the SPS Agreement. See Article 3.2.
136 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), p 131.
137 Ibidem.
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The application of Article 31(3)(c) could provide increased coherence between WTO
rules and MEA rules, however, the extent to which this will be the case will depend
on the DSB in a given case. The line of equilibrium will be determined on a case-by-
case basis by the DSB as will the value of other rules of international law.
So far, consideration has been given to the way in which the WTO DSB could deal
with MEAs as a source of interpretation of the WTO agreements. However, the
possibility also exists that the dispute settlement mechanism ofMEAs may be used
for the settlement of disputes concerning TREMs not the WTO DSM. The next
section will consider the appropriate forum for the settlement of potential disputes
that may arise over the use of trade measures taken pursuant to MEAs.
III. The Appropriate Forum for the Settlement of Disputes
Where a dispute between WTO Members concerns TREMs taken pursuant to an
MEA against a non-party to that MEA, it is clear that a non-party to an MEA cannot
be bound by the dispute settlement procedures of that MEA. Therefore, a WTO
Member that is not party to an MEA but is affected by a TREM taken pursuant to an
MEA, would most likely bring a case to the WTO claiming that the TREM is
inconsistent with the WTO agreements.138
138 WTO Members can bring the dispute to a dispute settlement panel or to arbitration with the
WTO, if both parties agree.. See DSU, Article 25:
"1. Expeditious arbitration w ithin the WTO as an alternative means of dispute settlement can
facilitate the solution of certain disputes that concern issues that are clearly defined by both
parties.
2. Except as otherwise provided in this Understanding, resort to arbitration shall be subject to
mutual agreement of the parties which shall agree on the procedures to be followed. Agreements
to resort to arbitration shall be notified to all Members sufficiently in advance of the actual
commencement of the arbitration process.
3. Other Members may become party to an arbitration proceeding only upon the agreement of
the parties which have agreed to have recourse to arbitration. The parties to the proceeding shall
agree to abide by the arbitration award. Arbitration awards shall be notified to the DSB and the
Council or Committee of any relevant agreement where any Member may raise any point
relating thereto.
4. Articles 21 and 22 of this Understanding shall apply mutatis mutandis to arbitration awards."
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Where both parties to a dispute concerning TREMs imposed pursuant to an MEA are
both members of the MEA, the WTO Secretariat has stated:
"There is general agreement that in the event a dispute arises between WTO
Members who are each Parties to an MEA over the use of trade measures
they are applying among themselves pursuant to the MEA, they should
consider in the first instance trying to resolve it through the dispute settlement
mechanisms available under the MEA ",139
Elowever, it should be noted that the WTO Secretariat's statement cannot be
interpreted to mean that the WTO has jurisdiction to decide on the compatibility of a
TREM with an MEA.140 It should also be emphasised that there is not a single case in
which any WTO Member has sought to settle an MEA dispute before the WTO. The
reason is not that all actual WTO environmental cases have involved unilateral trade
measures taken in the absence of an MEA but rather that the WTO has no
jurisdiction over MEA disputes. If the claim relates to the compatibility of the TREM
with the MEA, then the dispute settlement procedures of the MEA must be applied.
The WTO DSB can only examine MEA issues to the extent that it is necessary to do
so for the purpose of settling a WTO dispute.141 The WTO DSB could also decide
general questions of international law, such as the priority/applicability of WTO
agreements/MEAs, in a situation where there is a conflict between the WTO and
MEA, if it is necessary to do so for the purpose of settling a WTO dispute.
However, the WTO Secretariat's statement is valid to the extent that it is interpreted
as encouraging WTO Members that are party to an MEA to make claims under the
139 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), p 131.
140 As noted in section B.II.l, the WTO is not a court of general jurisdiction.
141 See also MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v. UK), UNCLOS Arbitration, pending at the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, The Hague, www.pca-cpa.org. One issue of contention concerns applicable
law. Ireland argues that Article 293 of the UNCLOS ("A court or tribunal having jurisdiction
under this section shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not
incompatible with this Convention") permits an UNCLOS tribunal to "apply" all relevant
treaties and customary law binding on the parties to the dispute. Ireland's inteipretation suggests
that an UNCLOS tribunal would be able to apply other rules relevant to the dispute even if this
is not necessary for the purpose of deciding UNCLOS issues. The UK, on the other hand, in my
view correctly, does not accept such a wide view of "applicable law". Presentation by A.E.
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MEA r ather than w ith the W TO agreements. N evertheless, the W TO S ecretariat's
statement i s not a treaty commitment and cannot beseen as 1 imiting the rights of
WTO Members to bring cases to the WTO where the consistency of a TREM with
the WTO agreements is at issue. If a party were to bring a claim to the WTO, arguing
that the TREM is inconsistent with WTO agreements then it is clear that WTO
jurisdiction cannot be limited.
The possibility arises that a dispute could be reviewed by both the MEA dispute
settlement mechanism and WTO dispute settlement mechanism if the issues can be
kept separate. In other words, the WTO DSM would deal with WTO issues and the
MEA dispute settlement would deal with issues arising under that agreement.
The Southern Bluefin Tuna arbitral tribunal although recognising "that there is
support in international law and in the legal systems of States for the application of a
lex specialis that governs general provisions of an antecedent treaty or statute" found
that "it is a commonplace of international law and State practice for more than one
treaty to bear upon a particular dispute" and that "there is no reason why a given act
of a State may not violate its obligations under more than one treaty".142
The Swordfish case that concerned a dispute between Chile and the EU over
swordfish fisheries in the South Pacific also illustrates the point.
Chile brought the case to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)
claiming that the EU violated UNCLOS, since it failed to co-operate with the coastal
state to ensure the conservation of the highly migratory species143, whereas the EU
Boyle at the Royal Institute for International Affairs, London, 8 April 2003.
142 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §52. See also the MOX Plant Case, (Ireland v. UK),
UNCLOS Arbitration, pending at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, The Hague, www.pca-
cpa.org. The question arose whether the dispute over the protection of the marine environment
from radioactive waste is a single dispute where the main elements fall under OSPAR
Convention and EU law and other elements under UNCLOS. North-East Altlantic Convention
(OSPAR), 22 September 1992, 32 ILM 1069 (1993). See also B. Kwiatkowska, "The Ireland v.
United Kingdom (Mox Plant) Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism", 18 IJMCL 1
(2003), pp3-5.
143 Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the
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brought the case to the WTO claiming that the Chilean denial of port access violated
the GATT 1994.144
The Case at the WTO
The EU initiated WTO dispute settlement proceedings after ten years of bilateral
consultations, exchange of notes, and experiments with a bilateral technical
commission.145 Since this was the second request from the EU, the DSB
automatically agreed to establish a panel to hear this case.146
The EU claimed that Chile signed a framework agreement, the "Galapagos
Agreement" on the conservation of living resources in the high seas, negotiated
within the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific, (a regional fishing
organisation comprising Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) to which the EC and
other interested countries were not invited to participate, although it repeatedly
showed its willingness to take part in a similar multilateral negotiating exercise. The
EC claimed that what Chile proposed to it and other interested states was
participation in a non-negotiable agreement.
One of the interesting aspects is that the EC brought the case to the WTO, because
the EC considered that the dispute was over port-access, an issue that UNCLOS does
not cover.
South-eastern Pacific Ocean, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order 2000/3, 20
December 2000.
144 Chile - Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation of Swordfish, Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, 7 November 2000, WT/DS193/2.
145 Consultations were held and the Commission suggested that multilateral negotiations open to
any interested party should start as soon as possible and be concluded within a pre-established
timeframe and that at least a limited and regulated access to Chilean ports should be made
available to Community vessels in parallel to the negotiating process. According the EU, Chile
refused to discuss any (even limited) access to their ports to Community vessels. See
www.europa.eu.int.
146 If after 60 days following the receipt of a request for consultations, consultations fail, the
complaining party can request the establishment of a panel. The defending party may block the
establishment of the panel. However, if a second request is made the appointment can not be
blocked. Presumably, Chile blocked the first request, however, there is no trace of this on the
WTO web-site.
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The EC's challenge before the WTO dealt with the Chilean denial of port access to
the EC's fishing fleet. The EC complained that its "fishing vessels operating in the
Southeast Pacific are not allowed under Chilean legislation to unload their swordfish
in Chilean ports, either to land them for warehousing or to transship them onto other
vessels. Consequently, Chile makes transit through its ports impossible for
swordfish. This prohibition renders also impossible the importation of the affected
catches into Chile."147
Article 165 of the Chilean Fisheries Law effectively prohibits the use of its ports for
the landing and service to the EE! long-liners and factory ships that disregard
minimum conservation standards,148 thereby impeding on the EU's ability to re¬
export fresh/chilled fish to the US market.
The EC, therefore, claimed that the Chilean measures were inconsistent with Article
V of the GATT 1994 dealing with freedom of transit.
Chile, on the other hand, argued that Article V of the GATT 1994 does not restrict its
sovereignty over its ports under international law, and demanded that the EC should
enact and enforce conservation measures for its fishing operations in the high seas, in
accordance with UNCLOS.
The dispute deals with the controversial issue of the applicable law regarding port
access.
States do not seem to favour a system of open ports,149 especially not from a fisheries
conservation p erspective.150 U nder c ustomary i nternational 1 aw t here i s n o g eneral
147 Chile - Measures Affecting the Transit and Importation ofSwordfish, Request for Consultations
by the European Communities, WT/DS193/1, G/L/367, 26 April 2000. See also Case
Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation ofSwordfish Stocks in the South¬
eastern Pacific Ocean, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Order 2000/3, 20
December 2000.
148 D.S. N°598, (DO Nov. 25, 1999).
149 F. Orrego Vicuna, The Changing International Law of the High Seas Fisheries (1999), pp261-6.
150 For example, Canada has on a number of occasions closed its ports to fishing vessels in order to
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right of access to foreign ports.151 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case noted that it is, by
virtue of its sovereignty that the coastal State may regulate access to its ports.152
However, since sovereignty has to be exercised in accordance with treaties, it is
necessary to determine whether UNCLOS and/or the WTO deal with port access.
UNCLOS does not contain any provisions on port access. The last paragraph of its
preamble affirms that "matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be
governed by the rules and principles of general international law". Therefore, the
issue ofport access cannot be examined under UNCLOS.
It is not clear whether Article V of the GATT applies to port access, as it is not
expressly mentioned in the provision, it has never been applied to issues regarding
fisheries or port access and it is difficult to determine whether all WTO Members
agreed to open their ports during the Uruguay Round.153
Article V.2 states:
"There shall be freedom of transit through the territory of each contracting
party, via the routes most convenient for international transit, for traffic in
transit to or from the territory of other contracting parties. No distinction
shall be made which is based on the flag of vessels, the place of origin,
departure, entry, exit or destination, or any circumstances relating to the
ownership ofgoods, ofvessels or ofother means of transport. "154
combat overfishing. L. de La Fayette, "Access to Ports in International Law" 11 International
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 1 (1996), p9. Article 2 of the Convention on the
International Regime of Maritime Ports provides for port access on a MFN and national
treatment basis. However, Article 14 of the convention specifically excludes fishing vessels and
their catches from its scope. Opened for signature 9 December 1923, 58 LNTS 285 (1923)
(entered into force 2 December 1926). See also UNESCO, Convention on the Protection of the
Undenvater Cultural Heritage, UN Doc 31 C/24 (3 August 2001),
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001232/123278e.pdf. Article 15, provides that "states
parties shall take measures to prevent the use of their ... maritime ports ... in support of any
activity directed at underwater cultural heritage which is not in conformity with this
Convention".
151 L. de La Fayette, "Access to Ports in International Law" 11 International Journal ofMarine and
Coastal Law 1 (1996), p2.
152 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. U.S.), ICJ Rep., (1986), 111.
153 Ibidem.
154 Article V.l contains a definition of the term "traffic in transit". Article V.3 provides that traffic
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Supposing that Article V is applicable to a situation where access to a port is refused
for the purpose of transshipment,155 and that therefore, the Chilean measure is
inconsistent with Article V of the GATT 1994, does not mean that the measure
would necessarily be inconsistent with GATT 1994. Indeed, Chile could have argued
that the measure was consistent with Article XX(g) that enables Members to impose
measures relating to the conservation of natural resources if these are taken in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, and provided
that there is no arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, and no disguised restriction
on trade.
The goal of fisheries conservation would fall under the policy goal of Article
XX(g).156 Chile could have argued that the measures were imposed pursuant to
UNCLOS, that UNCLOS is binding on the parties and that, therefore, UNCLOS
should be taken into account when interpreting Article XX(g).
However, as it was noted in section B.I and B.II.c. with respect to MEAs, TREMs
which are imposed pursuant to an MEA but that are not explicitly required or
authorised by the MEA would not benefit from a presumption of consistency with
Article XX. However, the measure would have an advantage over a unilateral
measure.
If the DSB would examine the measure under UNCLOS and find that Chile was
authorised to impose such measures and that the EU failed to comply with UNCLOS
requirements, this would probably weigh in the balance of determining the
legitimacy of the Chilean measure under Article XX.
However, the WTO DSB could also have followed its reasoning in the Shrimps II
case examined in Chapter 2. In other words, the DSB would have to determine
in transit "shall not be subject to any unnecessary delays or restrictions", however,, but this
appears to relate to processing of the goods at the customs barrier.
155 See L. de La Fayette, "Access to Ports in International Law" 11 International Journal ofMarine
and Coastal Law 1 (1996), p20.
156 See Shrimps case and Chapter 2.
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whether Chile had made good faith attempts to negotiate an agreement with the EU.
In order to determine whether this was the case, the WTO would not necessarily have
to determine whether the EU had complied with UNCLOS. Indeed, even if it were
found that the EU had not negotiated in good faith under UNCLOS, this would not
necessarily mean that Chile did negotiate in good faith. In addition, if it were found
that t he EU h ad n egotiated i n g ood faith, t his w ould n ot i mply t hat C hile d id n ot
negotiate in good faith. Therefore, if the dispute were solved by the WTO and not by
ITLOS, the claim raised by Chile under UNCLOS might not necessarily have to be
considered.
Indeed, in determining whether the Chilean measure would be justified under Article
XX, the DSB might only focus on whether Chile negotiated in good faith.
According to this interpretation, Article XX might permit unilateral, extra¬
jurisdictional measures even where both parties to the dispute have negotiated in
good faith, but have not reached agreement.157
In this situation, the DSB might have considered whether Chile and not the EU had
acted consistently with the co-operation requirements of UNCLOS in examining the
consistency of the Chilean measure with Article XX.
Of course, the degree of trade restrictiveness of the measure and whether the measure
constituted arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination would also have to be examined.
The Case before the ITLOS Chamber158
While the EC requested the establishment of a WTO panel, Chile referred the dispute
to ITLOS, so that the matter be considered under UNCLOS. Chile insisted that the
issue at stake in the controversy is not of a commercial nature, but relates to the need
157 See Shrimps II case and Chapter 2, section C.II.5.a.
158 Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South Eastern Pacific
Ocean (Chile/European Community), ITLOS Case no. 7, 20 December 2000.
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for conservation measures ensuring the sustainable fisheries for swordfish. On this
basis, Chile invited the EU to engage in formal dispute settlement under UNCLOS
Part XV. In November 2000, the Parties agreed ad-referendum to the establishment
of a special five-judge Chamber of the ITLOS in December 2000. On the request of
Chile and the EC, the ITLOS, by an Order dated 20 December 2000, formed a
Special Chamber to deal with their dispute concerning the conservation and
sustainable exploitation of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean
under UNCLOS.
The special chamber159 would have had to consider, among other issues, whether the
EC complied with its obligations under UNCLOS, Articles 116 to 119, "to ensure
conservation of swordfish, in the fishing activities undertaken by vessels flying the
flag of any of its Member States in the high seas adjacent to Chile's exclusive
economic zone"160, Article 64 to co-operate with Chile as a coastal State for the
conservation of swordfish in the high seas, that is for the conservation of highly
migratory species and whether the EU had fulfilled its obligations to report its
captures to the coastal state and to the relevant international organisation (FAO).161
In addition, the tribunal would have had to consider issues such as whether the
Chilean Decree, which purports to apply Chile's conservation measures relating to
swordfish on the high seas is in breach of Article 87 providing for freedom of the
high seas including freedom of fishing, subject to conservation obligations, Article
159 Article 15 of the Statute of the Tribunal provides for the formation of a Special Chamber, if so
requested by the parties to a dispute. The composition of the Chamber is determined by the
Tribunal, with the approval of the parties.
160 Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-eastern Pacific
Ocean, ITLOS, Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000, §2.3(a).
161 §2.3(b). The special chamber would also have had to determine whether the EC had challenged
the sovereign right and duty of Chile, as a coastal state, to impose measures within its
jurisdiction for the conservation of swordfish and to ensure their implementation in its ports, in a
non-discriminatory manner, and whether such challenge is compatible with the UNCLOS.
§2-3(c).
In this respect, it would also have had to determine whether it had jurisdiction in this
matter.§2.3(h). Also the EC obligations arising under Articles 300 calling for good faith and no
abuse of right, and 297(1 )(b) concerning dispute settlement would have been examined for
consistency. §2.3(d).
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89 prohibiting any State from subjecting any part of the high seas to its sovereignty
and Articles 116-119162, whether the "Galapagos Agreement" of 2000 was negotiated
in keeping with, and whether the substantive provisions were consistent with, Article
64 and 116-119 ofUNCLOS.163
If one relies on the reasoning in the 1999 ITLOS judgment on provisional measures
in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case, ITLOS implicitly recognised the relevance of the
precautionary principle to the management of sustainable fisheries in which Australia
and New Zealand claimed that Japan had failed to cooperate in the conservation of
southern bluefin tuna. The ITLOS considered the scientific uncertainty regarding
measures to be taken to conserve southern bluefin tuna, considered that the parties
should in the circumstances act with caution, and ordered provisional measures
designed to preserve existing stocks pending resolution of the dispute.164
In addition, the emergence under customary law of the general obligation to respect
the environment beyond areas of national control165, and the duty to consider the
interests of other states when a state exercises its fishing rights under the Convention
on the high seas166 could have been used by Chile to support its claim under
UNCLOS.
However, the EU could also have contended that it complied with all these
requirements and that it was Chile that refused to negotiate in good faith. In addition,
as was demonstrated in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, the fact that there
162 Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-eastern Pacific
Ocean, ITLOS, Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000, §2.3(e).
163 Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-eastern Pacific
Ocean, ITLOS, Order 2000/3, 20 December 2000, §2.3(f). Whether Chile's measures were in
conformity with Article 300 and whether Chile and the EC remain under a duty to negotiate an
agreement on co-operation under Article 64 of the Convention. §2.3(g).
164 See Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Provisional Measures), ITLOS No. 4 (1999).
165 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1996). 1982 UNCLOS, Article 192: "States have
the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment".
166 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), ICJ Rep. (1974), p72.
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were issues arising under different agreements would possibly put Chile at a
disadvantage in attempting a successful claim.
Japan argued that the dispute at issue was to be dealt with under the 1993 Convention
on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna ("1993 CCSBT") and not under
UNCLOS. The advantage for Japan in having the dispute resolved under the 1993
CCSBT was that the dispute would not be subject to compulsory jurisdiction. Japan's
argument rested on the fact that Australia and New Zealand by becoming parties to
the 1993 CCSBT had waived their right to bring the matter for arbitration under
UNCLOS. The tribunal considered that "a dispute concerning the interpretation and
implementation of the CCSBT will not be completely alien to the interpretation and
application of UNCLOS" and that although, the dispute was centred in the 1993
CCSBT, issues also arose under the UNCLOS.167
A similar issue was considered in relation to the GATT 1994 and the SPS Agreement
in Chapter 3, where it was also found that issues could arise under both
agreements.168
However, the tribunal found that on the issue of jurisdiction, the parties had
"precluded subjection of their disputes to section 2 procedures in accordance with
Article 281(1)".169 Article 281(1) of UNCLOS states that where
"parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means
of their own choice, the procedures providedfor in this Part apply only where
no settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement
between the parties does not exclude any furtherprocedure... "
In reaching this conclusion, the arbitral tribunal considered the relationship between
Article 281(1) with Article 16 of the 1993 CCSBT which provides:
167 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §52.
168 See Chapter 3, Section C.III.
169 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §63.
298
"1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the
interpretation or implementation of this Convention, those Parties shall
consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement
or otherpeaceful means oftheir own choice.
2. Any dispute ofthis character not so resolved shall, with the consent in each
case of all parties to the dispute, be referred for settlement to the
International Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to reach
agreement on the reference to the International Court of Justice or to
arbitration shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of
continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred
to in paragraph 1 above".
The arbitral tribunal found that Article 16 of the CCSBT was "virtually identical" to
Article XI of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and that, therefore, Article 16, although not
explicitly providing so, '"excludes any further procedure' within the contemplation of
Article 281(1) ofUNCLOS"170. The arbitral tribunal also supported its conclusion by
highlighting the fact that Article 281 of UNCLOS enables parties to limit the
jurisdiction of UNCLOS, where the parties agree.171 In addition, the tribunal referred
to the practice of states in many post-UNCLOS "international agreements with
maritime elements", of excluding compulsory adjudicative or arbitral procedures.172
Boyle, on the other, considered that other agreements post-UNCLOS that did not
provide for compulsory jurisdiction such as the 1993 CCSBT say nothing about the
parties intentions regarding compulsory jurisdiction under UNCLOS.173
170 Southern Blue/in Tuna Arbitration, §56 and 58.
171 Ibidem, §60-61. See Article 297 of the UNCLOS that provides limitations on the applicability of
compulsory procedures where costal states are concerned. See also Article 298 that establishes
certain optional exemptions to the applicability of compulsory section 2 procedures and enables
parties to reject compulsory procedures under certain circumstances and Article 299 which
provides that disputes excluded by Article 297 and exempted by Article 298 from application of
compulsory section 2 procedures may be submitted to such procedures "only by agreement of
the parties to the dispute."
172 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §63.
173 A.E. Boyle, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration", 50 ICLQ 2 (2001), p449. For a survey of
the d ispute s ee B . K wiatkowska, "The Australia a nd N ew Z ealand v Ja pan S outhern B luefin
Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII
Arbitral Tribunal", 16 IJMCL 2 (2001), pp239-294.
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It could be argued that these other agreements are subsequent agreements or
represent subsequent practice of the parties under Article 31(3)(a) and (b) of the 1969
Vienna Convention or that they contain rules that are covered by Article 31(3)(c) and
that, therefore, these rule must be taken into account when interpreting UNCLOS.
However, as discussed in section B.II.2.a, these do not override the explicit wording
of the treaty that is to be applied.
Boyle correctly questioned the use of Article 281 of UNCLOS rather than Article
282 ofUNCLOS174. Article 282 provides:
"If the Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or
bilateral agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request ofany
party to the dispute, be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding
decision, that procedure shall apply in lieu of the procedures providedfor in
this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. "
It is very clear from the wording of Article 282 that only a procedure that entails a
binding decision can apply instead of the procedures in UNCLOS.175 Therefore, it
can be concluded that the 1993 CCSBT procedures do not apply instead of UNCLOS
procedures, since the 1993 CCSBT procedures do not provide for binding decisions.
It should also be noted that even if Article 297, 298, 299 limit the applicability of
compulsory procedures of section 2 in certain situations, for example, where a
coastal state exercises its sovereign rights with respect to living resources in its EEZ,
including the determination of allowable catch, this would still not justify the fact
that a procedure of a general, regional or bilateral agreement leading to a non-
174 A.E. Boyle, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration", 50 ICLO 2 (2001), p449.
175 For example, in the Mox Plant Case, the ECJ "may be seized of the question whether the
provisions of the Convention on which Ireland relies are matters in relation to which competence
has been transferred to the European Community and, indeed, whether the exclusive jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice, with regard to Ireland and the United Kingdom as Member
States of the European Community, extends to the interpretation and application of the
Convention as such and in its entirety." If this view were to be sustained by the ECJ, the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal would be precluded by virtue of Article 282 of the
Convention.
MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), Order N° 3, Suspension of Proceedings on
Jurisdiction and Merits, and Request for Further Provisional Measures, Permanent Court of
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binding decision that would cover these issues, would apply instead of UNCLOS
procedures176.
Boyle's argument that the tribunal's use ofArticle 281 was inappropriate is pertinent.
Indeed, the use of Article 281 in this case renders the use of both Article 281 and
Article 2 82 r edundant, which i s i nconsistent with t he p rinciple o f e ffectiveness i n
treaty interpretation. Indeed, Boyle argues that the result of this reading of Article
281, that a regional agreement that does not provide for binding decisions will
exclude resort to UNCLOS procedures, on the assumption that this is the intention of
the parties, implies that a single provision that regional agreements exclude
UNCLOS procedures would be sufficient since Article 282 excludes resort to
UNCLOS where a regional agreement provides for compulsory jurisdiction.177 The
arbitrators gave too much weight to what they considered to be the teleological
interpretation of Article 281 rather than looking at the wording ofArticle 282.
The arbitrators possibly saw in Article 2 81 a means of avoiding that a dispute be
dealt with under two agreements, despite the fact that separate issues arise under
UNCLOS and the 1993 CCSBT.178 It is clear that if two jurisdictional fora deal with
a dispute, the potential for contradictory or incompatible decisions increases.
However, the arbitrators as noted in Section B.I. did recognise that a state act could
violate more than one agreement179, so it is more likely that the arbitrators may have
considered it difficult to decide on UNCLOS issues and on issues that arose under
Arbitration, 24 June 2003, §20-23.
176 For contra, see Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §61.
177 A.E. Boyle, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration", 50 1CLQ 2 (2001), p449.
178 Ibidem, p450. Kwiatkowska argues that the reason that Article 281 was resorted to was because
the tribunal probably agreed with Japan's argument that Australia and New Zealand had acted
inconsistently with their duty to submit the dispute to the ICJ, in reliance on Optional Clause
under Article 36(2) of the Court's Statute, which all three parties adhered to. Southern Bluefin
Tuna Award, §39(c). In other words, under Article 282 jurisdictional priority is given to the ICJ
over both the ITLOS and the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, as between states that have accepted
the Optional Clause, in all cases of compulsory jurisdiction under Part XV. See Southern Bluefin
Tuna Oral Hearings, Vol. I (Counsel Rosenne, 7 May 2000). B. Kwiatkowska, "The Australia
and New Zealand v Japan Southern Bluefin Tuna (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) Award of the
First Law of the Sea Convention Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal", 16 IJMCL 2 (2001).
179 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, §52.
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both UNCLOS and the 1993 CCSBT without also deciding on the interpretation and
application of the 1993 CCSBT180. The arbitral tribunal probably considered that the
fact t hat i t d id n ot h ave j urisdiction o ver t he 1 993 C CSBT, i mplied t hat i 11 acked
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case.181 The result of this position is that a
UNCLOS arbitral tribunal might reject jurisdiction to rule over any aspect of a
dispute unless it had jurisdiction over all aspects.182
This contradicts the approach taken by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. Indeed, the ICJ
declared itself to have jurisdiction over certain claims under customary international
law despite the fact that the US rejected jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to the
multilateral treaty because not all parties to the multilateral agreement were party to
the dispute183 and despite the fact that many issues overlapped.184
The fact that a provisional settlement was reached in Swordfish case185 leaves many
questions unanswered such as whether or not the ITLOS would have followed a
similar reasoning. The possibility that both ITLOS and the WTO DSM would
examine the issue is realistic and raises the problem of inconsistent decisions over a
same dispute. Although, treaty provisions should be read in the light of the
presumption against conflict of treaties, there is of course no guarantee that
incompatible decisions will not emerge.
180 A.E. Boyle, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration", 50 ICLQ 2 (2001), p450.
181 Ibidem.
182 Ibidem.
183 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua Case, (Jurisdiction and
Admissibility), ICJ Rep. (1984), 392, §67. J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law
in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?", 95 AJIL (2001), p557.
184 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua Case, (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986)
14, §175. See also Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran Case, ICJ Rep. (1980) 3, 19 §36:
"no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take
cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however
important". J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We
Go?" 95 AJIL (2001), pp557-8.
18~ The EU and Chile reached a provisional arrangement to resolve the dispute covering both access
for EU fishing vessels to Chilean ports and bilateral and multilateral scientific and technical co¬
operation on the conservation of swordfish stocks. Pending the ratification of this arrangement,
the EU requested a suspension of panel proceedings within the WTO 1 aunched in November
2000 and Chile suspended proceedings before the ITLOS. See WT/DS193/3 and
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Although, the possibility exists of separating issues under different agreements, it
could be argued that the fact that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is more
efficient than MEA dispute settlement mechanisms, that it is more likely that only
WTO claims would be made under the WTO agreements even if an MEA claim
could be made under the MEA. To the extent that the effectiveness of the dispute
settlement mechanism could impact the formulation of a particular claim and,
therefore, the use of a particular dispute settlement forum, the next section will
analyse whether the effectiveness of dispute settlement procedures under MEAs
should be increased. The validity of this proposition will be considered following an
examination of the WTO DSM and the dispute settlement arrangements ofMEAs.186
IV. Compulsory versus Non-compulsory Adjudication
The dispute settlement system of the WTO Agreement provides procedures for
compulsory jurisdiction, quasi-judicial panel procedures, independent appellate
review, quasi-automatic dispute settlement rulings within one year, automatic
adoption by the DSB unless there is a consensus not to adopt the panel report
(negative consensus), appellate review by a standing appellate body, alternative
dispute settlement, arbitration procedures, mandatory compliance and sanctions for
non-compliance in the form of compensation and suspension or withdrawal of
concessions.187
The DSU at the time of the entry into force of the WTO Agreement was considered
as a major breakthrough and strength of the new ruled-based multilateral trading
system.188 The DSU was an improvement over the GATT 1947 DSM, which allowed
WT/DS193/3/Add. 1.
186 The question of whether the WTO should promote alternative dispute settlement is considered in
Section C.V.
187 See DSU. The parties to a dispute can also agree to have their dispute settled by arbitration and
abide by the arbitration award pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU. The award is also subject to
surveillance of implementation and compensation, and suspension of concessions. DSU, Articles
21 and 22.
188 C. Valles and B. McGivern, "The Right to Retaliate under the WTO Agreement - the
'Sequencing' Problem, 34 JWT2 (2000), p83.
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parties to block the establishment of a dispute settlement panel or the adoption of a
panel report and where there was no possibility to appeal panel decisions. The GATT
DSM was political, conciliatory and at most a "legal order-in-embryo" that was
marked by adaptability rather than consistency and predictability.189 The WTO
removed to a large extent the "political filter that did not allow politically
objectionable decisions to have legal effect".190 The WTO DSM also "protects the
weaker WTO Members that previously were either unable or insufficiently daring to
muster a consensus in support of their complaints".191
Unlike the WTO DSM, the focus of most MEAs is on developing mechanisms to
assist parties to comply with their obligations in a flexible and non-confrontational
manner, thereby preventing disputes from arising. Therefore, instead of focusing on
bilateral disputes, most MEAs contain elaborate and flexible procedures aimed at
promoting compliance192 rather than sanctioning non-compliance.
189 Stiles, W. Kendall, "The New WTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism", 4 J1L & Practice 3
(1995), p4. See R. Behboodi, "Legal Reasoning and the International Law of Trade - The First
Steps of the Appellate Body of the WTO", 32 JWT 4 (1998), pp55 and 58-59. See also, F.
Weiss, "WTO Dispute Settlement and the Economic Order ofWTO Member States" in P. Dijck
and G. Faber (eds.) Challenges to the New World Trade Organisation, The Hague, (1996), p83.
190 J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p345.
191 J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a
More Collective Approach", 94 AJJL 2 (2000), p336.
192 Reporting, notification and information requirements and establishment ofmultilateral review
mechanisms as they promote the effective identification of problems, assist in the assessment of
compliance, and thereby encourage transparency. Reporting evaluates progress in meeting
objectives. See CITES, Article VIII.7, Decision 11.137 and Resolution Conf. 11.1, Kyoto
Protocol, Article 7.1, Article 18 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 9 and 10 of the
Stockholm (POPs).
Multilateral mechanisms for the review, inspection, verification, and/or monitoring of efforts to
implement and comply with treaty obligations are also provided for. The Conference of the
Parties (COP), standing committees, or other subsidiary bodies review and report on
compliance-related issues and can make recommendations and provide parties with technical
assistance to prepare reports, develop national legislation, or identify and implement other
measures to comply with treaty obligations. CITES (Resolution Conf. 11.1), Kyoto Protocol
Article 8, Article 18. The Basel Convention and the recent Rotterdam (PIC), Article 17 and
POPs, Article 17, are in the process of developing non-compliance regimes.
Financial and technical assistance the transfer of technology, differentiated responsibilities and
disincentives to address cases of non-compliance. Article 12, 13, 15 of POPs.
"Compliance and Dispute Settlement Provisions in the WTO and in Multilateral Environmental
Agreement", Note by the WTO and UNEP Secretariats, WT/CTE/W/191, 6 June 2001, (01-
2811), §12-13.
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Although, the main emphasis is on encouraging compliance, certain MEAs contain
dispute settlement provisions. These provide for non-binding options such as
negotiation193, good offices, mediation194 and compulsory conciliation if agreement
cannot be reached on any means of settlement or where all parties to the dispute
agree.195 Certain MEAs contain dispute settlement provisions that enable binding
outcomes if both parties to the dispute make an optional declaration accepting
compulsory judicial settlement of the ICJ or binding arbitration.196 However, since
few states make such a declaration, most MEAs, in effect, do not include a real
system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement.197 The most notable exception
193 Article XVIII. 1 ofCITES, Article 27, UN Fish Stocks Agreement.
194 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Article 2 7, Montreal Protocol and the Convention on B iological
Diversity. The role of the mediator is usually assigned to another party to the MEA, the
Secretariat or a Committee of the Convention. See "Compliance and Dispute Settlement
Provisions in the WTO and in Multilateral Environmental Agreement", Note by the WTO and
UNEP Secretariats, WT/CTE/W/191, 6 June 2001, (01-2811), §23. See P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p230. C. Cooper, "The
Management of International Environmental Disputes in the Context of Canada-US Relations: A
Survey and Evaluation of Techniques and Mechanisms", 24 CYIL (1986), p248.
195 1 979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, Article 9; 1985 Ozone
Convention, Article 11; 1992 Convention on Climate Change, Article 14; 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity, Article 27, CITES, Article 28, Article 13(2); 1980 Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), Article 25; Basel Convention,
Article 20; 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment, Article 15. See P. Birnie &
A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pp230-l. See also
J.C. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, 3rd ed., Cambridge, (1998).
196 Basel Convention, Article 20, Montreal Protocol, 1972 London Dumping Convention procedure
agreed by the parties under Article XI; 1996 Protocol, Article 16. 1973 MARPOL Convention,
Article 10; 1976 Rhine Chemicals Convention, Article 15; 1979 Bern Convention on the
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Article 18; 1992 Paris Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic, Article 32; 1999 Rhine
Convention, Article 16.
197 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pp226-
227. For example, see the Biological Diversity Convention and the 1985 Vienna Convention,
1995 Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 34 ILM 1547, Article 30 and
1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS, 33 ILM 1311, Article 2.
See also A.E. Boyle, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Settlement of
Disputes" in The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First Centuiy: A Tribute
to the Late Kenneth Simmonds, (eds.) J. J. Norton, M. Adenas and M. Footer, The Hague,
(1998), pi 10 and P. Sands, "Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: Existing
International Legal Arrangements" in Improving Compliance with International Environmental
Law, (eds.) J. Cameron, J. Werksman and P. Roderick, (1996), London, Chapter 3.
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is UNCLOS198 which provides for compulsory jurisdiction under ITLOS, ICJ,
arbitration or special arbitration.199
However, the question arises whether it would appropriate for MEAs to have a
system of compulsory adjudication.
The institutional arrangements in MEAs established since the 1970's200 are to some
extent similar to those found in the GATT 1947.201 Although, it was mentioned
previously in this section that the WTO DSM improved the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism, it should be noted that the GATT system achieved a high level of
compliance with trade commitments. The reduction of tariffs under the GATT 1947
system was very successful despite the fact that dispute settlement was not
compulsory.
198 UNCLOS is an MEA to the extent that it contains provisions on fisheries and the marine
environment.
199 UNCLOS, Article 287.
200 For example see 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar
Convention); the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, (London Convention); CITES; 1979 Convention on the Conservation
ofMigratory Species of Wild Animals (Bonn Convention); 1985 Convention for the Protection
of the Ozone Layer; 1987 Montreal Protocol; 1989 Basel Convention; 1992 UN Convention on
Climate Change together with the 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity and the Biosafety Protocol.
Prior to 1970, MEAs either had no institutional arrangements at all or they set up or used
existing IGOs to adopt detailed measures to further the goals of the MEA and to exercise a
supervisory role to ensure that parties would comply with the terms of the agreement. The fact
that IGOs were not cost-efficient and were very bureaucratic and there was a need for an
effective institutional machinery that would enable MEAs to be developed, updated, and adapted
to changing circumstances explained the shift in institutional arrangements. The more recent
institutional arrangements are more apt at allowing protocols to be added on. In addition, there
was a need to monitor states' implementation and compliance with MEAs and to take
appropriate sanctions when necessary. R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, "Autonomous
Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-noticed
Phenomenon in International Law", 94 AJ1L (2000), pp626-628.
201 In the sense that the GATT 1947 was not a formal IGO, as meetings of the parties were periodic
and were serviced by a permanent secretariat and supported by numerous subsidiary bodies, that
the normative content of the agreement was developed at the meetings of the parties, that the
supervision over implementation and compliance was ensured through the subsidiary bodies
giving scientific and technological advice or advice concerning financial assistance and transfer
of technology or advice on implementation and compliance, that decisions were taken by
consensus and that GATT 1947 panel decisions were more of a conciliatory nature.
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Boyle considers that compulsory dispute settlement provisions in MEAs can provide
an authoritative mechanism for resolving issues concerning the interpretation or
application of the treaty,202 but that dispute avoidance has the advantage that the
emphasis on reaching a consensus contributes to the stability of the system.203
The disadvantage, however, in trying to reach a consensus is that states may not be
willing to do so and that the process may be very time-consuming and extend over a
long-time span.204 In addition, the provision of compulsory dispute settlement does
not exclude the use of alternative dispute resolution. The WTO agreements also
contain provisions intended to facilitate compliance similar to those ofMEAs. WTO
agreements contain notification, counter-notification, monitoring and transparency
requirements, as well as requirements that committees or similar bodies be set up to
oversee the operation of the agreement and review agreements. For example, the SPS
Agreement requires governments to notify any new or revised SPS measure that
could significantly affect trade. Members also have to set up "enquiry points" to
respond to requests for information on new or existing measures. The SPS
Committee enables the exchange of information relating to the implementation of the
SPS Agreement,205 reviews compliance with the agreement, discusses specific trade
concerns and issues related to notification and transparency as well as recommends
notification procedures.206
The WTO also provides for a range ofnon-binding dispute resolution options such as
good offices, mediation, and conciliation procedures.207 Although, the provision of
binding dispute settlement procedures does not exclude the use of alternative dispute
resolution, WTO Members mainly rely on the binding dispute settlement procedures.
202 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p226.
203 Ibidem, pp230-l.
204 The Swordfish case demonstrated that even after ten years of negotiations no consensus or
agreement had been reached.
205 Article 12.
206 Annex B, Articles 5.8 and 7.
207 DSU, Article 5.
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However, bilateral dispute settlement208 is often considered inappropriate and
ineffective in the context of MEAs, because breaches of environmental obligations
often damage the interests of the international community in general rather than
solely the complaining party,209 hence the emphasis on co-operation.210
MEAs also need to be flexible as they should be in a position to adjust to an evolving
and expanding knowledge on environmental issues and to promote or impose stricter
measures over time where this is needed.
The advantage of resorting to alternative dispute settlement is that they are more
cost-effective, flexible and the parties remain free to negotiate a settlement without
having to follow the treaty provisions or rules of international law religiously.211 This
flexibility enables the parties to determine the extent to which they wish to
implement the provisions.
Therefore, the provision of compulsory dispute settlement jurisdiction in the context
ofMEAs does not seem necessarily appropriate.
It could also be argued that an effective enforcement mechanism should be available
to the parties to MEAs. However, there may be little point in having an enforcement
mechanism that sanctions non-compliance as non-compliance does not seem to be a
real problem in the context of MEAs212 as opposed to the problem of non-
participation by some important states and the weakness of the measures agreed.213
208 As well as the traditional mechanisms of state responsibility.
209 R.R. Churchill and G. Ulfstein, "Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: A Little-noticed Phenomenon in International Law", 94 AJIL
(2000), p629.
210 "Compliance and Dispute Settlement Provisions in the WTO and in Multilateral Environmental
Agreement", Note by the WTO and UNEP Secretariats, WT/CTE/W/191, 6 June 2001, (01-
2811), §6.
211 P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p230.
212 See D.G. Victor, K. Raustiala, E.B. Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of
International Environmental Commitment: Theory and Practice, (1998), pp 138-139, 661-662.
The only non-compliance procedure to generate any complaints is the Montreal Protocol one.
213 This problem is exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol.
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Even in a situation where non-compliance would occur, MEAs do contain non¬
compliance procedures that allow for sanctions such as the suspension of treaty
rights. However, these sanctions are ineffective as they lead to the exit rather than
action of parties to an MEA. In addition, sanctions can also be counterproductive as
non-compliance with MEAs tends to arise from an inability to comply rather than
from an intentional disregard of obligations.214 Therefore, sanctioning a party that
does not have the resources to comply with the requirements does not encourage or
enable a party to comply in the future. The provision of assistance and other
incentives are often more suitable.
It can also be concluded that even if an international environmental court with
enforcement mechanisms would be created, this would not necessarily resolve
potential non-compliance problems that could potentially arise under MEAs.215 In
addition, it is doubtful whether an international environmental court would be an
appropriate move since environmental disputes are often multidimensional as they
involve not only international environmental law but also other areas of international
law.216 Indeed, as Boyle notes it is preferable for the parties to take their disputes to a
generalist rather than specialist court in these cases217, whereas specialist courts and
tribunals are to be favoured when a special body of law is to be applied or where the
issues to be resolved are of a technical nature.218
214 EC's TBR, §8.
215 For contra see D. Esty, Greening the GATT- Trade, Environment, and the Future, (1994),
ppl50, 239-241. In addition, as Boyle notes: "there is no evidence of any need for new
institutional arrangements to handle the far smaller number of disputes that arise under
environmental treaties, and which have been quite satisfactorily resolved through non¬
compliance procedures or negotiation" and that international courts and arbitration have not
played a large role in the development of international environmental law. P. Bimie & A.E.
Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p55 and 221.
216 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam Case ICJ Rep. (1997) involved the law of treaties, international
watercourses, state responsibility, and state succession. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International
Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p224.
217 This is probably one of the reasons why the special chamber for environmental cases established
in 1993 by the ICJ has not been a success. In addition, this "specialist" court is not composed of
judges that are necessarily experts on international environmental law or on the scientific and
technical issues that are relevant to environmental disputes. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p224.
218 Such as the UNCLOS or the WTO Agreements.
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In addition, it should be noted that the value of an enforcement mechanism should
not be over-estimated. Indeed, although the WTO provides for compulsory dispute
settlement and sanctions, there are compliance problems with the Appellate Body
decisions. Therefore, Koester's statement that WTO DSB decisions are respected
needs to be relativised.219
The primary aim of the DSM is "to secure the withdrawal" of the WTO-inconsistent
measure. T he M ember must c omply with t he r ecommendations a nd r ulings o f t he
DSB, within a "reasonable period of time",220 ifprompt compliance is impracticable.
However, full compliance in the sense that inconsistent measures are removed has
not been achieved in cases such as the Bananas, Salmon and Hormones disputes,
although compensation or suspension of concessions have been granted. The
provision of compensation "should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal
of the measure is impracticable" and on a temporary basis. Compensation is
voluntary and should be determined by negotiation within 20 days after the date of
expiry o f t he reasonable p eriod. If n o a greement c an b e reached, t he c omplaining
Member may request the suspension of concessions equivalent to the level of
nullification and impairment.221 A Member may suspend concessions after it has
been held by arbitration that the measures are not in compliance with the covered
agreements,222 and after the DSB has authorised the suspension.223 If the other
Member does not agree to the level of suspension of concessions, the matter can be
brought to arbitration where the level of suspension of concessions will be
determined.224
219 V. Koester, "A New Hot Spot in the Trade-Environment Conflict", 31 EPL 2 (2001), p86.
220 Usually established after negotiation between the parties or by arbitration under Article 21.3(c).










Although, the WTO DSU contains elaborate provisions for sanctioning non-
complying Members, it cannot force full compliance with the Appellate Body
decisions. Therefore, ensuring compliance with rulings is obviously not solely linked
to whether a system provides compulsory dispute settlement procedures or elaborate
enforcement provisions. For example, political failures and the fact that the law may
not be viewed as legitimate will also provoke intentional non-compliance.
In conclusion, the argument that MEAs should provide an enforcement mechanism
similar to the one of the WTO should be rejected.
C. SOLUTIONS AVAILABLE TO WTO MEMBERS IN FURTHER
INTEGRATING MEA RULES IN THE WTO
It is essential that efforts be made in the WTO to further address the WTO-MEA
relationship and promote coherence between different sources of international law.
Section B .I, II and III have considered how the D SB c an contribute to increasing
coherence between the WTO and other sub-systems of international law, the
following sections will evaluate the options that are available to WTO Members in
doing so and will consider the relative effectiveness of these options.
I. Amendment of Article XX of the GATT 1994
A possible solution to integrate MEA rules in the WTO agreements would be to draft
rules that explicitly accommodate MEAs, for example, by amendment of existing
provisions.
Suggestions have been put forward to include a new sub-paragraph in Article XX
that would allow WTO Members to impose measures that are taken pursuant to an
MEA negotiated under internationally recognised institutions,225 or that would enable
225 WTO Document, CTE, Non-Paper by the European Community (19 February 1996). See also
See "Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules; Proposals Made in the
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these measures, at least where they are specifically required by the MEA, to benefit
from a presumption of consistency with the requirements of Article XX. The
presumption of consistency ofMEAs would follow the model of the SPS Agreement
that presumes that a measure, which conforms to an international standard is
consistent with the SPS Agreement.226
A new paragraph could also be included in Article XX based on Article XX(h),
which recognises the legitimacy of international commodity agreements that conform
to principles approved by the Economic and Social Council. Commodity agreements
that conform to specified criteria are valid automatically, other commodity
agreements can be validated on an ad hoc basis if submitted and not disapproved by
the WTO Members.227
However, a formal amendment of the rules contained in the WTO agreements is
difficult to achieve as this requires, for key provisions such as the non-discrimination
rules and provisions of the DSU, unanimous agreement of the membership228 and for
other provisions such as Article XX, a two-thirds majority of all Members.229
In addition, the amendment would only be binding on those Members having voted
in favour it. There is, of course, a procedure for obliging non-consenting countries to
accept the amendment, which requires that the amendment be approved by three-
fourth majority of all Members and that these three-fourth of all Members adopt a
separate decision forcing non-ratifying Members to either accept the amendment or
withdraw their membership. This is, of course, a very radical method of imposing
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) From 1995-2002, WTO Document, TN/TE/S/1,
23 May 2002, p2.
226 SPS Agreement, Article 2.4. See WTO CTE, WT/CTE/W/168, 19 October 2000. NAFTA,
Article 104 identifies three trade-related MEAs that may take precedence over NAFTA provided
that the MEA is implemented in the least NAFTA-inconsistent way. The listed agreements
include the Montreal Protocol, Basel Convention and CITES.
227 T. S choenbaum, in P. B irnie & A .E. B oyle, International L aw a nd the Environment, 2nd e d.,
Oxford, (2002), p706.
228 Article X.2 of the WTO Agreement.
229 Article X.3 of the WTO Agreement.
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amendments, which is very unlikely to take place in this context.230 In 1955, an
amendment was attempted with respect to Article I of the GATT 1947, but failed
because the unanimous consent required was not achieved as one single country
blocked ratification. It is, of course, difficult to speculate if nowadays the amendment
would have gone through, but this example clearly illustrates that amending the
agreements is very difficult. Amendments that have been ratified under GATT 1947
related to special conditions for developing countries.231 It should be remembered,
that a country that has not joined consensus to solve an environmental problem
through an MEA will most probably not do so at the WTO by agreeing to amend
trade rules in such a way that these could have a negative impact on their interests.
II. Establishment of a New "Understanding" on MEAs
Another option available to Members would be to establish a new "Understanding",
that is a new side agreement.232 This would be a more appropriate solution where
Members would consider it necessary to further develop the criteria that MEAs or the
measures taken pursuant to these agreements would need to fulfil, in order to take
precedence over WTO agreements or to benefit from a presumption of consistency
with WTO obligations.
Developing an Understanding would also be a more suitable option than an
amendment where Members would want to include a list ofMEAs that fulfil certain
requirements233 or where an approval system of future MEAs would be included.
230 R. Hudec, "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process - Can it Reconcile Trade Rules and
Environmental Needs", in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996), pl26.
231 In 1955 and in 1964.
232 See "Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules; Proposals Made in the
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) From 1995-2002, WTO Document, TN/TE/S/1,
23 May 2002, p3.
233 Article 104 of the NAFTA, which provides that the Montreal Protocol, CITES and the Basel
Convention take precedence over NAFTA obligations.
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A proposal was made at the Singapore Conference by the European Commission to
draft an "Understanding" that would enable measures taken pursuant to an MEA to
be considered "necessary" within the terms of Article XX of GATT 1994, whilst
enjoying no presumption of consistency with the chapeau of Article XX,234 if the
MEA would enable the participation of all states concerned and if there was adequate
participation in order to reflect the interests of the states, including those with
significant trade and economic concerns.
This proposal, however, may not bring more than what is already the practice of
panels and the Appellate Body, since even unilateral measures have been justified
under Article XX(b) and (g) but failed the test under the chapeau of Article XX.235 It
could be argued, though, that the chances of being inconsistent with the terms of the
chapeau are reduced. However, as noted in section B.I., if the measures are not
explicitly required by the MEA, these could well be found to be inconsistent with the
chapeau of Article XX. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 2 and 3, the
requirements of the chapeau and the interpretation given to these requirements by the
WTO DSB, as far as clarity and consistency are concerned, leave a lot to be desired.
Rutgeerts proposes an additional conditionality in order to prevent protectionism,
namely that "MEAs should only be accommodated under the Understanding if there
is enough scientific evidence of their environmental necessity and if they are truly
global".236
This proposal should be rejected. States negotiate MEAs because they believe them
to be necessary. It would be inappropriate for the WTO to sit in judgement on the
scientific evidence and any sensible government would dismiss this idea out of hand.
234 See "Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules; Proposals Made in the
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) From 1995-2002, WTO Document, TN/TE/S/1,
23 May 2002, p3. See also Chapter 3, section D.I.3 and approach taken in Article 3.2 of the SPS
Agreement.
235 See Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §195.
236 A. Rutgeerts, "Trade and Environment - Reconciling the Montreal Protocol and the GATT", 33
JWT4 (1999), p85.
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In addition, MEAs may not be "truly global" in the sense that all or most of the WTO
Members are party to an MEA, while nevertheless aiming to protect the environment
in a meaningful way. A requirement that an MEA should be open to all those
Members that have a legitimate interest in the environmental problem would be far
more appropriate.
Brack considers the establishment of a new side agreement on MEAs as the best
solution since it would avoid an amendment process, clear rules would be established
with respect to MEAs, and that it would be easier to negotiate.237 However, although,
the amendment process would be avoided, it is doubtful that consensus would be
reached more easily. Despite the fact that clear rules would be established, the
number of new rules may provide considerable grounds for discussion and
disagreement. As with an amendment process, a new agreement would also require
acceptance and ratification before it would be binding on all Members.
Marceau suggests that since consensus on the environment-trade debate would be
difficult to reach, a plurilateral agreement could be envisaged that would only bind
certain Members of the WTO.238 However, this would not necessarily be desirable
since this would have the tendency to encourage Members to pick-and-choose which
rules they wish to be bound by, thereby reverting to some extent to the system under
the old GATT.
III. Granting of Waivers for MEAs
Waivers that enable a WTO Member to derogate from its obligations under the WTO
agreements are provided for in Article IX.3 and IX.4 of the WTO Agreement and in
the GATT 1994 Understanding on Waivers.
237 D. Brack, "The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for the Multilateral Environmental
Agreement-World Trade Organisation Debate", 9 YIEL (1998), pl9.
238 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JIVT 5 (1999), pi48.
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A Member could request a waiver for a specific measure taken pursuant to an MEA
or for a list of specific measures taken pursuant to various MEAs. Kingsbury argues
that temporary waivers for major MEAs could prove to be a practical and expeditious
means o f r esolving conflicts.239 H owever, although, w aivers could p rovide for t he
accommodation of TREMs pursuant to MEAs, they are difficult to obtain240 and may
not be of great use from an environmental perspective since they may only be
granted in exceptional circumstances on a temporary basis.241 In addition, the
granting of waivers is determined on a case-by-case basis and is, therefore,
unpredictable. It is also worth noting that parties negotiating an MEA are faced with
considerable uncertainty, since waivers could only be granted after an MEA is
concluded.242
The Bananas case also demonstrated that waivers are interpreted restrictively and are
viewed as very specific.243 Therefore, using waivers as a means of integrating
environmental concerns is not a viable solution and should not be considered as a
substitute for amending or negotiating new rules. In addition, waivers are very
cumbersome since requests are processed through various stages in order to achieve
a consensus and where this is not achieved, a three-fourths majority of WTO
239 See "Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and WTO Rules; Proposals Made in the
Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) From 1995-2002, WTO Document, TN/TE/S/1,
23 May 2002, p2 and B. Kingsbury, "Environment and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime in the
International Legal System" in A.E. Boyle (ed.), Environmental Regulation and Economic
Growth, (1994), pp219-220.
240 Historically, the GATT 1947 provided waivers to authorise the Generalized System of
Preferences and a South-South tariff preference scheme both for a period of ten years. The scope
of the waivers was enlarged during the Tokyo Round of negotiations (1973-1979) and became
quasi-permanent through the adoption of the Enabling Clause. See also the Lome Waiver. See R.
Hudec, "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process - Can it Reconcile Trade Rules and
Environmental Needs", in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic
Mechanisms as Viable Means? (1996), p 128.
241 WTO Agreement, Article IX.4. Waivers that are for more than one year are to be reviewed
annually.
242 A. Rutgeerts, "Trade and Environment - Reconciling the Montreal Protocol and the GATT", 33
JWT 4 (1999), p84.
243 See section B.11.1. above.
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Members is required.244 However, since waivers do not amend or add obligations to
the WTO Agreement, they do not need to be ratified by the WTO Members.
Kingsbury also argues that since votes are influenced by extraneous political
considerations, it may be desirable to adopt a code of practice on such waivers.245
Although, this may to some extent alleviate arbitrariness, waivers will be a political
decision, which almost inevitably contains extraneous political considerations.
IV. Formal Interpretations by the General Council
As an alternative to an amendment process or the adoption of a new agreement,
Article XX of the GATT 1994 could be given an authoritative inteipretation by the
General Council under Article X.2 of the WTO Agreement and Article 3 .9 of the
DSU, where there is a three fourths vote ofWTO Members in favour of the adoption
of the interpretation.246 Again, as is the case for waivers, an interpretation would not
need to be ratified by each Member.
Since the WTO i s o ften c riticised for operating w ith 1 imited regard to s ubstantive
principles of international or national environmental policy or law247, the General
Council could decide that certain principles of international environmental law
should be relied on when interpreting the WTO agreements and could specify the
extent to which this would be the case.248
Of course, it could be argued that since the Preamble to the WTO Agreement
explicitly refers to sustainable development, that the Marrakesh Decision on Trade
244 WTO Agreement, Article IX.3.
245 B. Kingsbury, "Environment and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime in the International Legal
System" in A.E. Boyle (ed.), Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth, (1994), pp219-
220.
246 Article XI.8.
247 B. Kingsbury, "Environment and Trade: The GATT/WTO Regime in the International Legal
System" in Environmental Regulation and Economic Growth ed. A.E. Boyle, 1994, p221.
248 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), p 141.
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and Environment refers to the Rio Declaration, that it may not be necessary to
determine which principles of international environmental law are to be relied on,
since many that are relevant to trade are parameters of sustainable development.
Since the preamble to the WTO Agreement is part of the context of the WTO
Agreement, it can be concluded that the components of the principle of sustainable
development, such as the principle of protection of the environment, the principle of
conservation, the precautionary principle to anticipate adverse consequences of
environmental degradation, limits to territorial sovereignty and the principle of
common but differentiated responsibility are also by implication part of the context
of the WTO agreements, even though they are not explicitly mentioned in the WTO
agreements, and are, therefore, sources of interpretation of WTO agreements
pursuant to Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
The Appellate Body in the Shrimps case referred to the Preamble of the WTO
Agreement with respect to sustainable development, and stated that "we believe [the
preamble] must add colour, texture and shading to our interpretation of the
agreements annexed to the WTO Agreement, in this case, the GATT 1994"249.
Therefore, the principles of international environmental law that are parameters of
sustainable development also must also "add colour, texture and shading" to the
interpretation of the covered agreements.
For example, the Appellate Body in considering the unilateral character of the
measure at issue, referred to the standard set in the 1992 Rio Declaration, Principle
12.25° The precautionary principle is in the words of the Appellate Body in the
Hormones case, incorporated in the SPS Agreement, in particular in Article 3.3 and
5.7 of the SPS Agreement, although not being explicitly referred to.251
249 Shrimps Appellate Body Report, §161 and 163.
250 Ibidem, §168-173. See also Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, p29.
251 Hormones Appellate Body Report, §124.
318
The polluter-pays-principle, contained in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration as well
as in conventions such as the UN/ECE Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Co-operation, EC Treaty, and the OSPAR Convention252 has been
mentioned in the Superfund case examined in Chapter 2. The Panel noted that the
rules on border tax adjustments could follow the polluter-pays-principle,253 therefore,
it could be argued that the term "necessary" in Article XX(b) and in the SPS
Agreement could be interpreted to imply that the exporter must follow the polluter-
pays-principle. However, it is not certain that this interpretation would be accepted
by the DSB.
Therefore, although, principles of international environmental law have been
considered in the interpretation of the covered agreements, clear guidelines or rules
concerning their use would have the advantage of alleviating any doubts as to
whether and in which circumstances such principles should be relied upon.
V. Encouraging Dispute Avoidance
As discussed in section B.IV., the WTO DSM also provides for alternative dispute
resolution but it is not often resorted to. Marceau suggests that the procedures in
Article 5 of the DSU could include some duty to negotiate, so that non-binding
dispute resolution methods are fully exhausted before reliance is had on binding
forms of dispute settlement, in order to deescalate disputes that might arise. This type
of requirement is included in treaties such as the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Article 41, which provides that "if a
dispute regarding the application or interpretation of the present Convention arises
between two or more Parties to the Convention, they shall, upon the request of any of
them, seek to resolve it by a process of consultation and negotiation" and a milder
252 See J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body", 50 ICLQ April 2001, p269, footnote 106.
253 Ibidem, p269.
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form contained in UNCLOS, which requires that parties "proceed expeditiously to an
exchange of views".254
The downfall of such an approach is that the "terms of a negotiated settlement will
usually reflect not the merits of each party's case, but their relative power"255. If too
much emphasis is put on negotiation, developing countries although not as often
party to disputes would possibly suffer from a lack of power over developed
countries and a fair settlement would be difficult to reach. In addition, although
negotiation may discourage "copy-cat" disputes, Members may also see an
opportunity "to win time" by prolonging negotiations, thereby lengthening the time
span of individual disputes, while upholding their measures.
Conciliation is often used in disputes where the main issue is legal.256 It may
therefore, not be ideal in situations where scientific issues are central to the dispute
such as is the case in disputes concerning the SPS Agreement, the TBT Agreement
and Article XX of the GATT 1994.
VI. DSU Consultation Obligations
Marceau argues that WTO Members could consider modifying the DSU to introduce
new consultation obligations and/or new obligations requiring panels to consult with
experts, MEA Secretariats and "other outside sources of legal, scientific or technical
information".257 As was noted in Chapter 5, the use of experts adds transparency and
neutrality to the decision-making process, thereby adding legitimacy to the WTO
decisions. Although, panels consult with experts even though they are not obliged to
254 Article 283.
255 J. G. Merrills, "The Principle of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes", in (eds.) C. Warbrick and V.
Lowe, The United Nations and the Principles of International Law - Essays in Memory of
Michael Akehurst, London, New York, (1994), p51.
256 Conciliation is widely used in dispute settlement provisions in multilateral treaties UNCLOS
Articles 284, 297-8, and Annex V and in certain environmental treaties. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pp230-l.
257 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), pl41.
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do s o, i t w ould a ppropriate t o m ake a formal amendment t hat e nsures t hat p anels
refer to experts.
An obligation that consultations be held with MEA secretariats should be promoted
as well as an obligation that MEA secretariats participate in negotiations or
mediation. Panels could, for example, be encouraged to fully use their right to
request information under Article 13 of the DSU258, especially from MEA
secretariats that could, for example, advise on the conformity of a measure with the
MEA at issue.259 This would enable the already ongoing informal exchanges with
MEA Secretariats in the CTE to be strengthened and formalised.260
Attention should be directed at strengthening the dialogue between the WTO and
MEA secretariats, raising awareness in the WTO of the processes in MEAs,
encouraging increased co-ordination between trade and environment officials at the
national as well as international levels in order to share information and increase
transparency. In the long-term, this may encourage the wider acceptance of MEAs
and the desire on the part of all WTO Members to accommodate these in the WTO to
a greater extent.
Ministers in Doha have agreed to negotiate procedures for regular information
exchange between secretariats of MEAs and the WTO. The new information
exchange procedures should, hopefully, expand the scope of existing cooperation.261
258 Article 13 of the DSU:
"1. Each panel shall have the right to seek information and technical advice from any individual
or body which it deems appropriate...
2. Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to obtain their
opinion on certain aspects of the matter..."
259 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), p 141.
260 The WTO's Doha M inisterial Declaration welcomes "the WTO's continued co-operation with
UNEP and other inter-govemmental environmental organisations" and "encourage[s] efforts to
promote cooperation between the WTO and the relevant international environmental and
developmental organisations". WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (2001), §6.
261 Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, (2001), §31 (ii).
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VII. CTE Involvement
The CTE's mandate is to identify the relationship between trade measures and
environmental measures to promote sustainable development, and to make
recommendations on whether any modifications to WTO provisions are required.262
However, so far the CTE has mainly been a discussion forum that has not been used
as a means of negotiating amendments or new rules and it has failed to make
recommendations as to the interpretation of existing rules. Indeed, the Appellate
Body stated that it interpreted Article XX in the absence of recommendations of the
CTE.263 It has been argued that the reason for this appears to be the "unwillingness of
many Members, particularly developing countries, to change WTO rules".264
However, the SPS Committee has provided a number of clarifications to the
interpretation of the SPS Agreement, including decisions265, recommended
procedures for implementation of certain provisions, guidelines.266
Article 32 of the Doha Declaration, instructs the CTE to continue work on all items
on its agenda within its current terms of reference, which includes the relationship
262 See S. Shaw and R. Schwartz, "Trade and Environment in the WTO - State of Play", 36 JWT 1
(2002), pl30.
263 See Shrimps, §155. See S. Shaw and R. Schwartz, "Trade and Environment in the WTO - State
of Play", 36 JWT 1 (2002), pl46.
264 See S. Shaw and R. Schwartz, "Trade and Environment in the WTO - State of Play", 36 JWT 1
(2002), pl32.
265 WTO document, G/SPS/19.
266 WTO Documents, Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures -Recommended
Notification Procedures - Revision, 26/11/1999, G/SPS/7/Rev.l and Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures -Recommended Procedures for Implementing the Transparency
Obligations of the SPS Agreement (Article 7) - Revision, 2/4/2002, G/SPS/7/Rev.2.
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between the WTO and MEAs,267 and that the work "should include the identification
of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules". Hopefully, the renewed commitment to
the clarification of trade-environment issues, will bear its fruit and demonstrate a
willingness on the part of all WTO Members to increase the linkage between these
issue areas.
VIII. Reference to the ICJ
Although, the WTO has a special body of law to apply and adjudicates over disputes
concerning the consistency of TREMs with the WTO agreements, these disputes
often cover not only international trade law but also the law of the treaties and
international environmental law. Since it was recognised in section B.IV.3. that it is
preferable for disputes that are multi-disciplinary to be referred to a generalist court it
could be argued that the WTO should cede adjudicative power to a generalist court
such as the ICJ or leave it up to the parties to determine where these cases are to be
adjudicated.
In other words, the WTO would similarly to the dispute settlement arrangements of
UNCLOS provide a choice of dispute settlement forum.268 UNCLOS enables parties
267 The Doha Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, §32 states that the CTE
should give particular attention to:
"(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing
countries, in particular the least-developed among them, and those situations in which the
elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the
environment and development;
(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights; and
(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes."
268 The Convention does not aim to allocate a functional jurisdiction to each of the four compulsory
fora. The parties have the discretion to choose the fora that they consider most appropriate. Only
where parties do not agree to the choice of fora are the parties compelled to select arbitr ation.
See the "Montreux formula" of Article 287. See P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and
the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p221.
The choice of dispute resolution was due to the reticence on the part of some states in accepting
judicial settlement, the fact that the ICJ would be the only forum for such settlement and because
of the view that no individual forum would be able to deal with the wide range of issues that are
likely to arise and that therefore specialist bodies with technical expertise are needed. Where the
dispute involves the marine environment or living resources of the high seas and the parties are
unable to agree on a forum, the UNCLOS provides that arbitration is obligatory. UNCLOS, Part
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to refer disputes to arbitration269, special arbitration270, the ICJ as well as to a
specialised court, the ITLOS.271
Marceau considers that provisions could be included for the referral of certain issues
involving the relationship between obligations of the WTO and the provisions of
other treaties to the ICJ.
However, it is questionable whether a generalist court such as the ICJ would be able
to sustain the burden of litigation, at least with its current resources.272
Rather than referring disputes to another tribunal, the opinion of other courts or
tribunals could be sought for. Indeed, Article 13 of the DSU is not limited to factual
issues. For example, the ICJ could provide an opinion on the consistency of a
measure with the MEA or the legal relationship of the MEA and the WTO
provisions.273 Provided that such a procedure does not become too cumbersome, this
XV.
A.E. Boyle, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Settlement of Disputes"
in The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First Centuiy: A Tribute to the Late
Kenneth Simmonds, (eds.), J. J. Norton, M. Adenas and M. Footer, The blague, (1998), pi 11 and
P. Sands, "Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: Existing International
Legal Arrangements" in J. Cameron, J. Werksman and P. Roderick (eds.), Improving
Compliance with International Environmental Law, London, (1996), Chapter 3.
269 Arbitrators appointed under Annex VII are not necessarily lawyers but must be "experienced in
maritime affairs". P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed.,
Oxford, (2002), p225.
270 Special arbitrators equally are not necessarily lawyers but are experienced in the domain of
fisheries, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, or navigation as appropriate.
Special arbitrators may also be appointed as technical experts to "advise" the ICJ, ITLOS or an
arbitral tribunal in accordance with Article 289. P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and
the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p225.
271 The ITLOS is composed of persons of "recognised competence in the field of the Law of the
Sea", in other words, it is an alternative to the ICJ. Although, it should be said that the ITLOS's
structure is more eclectic than that of the ICJ as it accommodates litigation involving states,
international organisations, and private parties. The ITLOS tribunal is composed of 21 judges as
opposed to the ICJ's 15. See A.E. Boyle, "The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and
the Settlement of Disputes", in The Changing World of International Law in the Twenty-First
Centuiy, pi02.
272 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p224.
V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court ofJustice, Essays in
Honour ofSir Robert Jennings ( 1996), pp302-8. See generally, T.O. Elias, The International
Court ofJustice and Some Contemporary Problems: Essays in International Law (1983).
273 G. Marceau, "A Call for Coherence in International Law - Praise for the Prohibition Against
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may well be a valuable resource in adding neutrality to the decision-making process.
In addition, advisory opinions of the ICJ would "provide authoritative guidance on
the state of the law at the time they are decided".274
Co-operation and co-ordination between different courts/tribunals would certainly
contribute to a degree of coherence between different branches of international law
and would decrease potential conflicts between the decisions of different
courts/tribunals.275
This section demonstrated that there are solutions available to WTO Members in
further accommodating these rules and principles in the WTO. However, it is clear
that most of these solutions can only be truly successful ifWTO Members as a whole
agree to use them.
The recent Doha Declaration seems to be a step in the right direction as Members
have agreed to negotiations. Paragraph 31 (i) of the Doha Declaration states:
"With a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and
environment, we agree to negotiations, without prejudging their outcome, on:
(i) the relationship between existing WTO rules and specific trade obligations
set out in multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The negotiations
shall be limited in scope to the applicability of such existing WTO rules as
among parties to the MEA in question. The negotiations shall not prejudice
the WTO rights ofany Member that is not a party to the MEA in question. "
The objective of the new negotiations will be to clarify the relationship between trade
measures taken under the environmental agreements and WTO rules. However,
whether specific rules regulating the MEA-WTO relationship will emerge from these
negotiations is unclear.
"Clinical Isolation" in WTO Dispute Settlement", 33 JWT 5 (1999), p 143.
274 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pi08.
275 See J. P auwelyn, "The Use of Experts in WTO Dispute Settlement", 51 ICLQ April (2002),
p333.
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Indeed, there is a rift in the WTO between those Members that consider that existing
WTO rules are sufficient to accommodate MEAs276, particularly given the recent
developments in WTO jurisprudence and those Members that have identified a need
to clarify the legal status of the WTO-MEA relationship so as to reduce uncertainty
and avoid undermining environmental negotiations.277
D. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of health, environmental and other exceptions to the general trade
obligations implies that the WTO agreements are necessarily linked to some extent to
other sources of international law that deal with these other non-trade issues.
The DSB has shown willingness to look beyond the WTO agreements in order to
resolve disputes. This is a development from GATT 1947 panels that in most cases
did not follow international law rules on the interpretation of treaties. The DSU as
well as various panel and Appellate Body reports demonstrate that the WTO is not a
closed system that is impermeable to other sources of international law. As the
Appellate Body in the Gasoline case acknowledged, WTO agreements cannot "be
read in clinical isolation from public international law".278 The WTO DSB has shown
its willingness not only to take into consideration rules of international law contained
in Article 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention but also to rely on other general
rules of treaty interpretation such as the principle of non-retroactivity contained in
Article 28 of the Vienna Convention,279 the principle that an exception to a general
276 On 27-28 June 2001, UNEP and MEAs participated in a CTE information session on
compliance and dispute settlement that addressed the WTO-MEA relationship.
277 In a Report submitted by the Secretariat, it was noted that problems are unlikely to arise in the
WTO over trade measures agreed and applied among parties to an MEA. In the event of a
dispute, however, "WTO M embers are c onfident that the WTO dispute s ettlement p revisions
would be able to tackle any problems, which arise in this area, including in cases when resort to
environmental expertise is needed". WTO Secretariat, see Trade and Environment in the WTO,
www.wto.org/enelislT/thewtoe/ministe/min99e/english/aboute/13envie/htm.
278 Gasoline, Appellate Body Report, pi7.
279 Article 28 states that "[ujnless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to ... any situation which ceased to
exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty" was applied in the Hormones case as
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rule is to be interpreted narrowly280, the principle of estoppel281, the principle
contained in Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention that "a State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty"282, the
principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat)283, the principle of good
faith284, the principle of proportionality,285 the principle of legitimate expectations286
and the presumption against conflicts.287
The use of these rules and principles of international law, including those contained
in MEAs has the effect of legitimising the WTO dispute settlement process, in the
eyes of those whose values or interests are involved, in resolving disputes over
noted in the previous chapter. Hormones, US Panel Report, §8.25, Canada Panel Report, §8.28.
See also Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, adopted 20 March 1997
(WT/DS22/AB), Appellate Body Report, pi5.
280 Article XX is entitled general exceptions and as such provides for a "limited and conditional
exception from obligations under other provisions" and "not a positive rule establishing
obligations in itself' and thus should be interpreted narrowly. United States - Section 337 of the
TariffAct of 1930, adopted on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/345, §5.9. See also Wool Shirts,
pi6, Shrimp Panel Report.
281 See United States - Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, BISD
40S/358 (Adopted 27 October 1993), 480-486, §308-325.
282 when invoking Article XX, a Member invokes the right to certain specific substantive
provisions of GATT 1994 but in doing so should not frustrate or defeat the purposes and objects
of the General Agreement and the WTO Agreement or its legal obligations under substantive
rules of GATT by abusing the exception contained in Article XX. Shrimps Appellate Body
Report, §151.
285 Relied upon by the Gasoline Appellate Body, pi 8, where it was held that the interpretation of a
provision must not create a situation where paragraphs of a treaty are redundant, since all terms
of the treaty must be given meaning and effect. The Appellate Body in the Japan-Taxes case
also a pplied t he e ffectiveness p rinciple when a ddressing t he i nteipretation o f Article III. T he
Appellate Body stated that failing to take into account Article III. 1 in interpreting Article III.2
was a legal error because this would render "the words of Article III. 1 meaningless, thereby
violating the fundamental principle of effectiveness in treaty interpretation". Section G. The
Shrimps Appellate Body also made use of this principle in determining that Article XX(g)
referred both to living and non-living exhaustible resources. §128-131.
284 Emphasised by the Shrimps Appellate Body as it considered that where a Member would refuse
to enter into negotiations over the protection of exhaustible natural resources beyond its national
jurisdiction, unilateral measures may not be justified as the principle of good faith would been
breached. See Chapter 2, section C.II.5.a.
285 See Shrimps Appellate Body Report, § 141 and Asbestos Appellate Body Report, § 172.
286 See Japan - Taxes, Appellate Body Report, Section E.
287 See Guatemala - Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Portland Cement From Mexico,
adopted 25 November 1998, WT/DS60/AB/R, §65. Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, adopted 23 July 1998, WT/DS54, 55, 59, 64, §14.28ff.
See J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement
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competing values.288 The reason for this is that these principles encompass law and
values that are not exclusively concerned with trade liberalisation. This is common
sense as states have after all agreed to rules that are not solely contained in the WTO
agreements.
However, the primary responsibility for clarifying the WTO-MEA relationship rests
with WTO Members, not the dispute settlement system.289 Although, the DSB, can
make decisions in a specific case, it may not be able to clarify the general
relationship between the WTO and MEAs because the MEA-WTO relationship is not
merely a legal question, but also a politically sensitive issue that should be addressed
in negotiations. As Howse notes "it is all politics",290 therefore, the linkage problem
should be solved by political actors in a political arena291.
The advantages of additional guidelines or rules are to promote the handling of trade-
environment issues in a consistent and predictable way. The clarification of rules
could provide greater legal security for both MEAs and for the WTO and create a
clearer policy making environment for both trade policy makers and negotiators of
MEAs. In addition, as Boyle states "although courts are not unmindful of the need
for purposive construction, the parties to a treaty are usually best placed to decide for
themselves what is appropriate, and can help stabilise the regime by their
decisions."292
However, the problems of co-operation that were highlighted in Chapter 2 with
respect to MEAs also apply to the WTO in the context of reaching further agreement
Body", 50 ICLQ April 2001.
288 R. Howse, "Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The
Early Years of the WTO Jurisprudence", in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the
NAFTA - Towards a Common Law ofInternational Trade, Oxford, (2000), p36.
289 Trade and Environment News Bulletins, TE/036, 6 July 2001.
290 R. Howse, "From Politics to Technocracy - and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral
Trading Regime", 96 AJ1L (2002), pi 17.
291 D. Steger, "Afterword: The "Trade and ..." Conundrum - A Commentary", 96 AJIL (2002),
pl40.
292 P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002),
Chapter 4.
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on trade and environmental issues. If rules are to be negotiated, incentives for co¬
operation in reaching more specific rules must be explored. According to price
theory, and indeed common sense, co-operation will only take place if it is in the
interest of most members to do so. In this respect, co-operation between the WTO
and relevant international bodies should be encouraged, such as UNEP, the World
Bank, UNCTAD and secretariats of MEAs in order to contribute to technical
assistance and capacity building in developing countries.293
However, the advantage of the DSB in establishing the "line of equilibrium" between
trade and environmental concerns is that there is no risk that further legislative action
could result in a more restrictive approach to MEAs. Relying on an evolving
interpretation could be more flexible and would possibly leave more room for
dialogue.294 In addition, interpretation through the WTO DSB is relatively rapid and
straightforward means of achieving legal change since panel rulings, as noted in
section B.IV.l, are automatically binding on parties unless WTO Members reach a
consensus to overrule them (negative consensus).
Although, interpretation through the DSB, represents a transfer of power to the
DSB,295 since dispute resolution is not a mechanism for the "neutral application" of
legislation296, and that "dispute resolution inevitably interprets and expands upon
legislation"297, this is not unlimited. The Member States have the ability to reverse
293 The WTO and UNCTAD have increased their strategic partnership by creating, on 16 April
2003, a new legal framework for cooperating in technical assistance. Press release:
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr338_e.htm
294 J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p369.
295 Ibidem, p335.
296 J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p336. In
many national and international systems the principles of state responsibility and reparation of
injury for illegal acts were clarified through national and international jurisprudence rather than
legislation. E-U. Petersmann, "From the Hobbesian International Law of Coexistence to Modern
Integration Law: The WTO Dispute Settlement System", 1 JIEL 2 (1998), pi85.
297 J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p339. The
Appellate Body in the Japan-Taxes case found that that panels are not bound by the details and
legal reasoning of prior panel reports since there are other factors such as GATT practices and
particular circumstances of the case. Decisions were considered to be isolated acts that are in
general insufficient to establish subsequent practice. Indeed, the Appellate Body considered that
decisions do not form a sequence of acts establishing an agreement of the parties. Section E,
329
DSB interpretations, as they can renegotiate the treaty provisions,298 they have
exclusive power to adopt interpretations ofWTO agreements299 and the authority to
specify the standard of review.300
Nevertheless, it is essential that there be continuity, consistency, integrity and
coherence in legal interpretation in order to avoid manipulating the law to achieve a
given result.301 The DSB can only be considered as legitimate in adjudicating
competing values, if it demonstrates that its "decisions are not simply a product of its
own personal choice of the values that should prevail in a given dispute".302
This, of course, raises the issue of the value of precedents in the WTO. Indeed, in
order to establish that there is consistency, continuity and integrity in legal
interpretation, it is essential to consider how past decisions are being dealt with by
the DSB. Although, the WTO rejects stare decisis, the Japan-Taxes Appellate Body
did recognise that panels "should" take into account previous adopted panel reports
where these create "legitimate expectations" concerning future dispute settlement
outcomes. It, therefore, appears that the DSB will follow previous rulings unless an
explanation is provided for the departure of a previous approach. This would be
similar to the ICJ which, although, precludes stare decisis in accordance with Article
pi3. J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body", 50ICLQ April 2001, p274.
Petersmann criticised the Appellate Body for overlooking the "contextual difference between,
for instance, a judgement and a GATT panel report, whose subsequent deliberation and adoption
by both the GATT Council and the annual conference of the GATT Contracting Parties could
make such reports more than an "isolated act". E.U. Petersmann, "International Trade Law and
the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System 1948-1996: An Introduction", p3.
298 WTO Agreement, Article IX.2.
299 DSU, Article 3.9.
300 See J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p345.
301 See D. Palmeter and P. Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation:
Practice and Procedure, The Hague, 1999, p41 and Howse, "Adjudicative Legitimacy and
Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The Early Years of the WTO Jurisprudence",
in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the NAFTA - Towards a Common Law of
International Trade, Oxford, (2000), p60.
302 R. Howse, "Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International Trade Law: The
Early Years of the WTO Jurisprudence", in J.H.H. Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and the
NAFTA - Towards a Common Law ofInternational Trade, Oxford, (2000), p51.
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59 of its Statute, also relies on the value of past decisions.303 Indeed, although the ICJ
has the power to depart from them, it would not exercise that power lightly.304
Therefore, dispute resolution is a source of persuasive precedent of less binding
legislation,305 and it will be considered as an authoritative statement of law306,
especially when both the panel and Appellate Body agree. Therefore, decisions are
likely to be consistent and coherent, which indicates that the DSB is able short of
new rules to ensure a certain degree of coherence between competing values.
303 J. Cameron and K.R. Gray, "Principles of International Law in the WTO D ispute S ettlement
Body", 50 ICLO April 2001, p274.
304 M. Shahabuddeen, Precedent in the World Court 3, Cambridge, (1996).
305 J. Trachtman, "The Domain of the WTO Dispute Resolution", 40 Harv. ILJ 2 (1999), p339.
306 R. Hudec, "The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Process - Can it Reconcile Trade Rules and
Environmental Needs", in R. Wolfrum (ed.) Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic




Linkage between trade and environmental/health issue areas can and should be
improved in order to contribute to the goal of sustainable development. The ways in
which linkage can be improved in the WTO have been examined in the previous
chapters. However, it is inevitable that the degree oflinkage will not be acceptable to
all WTO Members in each and every circumstance. Disputes dealing with
environmental and public health issues are controversial and can reach impasse.1 The
fact that the WTO Members have different cultures, priorities, national political
imperatives, risk management procedures, consumer preferences and perceptions of
risk, different experience with respect to environmental protection and food safety,
and the fact that a consensus agreement does not necessarily and consistently
maximise welfare of its signatories, increases the risk that where a dispute is brought
to the WTO DSB, that the recommendations and rulings of the DSB will not be
complied with.
See the ongoing Hormones dispute.
WTO 2003 News Items, Dispute Settlement Body, 7 November 2003, Communication:
"The EC announced the entry into force of a new directive concerning the prohibition on the use
in stockfarming of certain hormones. The EC said that the new directive was based on a risk
assessment performed by an independent scientific committee. This committee, the EC said,
identified a risk for consumers for each of the hormones the use of which was banned in the EC
for growth promoting purposes. The EC stated that, accordingly, they considered that with the
entry into force of the directive, the EC was in conformity with the DSB recommendations and
rulings in the hormone case. The EC added that it thus expected that the US and Canada would
terminate their suspension of concessions to the EC.
The US responded that the directive neither removed the EC's unjustified ban on US beef, nor
did it present an appropriate risk assessment as a basis for the ban. The US said that it could not
therefore understand how the new directive could amount to the implementation of the DSB
recommendations. Likewise, Canada said that it saw no new scientific evidence in the new risk
assessment and that it consequently saw no reason to remove the existing sanctions."
See also Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse to Article 21.5 by
Canada, Panel Report, 18 February 2000, WT/DS18/RW.
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Therefore, there is a need to focus on the issue of how best to deal with situations
where conflicts are not resolved.
Non-compliance with WTO Rulings- A Breach of International Law?
Non-compliance can either be treated as a breach of international law which most
often requires the cessation of the wrongful conduct and reparation to be made or
non-compliance can be authorised, in the sense that a Member is able to maintain
WTO-inconsistent measures provided that an appropriate price be paid for this right
that enables an efficient breach of existing commitments.
It has been argued, by some authors, that non-compliance with the recommendations
and rulings of the DSB does not constitute a breach of international law.2 However,
many DSU provisions support the fact that Members are obliged to bring their
measures into conformity with the WTO agreements.3
Article 3.7 of the DSU states:
"[T]he first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure
the withdrawal of the measures concerned... [C]ompensation should be
resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal... is impracticable... "
The provision states that the aim of the DSM is to ensure that inconsistent measures
are withdrawn, which seems to be equivalent to the international law remedy of
cessation of wrongful conduct.4 The fact that the provision states that the aim of the
See also J. Bello, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less Is More", 90 AJIL 416
(1996), pp416-418.
See J.H. Jackson, "The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding - Misunderstandings on the
Nature of Legal Obligation", 91 AJIL (1997), pp60-64 and J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and
Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective Approach", 94 AJIL
(2000), p336.
International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Article 41, (1996), UN
GAOR, 51 Session, Supp. No. 10, UN DOC. A/51/10. Militaiy and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua Case, (Merits), ICJ Rep. (1986), 146-9. United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Teheran, ICJ Rep. (1980), 44-5. See J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and
Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective Approach", 94 AJIL
(2000), p337. See also I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford,
(1998), p462 and A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, (2000), Cambridge, p301.
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DSM is "usually" to secure the withdrawal of an inconsistent measure implies, in my
view, that the DSM enables Members to modify their measures in such a way that
render them consistent with the WTO agreements rather than obliging Members to
withdraw the measure altogether. The text of Article 3.7 does not imply that
inconsistent measures can be upheld indefinitely, despite the fact that immediate
withdrawal is not required.5
Indeed, a WTO Member has a reasonable period of time, usually not exceeding 15
months, to bring its policies into conformity with its obligations under the WTO
Agreements6, "if it is impracticable to comply immediately with the
recommendations and rulings"7. This enables Members sufficient time to make
administrative changes as well as replace domestic laws and regulations where
necessary to ensure compliance with the WTO agreements. The fact that immediate
compliance is not mandatory, in my view, suggests that the WTO Members as a
whole accept that changing national laws and regulations can be arduous and costly
from a political and legislative perspective, but not that they allow non-compliance.
5 Prompt compliance is nevertheless preferred. Article 21.1 of the DSU provides:
"Prompt compliance with the recommendations or rulings of the DSB is essential in order to
ensure effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all Members."
6
- EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Arbitration under Article
21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Award of the Arbitrator, 29 May 1998, WT/DS26/15, WT/DS48/13, §39, 41, 42 and 48. The
reasonable period of time was determined to be 15 months from the date of adoption of the
Appellate Body and Panel Reports by the DSB and that "it would not be in keeping with the
requirement of prompt compliance to include in the reasonable period of time, time to conduct
studies or to consult experts to demonstrate the consistency of a measure already judged to be
inconsistent...".
See also Australia - Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, Arbitration under Article
21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Award of the Arbitrator, 23 February 1999, WT/DS18/9, §38 where it was pointed out that "the
arbitrator is not obliged to grant 15 months as the reasonable period for implementation in all
cases. "Particular circumstances" justifying a longer or shorter period must be taken into account
on a case-by-case basis". "The conducting of risk assessments is not pertinent to the
determination of the reasonable period of time, it follows that the reasonable period in this case
should be considerably less than 15 months. The reasonable period of time, as determined under
Article 21.3(c), should be the shortest period possible within the legal system of the Member to
implement the recommendations and rulings of the DSB.
7 Article 21.3 of the DSU.
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In a situation, where an inconsistent measure is upheld beyond a reasonable period of
time, temporary remedies are available.
Article 22.1 of the DSU provides:
"Compensation and the suspension ofconcessions or o ther obligations a re
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and
ridings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However,
neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other obligations
is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to bring a measure
into conformity with the covered agreements. "
Sykes and Schwartz argue that the fact that full compliance is only "preferred" to
compensation or the suspension of concessions could indicate that the withdrawal of
an inconsistent measure is not obligatory. However, despite the weak language used,
the fact that compensation and suspension of concessions are to be temporary
excludes this possibility.
In addition, Article 22.8 of the DSU provides:
"The suspension of concession or other obligations shall be
temporary...[T]he DSB shall continue to keep under surveillance the
implementation of adopted recommendations or ridings . . .[while] the
recommendations to bring a measure into conformity with the covered
agreements have not been implemented. "
Ongoing "surveillance" is in my view aimed at inducing compliance. Sykes and
Schwartz's although recognising that surveillance indicates that there is an obligation
to comply, also offer an alternative explanation. Sykes and Schwartz argue that since
circumstances can change as well as the "calibration" of the "substantially
equivalent" concessions that:
"Ongoing oversight serves to check periodically on whether the impasse that
led to compensation or retaliation may have lifted. In effect, the violating
country is required to persuade the international community that persisting in
the violation is desirable. Hence, the existence of continued oversight by no
means excludes the possibility that Members have the legal right to opt for
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paying "damages" in the form of a loss of trade concessions from other
parties ",8
However, it is also stated in Article 22.8 that the withdrawal of substantially
equivalent concessions is to be temporary. Neither Article 22.1 or 22.8 provide a
textual basis for arguing that these measures could be upheld as long as the losing
party wishes or on a permanent basis. As was noted in Chapter 5, interpretation must
be b ased a bove a 11 u pon t he t ext o f t he t reaty, especially i f t here i s n o r eason for
assuming that the textual approach would lead to an interpretation that "leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable in the light of the objects and
purposes of the treaty"9 that would justify recourse to the teleological approach.
Other provisions of the DSU also point to the fact that compliance with the
recommendations and rulings is required.
With respect to "non-violation complaints," the DSU specifies in Article 26.1(b) of
the DSU:
"[W]here a measure has been found to nullify or impair benefits under, or
impede the attainment of objectives, of the relevant covered agreement
without violation thereof there is no obligation to withdraw the measure. "
There is no equivalent provision for measures that violate the WTO agreements,
which can be taken as support for the fact that if the covered agreements are violated,
that the withdrawal of the measure is obligatory.
Sykes and Schwartz also argue that the fact that the enforcement mechanism does not
"punish" Members that do not abide by the rules, since countermeasures are to be
substantially equivalent to the harm caused through non-compliance suggests that the
W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System", John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.
143, (21"1 series), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workinupapers.html.
ILC, Final Draft, Article 28, 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 32.
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WTO Members did not want to make compliance with the dispute resolution
findings mandatory.10
The argument that countermeasures do not punish those deviating from their
obligations is correct as well as the fact that punishing sanctions can be effective in
deterring Members from failing to comply. The economic paradigm of rational
opportunism implies that a party will comply with a treaty only if and as long as the
benefits of complying exceed the benefits of not complying. Therefore, according to
this paradigm, non-compliance with international agreements may only be prevented
if the costs of non-compliance are higher than those incurred through complying." In
addition, if the threat to impose the sanction is credible, and if the sanction is big
enough to deter "cheating," then cheating will never occur. Sanctions, therefore, will
never need to be imposed.12
However, it cannot be concluded that the absence of punishing sanctions implies that
non-compliance is permitted. In addition, as was pointed out in Chapter 5, experience
in other international contexts such as MEAs demonstrates that punishing sanctions
may not lead to compliance.13
In addition, non-compliance entails reputation costs that impact on their future ability
and credibility to negotiate with the aggrieved party and those that condemn the
offending Member's conduct. The WTO deals with more than just trade in goods and
links not only trade and environment issues. Game theory suggests that the
interconnection of issues encourages cooperation. Interconnected games incorporate
10 W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System", John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.
143, (2nd series), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workingpapers.html
11 See G. Kirchgassner and E. Mohr, "Trade Restrictions as Viable Means of Enforcing
Compliance with International Environmental Law: An Economic Assessment", in: R. Wolfram
(ed.), Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms as Viable Means?, Berlin,
(1996), p203.
12 S. Barrett, "International Cooperation and the International Commons", Duke Environmental
Law and Policy Forum, 10(1), (1999), pp 131-146.
13 The technical and financial ability to comply, the fact that the law is viewed as legitimate may
also determine whether rales are complied with. See Chapter 5, section B.IV.
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the concept that Members could adapt their actions with respect to TREMs according
to the outcomes observed in other areas being dealt within the WTO.14 The presence
of many Prisoner's Dilemma games over different subject areas could increase the
incentive to co-operate in a given area as there is a risk that non-co-operation in one
area could lead to non-cooperation in other areas.15 .
Negotiations in the WTO have a continuous character and do not have a known
endpoint. The negotiations in the WTO resemble an infinite repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma game, where the best strategy is to co-operate on every round of the
game.16
In addition, the risk of being submitted to tit-for-tat strategies encourages
compliance. Axelrod conducted a prisoner's dilemma tournament where he invited
all interested parties to submit strategies for repeated Prisoner's Dilemma.17 The
winner cooperated on the first round, betrayed in any round if the opponent had
betrayed in the round before, and cooperated otherwise.18
Dasgupta also demonstrated that alternative strategies involving social norms or
codes of conduct could lead to co-operation in repeated games. For example, the
adoption of co-operative behaviour by one player if the other does so and of non-co¬
operative behaviour for the rest of the game if the other cheats.19
14 See N. Hanley, J.F. Shogren and B. White, Environmental Economics - In Theory and
Practice, (1997), pl69.
15 R. Blackhurst and A. Subramanian, "Promoting Multilateral Cooperation on the Environment"
in K. Anderson and R. Blackhurst (eds.), The Greening of World Trade Issues, (1992), p252.
16 R. Gibbons, Game Theoryfor Applied Economists, Princeton, (1992), pp89-91.
17 R. Axelrod, The Evolution ofCooperation, New York, (1984).
18 Ibidem. S ee a lso R. Axelrod, " The Emergence o f C ooperation Among E goists" 7 5 A merican
Political Science Review (1981), pp306-18. If two strategies are identical, tit-for-tat always
produces the cooperative solution - the players cooperate on every round, maximising their
combined winnings. Playing against a strategy similar to itself, tit-for-tat usually produces the
cooperative solution.
19 See P.S. Dasgupta, "The Environment as a Commodity", 6 Oxford Review ofEconomic Policy
(1990), pp51-67. See also R. Blackhurst and A. Subramanian, "Promoting Multilateral
Cooperation o n t he E nvironment" i n K. Anderson a nd R. B lackhurst (eds.), The G reening of
World Trade Issues, (1992), p252.
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Kreps and Wilson argue that a finite repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game where the
payoffs are uncertain can produce either a co-operative or non-cooperative equilibria.
Therefore, each player should indicate their intention to co-operate and hope that the
other players will reciprocate. Although, dispute settlement in the WTO is not a finite
game, the example demonstrates that co-operation is promoted through reputation
and trust-building strategies.20
In addition to the fact that the absence of punishing measures cannot be taken to
mean that the WTO authorises inconsistent measures to be imposed indefinitely, it is
equally true that the fact that the WTO does not require full "reparation" for the
injury caused cannot be used as evidence to demonstrate that the WTO obligations
are not breaches of international law. Signatories to a treaty can decide on the form
of remedy available under the treaty and can in addition, seek remedies such as the
cessation of the wrongful conduct, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition,
satisfaction, restitution in kind, compensation, and countermeasures.21 However,
there is no obligation to provide for all of these remedies.22
Finally, although the WTO has "no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue helmets, no
truncheons or tear gas"23 to force compliance, does not imply that compliance is not
an obligation. The fact that it is difficult to force a state to end conduct that is in
breach of international law reflects a general problem of enforcement of international
law. In addition, despite the fact that a more collective and effective enforcement
20 D.M. Kreps and R. Wilson, "Reputation and Imperfect Information", 27 Journal of Economic
Theory (1982), pp253-79. See also R. Blackhurst and A. Subramanian, "Promoting Multilateral
Cooperation on the Environment" in K. Anderson and R . B lackhurst (eds.), The Greening of
World Trade Issues, (1992), p252 and R. Gibbons, Game Theoiy for Applied Economists,
Princeton, (1992), pp224-32.
21 ILC 2000 State Responsibility Draft Articles 30-31 and 35. See P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle,
International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), ppl90-l. ILC Draft Article 35.
Full reparation is the "restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in
combination". In addition, countermeasures may be taken by injured state to induce the
offending state to comply with its obligations. See also J. Pauwelyn, "The Role of Public
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?", 95 AJIL (2001), p537.
22 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, (2000), Cambridge, pp300-4. This is common sense
as not all remedies may be appropriate to a given situation.
23 J. Bello, "The WTO Dispute S ettlement U nderstanding: Less Is More", 90 AJIL 4 16 (1996),
pp416-417.
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mechanism aimed at inducing compliance24 has not been negotiated does not indicate
that non-compliance is allowed, even if in practice the situation may arise that a
Member does not comply even after a reasonable period of time has elapsed.25
Although, the WTO DSU does not authorise non-compliance, past a reasonable
period of time, the question arises whether non-compliance would be beneficial in
certain circumstances and should be authorised when it is efficient to do so. The next
section deals with this issue.
Should the DSU Authorise Efficient Breach of WTO Obligations?
Non-compliance with the WTO DSB recommendations and rulings occurs when the
WTO agreements are not Pareto optimal. In other words, the weighted sum of
welfare for each government26, measured by the political welfare of the political
officials, is not maximised. If an agreement is not on the Pareto efficiency frontier,
then there is an incentive to deviate from existing commitments as this could
potentially be welfare improving.
24 If the aim is to increase compliance with rulings, Pauwelyn suggests that a more collective and
effective enforcement mechanism. J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and Countermeasures in the
WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a More Collective Approach", 94 AJIL (2000), p336.
25 Although the Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, §30 set
out the commitment to improve and clarify the DSU, proposed changes in the procedures for
collective retaliation have not been included in the more advanced negotiations due to an
insufficient level of support.
Paragraph 30 "We agree to negotiations on improvements and clarifications of the Dispute
Settlement Understanding. The negotiations should be based on the work done thus far as well
as any additional proposals by members, and aim to agree on improvements and clarifications
not later than May 2003, at which time we will take steps to ensure that the results enter into
force as soon as possible thereafter".
The General Council at its meeting on 24 July 2003 extended the timeframe to review WTO
Dispute Settlement Rules to 31 May 2004.
http://www.wto.org/enelish/tratop e/dispu e/dispu e.htm#negotiation.
See also World Trade Organisation, TN/DS/9, 6 June 2003, Special Session of the Dispute
Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee, §6.
26 The weights or "shadow prices" enable the political welfare of one WTO Member to be traded
off against the welfare of another. W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of
Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System", John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 143, (2nd series),
http://www.law.uchicaco.edu/Lawecon/workintmapers.html.
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Therefore, from a welfare point of view, non-compliance may be desirable. As
Schwartz and Sykes note "when the political burden of performance to a promisor
exceeds the political detriment of nonperformance to the promisee(s), evaluated at
the proper weight or shadow price, nonperformance is jointly desirable".27
From a welfare perspective, a party should comply with its obligations whenever
compliance yields greater benefits to the promisee than costs to the promisor, while
allowing the promisor to depart from its obligations whenever the costs of
compliance to the promisor exceed the benefits to the promisee.28
The question arises whether the WTO system should allow departure from the
agreement a t a specific exercise p rice and i f s o whether t his should b e authorised
with or without first securing the permission of the promisee(s). In other words,
would a property rule, that requires negotiating with all affected parties to the
agreement or a liability rule that does not require negotiation before a WTO
inconsistent measure can be maintained, be preferable?
Property rules, although preponderant in international law, tend to be
disadvantageous when the number of signatories of a given agreement is high, when
the agreement covers many issue areas that are not easily reconciled, and when the
amendment process is arduous. Renegotiating an agreement when it is no longer
welfare maximising or not consistently welfare maximising can be burdensome but
also costly. Transactions costs of bargaining with the promisee(s) including strategic
bargaining costs associated with the modification of commitments tend to be very
high.
27 W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute
Resolution in the WTO/GATT System", John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.
143, (2nd series), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workingpapers.html.
28 Ibidem. See R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed., (1992), pp95-6, 135-6. J. Dunoff
and J. Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law", 24 The Yale JIL 1 (1999), pp31-3.
See generally, R.A. Posner, Values and Consequences: An Introduction to Economic Analysis of
Law, (1998).
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The use of a liability rule does not entail bargaining transaction costs but it also has
disadvantages. Indeed, the measurement of damages is costly. This is one of the
reasons that the international legal system usually uses property rules rather than
liability rules.29 In addition, a liability rule also has the drawback that errors in
assessing damages may deter efficient breach if they are too high or permit
inefficient breach if they are too low.30
If a legal system has the resources to perform an accurate assessment of the price of
non-compliance then in the presence of high transaction costs a liability rule is
generally to be preferred to a property rule.31 Although, the WTO leaves it to the
parties to a dispute to offer and accept mutually satisfactory compensation, the WTO
also provides for a process for determining the level of suspension or withdrawal of
concessions.32 Therefore, it appears that the WTO has the capacity to ensure the
proper calibration of "damages" and hence support a liability rule system.
Of course, a liability rule is not suitable to every international law context. Indeed,
the use of a liability rule requires that the setting of a monetary price for non¬
compliance be appropriate.33 A liability rule is appropriate in the context of
international trade law as it protects economic interests that can easily be valued in
monetary terms. In the context of human rights law and environmental law, however,
it would be inappropriate to fix a pecuniary value for the violation of such
commitments.
29 J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law", 24 Yale JIL (1999),
p26.
30 See D. Friedmann, "The Efficient Breach Fallacy", 18 J. Legal Stud. (1989), pp6-7.
31 Of course, if deviation from obligations is consistently inefficient, then a property rule is
preferable. See W.F. Schwartz and A.O. Sykes, "The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and
Dispute Resolution in the WTO/GATT System", John M. Olin Law & Economics W orking
Paper No. 143, (2nd series), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/workingpapers.html.
32 Article 22 of the DSU.
33 J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman, "Economic Analysis of International Law", 24 Yale JIL (1999),
pp31-3.
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Another argument against the use of a liability rule, is that the only Members that
would benefit from the option of not complying with the recommendations and
rulings would be developed countries as they are possibly the only Members in the
position to afford to not comply.34 In addition, if the Member that is suffering harm
from an inconsistent measure is a developing country, it is unlikely that the right to
take countermeasures would put this country in a better position. On the contrary, if
its main volume of trade is with the offending Member, countermeasures would put
this country in a worse position.35 With respect to this problem, however, it is not the
liability Rile in itself that is inadequate but the remedy.
Compensation under the WTO is understood to be the lifting of trade barriers by the
losing party and the suspension of concessions as the increase of barriers by the
winning party. However, if an offending Member were obliged to pay damages for
harm caused rather than negotiated concessions being rebalanced, this problem
would be alleviated.
The next section will examine the appropriateness of the remedies available under
the DSU in more detail.
Evaluation of WTO Compensation and Countermeasures
The appropriateness of the WTO remedies of compensation and suspension or
withdrawal of concessions depends on the purpose of an enforcement mechanism.
If the enforcement mechanism is to protect the balance of negotiated c oncessions,
then the remedies of compensation and suspension of concessions are appropriate. If
the goal is to ensure compliance with the obligations contained in the WTO
Agreements, in other words, to protect a rule-based system, it would arguably be
more effective to provide for reparation which, although, as Boyle notes, is not an
34 However, s o far o nly o ne d eveloping c ountry has i nvoked T REMs u nder G ATT 1 947 i n t he
Thai Cigarettes case.
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inflexible concept,36 should eliminate the consequences of the wrongful act.37 In
addition, an obligation to cease the wrongful act should be imposed. If, however, the
aim is to allow for efficient breaches, the remedy should be one that compensates the
injured party for harm arising from non-compliance with WTO obligations. Whether
WTO compensation or the suspension or withdrawal of concessions after a
reasonable time has elapsed is suitable for achieving this task is questionable.
Compensation, if offered, must be given to all WTO Members in accordance with
the MFN standard.38 It is difficult to see how compensating all WTO Members,
regardless of whether they have suffered injury or not, could enable an efficient
breach.
The suspension or withdrawal of concessions entails the raising of trade barriers
against the Member upholding the inconsistent measure by the complaining party but
not the whole WTO membership. Therefore, unlike compensation, the suspension of
concessions does not "punish" non-compliance. In theory, the suspension or
withdrawal does not jeopardise opportunities for efficient breach.
However, the suspension of concessions is a right that only a complaining party has.
Therefore, third parties and other WTO Members that have been adversely affected
by an inconsistent measure, must bring complaints to the DSB in order to have
access to this remedy. Therefore, unless all injured parties bring complaints to the
DSB, the full price of non-compliance may not be accounted for.
In order to apply a liability rule that only allows for "efficient breaches", it would be
worth considering whether after a country's measure is found to be WTO
35 See J. Pauwelyn, "Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules - Toward a
More Collective Approach", 94 AJIL (2000), p338.
36 P. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, 2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), p 191.
37 Chorzow Factory (Idemnity) case, (1928) PCIJ, Ser. A, no. 17, p47. ILC Commentary Notes,
YblLC (1993), II, Part 2, p63. P. Bimie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment,
'2nd ed., Oxford, (2002), pl91.
38 There is no obligation to offer compensation. Article 22.1 of the DSU.
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inconsistent, that Members that have been adversely affected by the inconsistent
measure be able to suspend concessions without necessarily having to bring their
case to a dispute settlement panel. This would be more efficient from the WTO
perspective as it would only have to rule once that the measure is inconsistent. If
opposing Members do not agree on the level of suspension of concessions, an injured
party could be afforded the same right as a winning party to refer the matter to
arbitration. However, it could be argued that this procedure would unfairly
disadvantage the complaining party as it would have to bear the costs of bringing the
case to the WTO. This issue could be solved by requiring that all litigation costs be
paid by the losing party.39
However, as was mentioned in the previous section, the remedy of suspension of
concessions is unlikely to be useful to developing c ountries and has a detrimental
effect on international trade due to the increase of trade barriers.
39 Although, there are no plans to do this, negotiations on the clarification and improvement of the
DSU have led to a proposal to add a new article to the DSU on Litigations Costs that would
make dispute settlement more accessible to developing countries.
Draft Article 28 provides:
"Members shall bear their own costs in procedures brought under this Understanding. However,
a panel or the Appellate Body may decide to award, at the request of [the parties][one of the
parties] to a dispute, an amount for litigation costs, taking into account the specific
circumstances o f t he c ase, t he r espective c onditions o f t he p arties c oncerned a nd special a nd
differential treatment to developing country Members. Where a panel or the Appellate Body
decides to grant such costs, it shall be guided by principles to be determined in a decision by the
DSB." World Trade Organisation, TN/DS/9, 6 June 2003, Special Session of the Dispute
Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade Negotiations
Committee. See Proposed Decision by the General Council included in this document:
"Desiring to give effect to the provisions of Article 27 of the DSU in order to assist developing
country Members i n e nhancing t heir c apacity t o make e ffective u se o f t he d ispute settlement
procedures, and build capacity in the area of dispute settlement, thereby assisting them to
exercise the rights of their membership;
Decides as follows:
1. The Secretariat is instructed to maintain and administer, through its technical cooperation
services, a roster comprised of at least [x] qualified legal experts, whose services would be made
available to developing country Members for the provision of legal advice and assistance in
respect of dispute settlement pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 27 of the DSU;
2. The General Council requests the Budget Committee to explore the manner in which adequate
resources, including through voluntary extra-budgetary contributions, can be ensured for the
delivery of technical assistance under Article 27 of the DSU, including the provision of legal
assistance as foreseen in paragraph 2 of that provision, and to report to the General Council by [-
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The need to improve conditions for developing countries with respect to WTO
remedies has been recognised in the negotiations on the clarification and
improvement of the DSU that are taking place pursuant to the Doha Declaration.
Indeed, Members have proposed to add a new paragraph to Article 22 that provides:
"Where the complaining party is a developing country Member, the proposal
should take into account all relevant circumstances and considerations
relating to the application of the measure and its impact on the trade of that
developing country Member. In such cases, the suitable form ofcompensation
should also be an important consideration. Where the complaining party is a
least developed country Member, special consideration shall be given to the
specific constraints that may be faced by such countries in finding effective
means of action through the possible withdrawal of concessions or other
obligations. "40
A mandatory compensation payment would, as mentioned in the previous section, be
a more effective form of compensation for developing countries. In addition, a
mandatory compensation payment to the affected parties would have the advantage
of not being trade restrictive. Another argument in favour of a compensation
payment is that unlike the adjustment of concessions that does not compensate a
specific industry for lost income due to trade restrictions, a compensatory payment
would enable the adversely affected Member to redirect the compensatory payment
to those domestic industries that have suffered hann.
If a compensation payment were to replace existing remedies, the question arises
how compensation payments should be calculated. Currently, the WTO only
provides for remedies after a "reasonable period of time" has elapsed and only for
harm caused after this time.
Compensation should pay for the lost benefits to the promisee, in terms of political
welfare, arising from n on-compliance w ith WTO obligations. If one assumes, that
40 Paragraph 2bis (c). World Trade Organisation, TN/DS/9, 6 June 2003, Special Session of the
Dispute Settlement Body, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador Peter Balas, to the Trade
Negotiations Committee.
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political welfare is directly correlated to national welfare, then compensation should
be paid from the time the inconsistent measure causes harm to promisee(s).
Compensation that arises from the time an inconsistent measure affects other WTO
Members, in a detrimental manner, is more disadvantageous to those Members
wishing to uphold an inconsistent TREM or SPS measure or technical regulation
than the current system of compensation and countermeasures from a financial
aspect.
It could be argued that since compliance cannot be forced, that WTO Members
wishing to maintain an inconsistent measure could do so and would consequently
suffer from countermeasures. However, the costs associated with a loss of reputation,
the increased difficulty with negotiations and cooperation in other issue areas, and
the risk of being submitted to tit-for-tat strategies when a system requires compliance
are likely to be more burdensome than the costs arising from an efficient breach of
obligations under a liability rule system.
On the whole the advantage of a liability rule system is to provide an
environmental/public health safety net for those WTO Members that consider that
the maintenance of trade related environmental measures or sanitary or phytosanitary
measures or technical regulations is appropriate. In a conflictual situation, options
need to be available to WTO Members that can lead to a compromise and that enable
both p arties t o n ot 1 ose face. Nevertheless, a 1 iability r ule sy stem i s n ot a 1 inkage
mechanism as environmental/health protection has to be paid for, where the TREMs,
technical regulations or SPS measures do not comply with existing WTO
commitments. A liability system should not be considered as a substitute for a
linkage system.
Linkage between environmental and trade imperatives must take place through the
dispute settlement body and more importantly through negotiations between the
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